« AnteriorContinuar »
the deceased, one of the men employed in carrying the So letters written by the wife during such separation, lumber from the planer across the track, had carried a in which she addresses him as her “dear husband," board across to a pile about four feet from it, and set are competent to show the condition of her feelings it down and turned around to go back to the mill for toward him; and the husband is a competent witness another board, when he was struck by defendant's to show that such letters are in the handwriting of bis car, which was being “kicked” in at an unusual rate wife. Holtz v. Diek. Opinion by Okey, J. of speed, without any warning to deceased. If de
GIFT -- DEED - DELIVERY AT GRANTOR'S DEATH. ceased had looked up the track he could have seen the
-A., having executed in due form a deed of gift approaching car in time to have avoided the accident. Held, that under these facts the court could not say
of real estate to his son, said to B.: “Take this deed
and keep it. If I get well I will call for it. If I don't, that the omission of the deceased to keep on the lookout for approaching cars was per se negligence. It was
give it to Billy," the grantee. A. was then ill, and
died within a few days thereafter of the same illness, properly a question of fact for the jury to determine
and B. then handed the deed to the grantee, who whether he ought to have kept on the outlook, or
caused it to be recorded. Held, that this did not oonwhether under the circumstances, he might not rely
stitute a delivery, and the instrument was invalid as a on being given timely warning of the approach of cars.
deed. B. was the agent of the grantor, and not of the See Kay v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 65 Penn. St. 269.
grantee, and hence the instrument was not only revocaMark v. St. Paul, M. & M.R. Co. Opiniou by Mitchell, J.
ble by the grantor at any time before his death, but
not having parted with all dominion over it during [Decided June 12, 1884.]
life, it became on his death a mere pullity. Wellborn DAMAGES-BREACH OF CONTRACT- WARRANTY.- - A v. Weaver, 17 Ga. 267; Carey y. Dennis, 13 Md. 1; harvesting machine was sold to the defendants by Hale v. Joslin, 134 Mass. 310; and see Phipps v. Hope, plaintiff with warranty of its quality and capacity, and 16 Ohio St. 586; 1 Jar. Wills (by R. & T.), 33 et seq. In whicb he understood was purchased by them for ac- Crooks v. Crooks, 34 Ohio St. 610, it appeared that tual use in barvesting a large crop of graiu belonging "the grantor, without reserving or intending to reto them. Held, that damages for injury to the serve any control over the instrument, delivered it to grain from delay, while they were experimenting with a third person to be by him delivered to the grantee the machine, and attempting to make it work, cannot at the death of the grantor,” and “the depositary aofairly be considered such as would arise either natur- cepted the deed for the grantee, and at the death of ally from the breach of the contract, or such as may the grantor delivered it to the grantee." This was reasonably be supposed to have been contemplated by beld to constitute a delivery. That was upon the thethe parties when making the contract as a probable ory that the grantor had delivered the instrument as result of the breach. Frohreich v. Gammon, 28 Minn. his deed, and that it took effect as of the date of the 477; McCormick v. Vanatta, 43 Iowa, 389; Hadley v. first delivery. The decision received the unanimous Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341. Wilson v. Reedy. Opinion by approval of this court in Ball v. Foreman, 37 Ohio St. Vanderburgh, J.
132. While this may be regarded as an exception to [Decided June 30, 1884.]
the rule as to deeds of this character, we regard the law as settled for this State as to any case fairly com
ing within these decisions. But neither of the cases OHIO SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.
was like this, and properly understood they are deciJANUARY TERM, 1884.
