ejected from the train; and if this is done in a proper and decorous manner and without the employment of unnecessary force, the holder of the ticket will have no action for damages against the railway company." 229 Some courts annex a just qualification to this rule, by holding that it does not apply where the passenger is prevented from using the ticket within the time stipulated thereon, through the fault of the carrier selling the ticket.230 But here, as in other like cases, there will be difficulty in saying what the carrier and the passenger, or either of them, is bound to do under the circumstances. It seems clear that the carrier can not excuse any unreasonable action toward the passenger on the ground that he is bound to act through two different agents, the one selling the ticket, and the other recognizing it and taking it up on the train; but that if the passenger has been delayed through the negligence of the carrier, the second of these agents is bound to know that fact or is bound to satisfy himself of it at the risk of the carrier, when the passenger makes representations to that effect. One court has held that, under such circumstances, the passenger is entitled to show to the conductor that he has used due diligence in endeavoring to make use of the ticket before the expiration of the limited time, and that the conductor is bound to take into consideration his statement, in determining whether or not he has the right to exact extra fare.231 In the absence of any regulation to the contrary, it is believed to be a general rule that a passage ticket which contains no limitation as to the time within which it may be used, may be, used at any time, at the election of the purchaser, unless he is notified of some limitation of time in respect of it at the time when he purchases it. It follows from this that he is not bound by any regulation of the company limiting the time within which it may be used, of which he has no knowledge. 232 Southern R. Co. v. Watson, 110 Ga. 681; s. c. 36 S. E. Rep. 209; Illinois &c. R. Co. v. Marlett, 75 Miss. 956; s. c. 1 Miss. Dec. (No. 26) 245; 23 South. Rep. 583; Mitchell v. Southern R. Co.. 77 Miss. 917; s. c. 27 South. Rep. 834. Right of passenger to recover the value of the unused portion of his ticket after being wrongfully expelled from the train on presenting it, see Houston &c. R. Co. v. Crone (Tex. Civ. App.), 37 S. W. Rep. 1074 (no off. rep.). See Auerbach v. New York &c. Tex. Civ. App. 463; s. c. 21 'S. W. 232 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Spicker, 105 Pa. St. 142. In one case the plaintiff applied to the ticket agent of defendant, at McGregor, for a round trip ticket to Goldthwaite and return, for the use of his wife, and at the time informed the agent that she would remain at the latter place for a month or six weeks, and asked the agent if he could issue and sell a round trip ticket for that purpose, and the agent replied that he could. The agent then made out the ticket, folded it and handed it to the plaintiff, who paid the charges for a round trip ticket. Shortly after, plaintiff 65 § 2600. Interpretation of such Time Limits.-A ticket issued during the day of December 6 and limited to two days is good until discovered that the ticket was good only for ten days and called the agent's attention to it, and asked that the time be extended to a month or six weeks, or that the money be refunded. The agent refused to do either. The wife went on the ticket, and attempted to return on it after the ten days had elapsed, and was ejected from the train. Plaintiff sued for the ejection. Judgment for him reversed: Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Holbrook, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 475, 482; s. c. 33 S. W. Rep. 1028. The court held that if the contract was in fact for a ticket good for thirty days, the plaintiff could recover, though the agent in issuing the ticket, limited it to a shorter time; and further, that the proposition by the plaintiff to the agent to sell him a ticket good for thirty days would not constitute a contract unless agreed to, but that the ticket was not conclusive evidence of the contract. The language of the court, speaking through Fisher, C. J., is as follows: "The appellant contends that if a contract was entered into as claimed by appellee, a breach of the same occurred when the railway agent refused to issue him a ticket good for the time he desired when he demanded one of that character from him at the time he called the attention of the agent to the ten days' time in which the ticket was limited. And if a breach of the contract then resulted, appellee's action for damages then arose, and he could only recover the damages sustained up to that time, and by reason of that breach, and not for what occurred subsequently, as he knew when he placed his wife aboard the train that the contract had been breached and he would not be permitted to use the ticket after the expiration of ten days. This does not appear to us to be a sound proposition of law. If a contract for transportation, good for the time stated by appellee, was actually made, and the consideration therefor was paid, it was a right of appellee to enforce performance in accord with its terms, and the statement by appellant that it did not propose to observe the contract would not absolve or relieve it from its liability to perform it. When one acquires a right by a valid contract and he undertakes to enjoy its benefits in a lawful and orderly manner, a formal notice to him that he will not be permitted to enjoy the right purchased will not end the contract and deprive him of its benefits. And when in the pursuit of his rights and privileges in the premises, he is prevented in partaking of its benefits by the conduct of the violator of