Election of Members; Election of General Council; Reports of the Secretary and Treasurer, Report of the Executive Committee.

Wednesday evening.-A paper by Andrew Allison, of Nashville, Teun., on "The Rise and Probable Decline of Private Corporations in America." A paper by Alexander Porter Morse, of Washington, D. C., on "The Citizen in Relation to the State." Discussion upon the subjects of the papers read.

Thursday morning.-The Annual address, by John F. Dillon, of New York; Reports of Standing Committees; Reports of Special Committees.

Thursday evening.-A paper by M. Dwight Collier, of St. Louis, on "Stock Dividends and their Restraint." A paper by Simon Sterne, of New York, on "The Prevention of Defective and Slipshod Legislation." Discussion upon the subjects of the papers read.

Friday morning.--Nomination of Officers; Miscellaneous Business; Election of Officers.

The Annual Dinner will be given at the Grand Union Hotel at 8:30 o'clock on Friday evening.

ΑΙ

A sketch in AN AMERICAN COURT. LIGHTING from the street car at one of the busiest corners of this city, we are confronted by a statue of white marble, representing a man sejant, whom it requires but little intimacy with the national monumentology to recognize as the ubiquitous Pater Patriæ. He is apparently keeping watch over the main entrance of a dingy-looking red brick building, solid but unpretentious. But the marble janitor makes no sign, and no man pries into our business or bars the door to curiosity. We climb the worm-eaten staircase unchallenged, and wander idly on till checked by a plain white-painted door, above whose lintels are the words "Common Pleas No. 3." It swings open at a push, and entering we find ourselves in a square room of fair size, lighted from two sides by several windows, all of which are double-sashed to exclude the jingling of the horse-car bells and the multifarious noises of the outer world. Facing the door is a long raised desk-table, occupying about half the side of the room and shaped in an arc of a circle, the concavity being toward the body of the room. Books and papers are piled or scattered on this table, behind which, at the apex of the arc, sits an elderly man of strikingly handsome and intelligent appearance-the judge of the court. He is in ordinary morning dress, and is busily engaged in revising the notes he has made during the progress of the case in hand-an occupation which does not apparently interfere with keen attention to what is passing around him.

Round the other three sides of the room, at a distance of about eight feet from the walls, runs a wooden railing some four feet in height, forming a barrier between those concerned in the present business of the court and the mere spectators like ourselves, who are accommodated with seats on a double row of benches ranged round the wall outside the charmed square. Within the inclosure, to the right-hand side of the bench, two rows of chairs, twelve in number, are arranged at right angles to the chord of the arc; and on these chairs, in various attitudes indicative of attention, indifference and repose, are seated the "twelve good men and true," upon whose verdict the issue of the trial depends. They are all apparently of the trades. men class, and here and there among their number one sees the dark skin which proclaims its wearer to be not many degrees removed from African parentage. A closer inspection of the jury reveals the curious fact that the jaws even of the most somnolent are moving slowly and ruminatively, as if engaged upon some toothsome cud; near them are some spittoons. In

front of the jurymen is a plain deal table with a few books and rolls of paper littered on it. The rest of the inclosure is studded with a score or so of comfortlesslooking bent-wood chairs, and occupied in groups by the parties to the suit and their witnesses and legal advisers. Another deal table in front of the bench accommodates the clerk of the court; and a few battered metal spittoous and a register stove make up the remaining equipments of the hall of justice.

The plaintiff in the present case appears to be a puny, sickly-looking boy of about twelve years of age, one of whose hands is enveloped in bandages, and who appears, through his "next friend," to claim damages for injury caused by the negligence of his employer, the defendant-a hard, shrewd-faced, middle-aged man, who is lolling at his ease on a chair close in front of the jury, with his legs resting across the seat of another chair at a convenient distance.