sive against the validity of this deed. They were cases
in which the grantors had parted absolutely with all MARRIAGE
dominion over the instruments, and there was no reRATIFICATION INDUCING
vocation or attempt to revoke. Here it was in terms SEPARATE FROM HUSBAND ACTION - EVIDENCE. - (1) While the pareuts of a married woman
stated by the grautor, that if he recovered he would pot liable in damages where they have encouraged her
call for the deed. As a deed of gift such an instruto separate from her husband, and supported her in
ment was therefore a mere nullity, and required no resuch separation, in the honest belief that it was neces
vocation. Williams. v. Schatz. Opinion by Okey, J. sary for her protection, the appearances seeming to in- STATUTE OF FRAUDS-BUILDING SEVERED dicate such necessity, although in fact there was no LAND-PURCHASE-MONEY-RECOVERY.-The statute of ground for separation and no actual necessity for such frauds cannot defeat the recovery of the purchaseprotection; yet where the motive was not protection money on a verbal contract for the sale of a dwellingto the wife, but malice and ill-will toward the hus- house then annexed to real estate, but to be severed band, an action may be maintained. Friend v. Thomp- from the freehold aud delivered on rollers, after the son, Wright, 636, 639; Rabe v. Hanna, 5 Ohio, 530; same has been so severed and delivered iu accordance Preston v. Bowers, supra; Schouler Hus. & W., $ 64; with the contract. Bostwick v. Leach, 3 Day, 476; Cooley Torts, 224. (2) A marriage entered into in this Hallen v. Runder, Cromp. M. & R. 266; Curtiss v. Hoyt, State when the wife is less than sixteen years of age 19 Conn. 154; Shaw v.Carbrey, 13 Allen, 462; Hartwell v. becomes irrevocable by cohabitation at the time, and Kelly, 117 Mass. 235, 237; Keyser v. District No. 8, 35 after she arrives at that age; and she may also ratify N. H. 477; Fortman v. Goepper, 14 Ohio St. 558; Wagthe marriage at that age in other ways, as by letters to ner v. C. & T. R. Co., 22 id. 563, 576. Long v. White. her spouse, addressing him as her husband, and sign- Opinion per Curiam. ing the letters by her Christian and his surname. Perry v. Lovejoy, 49 Mich. 529; Preston v. Bowers, 13 Obio St. 1. (3) On the trial of an action against hus
OHIO SUPREME COURT COMMISSION ABband and wife for inducing the plaintiff's wife to
STRACT. abandon him, in which the illegal acts are charged to
JANUARY TERM, 1884. have been done by the female defendant, evidence of her acts is competent, even if such acts were unknown
CORPORATION-INSOLVENT-LIABILITY OF STOCKto the husband, and he had not encouraged her to commit them; and if a cause of action is proved, both are
HOLDERS.-(1) In an action by a creditor of an insolvliable. (4) Evidence is also competent to show that
ent corporation to enforce the personal liability of its the parents had, after such separation, knowingly en
stockholders, where the stockholders were not all becouraged her to associate with disreputable persons.
fore the court, and it did not appear that those uot
served with process could not have been served, it was viding that if the purchaser shall take any objection error to assess upon the stockholders served the whole or make any requisition as to the title, evidence or amount of the indebtedness of the corporation. In an commencement of title, conveyance or otherwise, action of this kind all the owners of stock are neces- which the vendor is unable or unwilling to remove or sary parties. Rev. Stat., § 3260; Wright v. McCor- comply with, the vendor may by notice in writing demack, 17 Ohio St. 86; Umsted v. Buskirk, id. 113; livered to the purchaser or his solicitor, and notwithBrown v. Hitchcock, 36 id. 667 ; Wheeler v. Faurot, 37 standing any intermediate negotiation, rescind the id. 26. (2) In such action it was error to give judg- contract for sale. The purchasers made fourteen rement for some of the stockholders releasing them from quisitions. The vendor answered them.
The purassessment, upon the finding that they did not own chasers considered several of such answers insuffstock at the time the liability sought to be enforced cient, and insisted on the requisitions. The vendor accrued, without finding further that the stock held by gave notice that he rescinded the contract. The purthese defendants had not been sold by the corporation chasers waived the requisitions, and on the vendor prior to the time such liability accrued. Brown v. neglecting to complete the contract, applied by somHitchcock, 36 Ohio St. 667. Bonewitz v. Van Wert Co. mons for a declaration that they were entitled to a Bank. Opinion by McCauley, J.
conveyance of the property. Held, that the vendor had expressed his inability or unwillinguess, but the
purchasers had insisted on their requisitions; that RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.
