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he has, of course, the right to remain on board the train until it reaches an intermediate station at which it does stop. If the conductor has no authority to vary the rules of the company in regard to stopping his train at a station where it is not permitted to stop by such rules, then it is the plain duty of the conductor, when he discovers that the passenger has a ticket calling for a place at which the conductor can not stop the train, to inform the passenger of that fact, so that he can exercise his option as to the intermediate place at which he will get off; and a single decision to the contrary, though rendered by a Federal Court of Appeals, can not make a rule of law so palpably unreasonable, so unjust, and so opposed to public right.65 If a passenger purchases a railway ticket to a station at which local trains stop but through trains do not, he will not be entitled to enter the first train due after purchasing the ticket, it being a through train, and demand of the conductor that it stop at the station of his destination, when, by the regulations of the company, the conductor is not permitted to stop there. It has been held that, although in such a case the conductor takes up the ticket of the passenger and agrees to let him off at the station of his destination, this will not bind the company or make it liable in damages if the conductor afterwards refuses to do so. The theory is that it is not competent for the conductor to make a promise contrary to the public arrangements of his principal, which arrangements he has no power to change.67 Where a passenger takes passage upon a train which does not stop at his place of destination, which fact he has had a reasonable opportunity of ascertaining, the train conductor may require him to pay fare from the point of his destination to the next stopping place of the train."

68

§ 2564. Duty of the Conductor in such Cases.-Nor is this conclusion varied by the fact that the train conductor, after telling the pas

64 Richmond &c. R. Co. v. Ashby, 79 Va. 130; s. c. 52 Am. Rep. 620.

65 The author alludes to the case of Texas &c. R. Co. v. Ludlam, 57 Fed. Rep. 481; s. c. 6 C. C. A. 454. It is gratifying to note that one judge (Mr. District Judge Locke) dissented on this point.

66 Pittsburgh &c. R. Co. v. Nuzum, 50 Ind. 141. See also Ohio &c. R. Co. v. Applewhite, 52 Ind. 540; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Randolph, 53 Ill. 510; Fink v. Albany &c. R. Co., 4 Lans. (N. Y.) 147.

67 Ohio &c. R. Co. v. Hatton, 60 Ind. 12; s. c. 6 Cent. L. J. 389. See also Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Randolph, 53 III. 510.

69 Trotlinger v. East Tennessee &c. R. Co., 11 Lea (Tenn.) 533; Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. Pierce, 47 Mich. 277. The plaintiff bought a ticket to E., and entered a train pointed out to him by the ticket-seller. The conductor accepted the ticket, but immediately notified him that the train did not stop at E., but that he could get off at P. and there resume his journey for E. He refused to get off at P., and was ejected. It was held that he had no action for damages for the ejection, though he recovered for the excessive force used in accomplishing it: International &c. R. Co. v. Hassell, 62 Tex. 256; s. c. 50 Am. Rep. 525.

senger that the train does not stop at the place called for by his ticket, takes up the ticket and punches it. Nor, in the view of one court, does the fact that the conductor takes up the ticket of a passenger, calling for passage to a station at which the train is forbidden by the regulations of the company to stop, make it the duty of the conductor to stop the train at that point; though if the passenger boards the train in consequence of being misinformed by the station agent that it does stop there, he will have an action for damages founded on the misdirection. Where the conductor in charge of a train had an apparent authority to contract with a passenger to stop at a certain station, and he had frequently made and carried out such contracts, his agreement with the passenger to stop at such station was binding, although contrary to rules of the company, which were unknown to the passenger."1

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§ 2565. Statutory Obligation to Stop Train after Ticket, Calling for a Particular Station, is Taken Up.-Statutes have been enacted in many of the states requiring certain extra trains to stop at all stations, or at crossings of other roads, or at county seats, and perhaps at other places; and several decisions are found construing such statutes. The expression "a regular depot or station," in such a statute,72 does not include a place where, for a long time, there has been no depot, no freight, no agent, nor any employé stationed to attend to shipments, although occasional shipments of lumber have been made from there, and although the mail trains regularly stop there to deliver the mail, and the place is set down in the circulars and orders of the company as a station. In order to constitute a "regular passenger train,' within the meaning of a statute requiring such trains to stop at every county seat, it is not necessary that the train should be one which stops at all other stations; but a limited express train is such a train." Under a statute requiring railroad companies to stop all their trains of cars for passengers at a station for receiving passengers, for a time sufficient to receive and let off passengers,75 if the company transports

73

ton, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 271; s. c. 30 S. W. Rep. 885 (not to be off. rep.).

71 Texas &c. R. Co. v. Elliott, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 31; s. c. 54 S. W. Rep. 410.

72 N. C. Code, § 1964.

73 Land v. Wilmington &c. R. Co., 104 N. C. 48; s. c. 40 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. 18. The particular train failed to stop for freight.