Seated negligently on a corner of the table facing the jury and carelessly dangling his feet in mid-air, is a young man, plaiuly dressed, whose eloquent appeal to the jury proves him to be acting as counsel for the defendant. Despite the nonchalance of his attitude and bearing it is at once evident that he is fully alive to the interests of his client and the difficulties of his case; and his speech for the defense is logical and plausible. The sympathies of his audience are sure to be enlisted on behalf of the injured child, and he therefore appeals strongly to their business instincts as employers of labor on behalf of a brother tradesman. In some small matter of detail, a date or name, the judge has occasion to interrupt and suggest a question. The young advocate merely recognizes the interruption with a quick glance round toward the bench, and the words "Is that so?" and then adopts the emendation and continues his address with no further sign, respect or regard for authority. Presently he brings his speech to a close with an impassioned appeal to the honesty and impartiality of his hearers; and then slipping from his perch he saunters carelessly across the court, exchanges a few laughing remarks with his client, bites a corner off a plug of tobacco which he produces from his pocket, expectorates meditatively, and finally drops into a chair to hear what reply his opponent is prepared to give.

Meanwhile an elderly man, tall, gaunt and awkwardlooking, has stepped nervously up to the vacated place and stands facing the jury, leaning heavily forward with his hands planted on the table. He begins speaking in a low tone, and with monotonous delivery merely restating the facts of his client's case; but presently a change comes, and warming to his work, he waxes eloquent and indulges in a savage personal attack upon the character and motives of the defendant. Involuntarily we turn to look at the man who is being described to the assembled crowd as "this greedy employer of cheap labor," "this man without heart or conscience, who pays children twenty-five cents a week to do work which would be full of peril for grown men," this, etc., etc.; but are surprised to find, that instead of writhing under the sarcasms leveled at him, he still reclines in his former ungraceful attitude, and accepts the compliments with an indifferent smile. The appeal for helpless childhood follows as a matter of course; but passionate as is the language and cleverly as the points are made they elicit no sign from the inanimate twelve. Then after a few minutes' silence the judge proceeds to sum up the case, his cool, impartial statement and shrewd analysis contrasting strangely with the addresses that preceded it. In ten minutes he places the jury in possession of the legal aspect of the case, and then he dismisses them to consider their verdict. Each in turn rises, stretches himself, addresses himself to a spittoon, and saunters after the foreman; and as they leave the court we too rise and retire, to ponder upon the majesty of law stripped of its externals and its traditions of respect.-St. James' Gazette.

general property in the sense of that section of the Code. For that character of property does not embrace mere rights of action for injury sustained by the wife during coverture for assault and battery, slander and the like, or for rights of which she is the meritorious cause, either at common law or by statute, unless the statute in creating a new cause of action authorizes her to sue or invest her with general or separate estate in the subject-matter of the action. In actions for personal injury inflicted upon the wife during coverture, the husband and wife must join. But the husband may generally sue alone, or unite his wife with him for any ordinary right not concerning her general or separate estate accruing during the marriage relation, and in such cases the common law, which is virtually continued by sub-section 2, of section 34, supra, has wisely left the propriety of instituting such actions to the discretion of the husband; and sound reason, domestic peace and good public policy unite in sustaining the rule that gives to the husband such control. Our statutes have made but little change if any in these rules, except to allow the wife to sue if the husband deserts her, and to enable her to protect her separate or general property. When statutes, like that in regard to inebriate husbands, give the wife the right to sue and recover, she may do so by force of the express words of the statute; and the fact that the cases in which she may sue are generally provided for in the Code of Practice and statutes creating new causes of action which expressly invest her with that right, furnishes a strong presumption that her capacity to sue, which has been increased by statute from time to time, must be ascertained from the language of such statutes and unrepealed consistent common law rules. The wife, where she is the meritorious cause, under a statute like this or under the one authorizing rewards, may be a proper or necessary party, yet she could not maintain such actions without joining her husband unless he deserts her, then she might bring or defend them in his name."

