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§ 2699. This Duty Extends to Providing Safe Passage-Ways.— This duty extends to the exercise of reasonable care on the part of the carrier to the end of providing safe passage-ways from and to its stations and grounds and from and to its trains or other vehicles of transportation.122 The reasonable care which the law demands from a railway carrier of passengers, with respect to its sidewalks, is said to be the same as that which the law imposes upon a municipal corporation with respect to its sidewalks.123

road company was held liable for injuries to a passenger incurred without his fault, while alighting at the invitation of its employés at a place not reasonably safe for the purpose: Talbot v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 72 Mo. App. 291. State of facts, in an action against a railroad company to recover damages for an injury received by the plaintiff in stepping into an uncovered box, set in the ground, on alighting from its train at a station on a dark night,under which the admission of evidence to show the place where the train usually stopped was not error, there being testimony that on the occasion of the injury it stopped at the usual place: Southern Pac. Co. v. Hall, 100 Fed. Rep. 760.

122 Longmore v. Great Western R. Co., 19 C. B. (N. S.) 183; s. c. Thomp. Carr. Pass. 81; Knight v. Portland &c. R. Co., 56 Me. 234; Martin v. Great Northern R. Co., 16 C. B. 179, 186; Redner v. Lehigh &c. R. Co., 73 Hun (N. Y.) 562; s. c. 56 N. Y. St. Rep. 230; 26 N. Y. Supp. 358; s. c. aff'd 148 N. Y. 733; Skottowe v. Oregon &c. R. Co., 22 Or. 430; s. c. 30 Pac. Rep. 222; 16 L. R. A. 593; 12 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 112; East Tennessee &c. R. Co. v. Watson, 94 Ala. 634; s. c. 10 South. Rep. 228; Texas &c. R. Co. v. Brown, 78 Tex. 397; s. c. 14 S. W. Rep. 1034; Watson v. Oxanna Land Co., 92 Ala. 320; s. c. 8 South. Rep. 770; Gilmore v. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 154 Pa. St. 375; s. c. 25 Atl. Rep. 774; Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Hirsch, 69 Miss. 126; s. c. 13 South. Rep. 244; Green v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 36 Fed. Rep. 66;. Delaware &c. R. Co. v. Trautwein, 52 N. J. L. 169; s. c. 7 L. R. A. 435; 7 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 316; 41 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. 189; 19 Atl. Rep. 178; Collins v. Toledo &c. R. Co., 80 Mich. 390; s. c. 45 N. W. Rep. 178; Jamison v. San Jose &c. R. Co.,

55 Cal. 593, 598; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Glenk, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 599; s. c. 30 S. W. Rep. 278; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hammill, 56 N. J. L. 370; s. c. 24 L. R. A. 531; 29 Atl. Rep. 151 (footway along a railroad bridge leading to a passenger station); Izlar v. Manchester &c. R. Co., 57 S. C. 332; s. c. 35 S. E. Rep. 583; O'Rielly v. Long Island R. Co., 15 App. Div. (N. Y.) 79; s. c. 44 N. Y. Supp. 264; Flanagan v. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 181 Pa. St. 237; s. c. 40 W. N. C. (Pa.) 273; 37 Atl. Rep. 341; Cross v. Lake Shore &c. R. Co., 69 Mich. 363; s. c. 14 West. Rep. 181; 37 N. W. Rep. 361; Texas &c. R. Co. v. Orr, 46 Ark. 182; Hoffman v. New York &c. R. Co., 75 N. Y. 605; Reid v. New York &c. R. Co., 44 N. Y. St. Rep. 688; s. c. 17 N. Y. Supp. 801.

123 O'Rielly v. Long Island R. Co., 15 App. Div. (N. Y.) 79; s. c. 44 N. Y. Supp. 264. This salutary principle was applied in a case where a female passenger fell and received injuries while attempting to cross an unguarded and unlighted footway across a chasm from one of the defendant's passenger trains to another. It was held that, not only had the defendant failed to exercise that high degree of care which the law had put upon it, but that it had not even taken ordinary care, prudence and foresight in the premises. "The walk was a narrow one; there was no protection on either side of it; a large piece of timber was allowed to remain across it; and above and beyond all this, there were no sufficient lights to guide passengers in their transit from one car to another. It was its duty to have the walk sufficiently lighted, and in its failure in this regard it was unquestionably guilty of negligence:" Jamison v. San Jose &c. R. Co., 55 Cal. 593, 598.

