§ 3144. Regulation Requiring Identification of Purchasers of Tickets. A railway rule or regulation requiring an original purchaser of an excursion ticket at a reduced rate to be identified by the company's agent at the point of original destination before he can demand return passage has been held lawful and reasonable; and upon his non-compliance therewith the conductor on the return trip has the legal right to eject him.148 § 3145. Rights of Passenger who has Lost or Mislaid his Ticket.— Clearly, a passenger who has lost or mislaid his ticket, and who, after having been allowed a reasonable opportunity to search for it, can not find it, must either pay the fare which the carrier is entitled to demand of passengers boarding his vehicle without tickets, or else get off the vehicle. A by-law of a tramway company, enforceable by a penalty, providing that each passenger, when required to do so by an agent of the company, shall either deliver up his ticket or pay fare, is therefore reasonable and valid;149 and under the operation of such a by-law, a passenger who has lost his ticket is liable to the penalty, upon his refusal to pay a new fare.150 A passenger who has mislaid his ticket is entitled to a reasonable length of time in which to search for it; he is not obliged to have his ticket ready in hand the moment the conductor may demand that it shall be exhibited. 151 The loss of a ticket is very properly held to fall upon the passenger; any other rule would be a source of endless fraud upon the carrier and of intolerable delay to the public. "It is better and more reasonable that a passenger should now and then have to suffer the consequences of his own want of care, than that a system should be rendered impracticable which seems necessary to the transaction of this important branch of business. The public, whether wisely or not, desire to travel at the rate of four or five hundred miles a day, and that rapidity of movement can not be accomplished without peculiar arrangements to suit the exigeney, which must sometimes be found to produce inconvenience."152 It is the duty of the passenger, in case he has lost or mislaid his ticket, or in case the ticket which he happens to hold does not entitle him to proceed further, although he may have paid the price of a ticket to a station further on, to pay the fare demanded; and if the company afterwards refuses * * * 148 Abram v. Gulf &c. R. Co., 83 Tex. 61; s. c. 11 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 158; 18 S. W. Rep. 321. 14) Hanks V. Bridgman. L. R. (1896) 1 Q. B. 253; s. c. 65 L. J. M. C. (N. S.) 41; 74 Law T. Rep. 26. See post, §§ 3216, 3217. 150 Hanks v. Bridgman, supra. 151 Curtis v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 12 Upper Canada C. P. 89; Maples v. New York &c. R. Co., 38 Conn. 557. 152 Robinson, C. J., in Duke v. Great Western R. Co., 14 Upper Canada Q. B. 377, 384; s. c. id. 369. to make suitable reparation for the indignity to which he has been exposed in being compelled to repay his fare, he can maintain his action against it.153 But the circumstances may be such that satisfactory evidence can be given to account for the failure to produce the customary ticket, in which case the conductor is not justified in following out his instructions literally and in disregard of such evidence; as where the plaintiff purchased a ticket for a berth in a sleeping car, which he exhibited to the porter, who showed him his berth, which the plaintiff made preparations to occupy, and afterwards the ticket was demanded by the conductor of the car. The ticket cou.! not be found, having been lost in the meantime by the passenger. The train had not yet left the station where the ticket was purchasei. and the plaintiff procured from the defendant's agent a writing eertifying that he had paid for the berth he was occupying. The conductor refused to accept this, or any explanations in lieu of the ticket, and the plaintiff was accordingly ejected from the sleeping car. It was held that he was entitled to recover the price paid for his ticket, and reasonable compensation for the trouble and inconvenience occasioned by being deprived of his berth in the sleeping car. 154 Likewise, a passenger may be compelled to pay his fare, who has in his possession a coupon ticket which entitles him to ride the distances indicated by the coupons respectively, but who has lost a conductor's check which had been given him in exchange for one of his coupons. In such a case, the ticket with the coupons remaining attached, entitling him to ride from some point further on to his destination, is no evidence to the conductor of his right to ride upon that section of the road covered by the coupon detached by the conductor previously having charge of the train.155 If the passenger has paid for three 153 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Griffin, and Frederick v. Marquette &c. R. Co., 37 Mich. 342; s. c. 6 Reporter 116. 154 Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Reed, 75 Ill. 125. An informal writing by the ticket agent to the effect that a passenger has paid his fare, becomes a ticket as good as the printed one usually sold: St. Louis &c. R. Co. v. Dalby, 19 Ill. 353, 365, per Caton, C. J. See also Toledo &c. R. Co. v. McDonough, 53 Ind. 289. 