74 Ohio &c. R. Co. v. People, 29 Ill. App. 561.

75 Gen. Stats. S. C., § 1486.

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passengers from whom it receives fare, in a mixed train, composed of freight and passenger cars, it is bound to bring such a train to a stop for the egress of any passenger thereon who has paid his fare.76 It is the duty of a railroad company to transport a passenger from stations where two railroads intersect, on payment of a charge fixed by a statute of Texas," whether the passenger has a ticket or not, and no regulation of the company in conflict with the statute is valid.78 But a statute imposing upon railroad companies the duty of stopping their trains at the crossings of other railroads, does not carry with it the obligation to conduct and manage its trains at such a crossing as at a regular station, unless the statute says so in terms, and this, although passengers have at different times taken advantage of the statutory stop. It is needless to add that where there is a statute. under which the company is required to stop at a particular station, a passenger may purchase his ticket with full confidence that the law will be obeyed and that the train will stop there, although the ticket on its face recites that it will be good "only on such trains as stop at both stations;" so that if he is ejected because of the fact that the train does not stop at such station, he will have an action for damages.80 Under a statutes denouncing a penalty against railroad companies for failing to stop their trains at stations without a "legal or just excuse," the fact that the train is overcrowded by reason of conditions for which the company alone is responsible, does not constitute such excuse.s 82 But a severe snow storm, which the company could not and did not anticipate, which made it dangerous to stop at the regular station, did present such a "legal or just excuse."83

§ 2566. The Constitutionality of State Statutes Requiring Interstate Trains to Stop at Certain Stations a length of time sufficient to enable passengers to alight therefrom and board the same, has been passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United States four times.

76 Thomas v. Charlotte &c. R. Co., 38 S. C. 485; s. c. 17 S. E. Rep. 226. "Rev. Stat. Tex., arts. 4226, 4238. 7 Eddy v. Rider, 79 Tex. 53; s. c. 15 S. W. Rep. 113.

7 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Johnson, 44 Ill. App. 56. The theory of this decision is that, in failing to stop as required by statute, the company is guilty of no breach of duty to a passenger who attempts to alight at such a place, and, in the absence of notice of his perilous position, is not liable for injuries sustained in his attempt to do so.

85

84

In the latest of these cases, a State statute required all regular passenger trains to stop a sufficient length of time at county seats to receive and let off passengers with safety. The defendant company furnished four regular passenger trains per day, each way, which were sufficient to accommodate all the local and through business, and all such trains stopped at county seats. The act was held invalid as applied to an express train intended only for through passenger traffic between St. Louis and New York. The reasoning of the court was that, while railway companies are bound to provide primarily and sufficiently for those to whom they are directly tributary, yet they have the right, having met these local conditions, to adopt special provisions for through traffic; and that legislative interference therewith is a violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States, which, as interpreted, requires that, in the absence of regulation by Congress, commerce between the States shall be free. The same statute of Illinois had previously been declared unconstitutional, as being an unreasonable restriction of interstate traffic, when it was sought to require a fast mail train from Chicago to New Orleans, over an interstate highway, established by authority of Congress, to delay the transportation of United States mails, and interstate passengers, by turning from its direct route, and running to a stations three and one-half miles away from a point on that route, for the purpose of receiving and discharging passengers at that station, for whom the railroad furnished other and ample accommodations. On the other hand, a statute of Minnesota, requiring every railroad company to stop all of its regular passenger trains running wholly within the State, at its stations at all county seats, was held to be a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State, even as applied to a train connecting with another train of the same company, running into another State, carrying interstate passengers and mail.87 A statute of Ohio, providing that every railroad company should cause three of its regular trains carrying passengers, if so many are run daily, Sundays excepted, to stop at every station, city or village, containing over three thousand inhabitants, for a time sufficient to receive and let off passengers, was held, in the absence of legislation by Congress, not to be inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, when applied to trains engaged in interstate commerce through the State of Ohio. Mr. Justice Harlan, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: "The statute does not stand in the way of the railroad

94 Cleveland &c. R. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514.

85 Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Illinois, 163 U. S. 142. See ante, § 2548.

96 Cairo, Illinois.

87 Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427.

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company running as many trains as it may choose between Chicago and Buffalo without stopping at intermediate points, or only at very large cities on the route, if, in the contingency named in the statute, the required number of trains stop at each place containing three thousand inhabitants, long enough to receive and let off passengers. *** It was for the State to take into consideration all the circumstances affecting passenger travel within its limits, and, as far as practicable, make such regulations as were just to all who might pass over the road in question. It was entitled, of course, to provide for the convenience of persons desiring to travel from one point to another in the State on domestic trains. But it was not bound to ignore the convenience of those who desired to travel from places in the State to places beyond its limits, or the convenience of those outside of the State who wished to come into it. It was not compelled to look only to the convenience of those who wished to pass through the State without stopping."88

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§ 2567. Obligation to Stop at Other Points than Regular Stations.In the absence of a special contract, a person purchasing a ticket from a railway company has no right to demand that its trains shall stop at other than one of its regular stations; and although he may have paid his fare and embarked, under the mistaken belief that he may be disembarked at a particular point where the train does not stop, he has no right of action if he is put off in a civil manner at the stopping place nearest his destination. If a passenger has applied to a ticket agent for a ticket to a particular point where the train does not stop, and has been refused, but nevertheless goes upon the train, the fact that the conductor collects from him the regular fare, after knowledge that the passenger has taken the train desiring to be put off at such point, has been held not of itself sufficient to constitute a special contract between the company and the passenger that the passenger shall be put off at such point, where the fare so collected is the proper fare for a passenger to any point not exceeding a certain distance, which includes the point at which the passenger desires to be put off.90

85 Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285 (Shiras, Brewer and Peckham, JJ., dissenting).

89 Wells v. Alabama &c. R. Co., 67 Miss. 24; s. c. 6 South. Rep. 737; 40 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. 645. It has been held that the refusal of a railroad company to designate, as a flag station for its through trains, a place which is not an incorporated town, which contains only a few houses and is situated within three

miles of a regular station, is not unreasonable: St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Adcock, 52 Ark. 406; s. c. 40 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. 682; 12 S. W. Rep. 874.

90 Wells v. Alabama &c. R. Co., 67 Miss. 24; s. c. 6 South. Rep. 737; 40 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. 645. The fare collected was the fixed rate for any distance not exceeding eight miles, and plaintiff's destination, as well as other stations, was within that