subject, it was said by Mr. Chief Justice Black: "If the passenger is negligently carried beyond the station where he intended to stop. and where he had a right to be let off, he can recover compensation for the inconvenience, the loss of time and the labor of travelling back; because these are the direct consequences of the wrong done to him. But if he is foolhardy enough to jump off without waiting for the train to stop, he does it at his own risk; because this is gross imprudence for which he can blame nobody but himself. If there be any man who does not know that such leaps are dangerous, especially when taken in the dark, his friends should see that he does not travel by railroad." This rule has been applied so as to cut off a right of action for damages where a passenger attempted to alight at a point 150 feet beyond the station, while the train was moving at such a rate that its momentum carried him forward a rod or so after he struck the ground,-with the conclusion that he assumed all the risks of such an act;449 where a female passenger, after being carried a short distance beyond her station, jumped to the ground at a place where there was no station platform, upon the stopping of the train, under the direction of another passenger, and without the knowledge of any of the trainmen;450 where a passenger attempted to alight while he was being carried forward, from the station at which he intended to alight, to another station a few rods further distant from his station; where a passenger attempted to alight from a train in the dark, after it had passed his proper station, and when it was running at an increasing rate of speed, of which fact he was aware before descending the steps.452 But even here, there is no unbending rule of law, applicable to all cases, which conclusively imputes contributory negligence to such an act. Thus, it has been held that the contributory negligence of a passenger, who jumps from the train while it is in motion, after it has passed his station without stopping. although the station has been announced and the speed slackened,-is a question for the jury under all the circumstances of the case.*53

451

R. Co., 87 Me. 466; s. c. 32 Atl. Rep. 1010; 2 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. (N. S.) 293; Pennsylvania Co. v. Hixon, 10 Ind. App. 520; s. c. 38 N. E. Rep. 56; Williams v. St. Louis &c. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.). 36 S. W. Rep. 329 (no off. rep.); Western &c. R. Co. v. Goodwin, 105 Ga. 237; s. c. 12 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. (N. S.) 219; 31 S. E. Rep. 157.

448 Railroad Co. v. Aspell. 23 Pa. St. 147; s. c. Thomp. Carr. Pass. 252.

449 Butler v. St. Paul &c. R. Co., 59 Minn. 135; s. c. 60 N. W. Rep. 1090.

450 Texas &c. R. Co. v. Woods, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 612; s. c. 40 S. W. Rep. 846.

401 McDonald v. Boston &c. R. Co.. 87 Me. 466; s. c. 32 Atl. Rep. 1010; 2 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. (N. S.) 293.

452 Pennsylvania Co. v. Hixon, 10 Ind. App. 520; s. c. 38 N. E. Rep. 56. 453 Richmond v. Quincy &c. R. Co., 49 Mo. App. 104.

454

§ 3019. Further of Conduct of Passenger Carried beyond his Station. If a passenger is carried beyond his station through the fault of the carrier, and the train stops to let him off, and the place is an unsafe place for the purpose, and he is injured in the act of alighting, the question of his negligence will ordinarily be for the decision of the jury. If a carrier, through negligence, carries a passenger beyond his station, and then lets him off, it will not, for that reason, become liable to him for a subsequent injury to him, which he might have avoided by the exercise of ordinary care,-as where, being familiar with the place and the danger, he starts to walk back between the tracks and falls into a culvert and is injured.55 But where an old and feeble passenger was carried beyond his station three-quarters of a mile, and thereby missed his conveyance, and was compelled to walk home over a wet and muddy road at midnight, by reason of which walk and the incidental exposure, he contracted a sickness from which he never recovered,-it was a question for the jury whether the injury complained of was the proximate result of the failure to stop the train and let him off at his destination.456 Where a railway company carries a passenger away from the usual stopping place, to a place where there are no accommodations for alighting, and where the company knows there is special risk and hazard owing to the switching of the engine, it is a question for the jury whether the company used the proper caution to protect the passenger; and whether the passenger, with the knowledge she possessed of the danger, and in view of her right to presume that the company would use due care for her protection,-was guilty of negligence proximately contributing to her injury,-is also a question for the jury. A passenger,—in the particular case a woman, who learns that she must change cars before arriving at her destination, must find out where -he is to make the change, and if she fails to do so, through the failure to exercise ordinary care, and, by reason of her failure, is carried over the wrong line, she can not recover damages from the company, unless she is misled by its agents or servants. 458

454 Foss v. Boston &c. R. Co., 66 N. H. 256; s. c. 21 Atl. Rep. 222; 11 L. R. A. 367.

435 Fisher v. Paxson, 182 Pa. St. 457; s. c. 38 Atl. Rep. 407; 41 W. N. C. (Pa.) 310.

456 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Mask, 64 Miss. 738; s. c. 2 South. Rep. 360. 457 Franklin v. Southern &c. R. Co., 85 Cal. 63; s. c. 24 Pac. Rep. 723.

