54.-THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

All South, and part of North America, had long been held as Spanish and Portuguese provinces. Before Mr. Monroe became President these provinces rebelled against Spain, and set up governments of their own, which they were able to maintain if they competed with the mother-country alone. To enable them the more easily to control at home and among themselves, several European governments formed a combination, which they christened the "Holy Alliance." This alliance dictated to European governments wherever it dared, and had the power to compel obedience. While those composing it confined their acts to their own countries and to their immediate neighbors, our country neither felt alarm, nor took exception to their acts. It mattered nothing to us if they issued mandates, and others chose to obey. Our Government had no cognizance of the matter, however much it doubted the legitimacy of the whole proceeding. It was their business, not ours. But they soon turned their attention to the American Continent. Spain could not regain control over her provinces without help from Europe; and the propriety of extending aid to her soon became a subject of discussion, which our Government feared might ripen into action. These provinces, now republics, had sought to follow our precedent in establishing new governments. They naturally looked to us for countenance, if not for active support. When their governments had assumed regular form, our Government promptly recognized them as belonging to the family of nations. This added to their moral strength. Further, it was neither right nor politic for us to go. The "Holy Alliance" had interposed by force in Spain to determine who should rule there. They might go further, and attempt to dictate in the new South American states. The American feeling was aroused. Mr. Monroe, in his annual message in 1823, spoke for our people. He said:

"The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers have thought proper, on a principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force.

in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question to which all independent powers, whose governments differ from theirs, are interested, even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless, remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy; meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power, and submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference."

This message and the action in Congress had the effect of preventing the interposition of the "Holy Alliance" in American affairs. The independence of these new states soon became recognized by other governments, and are now flourishing republics, and their people left free to govern themselves and pursue their own happiness in their own way. In Europe this part of the message commanded great attention. Its author and our country challenged high respect. The new states have ever been our fast friends. So important, in the public estimation, were the words we have quoted, that, to the present day, they are known and referred to as แ The Monroe Doctrine."

55.-BANKS AND BANKING IN NEW YORK

Banks of discount and deposit are a great convenience to those engaged in trade and commerce. They enable persons having good business paper to anticipate its payment. The holder sells, and the bank buys it. If the maker is good and performs

his duty, the transaction is ended when it is begun. Making paper to sell is simply a means of borrowing, and differs essentially from anticipating existing means. When banks of issue obtained a footing in New York, the Legislature of the State frequently disgraced itself in granting charters, some of which were obtained through bribery, and nearly all under lobby pressure. The system of free banking relieved the Legislature from importunities for bank charters. But that did not relieve the State from the disgrace of having enacted a law favorable to banks and injurious to freedom in business. In 1804 the Legislature passed what was called a "restraining act," which gave the incorporated banks a monopoly of the business of discounting notes. It made it a penal offence to contribute capital to any company or association to be used in making discounts, or transacting any other business which banks usually transact, or to receive money on deposit, and declared all notes and securities received in such business to be void. This act, so utterly in conflict with democratic principles, the banks were able to retain on the statutebook until 1837. Mr. Van Buren, when in the State Senate in 1814, brought in a bill to repeal this restraint upon the freedom of business where no injury could arise to the public interests. But the bank interest, so easily concentrated, was too strong to be overcome, and his bill was defeated. This restraining act was intended to confer upon the incorporated banks the monopoly of making discounts and doing other banking business. At the time of its enactment, there were but six banks in the State, three in the city of New York, one in Albany, one in Hudson, and one at Waterford, Lansingburg, and Troy. These six banks had the power in the Legislature to drive out all competition in business, and for a long time to prevent the incorporation of a competitor. The banks continued their monopoly of the business of banking until 1837, when every bank but one in the State had suspended specie payments, which resulted in the free banking system of the next year. Whatever political appellation those voting for the act of 1804 might have borne, the principles of it were antidemocratic, and of the most objectionable character, and unworthy of the approval of any Democrat. The public could not pos

sibly suffer if a man having money should discount notes and buy and sell exchange, nor was there any legitimate object accomplished by declaring notes and securities he might receive to be null and void.

56. THE ACQUISITION OF FLORIDA.

Mr. Monroe is entitled to the credit of acquiring Florida-the Land of Flowers. After we acquired Louisiana, this territory was entirely disconnected with any Spanish or foreign possession of any European government. Owing to the great extent of waste land, the settlement of it had been slow and very limited. To Spain it was hardly worth governing. Her policy in settling her American possessions partook of the character of extreme liberality to the settler. He asked for land, described what he wanted, stated his ability and intention to use it for a definite purpose, and the governor made the grant and some official put him in possession. He paid nothing but officers' fees. The better parts of Florida had been thus granted. Court favorites had also acquired large grants by special royal favor. Hence that peninsula was of little intrinsic value to the mother-country, and hence her willingness to sell. The purchase was useful to us. It had been the headquarters of pirates and other vicious men, some of whom urged the Southern Indians to aggressions upon the whites within our limits. General Jackson chased these desperate men to St. Mark's and Pensacola, and inflicted summary justice upon them. To prevent all future difficulties, Spain wisely concluded to sell and we to buy. But the treaty contained one costly error. Our Louisiana purchase clearly extended to the Rio del Norte. In defining our boundary on the west side of Louisiana our negotiator consented to make the Sabine River the boundary, thus giving Spain all between the latter and the former, being the whole of Texas, worth twenty times as much as Florida, though then doubtless thought of little value. The effort to bring this Texas region back into the Union was the chief cause of our war with Mexico. The acquisition of Florida has been, on the whole, of vast importance to us. It is far better to own it, than to have a foreign government for a neighbor. We can far better protect our people.

57.-REMARKS ON MR. MONROE'S ADMINISTRATION.

Mr. Monroe was a superior Executive officer, and he had the good fortune to call about him several very able men as advisers and assistants. John Quincy Adams, William H. Crawford, John C. Calhoun, B. W. Crowninshield, and William Wirt were able men. The general business of the Government was well conducted. He took responsibility without hesitation and without a murmur. It was his purpose to carry out the principles of Jefferson, Madison, and the Democratic party. In judging of mankind he committed one great mistake. He thought that the "era of good feeling," as it was called, had a solid foundation to rest upon, and that Government could exist without political parties, forming and dividing on principle. Such a view is pleasant to contemplate, but can never practically be of long continuance. Men never did and never will think alike upon questions affecting the public interest. Some will be selfish and others not. Some will judge wisely and others foolishly. Some will ever seek to govern, while others are only satisfied when all participate in public affairs. The affairs of Government would soon go wrong, if there were no sentinels to point out dangers. Each party is a watch upon the other, calling attention to the practical operation of whatever is done or proposed.

Mr. Monroe had seen the Federal party drop out of sight, and seemed to think that party spirit went with it. But he lived to see sorry consequences of this error. Before he left office he saw the Democratic party torn by dissensions and shattered into fragments. He saw, in his own cabinet, three aspirants for his seat, another in the House of Representatives, and another at the Hermitage in Tennessee, each claiming to be the better Democrat, and to be the most fit to become his successor. He saw, too, that this disruption of the Democratic party induced the Federal party, under another name, to rally in support of the one who sat nearest him at the council-board, and to organize a party which has under some name opposed the Democratic party and its principles, with this gentleman as an active leader. The success of Mr. Monroe in 1820, though gratifying indeed, proved that a