holdings have been made with reference to round-trip tickets embodying special contracts with the purchaser, requiring him to identify himself, by writing his name or by other means, to a terminal ticket agent of the company selling the ticket, or of a connecting company-That where the person presenting the ticket to the terminal agent for identification insists, in defiance of the caution of the agent, in printing instead of writing his name thereon, such agent is not bound to satisfy himself as to his identity and to stamp and sign the return coupon, although he presents persons who state to the agent that he is the man whom he claims to be ;346 that the terminal agent has the right to refuse to validate and stamp the ticket, where the passenger has signed his Christian initial and his middle name without his surname, and the agent knows him personally and knows that such is not his correct signature;347 that the purchaser of a railway ticket which contains the condition that the purchaser will sign his name whenever called upon by any conductor, can not recover for ejection from the train upon his refusal to sign such ticket, though the agent from whom he purchased sold the ticket to him after a refusal by him to sign it.3 348 It has been held that the provision of a season ticket, that the same shall not be good for passage upon a particular train, is not waived by the acceptance by the conductor of such train of coupons from the ticket for passage thereon on two occasions, except so far as the right to collect cash fares for those rides is concerned.349

§ 2629. Circumstances where there was no such Waiver.Where, by the terms of a round-trip ticket over connecting roads, the passenger, before beginning the return trip, was to sign it in the presence of the ticket agent of the first road, it was held that a waiver of this condition, by the conductors of that and other roads, was not binding upon a subsequent connecting road. 350 The fact that some tickets have been collected by conductors of the company does not constitute a waiver, so as to bind the company to honor a ticket in a particular instance.351 Thus, conditions in a coupon. ticket book, that the coupons are to be detached in the conductor's presence, and to be accepted for passage only when accompanied by the ticket, are not waived by sometimes allowing passengers to pay

340 Central &c. R. Co. v. Cannon, 103 Ga. 828; s. c. 14 Am. & Eng. Rail. Cas. 405; 32 S. E. Rep. 874.

347 Sinnott v. Louisville &c. R. Co., 104 Tenn. 233; s. c. 56 S. W. Rep. 836.

348 Ketcheson v. Southern &c. R.

Co., 19 Tex. Civ. App. 288; s. c. 46
S. W. Rep. 907.

349 New York &c. R. Co. v. Feely, 163 Mass. 205; s. c. 40 N. E. Rep. 20. 350 Cloud v. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 14 Mo. App. 136.

351 Oppenheimer v. Denver &c. R. Co., 9 Colo. 320.

So, the

their fares with coupons without showing their books. 352 fact that a person has previously ridden in passenger cars upon a live stock ticket, which gave him a right to ride only on a freight train, does not vary his legal rights as evidenced by such a ticket accepted by him, or give him any right to ride thereon, in a passenger train.3 353 It has been held-but the decision seems to be a piece of gross injustice,-that the representations of the ticket agent to the purchaser of an ordinary railway ticket, which ticket contains a statement that it is good for passage between certain points if used within one day from date of sale, not made at the time the ticket was sold, but on the next day, though within twenty-four hours after the sale, to the effect that the ticket would be good and might be used after the expiration of one day from the date of sale, are not binding on the company.354 Nor did the fact that one of two ordinary railway tickets, containing stipulations that they were good only one day from date of sale, had been accepted by the carrier as good, though not used within one day from date of sale, constitute a waiver by the company of the stipulation contained in the other ticket.355 We find decisions to the effect that, where the holder of such a ticket makes no request to the identifying agent to sign and stamp it, but merely shows it to him, and he is told that it is all right, and the conductor to whom it is presented, saying that it is not all right, ejects him from the train without unnecessary force, he can not recover damages for the ejection;356 that oral statements made by the passenger to the conductor, such as that the holder of a ticket, which has expired by reason of the time limit thereon, had applied for identification to an agent of a connecting line, as the ticket required, in time to allow his return before its expiration, but had been advised to delay identification for the reason that the yellow fever was interfering with the operation of some of the connecting lines, and that, after such delay, such agent refused to identify him in time to

252 Boston &c. R. Co. v. Chipman, 146 Mass. 107; s. c. 5 N. Eng. Rep. 572; 14 N. E. Rep. 940.

333 Thorp v. Concord R. Co., 61 Vt. 378; s. c. 17 Atl. Rep. 791. But, contrary to this, it has been held that where a thousand-mile ticket was sold and delivered to a purchaser, and was several times honored by the conductors of the company without requiring him to sign the conditions stamped thereon.the company waived such requirement; and its conductor was not justified in ejecting the purchaser from the car for refusal to sign the

ticket or to pay the usual fare in money for the proposed passage: Kent v. Baltimore &c. R. Co., 45 Ohio St. 284; s. c. 10 West. Rep. 457; 12 N. E. Rep. 798.

