however, because there is a penal statute requiring conductors of passenger trains to stop their trains and to wait five minutes at every way station, that if this is not done and a person is injured while attempting to get on the train after it has moved on, the company will be liable civilly in damages to such person, without any reference to the negligence of the injured person himself. Circumstances may exist in which the failure to stop the train for the period required by the statute will not be the direct or proximate cause of the injury, but will stand as a mere collateral violation of law, which is to be redressed, if at all, in a criminal proceeding by the State against the conductor, and in which the proximate cause of the injury may be the culpable negligence of the passenger himself, in not going upon the train while it was at a halt at the station, but in attempting to board it after it had commenced moving on.623 § 2869. Duty to Announce the Names of Stations.624-In order to the proper discharge of the duty stated in the preceding section, it is the obvious duty of the railway company, through its trainmen, to announce to the passengers, in a distinct manner, the name of each station, shortly before or immediately upon the arrival of the train thereat; and then to stop the train long enough to enable all the passengers intending to leave at such station, a reasonable opportunity to get off in safety.625 With reference to the effect to be ascribed to calling out the name of the next station, some courts take the view that it is tantamount to a notification to the passenger that when the train stops it will stop opposite the platform of the station whose name is announced, and that it is hence an invitation on the part of those in charge of the train to any passengers wishing to leave the train at such station, to alight when the train stops." Other courts decline to ascribe any legal effect to such an announcement, but hold that it presents a question of fact for a jury.627 The failure so to announce a station which the train is approaching, will not support a recovery of damages for injuries sustained by a passenger in alighting from the train, without proof that it was the 623 Galveston &c. R. Co. v. Le Gierse, 51 Tex. 189. 624 This section is cited in § 2894. 625 Southern R. Co. v. Kendrick, 40 Miss. 374; Imhoff v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 20 Wis. 344; Keller v. New York &c. R. Co., 2 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 480; s. c. 17 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 102; Dickens v. New York &c. R. Co., 1 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 504; s. c. 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 41; New 626 Orleans &c. R. Co. v. Statham, 42 627 International &c. R. Co. v. Eckford, 71 Tex. 274; s. c. 8 S. W. Rep. 679. proximate cause of the injury.628 While it is the duty of a railroad company to have the names of stations properly announced, and to stop the train a sufficient time to allow the passengers to alight with safety, it need not give passengers personal notice that their station is reached.629 And, according to a grossly untenable view, the promise of a conductor to give a female passenger special notice when a junction at which she is to change cars is reached, in addition to the general announcement, is not binding on the company, because not within the scope of his authority.630 § 2870. Stopping Train before Reaching Station. It is obvious that when an approaching station has been announced, the passengers will naturally infer that the next stopping place will be such station; and hence that it will be actionable negligence for the company, after announcing a station, to stop the train, in the nighttime and in a dangerous situation, before reaching the station, unless a special warning is conveyed to the passengers, or unless there are other exculpatory circumstances.631 So, where, after the station had been announced, the train stopped before the station was reached, but opposite a platform, it was reasoned that a passenger might rightly have assumed that the platform was there for the purpose of receiving passengers; so that if he was injured while attempting to alight in consequence of a sudden jerk of the train, without being allowed a reasonable time to get off, the company will be liable to him in damages, although the train may have stopped at a second platform at the same station for a sufficient time safely to discharge all its passengers getting off there.632 § 2871. Stopping Train at Improper or Dangerous Place.-Stopping a train at an unusual place for discharging passengers, where 628 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Collier, 104 Tenn. 189; s. c. 54 S. W. Rep. 980 (especially since the statute law gives a qui tam action for a penalty of $100 for failing to make such announcement). 629 Houston &c. R. Co. v. Cohn, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 11; s. c. 53 S. W. Rep. 698; Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Perry, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 78; s. c. 27 S. W. Rep. 496; Texas &c. R. Co. v. Alexander (Tex. Civ. App.), 30 S. W. Rep. 1113 (no off. rep.); Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Kendrick (Tex. Civ. App.), 32 S. W. Rep. 42 (no off. rep.); St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. McCullough, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 534; s. c. 45 S. W. Rep. 324. 