§ 2700. Illustrations of this Duty.12-Stating the cases briefly, this principle was also applied where a female passenger was injured by the falling of a plank which reached from the ground to the platform of the station, while she was walking upon it, no steps having been provided, and the plank being the usual means by which persons reached the platform from the ground;125 where a railway company left an unguarded hole in a passage-way at its station, not likely to be seen by persons going to or returning from its cars;126 where a passenger was injured by falling through an opening at the head of a flight of stairs used as a means of access to the station, although the opening had been left by an independent contractor in repairing the stairway;127 where a passenger was injured in consequence of the defective condition of a bridge on the grounds of a railway company, forming part of its recognized way to and from its trains, notwithstanding it had an agreement with a third person whereby the latter was bound to keep the bridge in repair;128 where a passenger fell into an opening in a bridge leading from the railway station to a hotel which constituted an eating-house for passengers, although there were two such bridges, and although the railway company had never exercised any control over the one in question, and had not used it for three years;129 where a passenger was killed through the faulty construction of a bridge, which the railway company had erected for the more convenient transit of passengers between two platforms of its station;130 where a passenger was injured through the dangerous condition of an elevated walk to the carrier's boat. landing, although the walk was upon a public street which had never been opened as such, or used except by the carrier and its customers;131 where the passage-way to the defendant's train was but three or four feet wide, and the passenger was injured by being thrown therefrom in consequence of the unintentional turning round of another passenger, although there were several other roads to the train;132 where a female passenger stepped into a cattle-guard in the highway leading to the defendant's station, which cattle-guard was

124 This section is cited in § 2767. 125 Collins v. Toledo &c. R. Co., 80 Mich. 390; s. c. 45 N. W. Rep. 178.

126 Green v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 36 Fed. Rep. 66.

127 Gilmore v. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 154 Pa. St. 375; s. c. 25 Atl. Rep. 774.

128 Watson v. Oxanna Land Co., 92 Ala. 320; s. c. 8 South Rep. 770.

12 East Tennessee &c. R. Co. v. Watson, 94 Ala. 634; s. c. 10 South. Rep. 228.

130 Longmore v. Great Western R. Co., 19 C. B. (N. S.) 183; s. C. Thomp. Carr. Pass. 81.

131 Skottowe v. Oregon &c. R. Co., 22 Or. 430; s. c. 16 L. R. A. 593; 12 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 112; 30 Pac. Rep. 222.

132 Redner v. Lehigh &c. R. Co., 73 Hun (N. Y.) 562; s. c. 56 N. Y. St. Rep. 230; 26 N. Y. Supp. 358; s. c. aff'd 148 N. Y. 733.

filled with snow even with the track, and was killed by a gravel train before she could extricate herself;133 where a passenger fell into an open ditch and trestle in the nighttime in the necessary act of crossing a track of the defendant railway company.134

§ 2701. Extends to Care in Moving Trains so as not to Injure Passengers. It is almost needless to add that this duty of providing safe approaches to its stations extends to the obligation of taking care in moving its trains so as not to injure passengers who are obliged to cross its track or tracks. Here, decisions are found which exact of the carrier that high degree of care and caution which the law puts upon him after the passenger has entered his vehicle for the purposes of transit. Thus, it has been held that a railroad company which invites passengers to approach its depot by crossing its track at a place where there is no regular crossing, is bound to exercise the utmost care and caution in the movement of its trains and the handling of its cars, to prevent injury to persons going to or from its station.135 On the other hand, passengers who are obliged,

133 Hoffman v. New York &c. R. jury to a passenger through a deCo., 75 N. Y. 605. fect in the approach to its station, where the possession of the street railway company is not such an exclusive possession as to prevent the railway carrier from repairing the defect: Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Glenk, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 599; s. c. 30 S. W. Rep. 278.