155 Jerome v. Smith, 48 Vt. 230. See also, O'Brien v. Boston &c. R. Co., 15 Gray (Mass.) 20; s. c. Thomp. Carr. Pass. 22. If there is no special contract to vary the terms of a railroad ticket, it must be used as those terms direct,-e. g., a ticket with the words "Portland to Boston" im printed on it, purchased in Portland. does not entitle the holder to a pass age in a direction the reverse of that indicated on the ticket: Keeley v. Boston &c. R. Co., 67 Me. 163: 8. C. 6 Cent. L. J. 382; 17 Alb. L. J. 366: Coleman v. New York &c. R. Co., 146 Mass. 160. Where an additional and more circuitous route exists between two points on the main line of a railroad, a passenger holding a through ticket can not, as a matter of right. leave the train on the main line at one of these points and demand transportation to the other point over the circuitous route withect paying additional fare. The company is bound only to carry the pas senger over the through and most direct route. Especially is this so when the rate per mile to be charged 156 tickets for himself and companions, and received only two, the production of these two, with an explanation as to the failure to procure the third, can not excuse the payment of fare demanded.15 A railroad company is under no obligation to carry persons for less than the usual rates. If it chooses to do so, the passenger must comply with the regulations made in such cases,-namely, show a permission from the proper officer to travel. If this is not done, the person so travelling may be ejected from the train.1 157 § 3146. Rights of Passenger where Conductor has Wrongfully Taken Up his Ticket.-The fact that one of the defendant's conductors has wrongfully taken a passenger's ticket from him, does not justify him in getting upon another train of the defendant's, with the intention of riding without paying his fare. The conductor may properly expel such a passenger from his train.158 159 § 3147. Expulsion of Persons Refusing to Pay Fare.-A willful refusal to pay the proper fare demandable justifies expulsion from the train. The railroad company is under no obligation to transport a trespasser, and he may be expelled at any time, provided the manner and place of expulsion are such that the act will not result in wanton injury.1 It is important to observe the distinction between passengers who may honestly differ with the company's agents in regard to their rights, and therefore refuse to submit to exactions of fare in addition to that already paid, and persons who board the train, or remain upon it after their ticket is exhausted, with the intention of defrauding the company or resisting demands for payment of fare. It would seem that trespassers are not "passengers" contemplated by statutes which forbid the expulsion of passengers at other than regu for tickets is fixed by statute, and the price of the ticket, as in this case, was for the number of miles' travel on the most direct line between the two points: Bennett v. New York &c. R. Co., 69 N. Y. 594; s. c. 5 Hun (N. Y.) 599. See, also, Adwin v. New York &c. R. Co., 60 Barb. 590. 156 Weaver v. Rome &c. R. Co., 3 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 470. 157 Goetz v. Hannibal &c. R. Co., 50 Mo. 472. 158 Shelton v. Lake Shore &c. R. Co., 29 Ohio St. 214; Townsend v. New York &c. R. Co., 56 N. Y. 295. If a passenger has received a conductor's check in exchange for his ticket, and gets upon another train by the direction of the company's servant, and on the assurance of the conductor that such check will be received upon the other train, the company will be responsible for the act of the conductor in refusing to recognize such check and expelling the passenger from the train: Toledo &c. R. Co. v. McDonough, 53 Ind. 289. 150 Great Western R. Co. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305; Haley v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 21 Iowa 15; Chicago &c. R. Co. V. Boger, 1 Ill. App. 472; Lillis v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 64 Mo. 464; Ohio &c. R. Co. v. Muhling, 30 Ill. 9; O'Brien v. Boston &c. R. Co.. 15 Gray (Mass.) 20; s. c. Thomp. Carr. Pass. 22. lar stations.160 But this distinction is not always observed.181 After a person has refused to pay his fare, and is being put off the train, he acquires no right to passage by then tendering the fare demanded.162 In such a case, if put off at a regular station, he must there obtain a ticket and tender the same.1 163 Where the rates of fare fixed by the company were higher than allowed by law, and the plaintiff entered the cars and tendered the legal fare for the purpose, as he afterwards declared, of making money by suit against the company for expulsion in consequence of refusal to pay the rate fixed by the company, having been so expelled, it was held that he was entitled only to compensatory damages; and that, for the purpose of mitigating the damages, his subsequent declarations as to his object in entering the train were admissible in evidence.164 When, upon a steamboat, no collection of fares is made until the landing is reached, a person attempting to leave the boat without producing a ticket may be detained a reasonable length of time, in order that the officers of the boat may investigate statements explanatory of his failure to produce the ticket.165 § 3148. Statutory Penalties in England for Riding without Paying Fare.