458 St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. McCullough, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 534; s. c. 45 S. W. Rep. 324. Circumstances

under which railway company not liable for personal injuries sustained by passenger in falling through a railway bridge over a dirt road while walking back to the station at which the train had failed to stop: Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Jordan (Tex. Civ. App.), 33 S. W. Rep. 690 (no off. rep.). In a curious case in Texas, a passenger on a railway train was put off at one end of a trestle, and his gun, which was in the baggage car, was put off at the

§ 3020. Some Illustrations of the Doctrine of the Preceding Section. It was so held in a case in Michigan, where a train was passing the station at the rate of about six miles an hour, and a passenger, not wishing to disappoint his mother at home in her expectation of seeing him, leaped from the train and was hurt. The case was regarded as a hard one; but the negligence of the passenger was clear and undoubted, and it was therefore held that there was no case to go to a jury.459 It has been well held that one who has bought a ticket, or who has otherwise become entitled to transportation on a particular train of cars of a railroad corporation, is ordinarily a passenger of the corporation from the time when he reasonably or properly starts from the ticket office or waiting-room in the station to take his seat in a car of the train,* 460 till he has reached the station to which he is entitled to be carried, and has had an opportunity, by safe and convenient means, to leave the train and roadway of the corporation at the station.461 If the passenger chooses to abandon his journey at any point before reaching the place to which he is entitled to be carried, the corporation ceases to be under any obligation to provide him with the means of travelling further. And while it is true that, if he leaves the train while it is at rest at a station, he is entitled to an opportunity to do so in safety, it is equally true that the corporation is not under any obligation to make it safe for him to leave the train while it is in motion, and that if he does so, he assumes all risk of injury.462 Applying this principle, where a passenger on a railroad train left the train after the conductor had called out the name of the station to which he was entitled to be carried, and the car in which he was had passed the station and had almost stopped, and, while crossing to the station, he was killed by a locomotive engine on a parallel track, the approach of which he might have seen if he had looked before leaving the train, it was held that an indictment against the railroad corporation, under the Massachusetts statute,+63 could not be sustained.***

other. The ex-passenger crossed the trestle to get his gun, and, while returning with it, fell, and was hurt. It was held that the railway company was liable for any injury to him which was the natural and probable consequence of putting him off its train at one end of the trestle, and putting off his gun at the other, but not for subsequent injuries to him, which a prudent man with time to consider what to do, would have avoided; and a judgment for the plaintiff was reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial:

International &c. R. Co. v. Folliard. 66 Tex. 603.

459 Lake Shore &c. R. Co. v. Bangs, 47 Mich. 470; s. c. 13 Reporter 337. 480 Warren v. Fitchburg R. Co., 8 Allen (Mass.) 227.

461 Com. v. Boston &c. R. Co., 129 Mass. 501.

462 Com. V. Boston &c. R. Co., supra; Gavett v. Manchester &c. R. Co., 16 Gray (Mass.) 501.

463 Mass. Stat. of 1874, ch. 372. § 163.

454 Com. v. Boston &c. R. Co., 129 Mass. 501.

§ 3021. Other Instances of Injuries of this Kind where Recovery was Denied.-Applying the foregoing principles, a recovery of damages has been denied where a female passenger attempted to alight from a moving train, after having been warned of the danger of so doing, and this, irrespective of the question whether the warning proceeded from a trainman or from a passenger;465 where a passenger, after having been told by the conductor that the train was going to stop at a station, walked to the platform, and, after the train had passed the station, jumped and was injured, although if he had remained on, he could have got off without injury, as the train merely went to the other end of a switch and backed in;466 where a person, entitled to the rights of a passenger, jumped from a railroad train while it was running at the rate of ten or twelve miles an hour, without any reason to fear harm by remaining on the train, or that he would be ejected while the train was in rapid motion, if he had not gone voluntarily;467 where an employé of an adjoining road jumped from a train moving twenty-five miles an hour, when not invited or ordered to do so by the agents of the railroad company, and not to avoid any threatened peril, although the place where he jumped was the place where he was expected to leave the train, notwithstanding the fact that he was an experienced train hand, and was a poor man, and would not know how to get back if he did not jump; 468 where a passenger came on the car platform for the purpose of alighting, after the train had commenced moving, and saw two persons preceding him, thrown to the ground while attempting to alight, but nevertheless made the attempt himself and was killed; 469 where a passenger attempted to alight from a railway train at a street crossing while the train was in motion, although the hurt which he received was partly caused by a sudden jerk of the train produced by putting on the steam;470 and finally where a passenger unnecessarily stepped off a moving train in the dark without any in

