SECTION

2611. When railroad waiting-rooms

are to be kept open.

2612. Statutory regulations

this subject.

upon

2613. Regulations requiring passengers boarding cars outside

2616. Commutation, coupon and round-trip tickets.

2617. Rights of persons travelling on free passes.

of station to pay extra fare, 2618. Actions by railroad companies

although they have already

paid fare in the station.

2614. Illegible tickets.

against passengers to recover fares.

2619. Other holdings relating to railway tickets.

§ 2581. Nature of Passage Tickets.-An ordinary passage ticket is not a written contract, though it may be so drawn and signed as to become such, as where it embodies in explicit terms the undertaking which the carrier assumes toward the person named therein. Excluding tickets of this kind, it is to be observed that a passage ticket is a mere token or voucher furnished by the carrier to the passenger upon the payment by him of fare, to be used by him as evidence conveying the information to the conductor or other person in charge of the carrier's vehicle, that the passenger has paid his fare and has thereby become entitled to ride on the carrier's vehicle to the place named therein.133 As the conductor can not safely allow his duty, under his instructions, or under the rules of the carrier, to become varied by oral statements of passengers, which may or may not be true, as to what representations were made to them by the ticket agent or some other agent of the company, it is a just conclusion that the face of the ticket is conclusive evidence to the conductor of the nature and terms of the contract of carriage between the passenger and the carrier;134 though, as hereafter seen, the company may, in such case, become liable for any damages which the traveller, obeying the requirements of the conductor, may have sustained through the mistake or misrepresentation of the ticket-seller or other agent.13 It follows from this statement that, while the ticket will always be an evidentiary document upon any issue as to the terms of the contract of carriage, yet those terms may be proved outside of the

133 Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306; Rawson v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 48 N. Y. 212; Johnson v. Concord R. Co., 46 N. H. 213; Gordon v. Manchester &c. R. Co., 52 N. H. 596; State v. Overton, 24 N. J. L. 435, 438; Boice v. Hudson Riv. R. Co., 61 Barb. (N. Y.) 611; Barker v. Coflin, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 556; Elmore v. Sands, 54 N. Y. 512, 515; Henderson v. Stevenson, L. R. 2 Sc. App. 470,

per Lord Hatherley; Kansas City &c. R. Co. v. Rodebaugh, 38 Kan. 45; s. c. 15 Pac. Rep. 899.

124 Poulin v. Canadian &c. R. Co., 52 Fed. Rep. 197; s. c. 17 L. R. A. 800; 32 Am. L. Reg. 153; 52 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. 188; 6 U. S. App. 298; 3 C. C. A. 23; Atchison &c. R. Co. v. Gants, 38 Kan. 608; s. c. 17 Pac. Rep. 54.

125 Post, § 2587.

ticket. In other words, the parties are not confined to the meager language of such a document, as furnishing the exclusive evidence of what the contract was.136

§ 2582. Prima Facie, but not Conclusive Evidence of Right of Passage. The possession of a railroad ticket is not conclusive evidence of the right of the holder to transportation. The circumstances may be such that it will be a proper subject for investigation whether the holder of the ticket has not got possession of it by fraud, or whether it has not been previously used.137 The possession, however, is prima facie evidence that the holder has paid the regular price for it, and of his right to be transported at some time between the places specified thereon on some passenger train. If it is unmutilated, the presumption is that it has never been used for that purpose. 138

139

§ 2583. Transferability of Passage Tickets.-On the one hand, the law is believed to be that an ordinary railway passage ticket issued at the carrier's regular rate of fare, and without any restrictions upon. its face as to its transferability, is transferable, and may be used by any person being a proper person to be carried on such a ticket.1 Such railroad passenger ticket passes from hand to hand by delivery in the absence of terms rendering it non-assignable.140 On the other hand, where the carrier sells tickets at a reduced rate in consideration of special circumstances or of the assent of the purchaser to special conditions, a condition that the ticket shall not be transferable, but that fare may be collected from any person presenting it, other than the original holder, is valid.141 If such a ticket is presented by a person other than the one to whom it is issued, and the conductor insists upon taking it up and collecting fare

136 Van Buskirk v. Roberts, 31 N. Y. 661; Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306.

appearing, is valid in the hands of the holder, and entitles him to a return passage, subject to the pre