-In England it is provided by statute,166 that "if any per 160 Lillis v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 64 Mo. 464; Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Boger, 1 Ill. App. 472; People v. Jillson, 3 Park. Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 234; post, § 3244. 161 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Peacock, 48 Ill. 253; Fulton v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 17 Upper Canada Q. B. 428. 162 People v. Jillson, 3 Park Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 234; O'Brien v. Boston &c. R. Co., 15 Gray (Mass.) 20; s. c. Thomp. Carr. Pass. 22; State v. Campbell, 32 N. J. L. 309; Nelson v. Long Island &c. R. Co., 7 Hun (N. Y.) 140; Stone v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 47 Iowa 82; s. c. 10 Chic. Leg. N. 78; 6 Reporter 489; Hoffbauer v. D. & N. R. Co., 20 Alb. L. J. 474; Fulton v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 17 Upper Canada Q. B. 428; Hibbard v. New York &c. R. Co., 15 N. Y. 455, 462, per Denio, C. J. 163 Nelson v. Long Island R. Co., 7 Hun (N. Y.) 140. In State v. Campbell, 32 N. J. L. 309, the passenger had in his possession a spent ticket and a regular ticket. He insisted on the right of passage on the spent ticket, and exhibited no other. Having been ejected from the train, after considerable delay and difficulty, he produced the regular ticket, and demanded that he be car ried upon it, which demand was refused. The court held that his tortious refusal to produce this ticket before his expulsion was a breach of the contract, saying: "A passenger takes his ticket subject to the reasonable regulations of the company; it is an implied condition in his contract that he will submit to such regulations; and if he willfully refuses to be bound by them. by so doing he repudiates his contract, and after such repudiation can not claim any right under it." It was resolved in Stone v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 47 Iowa 82, that where a passenger has been ejected from a train for non-payment of fare, he must pay the fare from the station where he first entered the train, before he can insist on being carried forward upon the same train; and if he purchase a ticket at the point where he was ejected, the conductor may nevertheless exclude him from the train. 164 Cincinnati &c. R. Co. v. Cole, 29 Ohio St. 126. 165 Standish v. Narragansett Steamboat Co., 111 Mass. 512. 166 Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 Vict., c. 20, § 103. * ** * son travel, or attempt to travel, in any carriage of the company, or of any other company or party using the railway, without having previously paid his fare, and with intent to avoid payment thereof; or if any person, having paid his fare for a certain distance, knowingly and willfully proceed in any such carriage beyond such distance without previously paying the additional fare for the additional distance, and with intent to avoid payment thereof; or if any person knowingly and willfully refuse or neglect, on arriving at the point to which he has paid his fare, to quit such carriage, every such person shall, for every such offense, forfeit to the company a sum not exceeding forty shillings." By the same statute it is provided:167 "For better enforcing the observance of all or any of such regulations, it shall be lawful for the company, subject, etc., to make bylaws; * * * provided that such by-laws be not repugnant to the laws of that part of the United Kingdom where the same are to have effect, or to the provisions of this or the special act; and any person offending against any such by-law shall forfeit for every such offense any sum not exceeding five pounds, to be imposed by the company in such by-laws as a penalty for any such offense." Under § 103 of the foregoing provisions it is held that fraudulent intention is the gist of the offense of travelling without having paid the fare;168 and the fact that a person rode beyond the station for which he had purchased a ticket, but, on getting out of the train, tendered the full local fare charged by the company for this extra distance, after delivering up his ticket, was no evidence of an intention. to defraud the company.169 Under $103, by-laws were frequently made requiring a passenger not producing or delivering up his ticket, to pay his fare from the place from which the train originally started, or in default thereof forfeit a sum not exceeding forty shillings. In one case,170 a by-law of this description, made under the provisions of an act incorporating the railway company, similar in effect to the provisions above set out from the Companies Clauses Consolidated Act, was held not to impose a penalty, and did not, therefore, justify the arrest and imprisonment of a passenger committing a breach of it, in accordance with other provisions for the enforcement of penalties in the act incorporating the company.171 But 167 Ibid., § 109. 168 Dearden v. Townsend, L. R. 1 Q. B. 10; Bentham v. Hoyle, L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 289; London &c. R. Co. v. Watson, L. R. 3 C. P. Div. 429; s. c. 4 C. P. Div. 118. See, also, Regina v. Frere, 4 El. & Bl. 598; * * * McCarthy v. Dublin &c. R. Co., Irish 100 Dearden v. Townsend, L. R. 1 Q. B. 10. 170 Chilton v. London &c. R. Co., 16 Mee. & W. 212. 171 See, also, Barr v. Midland R. Co., Irish Rep. 1 C. L. 130. |