134 Texas &c. R. Co. v. Orr, 46 Ark. 182. Evidence which was held sufficient to take to the jury the question whether the railway carrier was negligent in failing to provide a safe and convenient way of egress from its station, and whether a passenger was guilty of negligence in walking along the tracks according to the custom of the passengers upon leaving the station: Reid v. New York &c. R. Co., 44 N. Y. St. Rep. 688; s. c. 17 N. Y. Supp. 801. It has been held that whether or not a railroad company is guilty of negligence in permitting a person to stand or kneel in a narrow passage-way leading to the station, in such a way that his limbs extend across the passage-way, rendering it liable for injury to an intending passenger who trips and falls over him, is at least a question for the jury: Lycett v. Manhattan R. Co., 12 App. Div. (N. Y.) 326; s. c. 42 N. Y. Supp. 431. The fact that a street railway company has trespassed upon the premises of a railway carrier of passengers, compelling it to resort to a proceeding to procure an injunction to compel the street railway company to remove its track, does not furnish any defense on the part of the railway carrier to an action for an in

135 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Hirsch, 69 Miss. 126; s. c. 13 South. Rep. 244; Baltimore &c. R. Co. v. State, 60 Md. 449 (highest possible degree of care); Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Chancellor, 60 Ill. App. 525 (highest degree of diligence); Chesapeake &c. R. Co. v. King, 99 Fed. Rep. 251; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Lowell, 151 U. S. 209; s. c. 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281; 38 L. ed. 131; Warner v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 168 U. S. 339; s. c. 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 68; 42 L. ed. 491; Graven v. MacLeod, 35 C. C. A. 47; s. c. 92 Fed. Rep. 846; Alabama &c. R. Co. v. Coggins, 88 Fed. Rep. 455; s. c. 32 C. C. A. 1; Browell v. New York &c. R. Co., 84 N. Y. 241; Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. Anderson, 72 Md. 519; s. c. 20 Atl. Rep. 2; 8 L. R. A. 673; St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Johnson, 59 Ark. 122; s. c. 26 S. W. Rep. 593; Pennsylvania Co. v. McCaffrey, 173 Ill. 169; s. c. 50 N. E. Rep. 713 (passenger alighted on side opposite depot, struck by train on parallel track); Burnham v. Wabash &c. Co.,

136

in boarding a train or in leaving it, to cross railroad tracks intervening between the train and the station, have the right to assume that the company will so regulate the movement of its trains on such tracks as to enable them to cross the tracks in safety.' The practice of "shunting" or "kicking" cars along tracks where persons are liable to be, without some one on the car to give warning or to arrest its motion, has been several times adverted to; has been condemned by judicial decisions as negligent, wanton and wicked; and has been prohibited by the rules of careful railway companies, and denounced by the criminal law. 137 It is the most obvious suggestion of reason to hold that a railway company is bound to use all reasonable precautions, to the end of giving notice of the approach of a car which has been "kicked" across a natural approach provided by the railway company to or from its station, where no means have been provided for stopping the car in case of danger. 138

§ 2702. Extends to Providing Safe Means of Ingress to Carrier's Vehicle.139-This duty obviously extends to providing safe means of ingress to the carrier's vehicle; since it is not the law that the duty of the carrier to his passenger does not attach until the passenger is actually on board his vehicle.140 The carrier is clearly under an obligation to keep such means of access lighted in the nighttime, and, where necessary, to have competent servants on the ground to point out the way.14: It has been held that the fact that one of the planks

91 Mich. 523; s. c. 52 N. W. Rep. 14 (allowing passenger to alight at dangerous place); Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Houston, 95 U. S. 697; s. c. 24 L. ed. 542; Schofield v. Chicago &c. Co., 114 U. S. 615; s. c. 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1125; 29 L. ed. 224; Delaware &c. R. Co. v. Converse, 139 U. S. 469; s. c. 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 569; 35 L. ed. 213; Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408; s. c. 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 679; 36 L. ed. 485.

136 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Ryan, 165. Ill. 88; s. c. 46 N. E. Rep. 208; aff'g s. c. 62 Ill. App. 264. As to the "right to assume," etc., see Vol. I, §§ 190, 191, 192, 751, 1307, 1327; Vol. II, §§ 1601, 1695, 1782, 1889, 1891.