630 St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. McCullough, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 534; s. c. 45 S. W. Rep. 324. 631 Central R. Co. v. Van Horn, 38 N. J. L. 133; McNulta v. Ensch. 134 Ill. 46; s. c. 24 N. E. Rep. 631; Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. Edelstein (Pa.). 16 Atl. Rep. 847; Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. McCormick, 124 Pa. St. 427. To the contrary, see Mitchell v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 51 Mich. 236. Compare Dunn v. Pennsylvania R Co., 47 Phila. Leg. Int. (Pa.) 524; International &c. R. Co. v. Smith (Tex.), 14 S. W. Rep. 642. 632 McNulta v. Ensch, 134 Ill. 46; s. c. 24 N. E. Rep. 631. 633 no provision has been made for their safety in alighting from the cars, may be such negligence as will render the company liable for injuries sustained by a passenger who is directed by the conductor to get off at that place, and who follows the direction without negligence on his own part." And clearly, if a railroad train stops at a place of peril on a dark night, after notice has been given that the next stopping place will be at a certain station, the safety of the passengers requires that some notice or warning should be given them. to retain their seats.634 When, therefore, after having twice called the name of the station which was the destination of a passenger, the train was stopped in the darkness over a trestle, by the engineer, without the knowledge or expectation of the conductor or other trainmen, and the passenger, in attempting to alight, fell through the trestle and was injured, it was held that he had an action for damages. At the same time, it must be obvious that no hard-and-fast rule of law can be deduced from these and other like cases. Here, as in other relations, the passenger is not exonerated from the duty of taking reasonable care for his own safety.636 635 $2872. Duty to Give Signals before Starting.-It may be assumed that in every well-managed railway passenger service, stated signals will be given before starting the train at every station, either by the bell or the whistle of the locomotive, or both, or by some other means, such as the conductor calling out "All aboard." In Germany, where railway service is more improved in this respect than in our country, the recollection of the writer is that three distinct signals are habitually given, and that the trainmen also make special efforts to see that any belated passenger is on board, before starting. It is not an unreasonable conclusion that the failure to give adequate signals before starting a railway train from a station, both for the purpose of warning persons intending to get on, and passengers intending to alight, is actionable negligence, if damage ensues therefrom;637 and a consideration of the number of accidents eas International &c. R. Co. V. Smith (Tex.), 14 S. W. Rep. 642. 34 Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. Edelstein (Pa.), 16 Atl. Rep. 847; Philadelphia &c. R. Co. v. McCormick, 124 Pa. St. 427. 635 Richmond &c. R. Co. v. Smith, 92 Ala. 237; s. c. 9 South. Rep. 223. ese It has even been held that the stopping of a train at a place other than a station, to be negligence as to persons injured while attempting to leave it, must be sufficiently long VOL. 3 THOMP. NEG.-22 to indicate to passengers that they 637 Curtis v. Detroit &c. R. Co., 27 337 which have happened in consequence of the starting of the train before adequate signals have been given, amply justifies this conclusion. Therefore, if a passenger sustains an injury by reason of the fact that the train is suddenly started without warning, the negligence of the railway company will generally be a question of fact for the jury.638 This duty extends to passengers who have got off the train at a stopping place for any lawful purpose, as where a passenger alights from the train for the purpose of delivering a message to some one on the station platform;639 or in favor of passengers who have got off the train merely to view a wreck upon the track, in consequence of which the train has been obliged to stop. Here, if the train is started without signals or warning, in consequence of which a passenger who has alighted without objection on the part of the trainmen, is left behind, the passenger will be entitled to recover damages, especially where the trainmen have given him reason to believe that the train will be delayed for a considerable time.640 On the other hand, there are holdings to the effect that the failure to give a signal, by whistle or otherwise, of the intention to start after stopping at a station, does not constitute negligence per se, where there is no statutory requirement for such a signal.641 The meaning of this is that it does not constitute negligence as matter of law, and without reference to the circumstances of the particular case; though under particular circumstances it may be evidence of negligence to go to a jury. For example, it has been held that where a train has made a reasonable stop, and passengers have not given notice or other evidence of their intention to alight, the starting of the train is not per se negligence for which the company will be liable.642 So, where a passenger train stopped at a flag station for the sole purpose of taking on water, and there was a platform at the station to enable passengers to get on and off, and a passenger alighted for a proper 54 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. 