* unwillingness meant unwillingness to go to the
trouble and expense of removing or complying with LIMITATION — STATUTE OF - ACKNOWLEDGMENT.
requisitious; and that the vendor had a right to reAn acknowledgment, in order to be sufficient to take
scind the contract at any time without giving his rea
sons. Ch. Div., June 13, 1884. Dames y. Wood. a debt out of the statute of limitations, must be absolute and unconditional-not controlled by any other
Opinion by Bacon, V. C. (51 L. T. Rep. (N. S.] 109.) language in the document-and must contain words of GAMING-AGENT-IMPLIED AUTHORITY TO PAY BET. such a character that there may reasonably be inferred -Where a person authorizes another to bet for him in therefrom a promise to pay the debt. The acknowl- the agent's own name, an implied request to pay if the edgment must not only be clear in itself in order to bet be lost is involved in that authority; and the moraise the implication of a promise, but must be ac- ment the bet is made, and the obligation to pay it if companied with words which prevent the possibility lost incurred, the authority to pay becomes irreroof the implication; though an expression of less than cable in law, and it is immaterial that such obligation a promise will not necessarily put an end to the impli- is not enforceable by process of law, if the non-fulfillcation. It is not enough for the writer of an acknowl- ment of it would entail serious inconvenience or loss edgment to refer to a debt as being due from some- upon the agent. So held by Bowen and Fry, L. JJ. body, but the latter, on its fair construction as read (affirming judgment of Hawkins, J., reported 48 L. T. by the light of surrounding circumstauces, must be an Rep. (N. S.] 74), Brett, M. R., dissenting. Ct. of App., admission that the writer himself owes the debt. A May 30, 1884. Read v. Anderson. Opinions by Brett, debtor wrote to his creditor, “I thank you for your M. R., Bowen and Fry, L. JJ. (51 L. T. Rep. (N. very kind intentions to give up the rent of Tyn-y- S.] 55.) bwrwydd next Christmas, but I am happy to say at
DAMAGES-PENALTY OR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.-An that time both principal and interest will have been
agreement for sale contained the two following propaid in full.” When this letter was written a property
visions : (9) As an earnest hereof the purchaser has called Tyn-y-bwrwydd belonged to the debtor's wife
this day paid into the hands of S. the sum of 5001. as a for her separate use, and for some time the rents of
deposit, the deposit to form part of the purchasethe property had been retained by the creditor in part
money to be paid on the day of possession; and (10) satisfaction of his debt. Held (reversing the decision
should either vendor or purchaser refuse or neglect to of Pollock, B., 48 L. T. Rep. [N, S.] 479; 23 Ch. Div.
carry out the above arrangement on her or his part, 207), that the letter was not a sufficient acknowledg- the one
so refusing or neglecting shall pay to the ment to take the debt out of the statute of limitations.
other the sum of 5001. as or in the nature of liquidated Morgan v. Rowlands, 26 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 855; L. R.,
damages. The purchaser was unable to carry out his 7 Q. B. 493; 2 Eng. Rep. 611,comments on. Ct. of App.,
part of the agreement. The vendor brought this acMarch 31, 1884. Green v. Humphreys. Opinions by
tion for specific performance of the agreement, or in Cotton, Bowen and Fry, L. JJ. (51 L. T. Rep. [N. S.]
the alternative, payment of the 5001. as liquidated 42.) (See 35 Am. Rep. 416; 24 id. 460; 26 id. 709.)
