that the remaining steps and the conclusion of his calculations had more than once presented themselves in his dreams.

The same phenomena is manifested in memory. Very often we cannot recall a familiar word, name, idea or event; so have to wait for it; perhaps think of something else, and what we are in quest of will come to us spontaneously. Referring to this, Miss Cobbe says "The more this phenomenon. says:is studied, the more I think the observer of his own mental processes will be obliged to concede that, so far as his own conscious self is concerned, the research is made absolutely without him. He has neither pain nor pleasure, nor sense of labour, in the task, any more than if it were performed by some one else; and his conscious self is all the time suffering, enjoying or labouring on totally different grounds.' Such phenomena as these are quite inexplicable on the supposition that the cerebral hemispheres are the sole organs of mental activity, but intelligible enough if we assume there are subordinate centres of psychical activity co-operating with the supreme centre.

1 Macmillan's Magazine, Nov. 1870, p. 25.

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CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATES 73

We conclude, therefore, that each psychical centre has a consciousness of its own, and that this consciousness is related to the supreme consciousness (the Ego), as the subordinate nerve centres are related to the supreme nerve centre (the cerebral hemispheres). The relationship would be similar to that which subsists in the social organism. In the psychical as in the social organism the springs of action are from below, not from above. Every unit counts, and the majority rule, the consensus of thought being the communal consciousness. Hamilton's assertion that "What we are conscious of is constructed out of what we are not conscious of" is only partially true, for the brain is itself the chief centre of consciousness, to which the subcentres or ganglia are only the contributaries.

The term "unconscious is now much in vogue, and is often used in a vague and indefinite sense, as signifying a state of nescience, the unknown, or unrevealed; or it is personified as the Unknown or the Unknowable of Spencer, or as the Unconscious or the metaphysical World-Substance of Hartmann. The use of the term in any such metaphorical sense is

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be deprecated. The term unconscious should signify only that which is unknown to the supreme centre, the cerebral hemispheres, the Ego, but which may nevertheless be cognisant to the subordinate nerve centres.

CHAPTER IV

MIND AND MATTER

The term Mind-Mind as the unextended-The relationship between mind and matter-Professor Bain's theory of this relationship-Modus vivendi-Is mind a function of brain?

PERHAPS no word in the English language is used in so loose a manner as the term Mind. I recently took up a book on mental science, written by an author of note, and I found Mind described as Consciousness, as the Sentient Principle, as the Immaterial Spirit, as the Thinking Principle, in one long sentence; and, in addition, as the Spiritual Principle, as the Spirit, as Thought—all in one short paragraph. Not one of these terms describes a concrete entity, or a Real Substance. Mind has come to be looked upon as a mere abstraction. It is no longer fashionable to speak of a Soul, as that term does not readily lend itself to denote an abstract idea. Even theologians have discarded the use of the term

The transfor

except in a metaphorical sense. mation in the meaning of this word would make an interesting chapter in the history of mental science. Plato's soul was a real thing; it inhabited a body; it was the self-moving, and in moving itself it also moved the body. Aristotle's vegetative and sensative souls (ûxaı) were also very real things, and even his ethereal intellectual soul (vovs) had a local, if only temporary, habitation. In the following pages I shall understand Mind to be The Mind-a concrete reality-not an abstraction. I shall assume it to be that something within the human organism which feels, thinks and wills— the Substantia Cogitans.1

Matter has been defined as the Extended, mind as the Non-extended. These definitions have been arrived at by a process of elimination. In his analysis of matter, Descartes proceeded by abstracting all its contingent properties, such as density, colour, elasticity and the like, with the view of retaining that property alone which is common to every form of matter; and he concluded that there was only one property common to all kinds of matter, and that 1 Appendix E.