465 Kilpatrick v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 140 Pa. St. 502; s. c. 27 W. N. C. (Pa.) 484; 48 Phila. Leg. Int. 297; 21 Atl. Rep. 408.

466 Savannah &c. R. Co. v. Watts, 82 Ga. 229; s. c. 9 S. E. Rep. 129.

467 St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Rosenberry, 45 Ark. 256; s. c. 11 S. W. Rep. 212 (the plaintiff had, without inquiry, boarded a through freight train running under telegraphic instructions, which did not permit it to stop at his destination. The conductor nevertheless took up his ticket, used abusive language,

VOL. 3 THOMP. NEG.-31

and ordered him to jump off at the station).

468 Jarrett v. Atlanta &c. R. Co., 83 Ga. 347; s. c. 9 S. E. Rep. 681 (each of the railroad companies was accustomed to allow the employés of the other to ride to and from their places of work on its trains).

460 Brown v. Barnes, 151 Pa. St. 562; s. c. 31 W. N. C. (Pa.) 179; 25 Atl. Rep. 144; 23 Pitts. L. J. (N. S.) 199.

470 Paterson v. Central R. &c. Co., 85 Ga. 653; s. c. 11 S. E. Rep. 872.

481

vitation or assurance from the conductor that it was safe to do so,— this being held negligence per se.11

§ 3022. Where the Train does not Stop Long Enough to Enable the Passenger to Get Off.-It must be concluded, from many of the foregoing decisions, that where the train does not stop long enough to enable the passenger, exercising ordinary care and diligence, to alight in safety, and the passenger is injured in attempting to alight, the company will be liable to the passenger, he proceeding with reasonable care.472 For example, where the facts tend to show that the train stopped but fifteen seconds at the place where a female passenger was to alight, and, before she had time to get off, started suddenly, whereby she was injured, the court could not say, as matter of law, that she was negligent in not accomplishing the feat of alighting within that time.473 Another court has reasoned that it is not an act of contributory negligence, as a matter of law, for a passenger to jump from the steps of a car while the train is leaving the station, where it has not stopped a reasonable time to allow the passenger to get off, and where an ordinarily cautious, careful and prudent person would not apprehend danger from the act. One court has reasoned that a railroad company whose servants move a train before a passenger thereon, who is entitled to leave at a stopping place, has had a reasonable time to alight, and while he is in the act of leaving the train, thereby gives him an implied invitation to alight while it is moving, and a compliance by him therewith is not negligence per se, unless the speed or some other circumstance makes it manifestly dangerous. 475 Another court has reasoned that where the train does not come to a full stop at the station at which the passenger is entitled to get off, and he nevertheless attempts to alight, and. owing to a great crowd upon the cars and platforms, is pushed or falls off and receives an injury, a case is made out which ought to go to a jury. Here, the passenger is not in the position of one who has voluntarily assumed an exposed position, not intended for passengers, or who has attempted to alight from the train without waiting for it to stop, knowing, or having reason to believe, that it

471 England v. Boston &c. R. Co., 153 Mass. 490; s. c. 27 N. E. Rep. 1. For an example of an insufficient complaint for an injury of this kind, under the rule in Indiana (abolished by Burns' Rev. Stat. Ind. 1901, § 359a; Ind. Act 1899, p. 58), which required the plaintiff to negative contributory negligence,-see Cincinnati &c. R. Co. v. Peters, 80 Ind. 168.

472 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Byrum, 153 Ill. 131; s. c. 38 N. E. Rep. 578.

473 Smitson v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 37 Or. 74; s. c. 60 Pac. Rep. 907.

474 Carr v. Eel River &c. R. Co.. 98 Cal. 366; s. c. 21 L. R. A. 354, and note; 33 Pac. Rep. 213.

475 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Stacker, 86 Tenn. 343; s. c. 6 S. W. Rep. 737.