137 Vol. II, §§ 1695, 1696, 1697. 138 Texas &c. R. Co. v. Nolan, 11 C. C. A. 202; s. c. 62 Fed. Rep. 552.

10 This section is cited in § 2885. 140 Ante, § 2638, et seq.; Rogers v. Kennebec Steamboat Co., 86 Me. 261; s. c. 25 L. R. A. 491; 29 Atl. Rep. 1069; 10 Am. Rail. & Corp. Rep. 332.

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141 This may be illustrated by a case where the plaintiff's ticket entitled her to passage over the defendants' road to Portland, and by steamboat from Portland to Belfast. The defendants' depot was distant from the steamboat landing about forty rods. The defendants owned the wharf, and had built their track upon it down to the steamboat landing. Trains were formerly upon it for the accommodation of passengers, but had been discontinued; baggage cars were, however, still run as before. Passengers were directed to use the wharf as a passage-way to the steamboat, and they did so use it. The plaintiff in this case, though directed by none of the officers of the railroad or steamboat, proceeded, in company with other passengers, from the depot to the place of embarkation, until within a few feet of the edge of the wharf, when she fell into a hole and sustained injury, for which the de

of a bridge over a ditch, furnishing an approach to a railway station or shelter, about eight inches shorter than the other plank, is not of itself evidence of negligence to charge the railway company, especially where the defect, if it be such, is plainly observable by the passenger, 142

§ 2703. Extends to Providing Passenger with Safe Means of Alighting from Carrier's Vehicle.-Obviously, the duty of a carrier toward his passenger extends to providing the passenger with reasonably safe means for alighting from the vehicle of the carrier, and a reasonable opportunity to alight.143 If a railway carrier has provided platforms at all its stations, it must use due care in stopping its coaches so as to afford passengers an opportunity to alight thereon, especially where its servants have announced that the next stop will be at a particular station.144 If it has provided a suitable and safe platform on one side of its tracks, by which it is intended that passengers on certain trains shall make their exit, while the platform on the other side is perilous and not intended for such use,—it becomes its duty to warn a passenger, especially one who is not familiar with the place, against alighting on the other side and going upon the dangerous platform.145 The duty of the carrier in this respect. is violated where it carries a female passenger beyond her station and stops opposite to a steep, slippery embankment, and where its employés render her no other assistance than to take hold of her arm while she is alighting, they standing on the ground.146 If a railway

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Said Appleton, C. J.: "The train arrives in the evening. Passengers from the cars to the boat pass rapidly over the intervening distance. The wharf should be lighted. The servants of the defendant corporation should be in readiness to point out the way. The wharf should be safe:" Knight v. Portland &c. R. Co., 56 Me. 234.

142 Stokes v. Suffolk &c. Co., 107 N. C. 178; s. c. 11 S. E. Rep. 991. For an averment held to state the duty of the defendant railroad company to furnish the plaintiff, a passenger, with safe ingress to and egress from its cars, although somewhat indefinite and broad,-see Falk v. New York &c. R. Co., 56 N. J. L. 380; s. c. 29 Atl. Rep. 157. It has been held that an averment that a train stopped at a place where the company was accustomed to take on and let off its passengers sufficiently designates

the place as a station at which passengers have the right to alight, although there is no averment that the train was stopped for the purpose of letting off passengers. or that the passengers were notified to alight there: Falk v. New York &c. R. Co., 56 N. J. L. 380; s. c. 29 Atl. Rep. 157.

143 Robson v. North Eastern R. Co.. L. R. 10 Q. B. 271; s. c. 12 Moak Eng. Rep. 302; Brown v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 54 Wis. 342; s. c. 41 Am. Rep. 41; Foy v. London &c. R. Co., 18 C. B. (N. S.) 225.

144 Ward v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 165 Ill. 462; s. c. 46 N. E. Rep. 365; rev'g s. c. 61 Ill. App. 530.

145 Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Davidson, 76 Fed. Rep. 517; s. c. 1 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 583; 22 C. C. A. 306; 46 U. S. App. 300.

146 Minor v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 21 App. Div. (N. Y.) 307; s. c. 47 N. Y. Supp. 307.

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