640; Gal veston &c. R. Co. v. Cooper, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 42; s. c. 20 S. W. Rep. 990; New York &c. R. Co. v. Woods, 9 Ohio C. C. 322; s. c. 2 Ohio Dec. 673; Paulitsch v. New York &c. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 280; s. c. 3 Cent. Rep. 336; Texas &c. R. Co. v. Brown (Tex. Civ. App.), 58 S. W. Rep. 44. 638 Galveston &c. R. Co. v. Cooper, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 42; s. c. 20 S. W. Rep. 990. And this has been held even with reference to the starting of a train at a flag station, where trains do not usually stop without being signaled: Galveston &c. R. Co. v. Cooper, 70 Tex. 67; s. c. 8 S. W. Rep. 68. But it has been held that a railroad company is under no duty to its passengers to give a signal before starting at a wood station at which its train has stopped to take on wood: Malcom v. Richmond &c. R. Co., 106 N. C. 63; s. c. 7 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 434. 639 Galveston &c. R. Co. v. Cooper, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 42; s. c. 20 S. W. Rep. 990. 640 Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Roundtree (Tex. Civ. App.), 25 S. W. Rep. 989. 641 Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Williams, 70 Tex. 159; s. c. 8 S. W. Rep. 78. 642 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Landauer, 36 Neb. 642; s. c. 54 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. 640; 54 N. W. Rep. 976. purpose, and was injured while attempting to regain the train, which had started without giving the usual signals, it was a case for damages, and none the less so from the fact that the train had not been stopped to take on or discharge passengers.643 An intending passenger who arrives after the schedule time for the departure of the train, has no right to have its departure delayed in order to enable him to get aboard; and to start it on time is not negligence as against him.64 644 $2873. Further of this Subject.-If the company have been in the habit of receiving and discharging passengers at a place other than their regular station, it is not negligence for a passenger to get on at that place while the train is standing still and there is no apparent danger in so doing. It is the duty of the trainmen to give the customary signals before starting from such a place.645 If the train does not stop at a station, the passenger will not be justified in making an attempt to get on. Thus, the plaintiff, having purchased his ticket, attempted to get upon the cars while they were slowly passing the station. The platform and steps were so full that he could only get upon the lower step. A jerk of the cars threw him off, but he held on to the iron rod and ran along with the cars, endeavoring to recover his position on the step, although the speed of the train was increasing, when he was struck by a platform near the track and was injured. No evidence was given tending to prove facts explaining or justifying this negligent and reckless conduct, and a nonsuit was But in cases where the effort of the passenger to held proper. 646 643 Galveston &c. R. Co. v. Cooper, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 42; s. c. 20 S. W. Rep. 990. 644 Paulitsch v. New York &c. R. Co., 102 N. Y. 280; s. c. 3 Cent. Rep. 336. By reason of the sudden starting of a train without signal, an emigrant passenger fell between the cars, which had been uncoupled to divide the train, and was injured; and the negligence of the railroad company was held to be the proximate cause of his injury, and his contributory negligence presented a question for the jury: Andrist v. Union &c. R. Co., 30 Fed. Rep. 345. For a case where an instruction that if no signal had been given, and no invitation extended by a servant of the company to passengers to get aboard, the plaintiff could not recover, was held erroneous,-see Texas &c. R. Co. v. Brown (Tex. Civ. App.), 58 S. W. Rep. 44. Under a complaint charging a railroad company with negligence in the movement of a particular train without warning, the plaintiff can not prove the neglect of the company to establish general regulations for the conduct of its servants in such cases: Connelly v. Minneapolis &c. Co., 38 Minn. 80; s. c. 35 N. W. Rep. 582. 645 Keating v. New York &c. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 673; s. c. 3 Lans. (N. Y.) 469. See, also, Mitchell v. Western &c. R. Co., 30 Ga. 22. 646 Phillips v. Rensselaer &c. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 177. See, also, Knight v. Pontchartrain R. Co., 23 La. An. 462; Hubener v. New Orleans &c. R. Co., 23 La. An. 492; Harper v. Erie R. Co., 32 N. J. L. 88; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Scates, 90 Ill. 586; s. c. 9 Cent. L. J. 167. |