A novel case is Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., Illinois Supreme Court, 19 Cent. Law J., 111, holding that a railway company engaged in the transportation of freights, for hire as a common carrier, is bound to transport or haul upon its road the cars of any other railroad company when requested so to do, and will hold the same relation as a common carrier to such cars, that it does to ordinary freight, and in case of loss will be held to the same measure of liability to the owner of the cars as would attach in respect to any other property. The court said: "The question presented is one of first impression in this court, nor have counsel cited any case where the exact question involved was considered by any court of last resort. It leaves this court free to determine the law on principle as it shall be thought best to subserve public interests, as well as the private interests of corporations concerned. No proof is needed to show the extent and

*

the importance of the interests involved in the decision. It is a matter of so much public concern that judicial notice may be taken of the fact that cars belonging to different companies are interchangeably used on all the principal railroads in the United States, and that no company could do any considerable freighting business that did not conform to this general usage. Without such usage it would be difficult, if indeed it would be possible, to transact the commercial business of the country. Freights for shipment across the continent could not well be stopped at the terminus of each carrier's line and reshipped in cars of the connecting carrier. That would occasion more delay than the necessities of eommerce would tolerate. The extent of the usage in regard to the exchange and transportation of cars among so many different railroads would seem to require such exacting rules and regulations as would insure the strictest accountability on the part of companies that may transfer or haul cars over their respective roads. ** And why may there not be such a thing as a common carrier of cars either with or without its load of freight. As to the freights the car contains, it will be conceded such carrying roads are common carriers, and are subject to the strict liability of such carriers, and as has been seen by a constitutional provision, all the rolling stock and other movable property belonging to a railroad in this State shall be considered personal property. What reason exists for discriminating against this class of personal property, and for holding that railway companies carrying it shall not be regarded as common carriers? The mode of moving it whether on wheels or in carriages, ought not to be the foundation of any distinction. In either case, the property is in the exclusive care and control of the carrier, and there is as much reason, arising from public considerations, why such a carrier should be held to the strict liability of an insurer for the safety of the property in the one case as in the other. * ** The undertaking of defendant in regard to moving the car was within the scope of the general business it had engaged to do for the public, and it would seem no reason exists why the liability for the safe delivery of the car should not be the same as with respect to the freight it contains, which it is conceded is that of a common carrier. On what principle may defendant be considered a common carrier as to freights on its road, and not as to the car containing it, which it is moving over its road with its own propelling power. The law, as has been seen, makes all railways in this State public highways, open to the use of all persons for the transportation of their persons or property, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and it is apprehended, it is unlawful to make any discrimination as to the property offered to be carried, or as to whether it belongs to a private person or to a corporation. If it is such property as is capable of being carried with the means ordinarily employed by such carrier, the obligation is imperative, and the carrier must receive

the property and carry it with safety in the way such property is usually carried, and any failure to do so will subject the carrier to damages. The only case to which the attention of the court has been directed having any features like the one considered is Malloy v. Tioga R. Co., 39 Barb. 488. In that case the defendant company, which it is conceded was a common carrier as to freights and passengers, engaged to furnish plaintiff the motive power to draw his cars loaded with his property over its road, the plaintiff being obligated to load and unload his cars, and furnish brakemen to accompany them, but who were subject to the control of defendant's conductor, and it was held defendant assumed the liability of a common carrier, and consequently was liable for injuries to plaintiff's cars and property not caused by inevitable accident or public enemies. But aside from authority, the conclusion reached on principle is, defendant occupied the relation of a common carrier as to the car of plaintiff in his possession, as well as the freight it contained, and as such was liable for its safe return to plaintiff unless its loss occurred from causes which exempt common carriers, which is not claimed in this case." To the same effect is New Jersey R. & T. Co. v. Penn. R. Co., 27 N. J. L. 100.

THERE

THE EXTRADITION OF ΕΝΟ.