137 Davis v. Great Western R. Co., scribed limitations as to time, etc. 20 Upper Canada Q. B. 27.

138 Pier v. Finch, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 514.

139 Nichols v. Southern &c. Co., 23 Or. 123; s. c. 18 L. R. A. 55; 52 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. 205; 31 Pac. Rep. 296; Hoffman v. Northern &c. R. Co., 45 Minn. 53; Spencer v. Lovejoy, 96 Ga. 657; s. c. 23 S. E. Rep. 836. In the first two cases above, it is held that a round-trip excursion ticket, used by the purchaser in going to the station named therein, and then sold and transferred, no restrictions

140 Spencer v. Lovejoy, 96 Ga. 657; s. c. 23 S. E. Rep. 836.

141 Lemon v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 52 Fed. Rep. 262; Drummond v. Southern &c. Co., 7 Utah 118; s. c. 25 Pac. Rep. 733; Chicago &c. R. Co.

in accordance with its terms, the holder is not, as matter of law, entitled to a receipt for it from the conductor, as a condition of paying his fare.142 Under the condition, printed on the ticket, that, if it is presented by a person other than the original purchaser, the company may refuse to accept it, the conductor has no right to take it up and exclude the transferee from the train; but if he does so, the consolation which the law allows the transferee by way of damages is the value of the ticket.143 The obligation of a person holding such a ticket extends beyond the case where he transfers it in fraud of the contract:-he must not allow it to be used by any other person through negligence or want of care.144 But where a ticket is sold with the restriction that it is "good for continuous passage only," it is plain that the passenger can not break the voyage and stop off before reaching the destination named therein, and transfer his right of passage for the remaining portion of the voyage to another person, through the device of giving to such other person the train check which the original passenger has received from the conductor.145 But the rule is different in respect of a "coupon ticket," issued by a railroad company for itself and also as agent for other connecting lines. Here each coupon is deemed to be a separate contract, so as to be transferable, although the ticket is sold at a reduced rate, provided there are no words of restriction or limitation upon it, as to the person entitled to use it.146 A neighbor who has social intercourse with a family and is in the habit of visiting it is not a "visitor" within a provision in a railroad coupon ticket providing that each undetached coupon shall entitle the head of the family, a member thereof, or a "visitor," to one passage. The word "visitor," as used therein, is to be confined to persons visiting the family at the time and becoming temporary members of the family as "guests."147

142 Houston &c. R. Co. v. Ritter, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 482; s. c. 41 S. W. Rep. 753.

143 Post v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 14 Neb. 110; s. c. 45 Am. Rep. 100.

144 See, for example, a case where such a ticket was taken from the passenger by the conductor, and the passenger ejected from the train, by reason of the fact, as claimed by the company, that the passenger had been allowing others to ride upon it in violation of its terms: Freidenrich v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 53 Md. 201. In another case, A. bought for his wife a non-transferable ticket, which, with his knowledge, was made out to Mr. E. B. Upon pres

entation of it by him for his wife's fare, the conductor refused to receive it, though both asserted it was bought for her, and she offered to sign it according to its conditions. It was held that, upon her refusal to pay the regular fare, the conductor had a right to put her off the train: Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Bannerman, 15 Ill. App. 100.

145 Walker v. Wabash &c. R. Co., 15 Mo. App. 333.

148 Nichols v. Southern &c. R. Co., 23 Or. 123; s. c. 18 L. R. A. 55; 52 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. 205; 31 Pac. Rep. 296.

147 Odell v. New York &c. R. Co., 18 App. Div. 12; s. c. 45 N. Y. Supp. 464.

§ 2584. Interpretation of Passage Tickets.-On the principle that doubtful or ambiguous language in a private document should be construed most strongly against the author of the document, such language in a passage ticket should be construed most strongly against the carrier; at least, it should not be extended in his favor by mere implication.148 But this does not mean that the construction shall be unreasonable. For example, a ticket issued by a railway company agreeing to carry a passenger "around to" a specified place without change does not imply an agreement that it will carry the passenger back without change.'