damages. It was contended that this 500l. was a pen. WILL-LEGACY-CHARGE ON REAL ESTATE-ADDI- alty, and was therefore not recoverable. Held, that TIONAL LEGACY GIVEN BY CODICIL.-The principle the meaning of the agreement was that the 5001. should that where a will contains a gift of legacies and resi- be recoverable, not if some minute provision were not due, the legacies are (in the event of the personal es- carried out, but if owing to the fault of either party, tate proving insufficient for their payment) to be the agreement were not carried out at all, and that deemed to be charged upon the real estate applies in that sum could be recovered in this case as liquidated favor of an additional legacy given by a codicil to a damages. Held, that it could also be recovered if the legatee named in the will. A testator, by his will, action were looked upon as an action to enforce the gave 3001. to his wife, and "all the residue of his prop- forfeiture of the deposit. High Ct. of Just., Ch. Div., erty, of whatever description,” to his sister. By a May 21. Catton v. Bennett. Opiniou by Kay, J. (51 codicil he left to his wife “the sum of 7001., in addi- L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 70.) tion to what he had already left her by his will.” The personal estate proved insufficient for the payment of debts and legacies in full. Held, that the 7001., as well
INSURANCE LAW. as the 3001., was charged on the real estate. Ch. Div., June 21, 1884. Matter of Hall. Opinion by Pearson, J. (51 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 84.
LIFE — "ON OR BEFORE PAID-UP POLICY. - (1)
Where an insurance policy contains a stipulation that VENDOR AND VENDEE-CONDITIONS OF SALE-RIGHT the policy shall determine if the premium is not paid TO RESCIND.-A sale took place under a condition pro
"on or before the day" fixed, and by a separate in
strament delivered simultaneously with the policy, provided that it should be null and void “if the said and for the same consideration, the company agrees, property shall be sold or conveyed.” The policy was after the payment of three annual premiums, to issue issued to a partnership, one member of which sold his a paid-up policy for a proportionate amount on the interest in the property to his copartner before the surrender of the policy to the company “on or before loss, and it was held that this did not have the effect it shall expire by the non-payment of the fourth or to avoid the policy. Another holding is followed in auy subsequent annual premium," the stipulation and Dermani v. Insurance Co., 26 La. Ann. 69; Pierce v. agreement should be read together as one coutract, Insurance Co., 50 N. H. 297; Burnett v. Insurance Co., and the word “on” in the coutract should be con- 46 Ala. 11; West v. Insurance Co., 27 Ohio St. 1, in strued to mean the instant of the expiration of the each of which cases the policy contained substantially policy. (2) In such a case the time of the surrender of the same provision. The conclusion we reach is also the policy is of the essence of the contract, and the in- sustained by the following authorities: Keeler v. Niagsured is not entitled to a paid-up policy on the surren- ara Fire Ins. Co., 16 Wis. 523; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. der of the original policy after it has expired by non- v. Ross, 23 Ind. 180; Dix v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 22 III. payment of a premium. This court, while always in- 272; Wood v. Rutland Ins. Co., 31 Vt. 552. Hathaway clined to follow the decisions of the State courts, be- V. State Ins. Co. Sup. Ct. Iowa, July 22, 1884. Opincause it admiuisters the law concurrently with them, ion by Reed, J. (20 N. W. Rep. 164.) yet is not bound by such decisions. 16 Pet. 45; 102
FIRE-OVERVALUATION-VERDICT NOT DISTURBED U. S. 14. The very able opinion in Montgomery v. Phonix Mut. Life Ius. Co., 14 Bush, 54, is not sus
—“OTHER INSURANCE."— When under the terms
of the policy, the assured will not gain any thing by tained by the weight of authority, and we think it, as well as the opinion in the demurrer in this case, is to
an overvaluation, the evidence of a fraudulent intent be criticised, because they apply to the rules of con
in overvaluing the property should at least be of a sat
isfying character to warrant a court in disturbing a struction applicable to contracts for land, to the construction of an insurance contract. Courts in constru
verdict for the assured. Bonham v. Iowa Cent. Ins.