RE has been so much misapprehension as to the grounds upon which the extradition of John E. Eno was demanded from Canada, that a brief reference to one or two of the real points raised may be interesting and profitable, at least to lawyers. While the case became in certain respects a celebrated one, it is not likely to appear in the books, as the decision is of a single judge sitting as a magistrate, and this decision, even if reported, does not fairly indicate the serious reasons advanced in favor of the extradition. These reasons are of interest to the profession because they are in some respects new, and present points never yet decided; they were well considered and deemed sound before any application was made for extradition; but the New York newspapers failed to learn, either before or after the proceedings, the real points of the controversy, and not only the general public, but even most lawyers have been led to believe that the effort to extradite Eno was a mere farce, if not worse. The New York Evening Post, after very proper and intelligent discussion from time to time of the question of common law forgery, and having presumed that though that was a question in the case it was the only question, misleads a whole community, at the expense of some reputable people, by speaking of the solemn request of our government for the extradition of Eno, and of the dignified proceedings of the Superior Court of Quebec, as "the bare-faced attempt to get hold of him in violation of the extradition treaty," and again of "the desperate attempt to kidnap him under the forms of law" and of "the evident bad faith of the attempt" * * * "to evade the provisions of the treaty."

It may be explained, in the first place, that the public prosecution of Eno was not begun in this county by the bank of which he had been president, nor by any of its officers, but was the direct result of the charge made to the grand jury at the opening of the June Term by the presiding judge, calling their attention to this particular case and exhorting them to do their duty in respect to it. No prosecutor appeared, but the

grand jury, with the assistance of the district attorney, made an examination of all the transactions of Eno, and finally brought in indictments, one for forgery in the first degree, and others containing counts for forgery in the second and third degrees. It was upon these indictments and the copies filed in the executive departments at Albany and Washington, that the request for extradition was made by our government, and upon nothing else.

The indictment for forgery in the first degree was that Eno "forged a certain check for $95,000; this check was what was known as a "Cashier's check," having those words printed on the margin and waterlined in the body, and was drawn upon the bank to the order of Dyett & Co., and signed "Jno. C. Eno, President." This check was upon its face to all intents and purposes the check of the bank, made and purporting to be made as the act of the bank, and in a third person's hauds binding upon the bank without more; it may be said that it was equivalent to, and purported to be, a writing executed by the bank as a corporation, as though the signature had been "The Second National Bank of New York," or the same by "Jno. C. Eno, President," or as though the writing were sealed with the seal of the corporation without any signature; it was one of the usual modes of executing a writing by a corporation.

The grand jury were advised that if the accused so executed this writing without authority and with intent to defraud, the act was forgery. The distinction between this case and that of People v. Mann, 75 N. Y. 484, is a narrow one, but it is believed that the distinction can be maintained, even if the provisions of the Penal Code were identical with those of the Revised Statutes under which that case arose. However that may be, it was not contested before the Canadian court, whether the act was forgery here, but whether it was forgery in Canada at the time of the Ashburton treaty or since.

Now on this branch of the case considerable evidence was produced, but it will be sufficient to bring out the point to say that the prosecution proved that the accused resigned his office in writing on May 13th last; the exact time of the day could not be directly proven, and no proof was produced as to this fact by the defendant, although of course he could establish it to a certainty; but at no time during the day of May 13th did he come to the bank; at a comparatively early hour on that day the cashier and the brother of the accused; on the suggestion of the brother, went through the books of the bank to ascertain, not if there was a defalcation, but the exact amount of a defalcation already known to the brother to exist, but until that time not known to the cashier; the circumstances led to the inference that this knowledge was due entirely to a confession made by the accused the night before, as the newspapers stated at the time, or in the early part of the day of the 13th. This check for $95,000 bore date May 13th; it was executed on that day, or on the following day, the 14th, when it was presented to the bank for payment. The bank directors had a meeting on the night of the 13th to consider the defalcation, and it was at this meeting that the whole deficit was provided for; but no one at this time knew any thing about this $95,000 check, nor was it even heard of until the morning of the 14th when it was presented, and caused such a commotion among the directors and the bank examiuer as came near closing the bank.

Not to detail all the circumstances, it was urged that it was a question for the jury and not for a committing magistrate whether the accused executed the check before or after his resignation. This matter the judge took upon himself to decide in favor of the accused, and weighed the evidence which was such as