entitled, in the absence of any specific contract or restriction in the ticket to the contrary, to stop over at the end of each division and resume the journey on the next coupon, provided it is done within the final limit fixed by the ticket.21 § 2598. Further of the Right to Stop Off and Resume Journey.— If a passenger having a ticket for a continuous passage only, enters a train which, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, he would have discovered does not stop at his place of destination, and he, upon making the discovery, leaves the train at an intermediate point, he is not entitled to be carried the remainder of the journey on the train which he ought to have taken in the first place.219 If the passenger, having such a ticket, surrenders it to the conductor, and then stops over at an intermediate station without his consent, and leaves his baggage on the train to be carried to his place of final destination, he will be liable, on resuming the journey, to the payment of additional fare, and the carrier will have a lien on his baggage for the same.220 It is immaterial that the passenger seeks to resume his journey on a subsequent trip made by the same train, in charge of the same conductor, on his original ticket. The contract having been broken by his voluntary act, he can not resume it without payment of additional fare for the uncompleted portion of his journey.221 But if the ticket entitles the passenger to stop over, but the conductor, without the passenger being aware of the fact, tears off the coupon for an entire segment of the trip, without giving him any stop-over ticket or other substitute therefor, the passenger will be entitled to complete the trip without any other ticket or the payment of fare, on the next day, upon entering a train run by the same conductor, especially where he is personally known to the conductor and his name is on the ticket.222 Nor does it make any difference with the rights of the passenger that, on attempting to resume his journey, he is compelled to produce the conductor's check given him by the conductor of the train which he left, on taking up his ticket; but such a check, unless it expressly authorizes him to stop over at the place where he has alighted, is regarded as being merely evidence that his fare has been paid for the continuous journey.223 Neither will it avail him that he has been told by an agent 218 Spencer v. Lovejoy, 96 Ga. 657; s. c. 23 S. E. Rep. 836. 219 Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Henry, 84 Tex. 678; s. c. 16 L. R. A. 318; 12 Rail. & Corp. L. J. 68; 19 S. W. Rep. 870. 220 Roberts v. Koehler, 30 Fed. Rep. 94. 221 Hatten v. Railroad Co., 39 Ohio St. 375. Cherry v. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 52 Mo. App. 499. 223 State v. Overton, 24 N. J. L. 435; Cheney v. Boston &c. R. Co., 11 Metc. (Mass.) 121; McClure v. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 34 Md. 532. But see of the company at a way station, that he would be at liberty to leave the train and proceed on his journey on another, and that the conductor's check which he held would be "good until taken up;" since, in the absence of proof to the contrary, a ticket agent at a way station has no authority to change or modify the contracts between the company and its through passengers, and the onus of showing such. an authority rests upon the passenger.224 A statute providing that passengers shall be allowed to stop over at will is regarded as applying only to the right to stop on such portions of the journey as lie within the State enacting the statute; it does not enter into the contract made between the carrier and the passenger so as to give him that right in another State.225 $2599. Tickets Limited as to Time.226-The general rule, subject to qualifications hereafter stated, is that a railway company may make a regulation limiting the time within which a passage ticket which it sells will be received by it for passage, such time being sufficient to enable the passenger to make his journey in comfort and safety; so that, after the expiration of the time so limited, the purchaser of the ticket can not claim a right of passage under it.227 Such a regulation has been held reasonable where it embraces a provision for refunding the purchase price of the ticket, or any unused part of it, if not used within the limited period.228 If the limitation expressed on such a ticket is reasonable, and the passenger' attempts to travel upon it after the limitation has expired, he may be Palmer v. Railroad Co., 3 So. Car. 580. 224 McClure v. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 34 Md. 532. 225 Boston &c. R. Co. v. Trafton, 151 Mass. 229; s. c. 23 N. E. Rep. 829. 220 This section is cited in § 2603. 