has used that care and skill in constructing and maintaining them which men of ordinary prudence and skill usually employ; and that it is error, in an action predicated upon such an injury, to charge the jury that the company is "bound to guard against all storms which can reasonably be anticipated." The "reasonable care" which the law imposes upon the carrier in this respect may not after all be essentially different from the duty of exercising the exact degree of care which the law puts upon him in protecting the passenger after entering his vehicle; because in either case the law demands no more than that the carrier shall do what is reasonable in view of the fact that human life is committed to his custody and protection. It is therefore well reasoned that the diligence and care of a railroad company in protecting its passengers in coming to and going from its stations, and of the passengers themselves, must be proportioned to the risk incurred by them on account of the number of trains and the like. But, subject to the foregoing limitations, this duty is a primary duty, and it can not be transferred to an independent contractor employed to construct or repair the premises of the carrier, so as to exonerate the latter from responsibility for the condition of his premises. 12 Nor does the state of the title of the premises make any difference with the duty of the carrier; whether they are owned by him in fee-simple, or held by him under a lease, or held under a lease made out to his agent,-it is all the same, since his duty to keep them in a reasonably safe condition arises in consequence of the fact that he elects to use them in the discharge of his public duties as carrier.13 Nor does it make any difference that the defect or obstruction by which the passenger is injured, has been erected on the premises of the carrier by third persons; since this fact does not alter the duty of the carrier to keep his premises clear of obstructions and in a reasonably safe condition.14

11

10 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Brigham, 29 Ohio St. 374; s. c. Thomp. Carr. Pass. 101. The author thinks that the instruction here condemned is absolutely unexceptionable.

11 Wallace v. Wilmington &c. R. Co., 8 Houston (Del.) 529; s. c. 18 Atl. Rep. 818. That this is the rule as to reasonable care,-see Vol. I, §§ 25, 26; Vol. II, § 1610.

12 Gilmore v. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 154 Pa. St. 375; s. c. 25 Atl. Rep. 774; Delaware &c. R. Co. v. Trautwein, 52 N. J. L. 169; s. c. 7 L. R. A. 435; 7 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 316; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 189; 19 Atl. Rep. 178; Watson v. Oxanna Land Co., 92 Ala. 320; s. c. 8 South. Rep. 770.

VOL. 3 THOMP. NEG.-10

13 York v. Canada &c. Steamship Co., 22 Can. S. C. 167.

14 Chance v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 10 Mo. App. 351. Where a statute provides that railroad corporations shall erect depots and waiting-rooms at junction points, and, in case of failure so to do, shail forfeit the sum of $25 for each day of such failure, the defendant, in an action under such statute, is liable for the sum of $25 for each day of such failure up to the time of the commencement of the action: State v. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 722. That to leave a pile of dirt and stones along the side of a railway track, in such close prox

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the safety of his station houses, premises, passage-ways, etc.; nor does it mean that, in this regard, he is held to the exact degree of care to promote the safety of his passengers which the law puts upon him after they have boarded his vehicle for the purpose of transit and committed their personal safety entirely to him; but it means that his duty is to take reasonable care to keep his premises in such a state that those whom he invites to go there shall not be unnecessarily exposed to danger." It has been distinctly ruled that a less degree of care is required of a railroad company in regard to the condition of the approaches to its cars, such as platforms, halls, stairways, etc.-than to that of the roadbed, machinery, passenger trains, etc., the rule being that in regard to the former, the company is bound simply to exercise ordinary care in view of the dangers to be apprehended; its duty in this respect being to provide a reasonably safe place for the accommodation of those awaiting the arrival and departure of trains, and to take such precautions for their safety as would naturally occur to ordinarily prudent and cautious men, and to guard against such accidents as are likely to occur or are reasonably to be apprehended by prudent men. And accordingly, an instruction that such a company is bound to take every possible precaution against injuries to passengers while crossing the station grounds, and is liable for such injuries, if human foresight could have prevented them, was held erroneous."

8

§ 2680. Applications of this Doctrine.-Accordingly, it has been held that a railroad company is not liable for injuries occasioned by its buildings or structures being blown down by a storm, where it

4 Welfare v. London &c. R. Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 693; s. c. 38 L. J. (Q. B.) 241; 17 Week. Rep. 1065; 20 L. T. (N. S.) 743.

As to this degree of care, see post. § 2722, et seq.

Blackburn, J., in Welfare v. London &c. R. Co., supra; Johnson v. Manhattan R. Co., 52 Hun (N. Y.) 111; s. c. 23 N. Y. St. Rep. 388; McDonald v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 26 Iowa 124; s. c. 29 Iowa 170; Thomp. Carr. Pass. 93; Liscomb v. New Jersey &c. R. Co., 6 Lans. (N. Y.) 75; Hulbert v. New York &c. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 145; Knight v. Portland &c. R. Co., 56 Me. 234; Martín v. Great Northern R. Co., 16 C. B. 129; Moreland v. Boston &c. R. Corp., 141 Mass. 31; s. c. 1 N. E. Rep. 909; O'Rielly v. Long Island R. Co., 15 App. Div. (N. Y.) 79; s. c. 44 N. Y. Supp. 264; Robertson v. Wabash &c.

