stances necessarily affecting his or her safety, and should be considered by the jury in connection with all other circumstances in proof.+24

§ 3016. How in the Case of Women.-Women, as a general rule, are less capable of performing such a feat with safety than are men, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of their limbs. It has accordingly been reasoned that it is negligence for a woman to attempt to alight from a moving train, however carefully she may make the attempt.25 Contributory negligence has been imputed to women, as matter of law, where they were injured in attempting to alight from moving railway trains under the following circumstances:-Where a woman attempted to alight unaided, with heavy bundles in her arms, where the step of the car was more than two feet above the station platform, and the train was in motion and increasing its speed, although she did so from the fear that she would be carried beyond her station;426 where, the train not having stopped for a reasonable time at the station to allow the passengers to alight, a female passenger undertook, although warned not to do so, to get off after the train had started ;427 where a woman seventy-five years old attempted to alight from a railway train while. it was in motion. +28 But it is obvious that there can be no hardand-fast rule of law that it is negligence for a female passenger to attempt to alight from a moving railway train, any more than there can be in the case of a male passenger. The courts have refused to impute negligence to women injured under such circumstances, but have left the question to the determination of a jury in the following cases: Where a female passenger, with an infant in her arms, attempted to alight after the car had resumed its motion, when, the car having started while she was on the steps, she was compelled to choose between the danger of stepping off or of being thrown off while trying to re-enter the car;429 where a train started out as a female passenger was in the act of alighting, and she was thrown down and injured;430 where, when a female passenger had one foot on the lower step, and the other off, in the act of alighting, the train

424 Little Rock &c. R. Co. v. Tankersly, 54 Ark. 25; s. c. 14 S. W. Rep. 1099.

425 Cincinnati &c. R. Co. v. Dufrain, 36 Ill. App. 352; Defoe v. St. Paul &c. R. Co., 65 Minn. 319; s. c. 68 N. W. Rep. 35.

426 Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Wingate, 143 Ind. 134; s. c. 42 N. E. Rep. 477.

427 Jewell v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 54 Wis. 610; s. c. 41 Am. Rep. 65. 428 Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Kennicott, 68 Ill. App. 90.

429 Odom v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 45 La. An. 1201; s. c. 14 South. Rep. 734.

430 Caruth v. Texas &c. R. Co., 45 La. An. 1228; s. c. 14 South. Rep. 736.

.431

started up:41 where a female passenger attempted to alight after the train had moved half the length of a car, she believing that she could do so in safety, considering the speed of the train, althoug! she may have apprehended "possible danger" from so doing,-the question being whether she acted as a prudent person would have done under similar circumstances, and the view being that mere knowledge on the part of a passenger that he is in danger of falling, in the act of alighting, does not make the act contributory negligence as matter of law;432 where a woman passenger on a railway train jumped from the lowest step of the platform of the passenger car to the ground, a distance of two and a half or three feet, after the conductor had called out "all off for" [naming the place of destination], and she tried to reach the ground by stepping down, no stool having been placed on the ground to assist her, and no offer having been made by any of the trainmen to help her down;433 where a woman seventy-six years old, weighing two hundred pounds, in order to avoid being carried beyond her destination, attempted to alight from a slowly moving train, which had started forward without allowing her a reasonable time to get off;434 where, in order to avoid being carried past her station, a female passenger stepped off the car in the dark at a cattle-guard, when the train was going at the rate of three or four miles an hour, and the brakeman, who was standing on the car platform, made no objection to her alighting;435 where a girl eighteen years old, travelling alone, who had travelled on the cars before over the same road, expected that a brakeman would help her to alight, and was surprised that he did not, and attempted to alight alone while the train was moving at the rate of four miles per hour, and was injured.436

