he is walking on a platform of a station provided for the convenience. of passengers while the train is stopping for refreshments;169 or where a passenger who has considerable baggage on the train, for which he has no check, alights from the train to assist in the transfer of such baggage, this not making him a servant of the company, because he has the right to identify his own property;170 or where, without objection from the company, he alights at some intermediate station, which station is a station for the reception and discharge of passengers, either from motives of business or curiosity,171 or for any reasonable and usual purpose, such as refreshment, exercise, the sending of a telegram, or the like;172 or where he has alighted from one conveyance, and is walking with the purpose of getting upon another.173 Therefore, the relation of carrier and passenger exists between a railroad company and a passenger on a train which is temporarily stopped by a burning tank of oil on the track, during which time passengers on the train are taken to a place some distance from the tank while waiting for a train to receive them on the other side of the tank.174 But if the person has left the conveyance with taken, but the court in the principal case says that it was, under the facts of these cases, unnecessary that this point should have been passed on. 160 Jeffersonville &c. R. Co. V. Riley, 39 Ind. 568. One who has left the train and gone upon the platform on the opposite side from the ticket office is a passenger within the meaning of the Massachusetts statute. The court held that, in the absence of any warning to the passenger that the side upon which he alighted was dangerous, it was a question for the jury as to whether reasonable care for the safety of the passenger had been used: McKimble v. Boston &c. R. Co., 141 Mass. 463; s. c. 2 N. E. Rep. 48; St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Coulson, 8 Kan. App. 5; s. c. 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 629; 54 Pac. Rep. 2 (so walking after having had his dinner, injured by defective platform). 170 Ormond v. Hayes, 60 Tex. 180. 171 Parsons v. New York &c. R. Co., 113 N. Y. 355; s. c. 3 L. R. A. 683; 22 N. Y. St. Rep. 697; 21 N. E. Rep. 145. 172 Alabama &c. R. Co. v. Coggins, 88 Fed. Rep. 455; s. c. 60 U. S. App. 140. 173 Hulbert v. New York &c. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 145. 174 Conroy v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 96 Wis. 243; s. c. 38 L. R. A. 419; 70 no intention of returning, and is not pursuing, as it were, a continuous line of travel, as in the case last stated, the relation of passenger and carrier ceases with the passenger's departure from the conveyance, -certainly when he has left the wharf or depot connecting therewith,175—and the going back to the conveyance after having left it, for some purpose of his own, with no intention to continue his journey, would not revive the relation of passenger and carrier which had terminated by his leaving it.176 And where a passenger on a street car voluntarily left the car before it reached the place where it regularly stopped to change cars, for a temporary purpose, and with the intention of re-entering the car, as he claimed, and was assaulted by the driver while on the street,-it was held that the company was not liable therefor, since the relation of carrier and passenger had ceased. The sound conclusion, and that which conforms with reason and the decisive weight of authority, is that a passenger on a railroad train remains a passenger on getting off at an intermediate station, so long as his object in doing so is not inconsistent with the character of passenger, and his motive in getting off is immaterial in an action for damages for injuries sustained in the act of alighting,178 or after alighting while still on the grounds of the carrier, or in remounting. As the passenger has this right to dismount at intermediate stations without suspending his relation of passenger and his rights as such, it necessarily follows that he is not guilty of negligence in leaving the train during a stop of several minutes, and in waiting for the signal to get on, before attempting to do so.179 § 2660. Doctrine that Temporary Absence Temporarily Suspends Relation of Carrier and Passenger. 180-Contrary to the doctrine of the cases above cited, there are decisions to the effect that, if a passenger leaves the train at an intermediate station, he for the time being surrenders his status and rights as a passenger and takes upon himself the responsibility for his own movements; although if he leaves without objection of the company, he has a right to enter and resume his journey.18: 175 Platt v. Forty-second Street &c. R. Co., 4 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 406. 176 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Krouse, 30 Ohio St. 222. 177 Central R. Co. v. Peacock, 69 Md. 257; s. c. 2 Cent. Rep. 867; 14 Atl. Rep. 709. 