R. Co., 152 Mo. 382; s. c. 53 S. W. Rep. 1082; Trinity &c. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 690; s. c. 46 S. W. Rep. 389; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hammill, 56 N. J. L. 370; s. c. 24 L. R. A. 531; 29 Atl. Rep. 151 (footway along railroad bridge leading to passenger station); Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Scates, 90 III. 586; Clark v. Howard, 88 Fed. Rep. 199; s. c. 60 U. S. App. 32; Ainley v. Manhattan R. Co., 47 Hun (N. Y.) 206; s. c. 13 N. Y. St. Rep. 557.

Kelly v. Manhattan R. Co., 112 N. Y. 443; s. c. 3 L. R. A. 74; 21 N. Y. St. Rep. 507; 20 N. E. Rep. 383.

Kirby v. Delaware &c. Canal Co., 20 App. Div. (N. Y.) 473; s. c. 46 N. Y. Supp. 777; Trinity &c. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 690; s. c. 46 S. W. Rep. 389.

Moreland v. Boston &c. R. Co., 141 Mass. 31.

has used that care and skill in constructing and maintaining them which men of ordinary prudence and skill usually employ; and that it is error, in an action predicated upon such an injury, to charge the jury that the company is "bound to guard against all storms which can reasonably be anticipated."10 The "reasonable care" which the law imposes upon the carrier in this respect may not after all be essentially different from the duty of exercising the exact degree of care which the law puts upon him in protecting the passenger after entering his vehicle; because in either case the law demands no more than that the carrier shall do what is reasonable in view of the fact that human life is committed to his custody and protection. It is therefore well reasoned that the diligence and care of a railroad company in protecting its passengers in coming to and going from its stations, and of the passengers themselves, must be proportioned to the risk incurred by them on account of the number of trains and the like. But, subject to the foregoing limitations, this duty is a primary duty, and it can not be transferred to an independent contractor employed to construct or repair the premises of the carrier, so as to exonerate the latter from responsibility for the condition of his premises.12 Nor does the state of the title of the premises. make any difference with the duty of the carrier; whether they are owned by him in fee-simple, or held by him under a lease, or held under a lease made out to his agent,-it is all the same, since his duty to keep them in a reasonably safe condition arises in consequence of the fact that he elects to use them in the discharge of his public duties as carrier.13 Nor does it make any difference that the defect or obstruction by which the passenger is injured, has been erected on the premises of the carrier by third persons; since this fact does not alter the duty of the carrier to keep his premises clear of obstructions and in a reasonably safe condition.14

"Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Brigham, 29 Ohio St. 374; s. c. Thomp. Carr. Pass. 101. The author thinks that the instruction here condemned is absolutely unexceptionable.

Wallace v. Wilmington &c. R. Co., 8 Houston (Del.) 529; s. c. 18 Atl. Rep. 818. That this is the rule as to reasonable care,-see Vol. I, $ 25. 26; Vol. II, § 1610.

Gilmore v. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 154 Pa. St. 375; s. c. 25 Atl. Rep. 774; Delaware &c. R. Co. v. Trautwein, 52 N. J. L. 169; s. c. 7 L. R. A. 435; 7 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 316; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 189; 19 Atl. Rep. 178; Watson v. Oxanna Land Co., 92 Ala. 320; s. c. 8 South. Rep. 770.

VOL. 3 THOMP. NEG.-10

13 York v. Canada &c. Steamship Co., 22 Can. S. C. 167.

14 Chance v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 10 Mo. App. 351. Where a statute provides that railroad corporations shall erect depots and waiting-rooms at junction points, and, in case of failure so to do, shall forfeit the sum of $25 for each day of such failure, the defendant, in an action under such statute, is liable for the sum of $25 for each day of such failure up to the time of the commencement of the action: State v. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 722. That to leave a pile of dirt and stones along the side of a railway track, in such close prox

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§ 2681. Doctrine that Carrier is Bound to use Extraordinary Care as to the Safety of Stations, Grounds, etc.-Contrary to this, other courts have supposed that the high and exact degree of care which the law puts upon the carrier, so long as the passenger has committed the safety of his person to him, remains until the carrier has conducted the passenger from his vehicle to a safe place either upon or outside his grounds. For example, it has been held that while a railway company is not bound to have its depot platform absolutely safe, yet it is bound, under the circumstances, to use more than ordinary care and precaution, in order to make it reasonably safe.15 So, it has been reasoned that where such a company provides no platform at a place where it discharges passengers from its train, but substitutes therefor a box or stool upon which the passengers are to step in alighting, it is bound to use the safest appliance of the kind that has been known and tested.16 So, it has been said that a railroad company which negligently and wrongfully carries a female passenger beyond its usual stopping place and into its switch yard, where there are no accommodations for passengers to get on or off its cars, owes the passenger the duty to use every precaution for her protection.17 Another court has reasoned that the extraordinary care required of a railroad company in respect to passengers on trains is required in respect to a bridge or elevated platform on the railroad property, which is used as an approach to the station, and over which persons are invited to enter the premises for the purpose of taking passage on trains, where it joins an open trestle on the same level, into which persons are liable to walk while crossing the bridge.18