354 Hanlon v. Illinois &c. R. Co., 109 Iowa 136; s. c. 80 N. W. Rep. 223.

355 Hanlon v. Illinois &c. R. Co., 109 Iowa 136; s. c. 80 N. W. Rep. 223 (citing Sherman v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 40 Iowa 45; Stone v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 47 Iowa 82).

336 Houston &c. R. Co. v. Arey, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 457; s. c. 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 614; 44 S. W. Rep. 894.

enable him to complete his return passage before the ticket expired, and that the company had also refused to extend the ticket,-did not afford any ground for making his ejection by the conductor wrongful, so as to enable him to recover damages therefor;357 that where the contract requires the identifying agent to witness the signature of the holder of the ticket, and he fails to have this done, he can not recover damages for being ejected from the train, although the identifying agent informed him that it was unnecessary to witness his signature.358

§ 2630. Tickets Procured through Fraud.-There is no difficulty in concurring with the view that where a railway company sells any species of ticket at a special or reduced rate, upon an agreement that the purchaser shall identify himself as such, and upon an agreement that it shall not be good in the hands of any other person, its transfer to a ticket broker and its resale by such broker, and the subsequent use of it by the purchaser, operates as a fraud and a wrong, not only upon the company selling it, but upon all the connecting carriers over whose lines it calls for passage, so as to make the original purchaser of the ticket, the ticket broker who purchases and resells it, and the subsequent purchaser who uses it, jointly and severally liable at law to any and all of the companies in whose behalf it is issued, and who are defrauded by such use of it. Each of the connecting carriers, who have agreed with the company selling the ticket to recognize it for transportation over its line, is entitled to damages for a violation of the contract embodied therein, so far as it affects its own line, as much as though the ticket had been issued by itself.359 Where

357 Mitchell v. Southern R. Co., 77 Miss. 917; s. c. 27 South. Rep. 834. This decision does not seem to be sound. Although the identifying agent was the agent of a connecting carrier, yet, pro hac vice, he was the agent of the carrier selling the ticket, and his misrepresentation to the passenger and the act of the conductor in expelling him, amounted to a fraud and a wrong upon him, for which, the facts being established, the company ought to have been answerable. It has been held that a complaint which alleges that a passenger, on attempting to get himself identified before the company's agent as his return ticket required, was wrongfully and unjustly refused identification, and that he was wrongfully ejected from a train by defendant's conductor, in

the presence of many passengers, with great indignity, wrong, and hardship, is not good on demurrer. since such allegations are conclusions only, and not averments of fact: Mitchell v. Southern R. Co., 77 Miss. 917; s. c. 27 South. Rep. 834. The decision does not seem to be tenable. The allegations were plainly sufficient to advise the defendant fairly and fully of the grounds of the action, and to bar a further action for the same cause; and these are the two offices of pleading. To require the party to be more explicit would be to require him to plead evidence, which is contrary to a rule of good pleading.

358 Central Trust Co. v. East Tennessee &c. R. Co., 65 Fed. Rep. 332. 39 Nashville &c. R. Co. v. McConnell, 82 Fed. Rep. 65.

a ticket, thus limited to the original purchaser, is fraudulently transferred to another, and he attempts to use it, and the terms of the ticket are that if the holder parts possession of it in any manner except to an authorized officer of the company, he forfeits all rights under it, and that no other person can acquire any property therein, but that, unless its conditions are complied with, it shall be void, and, on presentation, may be taken up by the company and full fare collected, the company may, when it is presented by a person other than the original purchaser, take it up and refuse to surrender it.360 A thousand-mile railroad ticket given by a railroad company to a newspaper in payment of advertising, with power to sell and transfer, whose validity is on its face expressly limited to the first purchaser, becomes valueless in the hands of any other person after the sale to such first purchaser and an insertion of his name in the ticket, and such subsequent purchaser can not recover for being ejected while attempting to ride on such ticket.361

300 Levinson v. Texas &c. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 43 S. W. Rep. 1032. But where a person purchased a mileage ticket which provided that it should not be good for the passage of any one other than the original purchaser, under an assumed name, with the connivance of the ticket agent, and the conductor took it up, upon the admis

sion of the holder that the name on the ticket was not his true name, it was held that he might maintain trespass against the company: Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Pendergast, 75 Ill. App. 133.

361 Davis v. South Carolina &c. R. Co., 107 Ga. 420; s. c. 33 S. E. Rep. 437.

2639. Further as to when the rela- 2659. Passenger temporarily absent

2642. Status of passenger as depend- 2661, Persons on board trains de

2653. Persons employed on a private 2670. Idlers and spectators upon the