149

§ 2585. Passage Ticket Furnishes Evidence to the Conductor of the Real Contract.-A conductor is justified in acting upon a ticket tendered by a passenger as showing the actual contract made by the latter with the company, in the absence of any reasonable statement by the passenger that through fraud, mistake or inadvertence, it does not show the real contract.150 A conductor of a freight train may require of one attempting to take passage on his train, evidence beyond his own statement and the production of a ticket, that he has conformed to a regulation requiring special permission to ride on such trains. But in such a case, where it does not appear that the intended passenger is absolutely required to exhibit personally such permission to the conductor, he may rely on a promise of the telegraph and ticket agent to procure such permission and give it to the conductor; and if he boards the train relying on such promise, he can not be rightfully ejected therefrom for a failure personally to exhibit such permission. 151

2586. Effect of Unstamped Tickets. 152-A condition upon a round-trip railroad ticket, which is sold at a reduced rate, that it must be stamped by the agent of the company at one of its terminal points before it will be accepted for the return passage, to whom the purchaser of the ticket identifies himself, is reasonable, and the holder of such ticket who fails to have it so stamped, is not entitled to the return passage thereon.153 In such a case the purchaser of the

148 Georgia R. &c. Co. v. Clarke, 97 Ga. 706; s. c. 5 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. (N. S.) 219; 25 S. E. Rep. 368.

140 Dillon v. Lindell R. Co., 64 Mo. App. 418; s. c. 2 Mo. App. Rep. 1100.

150 Alabama &c. R. Co. v. Drummond, 73 Miss. 813; s. c. 20 South. Rep. 7.

151 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Hine, 121 Ala. 234.

152 This section is cited in §§ 2553, 3210, 3222.

153 Watson v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 104 Tenn. 194; s. c. 56 S. W. Rep. 1024; Reed v. Texas &c. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 50 S. W. Rep. 432 (no off. rep.); Mosher v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 127 U. S. 390; s. c. 32 L. ed. 349.

ticket, it being sold at a reduced rate, is deemed to have taken notice of the fact that it is sold to him subject to special and unusual conditions provided thereon.154 Such conditions have even been held. obligatory upon a passenger who can neither read nor write, although he is not specially notified of them.155 Where a round-trip ticket. is sold under an arrangement that it is to be stamped by a ticket agent of the company before being used for the return trip, if the proper ticket agent refuses so to stamp it, and the conductor, on whose train the passenger attempts to return, acting under his instructions not to accept unstamped tickets, refuses to receive it, the passenger will have an action for damages against the company; for, although the conductor may be justified, under the circumstances, in refusing to receive the unstamped ticket, yet the wrong of the agent in refusing to stamp it will be imputed to his principal, and that will afford ground to support the action.156 This is especially true where the holder of the ticket is the original purchaser, but the agent of the company has nevertheless arbitrarily refused to date and stamp the coupon of it, although the passenger has furnished him with sufficient proof of his identity.157 So, although an unstamped return coupon of a railroad passage ticket, which provides that it must be stamped in order to be available, does not confer, in the absence of anything else, any right of passage upon its holder,—yet if the holder, on entering the cars, exhibits it to the conductor and is told by him that it is all right, the company can not afterwards eject him on the ground that it is all wrong, without the company incurring a liability to pay damages. 158 The fact that other persons have been allowed to ride on the return portion of unstamped railroad tickets, which were sold. on condition that they should not be good for return trip until stamped, does not entitle the holder of a similar unstamped return ticket to passage thereon, unless he knows of such other instances, and they have been so frequent as to mislead people into the belief

154 Watson v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 104 Tenn. 194; s. c. 56 S. W. Rep. 1024.

155 Watson v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 104 Tenn. 194; s. c. 56 S. W. Rep. 1024.

154 Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Martino, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 634; s. c. 21 S. W. Rep. 781; 11 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 270; Morse v. Southern R. Co., 102 Ga. 302; s. c. 29 S. E. Rep. 865; Southern R. Co. v. McKenzie, 102 Ga. 313; s. c. 29 S. E. Rep. 869. On the contrary, there is an untenable Federal -decision to the effect that where the passenger can not have the ticket VOL. 3 THOMP. NEG.--4

stamped before the return train leaves, owing to the fact that the agent is not there, and boards the train, and the conductor insists on his paying fare, and ejects him for his refusal so to do, he can not maintain an action against the company: Mosher v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 326; s. c. aff'd 127 U. S. 390.

157 Morse v. Southern R. Co., 102 Ga. 302; s. c. 29 S. E. Rep. 865; Southern R. Co. v. McKenzie, 102 Ga. 313; s. c. 29 S. E. Rep. 869.

158 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Blair, 104 Tenn. 212; s. c. 55 S. W. Rep. 154. 49