the agreement, such one so creating the breach can not urge as a defense that the breach he was guilty of shall be a bar to recovery for the subsequent consequences that resulted by reason of his wrongful interference. Suppose that I should purchase a ticket granting me the privilege of a seat in the theater, and before I occupied the seat I was informed by the agent that sold it that I would not be permitted to enjoy its benefits, and, ignoring the breach, I should occupy the seat purchased, and when conducting myself in an orderly manner, should be removed or ejected from the theater. the consequences that resulted from this tort or trespass be defended on the ground that the agent had notified me that he had violated or would violate the contract; and would I be estopped in recovering such damages because I had been previously informed that I should not enjoy what I had bought and paid for and what was rightfully mine? A rule that would deny me the privilege to enjoy the benefits of the contract and subordinate my rights to the arbitrary will of the violator would be a doctrine that should find no favor or advocate in a court of law or equity. But a rule more consonant with reason and justice would be that I might expect the wrongdoer, when I was endeavoring to enjoy the privileges and benefits purchased, would 'see the error of his ways,' and relent, and not persist in executing the unlawful purpose to create a breach in fact by wrongfully and forcibly depriving me of benefits to which I Could midnight of December 8.233 A round-trip ticket providing that it - would not be good for the return passage after midnight of the last day allowed for the return, and in no event later than October 4, was not sufficient to protect the holder of it from ejection on October 5 while on his return passage, although he commenced his return passage on October 4.234 Other courts have interpreted such tickets as protecting the passenger from ejection where he began the journey on the last coupon before the expiration of the time limited in the ticket. It was so held where the passenger stipulated in the ticket to "use the same on or before the expiration" of a day named,— the view of the court being that he complied with the limitation when he entered upon the transit before midnight of the day named.235. A railroad ticket stating that it is good for one continuous passage "on and from" the date stamped on back, requires the journey to be commenced on the day the ticket is dated, although such day may be ended before the journey is completed.236 Where the ticket expressly may be entitled. If I, without violence and in an orderly manner, seek to enjoy the benefits I have purchased, it then becomes the duty of the one from whom I acquired these rights by contract to abstain from acts that would deprive me of my rights in the premises; and if he, in violation of this duty, becomes an active agent in further breaching the contract by forcibly refusing me the privilege purchased, there results an additional wrong in the nature of a tort or trespass, for the proximate consequences of which he would be liable." A verdict for the plaintiff was reversed on the ground that it was error to submit the defendant's theory of the case in a charge which required the jury, in order to return a verdict for the defendant, to find that the ten days' limitation was a reasonable one, the time required for the round trip being but two days, and there being nothing in the case to raise such issue. 233 Georgia &c. R. Co. v. Bigelow, 68 Ga. 219. 234 Mitchell v. Southern R. Co., 77 Miss. 917; s. c. 27 South. Rep. 834. 235 Evans v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 11 Mo. App. 463. In an action to recover damages for ejecting the plaintiff from the defendant's passenger train, it appeared that the plaintiff, on September 21, purchased in St. Louis a ticket to New The York, specified on the ticket "to be good for one continuous passage to point named in coupons attached," and that the buyer agreed with the several companies "to use the same on or before September 26th." plaintiff in his passage stopped over at Cincinnati and at Cleveland. From Buffalo he paid his fare to Rochester. The last coupon entitled him to a passage from Buffalo to New York over defendant's road. He presented his ticket upon taking the cars at Rochester on the afternoon of September 26th. It was not objected to and was repeatedly punched, until at Hudson, at 3 A. M. of September 27th, the conductor refused to recognize it, and, upon plaintiff's refusal to pay fare, forcibly ejected him from the train. It was held that plaintiff had a right to begin his journey on the last coupon at Rochester any time on September 26th, and to continue it to New York, if necessary, on September 27th; the ticket was "used" when accepted at Rochester, and as he was entitled to passage to New York, the stoppages at Cincinnati and Cleveland could not be complained of: Auerbach v. New York &c. R. Co., 89 N. Y. 281; s. c. 42 Am. Rep. 290. 20 Demilley v. Texas &c. R. Co., 91 Tex. 215; s. c. 42 S. W. Rep. 540; aff'g s. c. 41 S. W. Rep. 147. states that it is "good for one continuous passage on and from the date" named thereon, and also that it can not be sold, but can be redeemed within ten days after the expiration of the right to use it,-its use is limited to the date which is indicated thereon, and to such further time as is necessary to complete a continuous passage.237 Where a ticket called for a "continuous passage within one day of the date of sale," the purchaser was entitled to such a passage from the day when the ticket was sold to him in fact, although it was so dated as to bear a prior date.2 238 .239 § 2601. Statutes Regulating such Tickets.