Co., 25 lowa, 328; Franklin Ins. Co. v. Vaughan, 92 U. ing contracts may look to the subject matter and the
S. 519; Williams v. Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 61 Me. 67; surrounding circumstances, and may avail themselves of the same light which the parties to the contract pos
Wood Ins., $ 426; Dogge v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 49
Wis. 501. (2) If the policy contains a provision that it sessed. Merriam v. United States, 107 U. S. 441. In
is to become void in case of other insurance being subthis case the language, strictly construed, binds the company to issue a paid-up policy only “after the re
sequently effected without the written consent of the
first company, such company cannot escape liability ceipt of not less than three annual premiums; * and on the surrender of said policy to the company on
thereby when the “other insurance” is void, and or before it shall expire,” etc. The right to a paid-up
known and accepted by all parties as being void. Hub
bard v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 33 Iowa, 325. Sup. Ct. policy commenced only after the payment of the re
Iowa, June 7, 1884. Behrens v. Germ. Fire Ins. Co. quisite number of annual premiums, aud it was on condition that the policy was surrendered “
Opinion by Seevers, J. (19 N. W. Rep. 838.)
on or before it shall expire" by reason of the non-payment of FIRE-CONDITIONS— FAILURE premiums. This was the time fixed within which the
ERY OF PREMIUMS-ACTION WITHIN A YEAR.- Where company was bound to issue a paid-up policy. The au insurance policy contains a condition that if the effect of the surrender may or may not have deprived person assured is not the sole owner of the property the assured of the full insurance for the remainder of
the insurance company must be informed and the fact the year. In our view, it is not material to determine expressed in the written part of the policy, and that the effect of such a surrender; the important question otherwise the policy is void, a failure to comply with is, has the agreement limited the time within which the condition renders the policy void ab initio. Where the surrender must be made? If we consider the sub
money is paid upon an insurance policy with the exject-matter of this contract, and the circumstances
pectation of receiving a return, and in good faith, the under which this and other insurance companies do element of fraud not existing upon a failure of the business, we feel constrained to give defendant a strict consideration, the policy being void ab initio, the construction of this agreement, even though it may be premiums paid may be recovered, and it is immaterial hardship upon complainants, who are infants. The whether or not there bas been a loss under the policy. overwhelming weight of authority is against the court Taylor v. Sumner, 4 Mass. 56; Richards v. Marine Ins. in Montgomery v. Phenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. Most of Co., 3 Johns. 307; Murray v. Columbian Ins. Co., 4 id. these decisions have been delivered since that opinion, 443; Elbers v. U.S. Ins. Co., 16 id. 129; Delavigne v. and some of them since the overruling of the demur- Same, 1 Johns. Cas. 310; Murray v. Same, 2 id. 168; rer. See Attorney-General v. Continental Ins. Co., Robertson v. Same, id. 250; Holmes v. Same, id. 329; 83 N. Y. 74; Hudson v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., Jackson v. New York Ins. Co., id. 191; Forbes v. 28 N. J. Eq. 168; Bussing's Ex'r v. Union Mut. Life
Church, 3 id. 159; Steinback v. Rhinelander, id. 269; Ins. Co., 34 Ohio St. 222; Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Donath v. Ins.Co. of N.A.,4 Dall. 463; Clark v. Manfrs. Whitehead, 58 Miss. 226; S. C., 38 Am. Rep. 322; Cof- Ins. Co., 2 Wood. & M. 473; Scriba v. Ins. Co. of N. A., fey v. Universal Life Ins.Co., 10 Biss. 354; Smith v. Na. 2 Wash. C. C. 107; Stevenson v. Snow, 3 Burr. 1237; tional Life Ins. Co., 13 Ing. L. J. 330. Sheerer v. Man- Feise v. Parkinson, 4 Taunt. 640; Routh v. Thompson, hattan Life Ins. Co. Cir. Ct., D. Ky., July 15, 1884.