431 Sanderson v. Missouri &c. R. Co., 64 Mo. App. 655; s. c. 2 Mo. App. Rep. 1169.

432 Sanderson v. Missouri &c. R. Co., supra.

433 Brodie v. Carolina &c. R. Co., 46 S. C. 203; s. c. 24 S. E. Rep. 180.

434 Southern R. Co. v. Mitchell, 98 Tenn. 27; s. c. 40 S. W. Rep. 72.

45 Jacob v. Flint &c. R. Co., 105 Mich. 450; s. c. 2 Det. L. N. 156; 63 N. W. Rep. 502.

436 Jacob v. Flint &c. R. Co., supra. The court ruled that she was subject to the ordinary rules of contributory negligence applicable to cases of passengers alighting from moving trains. So, where the evidence was conflicting as to whether the train stopped for a sufficient length of time to enable a female

passenger, in the exercise of due diligence, to get off in safety, the court assumed that it did not, and that the company was negligent: but yet, as the passenger passed out of the car and went down onto the steps of the platform, and from thence stepped or jumped onto the platform of the station while the train was in motion, contrary to the warning of the brakeman and bystanders who were present,-it was held that she must be deemed guilty of negligence which materially contributed to the injury complained of, and that special findings to the contrary by the jury were not supported by the evidence: Jewell v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 54 Wis. 610; s. c. 13 Reporter 767.

437

§ 3017. Where the Train has Stopped a Sufficient Time for the Passenger to Alight. As already seen,438 the courts generally concur in the view that a railway passenger carrier discharges his duty to the passenger in affording him an opportunity to alight at the place of his destination, when he stops his train opposite the station platform, or at some other suitable place, for a sufficient length of time to enable all the passengers intending to alight at that station to do so, and when he gives him adequate warning that the train has arrived at that place; and that the carrier is not bound to subject the progress of his train to the delay which would result from sending his servants through every car to discover whether every passenger intending to alight at the particular stopping place has done so, before starting the train forward,-assuming, of course, that the passenger has boarded a train which regularly stops at the place of his destination, or which is legally bound to stop there.439 Then, it is reasoned in many cases, that there is a reciprocal duty on the part of the railway carrier and the passenger, the carrier to give a reasonable notice of the approach of the train to the station and to afford a reasonable time to enable the passenger to leave the train while it is at rest; and the passenger to use reasonable diligence and care in getting off. Judicial authority seems to be. unanimous in the conclusion that if the carrier has thus given the passenger reasonable notice, and afforded him a reasonable opportunity to get off at the proper stopping place, and the passenger nevertheless neglects to avail himself of the opportunity of doing so, but chooses to wait until the train has again started, and then is injured while attempting to leave the train while in motion,—he will be, precluded from recovering damages by reason of his own negligence. But if the carrier has not afforded the passenger a reasonable time in which to alight, but starts its train forward while the passenger is in the act of alighting, then contributory negligence will or will not be ascribed to the passenger, according to the cir

440

4 This section is cited in § 2560. 428 Ante, § 2860, et seq.

439 As to this, see ante, §§ 2554, 2557, 2890.

440 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Lyons, 129 Pa. St. 113; s. c. 47 Phila. Leg. Int. 179; 41 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. 154; 25 W. N. C. (Pa.) 6; 18 Atl. Rep. 759; Murphy v. Rome &c. R. Co., 32 N. Y. St. Rep. 381; s. c. 10 N. Y. Supp. 354; McDonald v. Long Island R. Co., 116 N. Y. 546; s. c. 27 N. Y. St. Rep. 481; 22 N. E. Rep. 1068: Ridenhour v. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 102 Mo. 270; s. c. 13 S. W. Rep. 889.

441 Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Slatton, 54 Ill. 133; Texas &c. R. Co. v. Miller, 79 Tex. 78; s. c. 11 L. R. A. 395; 15 S. W. Rep. 264; Little Rock &c. R. Co. v. Tankersley, 54 Ark. 25; s. c. 14 S. W. Rep. 1099; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Lyons, 129 Pa. St. 113; s. c. 47 Phila. Leg. Int. 179; 41 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. 154; 25 W. N. C. (Pa.) 6; 18 Atl. Rep. 154; Straus v. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 75 Mo. 185; Richmond &c. R. Co. v. Morris, 31 Gratt. (Va.) 200. Compare Swigert V. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 75 Mo. 475.

