§ 2603. Application of this Rule to Commutation Tickets.Under the operation of a rule already stated,248 a commutation ticket good for a certain number of miles of travel, but limited by its terms to be used within a certain time, is worthless after the expiration of such time, and the holder can not claim transportation under it, although the number of miles of travel guaranteed by it have not yet been exhausted.249 Similarly, a commutation ticket good for one thousand miles' travel upon two roads forming one continuous line (issued by a company owning one road and leasing the other), three hundred miles to be travelled upon one road and seven hundred miles to be travelled upon the other, as indicated by differently colored figures, does not entitle the holder to travel upon a division of the road after the number of miles specified for that division have been entirely punched out of the ticket, although there yet remain upon the ticket figures for the other division, not punched out, amounting to the number of miles for which the ticket is offered.250

251

§ 2604. Other Applications of this Rule.—It is scarcely necessary to say that if the time limited on the face of the ticket has expired, and the passenger refuses to pay other fare, he can not claim damages by reason of being expelled from the train, unless the expulsion takes place at an improper place, or in an unlawful manner.2 It has been held that a stipulation in a railroad ticket, sold as good for thirty days, that the purchaser shall have himself identified as such at the terminal point of his journey, and that the ticket shall be good for fifteen days only after identification, is not illegal or unreasonable, but is binding on the passenger.252 One court has gone so far as to hold that where a ticket is limited to expire on a certain date, a passenger is not entitled to ride after that date, although he has been unable to use the ticket at an earlier date, in consequence of a delay on the part of the company itself.253 In the construction of the language of such a ticket, it has been held that where it reads that it is good only for three days after being officially signed and stamped, this means that the journey must be completed within three days after it is so signed and stamped, and not that the passenger is at liberty to commence the journey at any time within those three days.254

249 Ante, § 2599.

240 Powell v. Pittsburgh &c. R. Co., 25 Ohio St. 70; Sherman v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 40 Iowa 45; Lillis v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 64 Mo. 464.

250 Terre Haute &c. R. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 47 Ind. 79.

252 Rawitzky v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 40 La. An. 47; s. c. 3 South. Rep. 387.

253 Pennsylvania Co. v. Hine, 41 Ohio St. 276.

254 Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Wright, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 463; s. c. 21 S. W.

251 Pennington v. Philadelphia &c. Rep. 399. R. Co., 62 Md. 95.

§ 2605. Application of this Rule in the Case of Connecting Carriers.-There is still more difficulty in applying this rule in the case of connecting lines. But it is clear that where different railway lines have through traffic arrangements, so that either of them may sell what is called a coupon ticket good for a continuous passage over the others, each of them is bound to honor the ticket and to act in the same way in regard to the rights of the passenger as though it had sold the ticket itself, and the passenger were upon its own vehicle. With this idea in view, it has been well held that where such a ticket expires on Sunday, and the last connecting line runs no train on that day, it is bound to carry the passenger on the following day.255 Upon the same conception, it has been held that if such a ticket is a joint contract of the connecting carriers, and the passenger is delayed by a wreck upon the line of one of them, the succeeding carriers must transport him, although, in consequence of the wreck, his ticket has expired.25 But we may doubt the conclusion of the same court that the rule is otherwise where the carrier selling the ticket acts merely as the agent of the other carriers, and is not responsible beyond his own line, which fact is expressed on the ticket itself.257 In such a case it would seem to be enough that there is a through traffic arrangement among the connecting carriers, whereby each has agreed that the first carrier shall be his agent in selling the ticket to the passenger. In such a case, surely the default of the first carrier in forwarding the passenger to the next one in time, ought not to prevent the passenger from insisting that the next one shall honor the ticket for which it has received, or will receive, the consideration. One court has held that a railway company which sells an excursion ticket for a continuous trip over its own and connecting lines, limited as to time, providing that the company shall not be liable for any delays occurring on other lines, has no right to refuse the ticket because not presented within the time limited, unless such limit was reasonable under the existing circumstances and conditions, and unless the passenger, by reasonable diligence, might have completed his journey within that time.258

§ 2606. Extensions of Limited Tickets.-If the time limited upon a railway ticket has been extended by an authorized officer of the company, and the conductor of the company refuses to give effect to the extension, the passenger will have a right of action for the result

255 Little Rock &c. R. Co. v. Dean, 43 Ark. 529; s. c. 51 Am. Rep. 584.

256 Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Looney, 85 Tex. 158; s. c. 16 L. R. A. 471; 19 S. W. Rep. 1039.

257 Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Looney, 85 Tex. 158; s. c. 16 L. R. A. 471; 19 S. W. Rep. 1039.

25 Gulf &c. R. Co. v. Wright, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 463; s. c. 21 S. W. Rep. 399.

1

ing damages. 259 It has been held that a written extension of time on a return ticket, indorsed by an authorized agent before its expiration, will be effectual, unless the expiration was made subject to conditions or contingencies which have already happened.260