11 East, 428; Oom v. Bruce, 12 id. 225; Penson v. Lee, Opinion by Barr, J. (20 Fed. Rep. 886.)
2 Bos. & P. 330; Hentig v. Staniforth, 5 Maule & S. FIRE-VOID POLICY-CHANGE
OF PROP- 122; Colby v. Hunter, 3 Car. & P.7; May Ing., $ 4; 4 ERTY.-Where one of the provisions of an insurance Wait Act. & Def. 119. (2) Where a fire insurance polpolicy given to a partnership is that “if the title of the icy contains a condition that no action shall be brought property is transferred, incumbered or changed,
against the insurance company upon the policy unless * * the policy shall be void,”a dissolution of within one year after a loss by fire, but the policy is the partnership, and a sale by one partner to the other void ab initio, held, that an action may be brought and of his interest, is a change of title to the property, and maintained by the assured to recover the amount of will render the policy void. The case of Hoffman v. premiums paid, even after one year from a loss by fire, Ætna Ins. Co., 32 N. Y. 405, is probably the leading the condition not applying to such an action. Taylor case holding this doctrine. The policy in that case v. Sumner, 4 Mass. 56; Murray v. Columbian Ins. Co.,
4 Johns. 443; Holmes v. U. S. Ins. Co., 2 Jobus. Cas. reflect upon, that ship-owners should weigh the desir. 329; Steinback v. Rhinelander, 3 id. 269; Scriba v. Ivs. ability of a mutual compact to eschew the law courts Co. of N. A., 2 Wash. C. C. 107; Oom v. Bruce, 12 in toto. The remedy is in the hands of the treasury, East, 225. Plaintiff therefore is not defeated of re- for it is a matter of constant remark that the court covery of the premiums paid upon the policies issued fees are a source of lucrative income when all expenbefore the one under which he claimed in his action in ses have been paid. An addition to the judicial staff the United States Circuit Court, on the ground that no is therefore not impossible. loss had occurred on their policies. Sup. Ct. Iowa, Our new palace of justice, the Royal Courts, has not June 10, 1884. Waller v. Northern Assurance Co. Opin- been altogether successful. One-balf of the building, ion by Beck, J. (19 N. W. Rep. 865.)
the Central Hall, is of no use whatever, except upon the annual occasion of the procession of the judges. If it and the courts had been on the same level, it would
have been eagerly utilized as a place for impromptu OUR LONDON LETTER.
consultations, after the manner formerly in vogue in
Westminster Hall. But the courts are situated in EYOND doubt the leading topic of conversation surrounding galleries, and the greater number of them amongst barristers and solicitors, both old and
are separated from the hall by at least a hundred yards young, is the present and the probable future of passage. In addition to their structural defects the condition of legal business in this country. The legal law courts suffer grievously from mismanagement. interests are already subjected to a considerable de- There is an elaborate apparatus for turning on hot pression, and are threatened with something danger- and cold air at will, but no one understands the mode ously like extinction. The tendency of the legislation of manipulation, so that the ordinary course is that of the day is to discourage litigation by rendering it one is scorched by tropical blasts in summer and more or less penal. This is effected by an exaggeration chilled by artificial north-easters in winter. Also the of the court fees in all cases, but especially in those old electric lighting machinery has been sold and the connected with bankruptcy. Professional fees have new is not ready nor likely to be for many a long day, been simultaneously reduced, and the consequence is to the infinite annoyance of the judges and of practithat the gentlemen whose“ rapacity” is the favorite tioners. bubject of the lay press find considerable difficulty in Lord Coleridge has been performing a useful task in “making both ends meet." Now the source of this the course of the present Circuit by calling attention tone in journalism is near at hand; it is to be found to the subject of the inequality of sentences. There in the notorious fact that the majority of legal leader is a prevalent disposition to think that his conclusions writers are men who have failed at the bar. But the
are a little too basty and that he has, in yielding to the question whether or not it is right to discourage litiga- dictates of humanity, forgotten the logical theory of tion is a serious one to which lawyers answer that punishment. Also your correspoudent does not quite courts of law are the natural arena for the settlement know, nor has he found any one to explaiu to him inof substantial differences. Upon this a distinguished telligibly, what Lord Coleridge means by saying that American lawyer, whose works bave been read with "we manufacture our own criminals." That we did great interest in this country, holds an apparently op- so before the system of solitary confinement was inposite opinion. He says of certain by-gone reforms troduced is a fact; that we do so now is questionable, in the practice of the New York courts that they except in so far as we cannot help breeding them. tended to diminish litigation, but there can be little An interesting phenomenon of the present sittings, doubt that the sense would be more complete if be- and one which may not be without influence in simplitween “ diminish” and “litigation" the word frivo- fying the difficulties indicated by the word "delay," lous were inserted.