178 Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Overfield, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 440; s. c. 47 S. W. Rep. 684; 1 J. A. 57; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 102; 12 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. (N. S.) 207. 170 Texas &c. R. Co. v. Mayfield, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 415; s. c. 56 S. W. Rep. 942. 180 This section is cited in § 2946. 181 De Kay v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 41 Minn. 178; s. c. 4 L. R. A. 632; 43 N. W. Rep. 182; State v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 58 Me. 176; s. c. 4 Am. Rep. 258. Where a passenger left her train, and boarded another, at a meeting point, to converse with her sister, she was not a passenger on 182 $2661. Persons on Board Trains Delayed by Accidents.-If the relation of carrier and passenger has commenced, as between a railway company and a person taking passage upon one of its trains, the relation will not be temporarily suspended during the period of time when the train is delayed by an accident; but, during such period of delay, the person who has so taken passage will be entitled to all the rights of a passenger upon a moving train, including that of protection from the willful misconduct of the servants of the company.1 As a general rule, when a passenger who holds a ticket from one point to another selects his train and enters upon his journey, he has no right to leave the train at a way station, and afterwards enter another, and proceed to his destination without procuring a ticket or paying his fare from the way station. If, however, the company is not prosecuting the journey in a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, as the passenger has a right to demand that it shall do, then he may leave the train which he has selected, and continue his journey upon another under the original contract, and without paying an additional fare.183 § 2662. Status of Person Carried beyond Destination while being Brought Back.-Where a street car passenger notified the conductor where to let him off, but was carried by, through fault of the conductor, and was permitted to remain on the car until its return trip, he remained a passenger, although he paid but one fare.184 § 2663. When the Relation of Carrier and Passenger Terminates.185 Speaking with reference to railway carriers of passengers, the general view is that the relation of carrier and passenger does not terminate until the passenger has been allowed a reasonable time within which (1) to alight from the car or the train, and (2) to leave the premises of the carrier by the usual and provided way.186 The usual and provided way may not always be the the latter train, though her conductor, whose authority was limited to his own train, consented to her boarding the other train: Bullock v. Houston &c. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 55 S. W. Rep. 184 (no off. rep.). 182 Dwinelle v. New York &c. R. Co., 120 N. Y. 117; s. c. 30 N. Y. St. Rep. 578; 24 N. E. Rep. 319; 2 L. R. A. 224. 183 Wilsey v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 83 Ky. 511. In this case the train was delayed by a wreck, and the passenger was told that it would be delayed several hours. He was sick, and went to a hotel and went to bed. Next day he boarded another train of the company and sought to ride on a conductor's check. He was ejected. It was held that, under the circumstances, he was entitled to ride, and could recover for the ejection: Wilsey v. Louisville &c. R. Co., supra. 184 Rosenberg v. Third Ave. R. Co., 61 N. Y. Supp. 1052. 185 This section is cited in § 2633. 180 South Covington &c. St. R. Co. v. Beatty, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1845; s. c. 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 75; 50 S. W. Rep. 239 (no off. rep.); Atlanta &c. shortest practical route to the nearest highway. The question evidently is whether the passenger, in view of his acquaintance with the place, the state of the light which enables him to see his way, and other circumstances, proceeds in the exercise of reasonable care in making his egress from the premises of the carrier,-which circumstances generally present questions of fact for the jury.1 187 § 2664. Further as to when the Relation Terminates.-For some purposes, as where the passenger is injured while getting off, the relation of a railway carrier and passenger terminates when the train stops at the passenger's destination and remains a sufficient length of time to enable him to get off;1 188 and from this the conclusion has been deduced that, where the passenger was asleep when he reached the station where he was to get off, and was injured while attempting to get off after the train had started, he could not recover damages from the company, although the porter or brakeman told him that he thought it was safe to get off.189 On the other hand, it has been held proper to direct a jury that the duty of a railroad company as a carrier of passengers does not cease until they are safely landed on the ground at the point of their destination;190 but it would seem that this direction would not be good in its