1

§ 2607. Identity of the Holder of the Ticket.-Railroad companies, as is well known, issue "mileage tickets" to commercial travellers and others, and "commutation tickets" to the residents of suburban towns, at reduced rates of fare, exacting the regular fare from casual passengers. In order that these mileage and commutation tickets may not be loaned or sold to casual passengers and used by them in fraud of the rights of the company, the purchaser of the ticket is usually required to sign his name thereon, and the train conductor is authorized to demand his signature or other evidence of identification. Conditions of this nature in mileage books261 and in excursion tickets,262 to the effect that if the ticket is presented by a person other than the purchaser it shall be void, or shall be forfeited to the company, or requiring the purchaser to identify himself as such at his point of destination before commencing the return passage,263 are reasonable and valid. Where the passenger is required, by the terms of such a ticket, to sign it upon the request of the conductor, for the purpose of identification, if he refuses to do so, he may be treated as a trespasser upon the train264 and ejected therefrom without refunding the passage money which he may have paid;265 and this although the ticket agent from whom he bought the ticket sold it to him notwithstanding his refusal to sign it.266 Where the holder of a round-trip ticket is required to identify himself to the station agent of the company, for the purpose of having his ticket stamped in order that it may be used on the return voyage, the agent may rightfully refuse so to stamp the ticket, unless the

250 Randall v. New Orleans &c. R. Co., 45 La. An. 778; s. c. 13 South. Rep. 166.

200 Randall v. New Orleans &c. R. Co., 45 La. An. 778; s. c. 13 South. Rep. 166.

261 Eastman v. Maine &c. R. Co. (N. H.), 46 Atl. Rep. 54.

202 Dangerfield v. Atchison &c. R. Co. (Kan.), 61 Pac. Rep. 405.

23 Dangerfield v. Atchison &c. R. Co., supra.

204 Southern &c. Co. v. Hamilton, 54 Fed. Rep. 468. It has been held that one holding a commutation ticket, and claiming the right to travel as a passenger on a railroad

train on the ground that he is a member of the partnership named on the face of the ticket, must show the conductor that his name appears endorsed thereon, in compliance with the conditions specified on the reverse side of the ticket: Granier v. Louisiana &c. Co., 42 La. An. 880; s. c. 8 South. Rep. 614.

265 Ketcheson V. Southern Pac. Co., 19 Tex. Civ. App. 288; s. c. 46 S. W. Rep. 907; Dangerfield v. Atchison &c. R. Co. (Kan.), s. c. 61 Pac. Rep. 405.

206 Ketcheson v. Southern Pac. Co., 19 Tex. Civ. App. 288.

passenger satisfies him of his identity as the purchaser of it;207 and the holder of the ticket will not be entitled to the return passage thereon where he wholly fails to identify himself to the agent of the company, and have the ticket signed, dated and stamped as required, by the contract embodied therein.268 If the ticket is, by its terms, subjected to forfeiture to the company if used by any person other than the one to whom it is issued, the company will have no right to exact the forfeiture of it, where it is so used by a person without the permission of the holder.269 If the terminal agent of the carrier, in case of a round-trip ticket, fails or refuses, upon the holder identifying himself as the original purchaser of it, in accordance with its terms, correctly to stamp it, in consequence of which the holder is ejected on his return passage, he will manifestly have an action against the carrier for the injury; and it has been held that he will have such an action although the ejection takes place by a connecting carrier while the passenger is attempting to make the return transit over the line of such carrier, in accordance with the terms of the contract.2 270

§ 2608. Collecting Extra Fare from Passengers without Tickets. If a carrier of passengers were prohibited from imposing some reasonable penalty upon passengers who do not take the trouble to purchase their passage tickets before entering the carrier's vehicle, the carrier could maintain no effectual check upon the frauds of his own conductors or train agents. With this fact in view, railroad companies and other carriers have generally established regulations requiring passengers, who do not purchase their tickets of the agent appointed to sell the same, before entering the carrier's vehicle, to pay an extra fare to the conductor or other person taking up tickets and collecting fares thereon. In view of this fact, such regulations have been generally held to be reasonable, but always with the proviso that the carrier has afforded the passenger a reasonable opportunity to purchase his ticket of the proper agent before the departure of the train or other vehicle.272 Thus, it has been held that a regu

267 Bethea v. Northeastern R. Co., 26 S. C. 91; s. c. 1 S. E. Rep. 372.

208 Wenz v. Savannah &c. R. Co., 108 Ga. 290; s. c. 33 S. E. Rep. 970; Savannah &c. R. Co. v. Wenz, 108 Ga. 290; s. c. 33 S. E. Rep. 970.

20 Mueller v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 75 Minn. 109; s. c. 12 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. (N. S.) 137; 77 N. W. Rep. 566.

270 Gulf &c. R. Co. v. St. John, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 257; s. c. 35 S. W. Rep. 501.

271 This section is cited in §§ 2612, 3141, 3218.

272 McGowen v. Morgan's &c. Co., 41 La. An. 732; s. c. 6 South. Rep. 606; 5 L. R. A. 817; 39 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. 460; State v. Hungerford, 39 Minn. 6; s. c. 38 N. W. Rep. 628;

lation of a railroad company, requiring passengers who fail to purchase a ticket before entering the cars to pay ten cents more than the regular fare, for which an extra check will be given by the conductor, which will be cashed at any regular ticket office, is not unreasonable.2 273 Nor is such a payment so refunded a part of the "fare or charge for transportation," within the meaning of a statute fixing the maximum rate of fare.274 In some cases the right of a railroad company to charge an extra price for the carriage of those passengers who pay their fare upon the train is guaranteed by statute.2 275

§ 2609. When this Extra Fare can not be Demanded.276-The right of a railway company to demand extra fare from a passenger who does not purchase a passage ticket before boarding the train, is always predicated upon the premise that the company has afforded the passenger a reasonable opportunity to purchase his ticket before. the departure of the train.277 If the passenger is not afforded this reasonable opportunity, but is compelled to board the carrier's train without first purchasing a ticket, he will have, upon tendering to the