has been the rapidity with which judges, sitting with The most serious danger by which the legal profes- out juries, have disposed of their lists. The officials sion is threatened in England is contained in the have been at their wits' end to ma:ufacture lists sufthreat of the trading communities to establish private ficently large to satisfy the voracious appetites of courts of commercial arbitration. Their reasons are Justices Mathews, Kay and North. Suits with highly two-fold. In the first place they say that lawyers sounding names went down before them like ripe know nothing of business, a categorical accusation corn before the knives of a reaping machine. The which the bar indignantly denies. Nor can there be any former judge is especially notorious for a capacity for hesitation in saying that there are at the bar specialists getting to the root of a dispute, which in a man of less in every kind of business who only differ from men of authority, would be stigmatized as jumping at conclubusiness in their complete understanding of the law. sions. Technicalities he scorns as quibbles and intriSuch men are well-kuown even amongst juniors. cate legal arguments are met by the criticism, " That There is Mr. Moulton, who is a scientific man as well may be law, Mr. —, bu, it is certainly not busias a lawyer, and to whom the facts which crop up in uess.” When he sits with a jury he takes them into patent cases, and in questions concerning electric his confidence by a look which seems to say, "you and lighting are as familiar as the alphabet. Mr. Gorell I know all about this, gentlemen, and counsel's arguBarnes is a successful advocate in shipping cases, be- ments assist us very little.” But it is rumored that cause he has had practical experience in the matter; this expedition in courts of first instance will in all Mr. Shortt is familiar with the intricacies of publish- probability increase the arrears in the Court of Apers' offices, and the list might be continued to an in- peal, especially in these days when every excuse for definite length. There are incapable men in this as au appeal is eagerly seized. The last named judge has in every other profession, but suitors are not often however recently giveu a decision in Wilkins v. Scinde, their victims for they drop out of the race early. But Delhi & Punjaub R. Co., which is founded on the prin. the second of the reasous for the discontent with ciples of law, if upon any principle. A servant of an which commercial men regard the administration of East India railway applied for furlough to which he the law is as weighty as it is old. Delay, which is the was entitled after long and faithful service. The apourse of suitors, threatens to to be the ruin of the law.
plication was granted, and two days later the servant yers themselves. In the settlement of commercial received a notice that a six months' notice must be in. disputes this delay is absolutely ruinous, especially cluded in the grant of furlough. The Divisional where the shipping interests are concerned, and it is Court will, ere long, express their opinion as to tho hardly strange, though it is not altogether "leasant to law upon this point, but there can beono question that
the action of the company was not prompted by the also extends their application to persons who, though principles of honesty.
born or naturalized in the United States, have reVice-Chancellor Bacon has given general satisfac- nounced their allegiance to vur government," expation by his decision that the executrix of Lady triated themselves, and became citizens of a foreign Lytton was not entitled to publish the late Lord government. It is to such subjects that the language Lytton's love letters to his wife before the days of of Mr. Justice Miller, in the famous Slaughter House their disagreement. This venerable judge is as sound cases applies. a lawyer as any man on the judicial bench, and has It would be a very strange state of things, if all the the merit of being extremely entertaining. Amongst children born in the United States of foreigners, who bis peculiarities is the correctness of his English style, had never become naturalized, were aliens. Probafor this is not a common characteristic of the judges. bly more than a million of citizens of the United Lord Coleridge is always elegant in his diction, and States are so only from the fact of their birth here, Mr. Justice Stephen is severely correct when he their parents having been foreigners who were never speaks deliberately, but the majority of the judges naturalized. The doctrine laid down in the opinion in are, by reasou of an affection for banging sentences, question goes a little further than