-But it is clearly competent for the State within which the railway is operated, to enact a different regulation, in the exercise of its police power;2 and some States have enacted such statutes. In Maine it is enacted240 that no railroad company shall limit the right of a ticket-holder to any given train; but that such ticket-holder shall have the right to travel on any train, whether a regular or an express train, and to stop at any of the stations at which such train stops, and that such ticket shall be good for a passage, as above, for six years from the day it is first used.241 Such a statute can, of course, have no application to a contract of interstate or international carriage. The statute of Maine, consequently, does not apply to a railway ticket from Portland to Montreal, at least where it is attempted to use the ticket beyond the limits of the State;242 and the sound view clearly is that it does not apply to any portion of the transit whether within or without the State, since it is well settled that passenger transit is commerce, and that passenger transit across the boundaries of States is interstate commerce; and passenger traffic across international boundaries would consequently be international commerce. A contract for a continuous passage across an interstate or international boundary would, therefore, be a contract relating to interstate or international commerce; and it would not be competent for a State, under the construction placed by the Supreme Court of the United States upon the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, to enact a statute regulating such a contract, or regulating the execution of any part of it.243 237 Texas &c. R. Co. v. Powell, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 212; s. c. 35 S. W. Rep. 841. 238 Ellsworth v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 95 Iowa 98; s. c. 29 L. R. A. 173; 63 N. W. Rep. 584. 230 4 Thomp. Corp., § 5512. 241 Dryden v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 60 Me. 512. 242 Carpenter v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 72 Me. 388; s. c. 39 Am. St. Rep. 340. 243 See, generally, in support of the text, Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Penn 240 Pub. Laws Me. 1871, chap. 223. sylvania, 114 U. S. 196; Case of the § 2602. Tickets "Good for This Trip Only;" "Good for This Day Only."-Under the operation of the rule of the preceding section, at ticket having on its face the words, "Good for this trip only," entitles the holder to a passage on a subsequent day, as well as on the day of its date, unless it contains some other limitation as to time; since the above words do not relate to time or prescribe a definite trip to which the ticket is applicable.24 But where the ticket contains on its face the date and also the words, "Good for this day only," it is obviously limited to the day of its date, and the passenger can have under it only a continuous passage on some train of that day, without any stop-over privilege. If the ticket is stamped on its face, "Good for this day only," those words determine the contract between the carrier and the passenger; so that the mere verbal declarations of the company's ticket agent, made subsequent to the purchase of such ticket, as to its being good at any time thereafter, will not constitute a valid contract, in the absence of proof that the agent had authority to make an oral contract for the company, varying the one indicated by the ticket.246 The words on a railway passage ticket, "For this day and train only," were in one case held not of themselves à representation that the particular train which the purchaser boarded would stop at the station therein named, but merely that it was good on that day on any train stopping at the station for which it was sold.247 245 State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 232, 281; Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 117 U. S. 34. A statute of Texas (Gen. Laws 1893, p. 97) imposes a penalty for refusing to redeem a ticket presented within ten days after the right to use it has expired. This wholesome statute was enacted to relieve the public against the rascally practice of railway carriers who refused to redeem tickets having a time limitation, even though the holders might be prevented by accident, misfortune, or circumstances amounting to necessity, from using them, thereby standing upon the letter of the contract, keeping the money, and shirking the performance of the service for which they had been paid. It is scarcely necessary to say that those railway carriers which had made the practice of refusing to redeem such tickets at all, refused to redeem them when presented after the expiration of the ten day limit. When, therefore, a person purchased a local excursion ticket, good for one day only, with the privilege of having the time extended if de posited before its expiration, and the ticket was not deposited within that time, and was not presented for redemption until more than eleven days after its date, although before the date to which it might have been extended, the holder of it could not recover from the carrier the statutory penalty: Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Murphy (Tex. Civ. App.), 35 S. W. Rep. 66 (no off. rep.). Right to recover this statutory penalty is confined to the contract expressed in the ticket, and is not enlarged by statements issued in a circular by the company, announcing excursion rates for the round trip: Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Murphy, supra. 244 Pier v. Finch, 24 Barb. (N. Y.) 514. 245 Gale v. Delaware &c. R. Co., 7 Hun (N. Y.) 670. 246 Boice v. Hudson River R. Co., 61 Barb. (N. Y.) 611. See also McClure v. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 34 Md. 532. 247 Duling v. Philadelphia &c. R. Co., 66 Md. 120; s. c. 5 Cent. Rep. 570. |