known as the Civil-Rights Law, was enacted, designed to protect the lately emancipated slaves in the civil rights with which they had been clothed, under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amerc ments to the Constitution of the United States. In 1875 another act of the same nature was passed, known as the Supplemental Civil-Rights Law, which provided, under a penalty and subject to indictment as for a misdemeanor in a court of the United States, "that all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous conditions of servitude."76 The constitutionality of this act was denied by some of the State courts," and in some of the inferior Federal courts ;78 and the statute was finally overthrown in the Supreme Court of the United States, as an attempt on the part of Congress to establish a police regulation which lay within the exclusive power of the States, except in cases where it affected interstate commerce.79 § 3124. Statutory Prohibition under which such Separation Unlawful.-In a case which arose under a private Act of Congress, passed in 1863, granting certain privileges to a railroad corporation, accompanied with the provision, however, that "no person shall be excluded from the cars on account of color," it was held that this language meant that persons of color should travel in the same cars with white people, and that the enactment was not satisfied by the company providing cars assigned exclusively to people of color, though they were as good as those which they assigned exclusively for white persons, and in fact the very cars which were at certain times assigned exclusively to white persons. Davis, J., said, in regard to the passage of this act: "It was the discrimination in the use of the cars on account of color, where slavery obtained, which was the subject of discussion at the time, and not the fact that the colored race could 76 Acts Cong. 1874, 1875, p. 335, ch. Rights Bill, 1 Hughes (U. S.) 541. 114. "See Donnell v. State, 48 Miss. 661; Sauvinet v. Walker, 27 La. An. 14; Peters' Case, 9 Am. L. Rev. 164. But, see District v. Saville, 9 Am. L. Rev. 584. 78 Cully v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 1 Hughes (U. S.) 536; The Civil Compare Green v. Bridgeton, 9 79 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3; s. c. 27 L. ed. 835; also cited sub nom. Robinson v. Memphis &c. R. Co. not ride in the cars at all."80 Railroad corporations are expressly prohibited by statute in Pennsylvanias1 from making this classification of their passengers; and any person, on account of color or race, compelled to occupy any particular part of their cars, may recover $500 in an action of debt, as damages for this grievance.$2 Under this statute, Paxson, J., was of opinion that the mere fact that the plaintiff was excluded from a certain car, and directed to take a seat in another car equally comfortable, in which white persons were seated, was of itself no evidence that she was excluded on account of her color. "I do not think," said he, "it was intended by said act to give them superior privileges, or to so interfere with the reasonable police arrangement of railroad companies in operating their road and moving their cars as to enable a colored man to force himself into a car where, by reason of such police regulations, a white man may not enter. An ordinary traveller takes his seat in such car as may be pointed out to him by those in charge of the train. In doing so, he recognizes the undoubted right of the company to designate the car which he shall enter. He has a right to a seat, but not to a seat in any particular car.' 9783 § 3125. Colored Passenger Entitled to Equal Accommodations with White Passenger.-But, although a regulation separating the two races on the carrier's vehicle is upheld, yet the courts are agreed that a passenger of either race is entitled to the accommodation which he purchases. For example, if he purchases a first-class ticket, he can not be put into a second-class compartment. Accordingly, in an action by a female colored passenger for having been forcibly excluded from the dinner table provided for passengers in general, and ordered to take her meals upon the guards of the boat or in the pantry, as was customary for colored passengers, the court held that, under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil-Rights Law of 1866, which guaranteed to colored persons the right to make and enforce contracts, she had a right to the accommodations demanded.84 So Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 445, 452. $1 Pa. Act of March 22, 1867, Pamph. Laws, 38; 2 Bright. Purd. Dig. (Pa.) 1228, § 80. 82 Central R. Co. v. Green, 86 Pa. St. 427. 83 Central R. Co. v. Green, 86 Pa. St. 421, 426. 