that contained in the despair of the reporters. So much is this the case the revised Code of Italy on this subject, referred to that the reports, which purport to be taken verbatim, by your correspondent, that “the child of an alien is cannot do more than represent the substantial mean- an alien." The child of an alien born in this country, ing of judicial observations. But slipshod style and as emphatically enunciated in Justice Field's opinion, inarticulate pronunciation are fiercely mocked by is a citizen; entitled to all the rights and privilges of Vice-Chancellor Bacon, who is apt to say, “he may be such a status, except in the cases specially mentioned. talking double Dutch, but English it is not. More
GEORGE O'DOHERTY. over he is a great stickler for old customs, and objects WASHINGTON, Nov. 22, 1884. strongly to that anomalous thing, a bearded barrister. Two causes célèbres are in prospect, but there is
BUSH V. LATHROP. every reason to believe that the public will find its Editor of the Albany Law Journal: meal of scandal sadly disappointing. The defendant The Supreme Court of Nevada in Haydon v. Nicoin Fortescue v. Garmoyle (a Savoy actress against the letti, 30 A. L. J. 386, cites and follows Bush v. Lathrop, son of Lord Cairns) is out of England and will not re- 22 N. Y. 547. The exact status of this case in New turn till the trial is over; and the case of Adams v. York is an interesting study. In Moor v. MetropoliColeridge cannot well involve any thing but a point of tan Bank, 55 N. Y. 41 (opinion by Grover, J.), the Relaw. If however they should prove interesting, there porter head-notes the case as overruled. In Greene v. may be an opportunity of describing them on a future Warnick, 64 N. Y. 225 (opinion by Earl, J.), the court occasion.
quotes Judge Allen's opinion in Schafer v. Reilly, 50 N. THE TEMPLE, Nov. 11, 1884.
Y. 61, approving Judge Denio's opinion in Bush v.
principle as upon authority.” I have followed up CORRESPONDENCE.
Bush v. Lathrop somewhat, and am inclined to think
(from the reports) that Judge Grover, who gave the CITIZENSHIP OF CHILDREN BORN OF ALIENS opinion as above, carried a kuife for that case. I hope THE UNITED STATES.
some correspondent of yours will give us the benefit
of his investigations about it. Editor of the Albany Law Journal :
Respectfully, "Attentive readers of the opinion of Mr. Justice
B. W. HUNTINGTON. Field (U. S. Cir. Ct., Ninth Circuit) in the matter of
NEW YORK, Nov. 20, 1884.
Editor of the Albany Law Journal : States of persons engaged in the diplomatic service of There are typographical errata in a communication foreign governments, such as ministers and ambassa- written by the undersigned, and published in the last dors, whose residence, by a fiction of public law, is re- number of the JOURNAL, which I desire to correct. garded as part of their own country. But in the Referring to constitutional provisions and to statute Slaughter House case, 16 Wall. 36, Mr. Justice Miller law in the United States, I said that there was "incondelivering the opinion, the court say: 'The phrase, sistency and inequality.” The types have it “ irregu'subject to its jurisdiction,' was intended to exclude larity," which may be an appropriate term, but it was from its operation children of ministers, consuls and not in my mind. Again, “dominant northern States” citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the may not be as intelligible to the casual reader as United States.' (The italics are mine.) ”
“dominant modern States." The substitute of “that" I clip the above from a communication in your for “than" in concluding paragraph is obvious. JOURNAL of the 22d inst., signed “Alex. Porter
Very truly yours, Morse." He is evidently a very inattentive reader of
ALEX. PORTER MORSE. the opinion of Mr. Justice Field, to which he refers, WASHINGTON, D. C., November 24, 1884. or he would not have stated that the justice had limited the words, “subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States in the fourteenth amendment, so as to
NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. except from citizenship only children born in the United States of persons engaged in the diplomatio service of foreign governments.
BISHOP ON INSOLVENT DEBTORS. So far from limiting the words to such persons, the A Treatise on the Common and Statute Law of the State of justice also says that they except from citizenship New York relating to Insolvent Debtors, including article "persons born on a public vessel of a foreign country, first, second and third of title 1, chapter xvii, of the Code whilst within the waters of the United States." He of Civil Procedure, and the law of voluntary assignments