cumstances. Ordinarily, the question whether he proceeds in the exercise of reasonable or ordinary care will be a question of fact for the jury;442 but negligence will be imputed to his conduct as matter of law where it is obviously rash and dangerous for him to attempt to alight while the train is in motion, merely to avoid being carried beyond his place of destination.443 Upon the question what is a reasonable length of time to stop at a station in order to discharge the passengers, regard must obviously be had to the situation of the passengers; and the trainmen will not be justified in shutting their eyes to such situation and in feigning want of knowledge, and stopping the train for a mathematical length of time applicable to all cases. For example, if a female passenger is encumbered by the care of a baby, and if her egress from the car is obstructed by the entry of other passengers, the mere fact that the train stopped the usual length of time, will not be sufficient to show due care on the part of the company, or negligence on the part of the passenger.*** Whether a train has stopped at a station for a sufficient length of time to allow a passenger to get off is not a question to be determined by expert witnesses, but is ordinarily a question for the jury under all the circumstances in evidence.445 It has been held that a railroad company is not bound, in the absence of a custom to do so, to give signals for passengers to get off, or signals of the starting of the train, where it stops long enough for them to do so in safety; so that if, after the train has stopped for a reasonable length of time, it starts without giving any signal of its purpose to do so, and a passenger, then in the act of alighting, is injured, none of the employés knowing of his exposed situation, he can not recover.446

442 Ante, § 3014; Southern R. Co. v. Mitchell, 98 Tenn. 27; s. c. 40 S. W. Rep. 72; Jacob v. Flint &c. R. Co., 105 Mich. 450; s. c. 63 N. W. Rep. 502.

443 Ante, §§ 3011, 3012, 3013; Soloman v. Manhattan R. Co., 103 N. Y. 437; s. c. 4 Cent. Rep. 778; Jewell v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 54 Wis. 610; s. c. 41 Am. Rep. 63; Jacob v. Flint &c. R. Co.. 105 Mich. 450; s. C. 63 N. W. Rep. 502; Scully v. New York &c. R. Co., 80 Hun (N. Y.) 197; s. c. 61 N. Y. St. Rep. 804; 30 N. Y. Supp. 61; s. c. aff'd 151 N. Y. 672; 46 N. E. Rep. 1151; Toledo &c. R. Co. v. Wingate, 143 Ind. 134; s. c. 42 N. E. Rep. 477; Burgin v. Richmond &c. R. Co., 115 N. C. 673; s. c. 20 S. E. Rep. 473 (although the train fails to stop at his station and he is on his way home to see his dying child, and is not commanded

or invited to leave the train by any of the trainmen, and although the attempt is not obviously dangerous); Schiffler v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 96 Wis. 141; s. c. 71 N. W. Rep. 97: 8 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. (N. S.) 122 (where the train did not slow up at a place where a seventeen-year-old boy wanted to get off as the conductor promised him to do, it not being a place where the train was scheduled to stop); Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. Bangs, 47 Mich. 470 (where the train should stop, but does not. and the passenger jumps therefrom in order to get off there and avert distress to others).

444 Luse v. Union &c. R. Co., 57 Kan. 361; s. c. 46 Pac. Rep. 768.

445 Stowe v. Bishop, 58 Vt. 498; s. c. 2 N. Eng. Rep. 110.

446 Atlanta &c. R. Co. v. Dickerson, 89 Ga. 455; s. c. 15 S. E. Rep. 534.

§ 3018. Alighting from Moving Train where Passenger is Carried beyond his Station.-The courts also generally concur in the conclusion that, although the passenger is negligently or wrongfully carried beyond his station without affording him a reasonable and safe opportunity there to alight, yet if he nevertheless attempts to alight from the train while in motion, under circumstances of danger, such as would deter a reasonable and prudent man from making the attempt, and he is not impelled by any circumstance of sudden fear or urgent necessity, or misled or coerced by the advice, commands or threats of the carrier's servants, he can not make the wrong or negligence of the carrier the ground of recovering damages, but the hurt which he receives in so attempting to alight is imputable to his own negligence as the proximate cause of it.**7 In a leading case on this