84 In this case it will be observed that the conveniences accorded to colored persons were in no respect equal to those enjoyed by white pas sengers, and the case is not an authority against the contention that a classification of passengers may be made without violating the provisions of the Supplemental Civil Rights Law of 1875: Coger V. North-Western Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145. See this case disparagingly noticed by Clifford, J., in Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485, 507. Compare Ellis v. Narragansett Steamship Co., 111 Mass. 146. That a carrier may exclude a colored woman § 3126. What are Equal Accommodations when Allotted to Colored Passengers.-Upon the question what are equal accommodations in a car set apart for colored passengers, with those in a car on the same train set apart for white passengers, it has been held that the mere circumstance that there has been at some time chewing and smoking in a room set apart for colored passengers, at a station, and not in the one set apart for white passengers, does not conclusively show that the accommodations of the two rooms are not substantially equal at a time when there is no chewing or smoking in the room. 85 § 3127. Right of Colored Passenger to Damages for the Refusal of Equal Accommodations with White Passengers.-In Texas a hard and unjust law has been rendered harder and more unjust by judicial interpretation. In that State the failure of a railroad company to furnish accommodations on its train to a negro passenger, equal to those furnished to white passengers on the same train, in violation of the statute, does not create any presumption that the negro has sustained damage, not even nominal damage; but he must show that it has visited actual damage upon him.86 If he is forced into a car in which there is no water-cooler and no water-closet, such as are provided on the same train in cars occupied by white passengers, and is transported in such a car for a distance of fifty miles, this does not, according to the humane jurisprudence of Texas, render the railroad company liable to him, unless he has sustained substantial damage from the lack of such conveniences.87 But the failure of a railroad company to furnish a coach set apart for colored passengers with a water-closet renders it liable in damages to one who is damaged thereby, on the ground of failure to perform its duty as a common carrier, without regard to a violation of the separate-coach act.“ § 3128. Ejecting Colored Passengers from Waiting-Rooms or Cars Set Apart for White Passengers.-The right to separate passengers of the two races into different waiting-rooms, or different cars, or compartments of cars, on the same train, necessarily carries with it from a car set apart for ladies, where she is given an opportunity to ride with people of her own color in a car which is equal in accommodations to the other,-see Chilton v. St. Louis &c. R. Co.. 114 Mo. 88; s. c. 19 L. R. A. 269; 21 S. W. Rep. 457. 95 Smith v. Chamberlain, 38 S. C. 529; s. c. 19 L. R. A. 710; 17 S. E. Rep. 371. 86 Norwood v. Galveston &c. R. Co., 12 Tex. Civ. App. 560; s. c. 3 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. (N. S.) 395; 34 S. W. Rep. 180. 87 Henderson v. Galveston &c. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 42 S. W. Rep. 1030 (no off. rep.). Writ of error denied by Supreme Court. 88 Henderson v. Galveston &c. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 38 S. W. Rep. 1136 (no off. rep.). So This section is cited in § 3253. the right to remove by force a person of one race who persists in occupying the waiting-room, the car, or the compartment, set apart for the other race; but this must be done in a decent and proper manner, and without the use of unnecessary violence; and for any unnecessary rudeness or excessive force, in accomplishing this duty, the company will be liable," whether the force was employed by its own servant, or by another passenger called upon by him to assist him.91 92 § 3129. Excluding "Runners," Peddlers, Hotel Managers, etc., from Carrier's Vehicles and Premises.-The well-established right of carriers to make reasonable regulations for the conduct of passengers and others transacting business upon their premises, is accompanied by the right to exclude from their premises persons having no business with the carrier, and whose presence would be detrimental to his interests or the safety and convenience of passengers." This rule follows naturally from the strict accountability to which the carrier is held for the safety of passengers and goods intrusted to his charge. It may be true that when the carrier constructs and opens station houses designed for the reception of the public, by so doing an implied license is prima facie given to all persons to enter his premises, and no