application to the facts stated in the preceding case. The relation was deemed not to have been terminated, so as to deprive the person of his right of protection as a passenger, from the mere fact that he left the train on the wrong side, where the company failed to notify him that the act was dangerous. It has been held that where passengers remain on board 191 R. Co. v. Bates, 103 Ga. 333; s. c. 30 S. E. Rep. 41; Brunswick &c. R. Co. v. Moore, 101 Ga. 684; s. c. 28 S. E. Rep. 1000; Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Martin, 3 Ohio Dec. 93; s. c. 2 Ohio N. P. 353; McKimble v. Boston &c. R. Co., 139 Mass. 542. A passenger upon alighting from a street car does not cease to be a passenger, but is entitled to protection from the negligent management of cars on a parallel track: South Covington &c. R. Co. v. Beatty, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1845; s. c. 50 S. W. Rep. 239; Atlanta &c. R. Co. v. Bates, 103 Ga. 333. 187 Keefe v. Boston &c. R. Co., 142 Mass. 251; s. c. 2 N. E. Rep. 660. The following cases hold that the relation of passenger and carrier is not terminated until the passenger has had an opportunity to leave the train in safety: Allerton v. Boston &c. R. Co., 146 Mass. 241; Cincinnati &c. R. Co. v. Carper, 112 Ind. 26; St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Finley, 79 Tex. 85; Texas &c. R. Co. v. Miller, 79 Tex. 78; s. c. 11 L. R. A. 395; Central R. Co. v. Whitehead, 74 Ga. 441. That he continues a passenger while on company's premises: Gaynor v. Cld Colony &c. R. Co., 100 Mass. 208; Burnham v. Wabash &c. R. Co., 91 Mich. 523; Ormond v. Hayes, 60 Tex. 180 (looking after the removal of his baggage). 188 Imhoff v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 20 Wis. 344; Jeffersonville &c. R. Co. v. Parmalee, 50 Ind. 42. 189 Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Perry, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 78; s. c. 27 S. W. Rep. 496. 190 Central R. Co. v. Whitehead, 74 Ga. 441. 191 McKimble v. Boston &c. R. Co., 139 Mass. 542. a steamboat over night, after it has arrived in port, with the permission of the captain, their voyage is not ended until they have had a reasonable time, on the following morning, to leave the boat and to remove their baggage from it.192 Another court has held that a passenger alighting from a train and taking a position upon a sidewalk of a highway ceases to be a passenger, and, when injured while crossing the railroad track, without looking for approaching trains, can not recover. Another court has held that a passenger who, having got upon the wrong train, voluntarily gets off at a point not a station, upon the stopping of such train by the conductor, and walks along the track towards a train pointed out by the conductor as one which will carry him towards his destination, ceases to be a passenger after leaving the train, and can not recover for injuries sustained by falling into a cattle guard upon the track.194 193 § 2665. When the Relation Terminates in Case of Passengers on Street Cars. With respect to passengers upon street cars, that is to say, cars drawn or propelled along city or village streets for the conveyance of passengers merely, whether the motive power be horses, electricity, or underground cables, the relation of carrier and passenger terminates as soon as the passenger steps from the car upon the surface of the street, and does not continue during his passage to the sidewalk or thereafter.195 Somewhat at variance with the above it has been held that a passenger, on leaving a train at a streetrailway station, remains a passenger while he is passing to the sidewalk, in so far that he is entitled to protection against the negligent movement of the company's trains on an adjacent track.196 But it is not necessary to ascribe to him the status of a passenger after quitting the carrier's vehicle, in order to entitle him to reasonable care to the end of protecting him against injuries from the movements of the carrier's cars or trains while he is leaving the carrier's premises.197 It is plain that the status as a passenger, of one riding. in a street car, does not necessarily terminate upon the arrival of the car at the destination of the passenger, if he does not alight at that point. He has the right to go on past his destination and as 192 Prickett v. New Orleans Anchor 31 N. E. Rep. 391; Smith v. City &c. Line, 13 Mo. App. 436. 193 Allerton v. Boston &c. R. Co., 146 Mass. 241; s. c. 5 N. Eng. Rep. 825; 15 N. E. Rep. 621.. 194 Finnegan v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 48 Minn. 378; s. c. 15 L. R. A. 399; 51 N. W. Rep. 122. 135 Creamer v. West End St. R. Co., 156 Mass. 320; s. c. 16 L. R. A. 490; VOL. 3 THOMP. NEG.-9 R. Co., 29 Or. 539; s. c. 5 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. (N. S.) 163; 46 Pac. Rep. 136; rehearing denied in 29 Or. 546; s. c. 46 Pac. Rep. 780; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Walsh, 78 Ill. App. 595. 196 Burbridge v. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 36 Mo. App. 669. 197 Post, § 2886. 129 |