§ 2682. To What Portions of the Carrier's Grounds this Duty Extends. Generally speaking, this duty extends to all portions of the

imity to the track that it injures a person standing on the step of a passing train, does not show a willful desire to injure or a reckless disregard or indifference to the safety of its pasengers, where the foreman of the company thought it had been sufficiently leveled down, and where other cars had passed it in safety,was held in Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Mehlsack, 44 Ill. App. 124. A quarryman who, with the consent of a railroad company, has constructed a gravity road partly on his own property and partly on that of a railroad company, becomes a licensee of the company so as to charge the company with his negligence and that of his employés, as toward

a passenger, where the conditions under which the gravity road has been constructed and is being operated, are such as to warn the company of danger to its passing trains: Lynch v. New York &c. R. Co., 8 App. Div. (N. Y.) 458; s. c. 40 N. Y. Supp. 775.

15 Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Butcher, 83 Tex. 309; s. c. 11 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 173; 18 S. W. Rep. 583.

16 Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Wortham, 73 Tex. 25; s. c. 10 S. W. Rep. 741. 17 Franklin v. Southern Cal. &c. R. Co., 85 Cal. 63.

18 Johns v. Charlotte &c. R. Co., 39 S. C. 162; s. c. 20 L. R. A. 520; 17 S. E. Rep. 698.

ground of the carrier which passengers will naturally and ordinarily use, in the absence of being warned not to do so, in approaching the carrier's station, in waiting for the arrival of its vehicle of transportation, and in getting on or off the same. It extends to keeping a safe passage-way between its trains and its telegraph office,19 and between its trains and eating-houses to which its passengers are likely to resort;20 to and from its mail cars, where the public have the right to go to post their letters;21 to the stairways leading from the street up to elevated railway stations ;22 to the approaches to the station and platforms of a railway company.23 It extends to the duty of furnishing a reasonably safe place for passengers to alight, but not an absolutely safe place.24 On the other hand, a railroad company is not bound to fence its premises about a station to prevent passengers from taking a "short cut" across them at night for the purpose of reaching the train sooner than by the customary way;25 but if the company hold out an inducement or invitation to its patrons to do so, they will be liable for injuries received on account of the defective condition of the premises so traversed.20

§ 2683. Extends to Providing Safe Waiting-Rooms for Passengers. It has been held that the presumption of negligence arising from an injury to a passenger, proceeding from some source under the control of the carrier,27 does not apply in the case of an injury received by a person in consequence of stepping upon a small stick or bung of a barrel, accidentally dropped upon the floor of a railway station house, which is not shown to have been allowed to remain there more than a few minutes; since the facts clearly establish the absence of negligence.28 Somewhat in line with this, there is a holding to the effect that a railway carrier of passengers was not liable to a passenger who sustained an injury from slipping upon some pieces

12 Post, § 2710.

20 Post, 2708.

21 Post, § 2707.

22 Ainley v. Manhattan R. Co., 47 Hun (N. Y.) 206; s. c. 13 N. Y. St. Rep. 557.

23 Union &c. R. Co. v. Evans, 52 Neb. 50; s. c. 71 N. W. Rep. 1062 [citing Buenemann v. St. Paul &c. R. Co., 32 Minn. 390; Skottowe v. Oregon &c. R. Co., 22 Or. 430; s. c. 16 L. R. A. 593; Collins v. Toledo &c. R. Co., 80 Mich. 390]; Christie v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 61 Minn. 161; s. c. 63 N. W. Rep. 482.

"Texas &c. R. Co. v. Woods, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 612; s. c. 40 S. W. Rep. 846.

25 Burgess v. Great Western R. Co., 6 C. B. (N. S.) 923.

26 Longmore v. Great Western R. Co., 19 C. B. (N. S.) 183; S. C. Thomp. Carr. Pass. 81.

27 As to this presumption see post, § 2754, et seq.

28 Bernhart v. Western Pennsylvania R. Co., 159 Pa. St. 360; s. c. 24 Pitts. L. J. (N. S.) 319; 28 Atl. Rep. 140. Compare Foley v. Manhattan &c. R. Co., 34 N. Y. Supp. 1050; s. c. 69 N. Y. St. Rep. 21; Barth v. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 142 Mo. 535; s. c. 10 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. (N. S.) 281; 44 S. W. Rep. 778.