person is a trespasser by merely entering therein; but such a license is revocable, and when revoked, the right to enter or remain is terminated.93 Thus, it has been held proper to exclude, by force if necessary, an innkeeper from a railroad depot, whose habit had been to enter the depot and annoy passengers by soliciting patronage for his house, having been previously notified that he must discontinue the practice. And such person's rights will not be enhanced in the premises even though he has in his possession a ticket entitling him to passage upon the defendant's railroad, and he enters the depot with the bona fide intention of taking the cars, if he fails to exhibit the ticket when ordered to leave the station, and his conduct is such as to induce the defendant's agent to believe that his intention is to continue to violate the regulations of the company.95 But the carrier's station agent will not be justified in thus removing a person merely because, in his judgment, and without proof of the fact, he has violated regulations of the company, although he had 94 Rose v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 70 46. See also Markham v. Brown, 8 Miss. 725; s. c. 12 South. Rep. 825. N. H. 523. 91 Post, $3253. Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumn. (U. S.) 221; s. c. Thomp. Carr. Pass. 11; Com. v. Power, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 596; Harris v. Stevens, 31 Vt. 79; Barker v. Midland R. Co., 18 C. B. VOL. 3 THOMP. NEG.-37 93 Com. v. Power, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 596; Harris v. Stevens, 31 Vt. 79. 4 Com. v. Power, supra; Landrigan v. State, 31 Ark. 50. 95 Com. v. Power, supra. 577 96 conducted himself offensively to such agent personally. If the railway company ejects a passenger from its premises for a supposed violation of its rules in soliciting for a hotel, which supposition is erroneous, the company will be liable for the injury thereby done to him, without regard to the degree of force employed in making the ejection, whether it was merely sufficient force to accomplish the purpose, or excessive force.97 In such a case it will not be enough that the employés of the railway company had reasonable cause to believe that the passenger was violating the rules of the company, in soliciting for a hotel, and the jury should not be so instructed if there is evidence tending to show that unnecessary force was used in making the ejection.98 A carrier is not bound to give passage to a person who desires to use the facilities which such passage affords for trafficking purposes of his own: any other rule would be demoralizing to good management."" 99 § 3130. Excluding Idlers, Hackmen, etc., from Carrier's Premises. A person resorting to a railroad station for the purpose of taking a train, should come within a reasonable time for this purpose. next prior to the departure of the train. He has no right to come, it may be, hours before such departure, and insist upon his right to remain there merely because he intends to take passage on a trait some time.100 An omnibus proprietor who carries passengers and their luggage for hire, to and from a railway station, can not maintain an action against the company for refusing to allow him to drive his vehicle into their station yard. Said Jervis, C. J., in so holding: "It is not pretended that the plaintiff was using, or seeking to use, the railway. What right, then, can he have to say to the company, I will use your private property for my profit? There is no pretense for the action. It has neither principle nor any color 482. Hall v. Power, 12 Metc. (Mass.) desiring to use the railway, in the 97 St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Osborn, 67 Ark. 399; s. c. 55 S. W. Rep. 142. 98 St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Osborn, 67 Ark. 399; s. c. 55 S. W. Rep. 142. Jencks v. Coleman, 2 Sumn. (U. S.) 221; s. c. Thomp. Carr. Pass. 11; Barney v. The D. R. Martin, 11 Blatchf. (U. S.) 233; s. c. 5 Chic. Leg. N. 535; s. c. sub nom. Barney v. The Oyster Bay &c. Steamboat Co., 67 N. Y. 301. In England, the owner or manager of a railway station may in his discretion exclude therefrom, or admit upon such conditions as he may think fit, any person not using or absence of any decision to the cotrary by the English railway commission: Perth &c. Committee . Ross, L. R. (1897) A. C. 479; s. c. 66 L. J. P. C. (N. S.) 81. In that country a hotel owner has no right, by himself or by his servants, to enter upon or use a railway station without the leave of its owners and 15der such terms as the owners may prescribe, for the purpose of meeting intending customers of the hotel: Perth &c. Committee v. Ross, L. R. (1897) A. C. 479; s. c. 66 L. J. P. C. (N. S.) 81. 100 Harris v. Stevens, 31 Vt. 79. |