227 Pennington v. Philadelphia R. Co., 62 Md. 95; Rawitzky v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 40 La. An. 47; s. c. 3 South. Rep. 387; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Wright, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 463; s. c. 21 S. W. Rep. 399; Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Looney, 85 Tex. 158; s. c. 16 L. R. A. 471; 19 S. W. Rep. 1039; Little Rock &c. R. Co. v. Dean, 43 Ark. 529; s. c. 51 Am. Rep. 584; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hine, 41 Ohio St. 276; Randall v. New Orleans &c. R. Co., 45 La. An. 778; s. c. 13 South. Rep. 166; Walker v. Wabash &c. R. Co., 15 Mo. App. 333; Auerbach v. New York &c. R. Co., 89 N. Y. 281; rev'g s. c. 60 How. Pr. 382; Hill v. Syracuse &c. R. Co., 63 N. Y. 101; Farewell v. Grand Trunk &c. R. Co., 15 Upper Canada C. P. 427; Elmore v. Sands, 54 N. Y. 512; Barker v. Coflin, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 556; Boice v. Hudson River R. Co., 61 Barb. (N. Y.) 611; Boston &c. R. Co. v. Proctor, 1 Allen (Mass.) 267; Shedd v. Troy &c. R. Co., 40 Vt. 88; State v. Campbell, 32 N. J. L. 309; Wentz v. Erie R. Co., 5 Thomp. & C. (N. Y.) 556; s. c. 3 Hun (N. Y.) 241; Nelson v. Long Island &c. R. Co., 7 Hun (N. Y.) 140; Briggs v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 24 Upper Canada Q. B. 510; Southern R. Co. v. Howard, 111 Ga. 842; s. c. 36 S. E. Rep. 213. A by-law of an English railway company imposing a penalty upon any passenger using or attempting to use a ticket upon a day for which it is not available, without regard to any intent by the passenger to commit fraud, is unreasonable and void: Huffman V. North Staffordshire R. Co., L. R. (1894) 2 Q. B. 821. 225 Southern R. Co. v. Watson, 110 Ga. 681; s. c. 36 S. E. Rep. 209. ejected from the train; and if this is done in a proper and decorous manner and without the employment of unnecessary force, the holder of the ticket will have no action for damages against the railway company.229 Some courts annex a just qualification to this rule, by holding that it does not apply where the passenger is prevented from using the ticket within the time stipulated thereon, through the fault of the carrier selling the ticket.230 But here, as in other like cases, there will be difficulty in saying what the carrier and the passenger, or either of them, is bound to do under the circumstances. It seems clear that the carrier can not excuse any unreasonable action toward the passenger on the ground that he is bound to act through two different agents, the one selling the ticket, and the other recognizing it and taking it up on the train; but that if the passenger has been delayed through the negligence of the carrier, the second of these agents is bound to know that fact or is bound to satisfy himself of it at the risk of the carrier, when the passenger makes representations to that effect. One court has held that, under such circumstances, the passenger is entitled to show to the conductor that he has used due diligence in endeavoring to make use of the ticket before the expiration of the limited time, and that the conductor is bound to take into consideration his statement, in determining whether or not he has the right to exact extra fare.231 In the absence of any regulation to the contrary, it is believed to be a general rule that a passage ticket which contains no limitation as to the time within which it may be used, may be used at any time, at the election of the purchaser, unless he is notified of some limitation of time in respect of it at the time when he purchases it. It follows. from this that he is not bound by any regulation of the company limiting the time within which it may be used, of which he has no knowledge.232 229 Southern R. Co. v. Watson, 110 Ga. 681; s. c. 36 S. E. Rep. 209; Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Marlett, 75 Miss. 956; s. c. 1 Miss. Dec. (No. 26) 245; 23 South. Rep. 583; Mitchell V. Southern R. Co., 77 Miss. 917; s. c. 27 South. Rep. 834. Right of passenger to recover the value of the unused portion of his ticket after being wrongfully expelled from the train on presenting it, see Houston &c. R. Co. v. Crone (Tex. Civ. App.), 37 S. W. Rep. 1074 (no off. тер.). 230 See Auerbach v. New York &c. R. Co., 60 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 82, where this principle is recognized. Tex. Civ. App. 463; s. c. 21 'S. W. 232 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Spicker, 105 Pa. St. 142. In one case the plaintiff applied to the ticket agent of defendant, at McGregor, for a round trip ticket to Goldthwaite and return, for the use of his wife, and at the time informed the agent that she would remain at the latter place for a month or six weeks, and asked the agent if he could issue and sell a round trip ticket for that purpose, and the agent replied that he could. The agent then made out the ticket, folded it and handed it to the plaintiff, who paid the charges for a round 231 Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Wright, 2 trip ticket. Shortly after, plaintiff VOL. 3 THOMP. NEG.-5 65 holding a ticket bearing upon its face the stipulation "Good for this day and train only" will not be entitled to leave the train after his journey has commenced, and afterwards, though on the same day, claim passage on such ticket.212 Even though it has been customary upon a certain railroad to allow passengers to stop over at stations intermediate upon their journey without detriment to their right to resume travel upon the same ticket, yet the railroad company may at any time make a regulation to the contrary, and a passenger will be bound by such regulation whether he has notice of it or not.218 Such a rule has been upheld by the courts upon the assumption that it is necessary for the prevention of frauds upon the carrier.214 By the voluntary act of the passenger in leaving the train upon a ticket which gives him no stop-over privileges, with the intention of resuming his journey upon the same ticket, the contract of carriage is deemed to have been broken; and if the passenger thereafter enters the vehicle of the carrier without purchasing another ticket, or making payment of fare, he is deemed a trespasser, and may be rightfully ejected from the vehicle.215 This rule applies to coupon tickets calling for a continuous passage over connecting lines, as well as to tickets over a single line, if the contract so requires;216 but if the contract does not so require, it seems that there is a right to stop off on completing the portion of the journey covered by each coupon, provided the passenger can resume the journey before the time limited for the next coupon has expired.217 Accordingly, it has been held that the holder of a valid passenger ticket over a system of railways operated under one management, but divided into separate divisions, to which ticket coupons for each division are attached, is York &c. R. Co., 51 N. Y. 100; Cheney v. Boston &c. R. Co., 11 Metc. (Mass.) 121; Cleveland &c. R. Co. v. Bartram, 11 Ohio St. 457; State v. Overton, 24 N. J. L. 435; Johnson v. Concord R. Co., 46 N. H. 213; Beebe v. Ayers, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 275; Drew v. Central Pacific R. Co., 51 Cal. 425; Briggs v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 24 Upper Canada Q. B. 510; Craig v. Great Western R. Co., 24 Upper Canada Q. B. 504; Barker v. Coflin, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 556; Breen v. Texas &c. R. Co., 50 Texas 43; Gale v. Delaware &c R. Co., 7 Hun (N. Y.) 670; Oil Creek &c. R. Co. v. Clark,72 Pa. St. 231; Terry v. Flushing &c. R. Co., 13 Hun (N. Y.) 359; Dunphy v. Erie R. Co., 10 Jones & Sp. (N. Y.) 128; Wyman v. Northern &c. R. Co., 34 Minn. 210; Coombs v. Reg., 26 Can. S. C. 13. 212 Gale v. Delaware &c. R. Co., 7 Hun (N. Y.) 670. 213 Johnson v. Concord &c. R. Co., 46 N. H. 213. See, also, Dietrich v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 71 Pa. St. 432. 214 Beebe v. Ayers, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 275. 215 Dietrich v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 71 Pa. St. 432; Vankirk v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 76 Pa. St. 66. As to what effect declarations of the company's ticket-seller or conductor in regard to the right to stop over will have upon the contract for carriage, see Burnham v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 63 Me. 298; Denny v. New York &c. R. Co., 5 Daly (N. Y.) 50; Vankirk v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra. 216 Little Rock &c. R. Co. v. Dean, 43 Ark. 529. 217 Little Rock &c. R. Co. v. Dean, 43 Ark. 529. entitled, in the absence of any specific contract or restriction in the ticket to the contrary, to stop over at the end of each division and resume the journey on the next coupon, provided it is done within the final limit fixed by the ticket.218 $2598. Further of the Right to Stop Off and Resume Journey.— If a passenger having a ticket for a continuous passage only, enters a train which, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, he would have discovered does not stop at his place of destination, and he, upon making the discovery, leaves the train at an intermediate point, he is not entitled to be carried the remainder of the journey on the train which he ought to have taken in the first place.219 If the passenger, having such a ticket, surrenders it to the conductor, and then stops over at an intermediate station without his consent, and leaves his baggage on the train to be carried to his place of final destination, he will be liable, on resuming the journey, to the payment of additional fare, and the carrier will have a lien on his baggage for the same.220 It is immaterial that the passenger seeks to resume his journey on a subsequent trip made by the same train, in charge of the same conductor, on his original ticket. The contract having been broken by his voluntary act, he can not resume it without payment of additional fare for the uncompleted portion of his journey 221 But if the ticket entitles the passenger to stop over, but the conductor, without the passenger being aware of the fact, tears off the coupon for an entire segment of the trip, without giving him any stop-over ticket or other substitute therefor, the passenger will be entitled to complete the trip without any other ticket or the payment of fare, on the next day, upon entering a train run by the same conductor, especially where he is personally known to the conductor and his name is on the ticket.222 Nor does it make any difference with the rights of the passenger that, on attempting to resume his journey, he is compelled to produce the conductor's check given him by the conductor of the train which he left, on taking up his ticket; but such a check, unless it expressly authorizes him to stop over at the place where he has alighted, is regarded as being merely evidence that his fare has been paid for the continuous journey 223 Neither will it avail him that he has been told by an agent Spencer v. Lovejoy, 96 Ga. 657; 8. c. 23 S. E. Rep. 836. 21 Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Henry, 84 Tex. 678; s. c. 16 L. R. A. 318; 12 Rail & Corp. L. J. 68; 19 S. W. Rep. 870. 94. Roberts v. Koehler, 30 Fed. Rep. 221 Hatten v. Railroad Co., 39 Ohio St. 375. 222 Cherry v. Kansas City &c. R. Co., 52 Mo. App. 499. 223 State v. Overton, 24 N. J. L. 435; Cheney v. Boston &c. R. Co., 11 Metc. (Mass.) 121; McClure v. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 34 Md. 532. But see |