"conscious that he was going to die," and said "he was killed," the attending physician asseverating that he was in the article of death, and that he did die the next morning after being shot, the court did not err in admitting the evidence.-Swain v. State, Ga., 101 S. E. 539.

41. Self-Defense.-To justify killing in selfdefense, defendant must not only have believed he was in danger, but the circumstances must have been such as to afford reasonable grounds for the belief.-Loy v. State, Wyo., 185 Pac. 796. 42. Highways-Ordinary Case.-A passenger, riding as a guest in an automobile, must exercise ordinary care, having due regard to her situation as a guest of the driver.-Willis v. Schertz, Ia., 175 N. W. 321.

43. Husband and Wife-Negotiable Instruments.-Contracts between husband and wife as parties to negotiable instruments are not valid. -Leavitt v. Wintman, Mass., 125 N. E. 390.

44. Injunction-Political Acts.-The jurisdiction of a court of equity pertains only to the maintenance of civil, personal and property rights, and it has no jurisdiction to restrain acts of a political nature unless civil property rights are involved.-Payne v. Emmerson, Ill., 125 N. E. 329.

Where infection

46. Insurance Accident. occurs, either when accidental wound is received or that it followed as natural and ordinary consequence, death ensuing from such injury and infection may be deemed "accidental," within a policy covering death from "bodily injury sustained and effected directly through external, violent and accidental means, exclusively and independently of all other means."-Bell v. State Life Ins. Co. of Indianapolis, Ind., Ga., 101 S. E. 541.

47. Assignment of Policy.-A life policy may be assigned or pledged by concurrent act of the insured and beneficiary as security for debt.-Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. California State Bank, Mo., 216 S. W. 785.

48. Constitution and By-Laws.-By-laws of a fraternal benefit association become a part of its contracts of insurance.-Grand Lodge A. O. U. W. of Maine v. Martin, Me., 108 Atl. 355.

49.- -Place of Contract.-A life insurance policy is governed by the laws in force when issued.-Alford v. New York Life Ins. Co., Mo., 216 S. W. 754.

50. Subrogation.-Insurer has no right of subrogation against insured, where insured's loss exceeds his recoveries from insurer and the one causing the fire, after deducting attorney's fees and costs, and this, though insured was not invited to take part in the action against the third person, and though the policy was a valued policy; the insurance being for only two-thirds of the value.-Washtenaw Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Budd, Mich., 175 N. W. 231.

51. Landlord and Tenant-Renewal of Lease. -Facts held to show that sublessee legally and seasonably exercised the right of renewal to a fixed date, under the sublease option provision, by words sufficient to constitute an election to continue the lease and to constitute adequate notice thereof to sublessors.-Oren Hooper's Sons v. Sterling-Cox Shoe Co., Me., 108 Atl. 353.

52. Libel and Slander-Publication.-A letter addressed to plaintiff accusing him of larceny was not published simply because it fell into the hands of plaintiff's mother and was opened by her. Zanley v. Hyde, Mich., 175 N. W. 261. 53. Life Estates-Adverse Possession.-Possession by life tenant is not adverse to remaindermen.-Bramhall v. Bramhall, Mo., 216 S. W.

tion as amended.-Lammers v. Chicago, Great Western R. Co., Ia., 175 N. W. 311.

55. Master and Servant-Casual Employment. -One employed for a dollar an hour to repair a well, a work occupying only some two hours, held a "casual employe," not entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.-Otmer v. Perry, N. J., 108 Atl. 369.

56. Course of Employment.-The act of a truck driver in obtaining a receipt for his load to be signed by the party to whom it was to be delivered was within the line of his employment, and for his death caused by injuries in an elevator while trying to get the receipt, his widow was entitled to compensation.-E. E. Walsh Teaming Co. v. Industrial Commission, Ill., 125 N. E. 331.

57.- -Safe Appliances.-The duty of the master to provide reasonably safe appliances and a safe place in which to work is primary and absolute, and cannot be delegated to another without at the same time incurring the risk for the neglect of such other.-Beck v. Sylva Tanning Co., N. C., 101 S. E. 498.

58.-Workmen's Compensation Act. The legislature, within the exercise of its police power, in enacting a compulsory Workmen's Compensation Act, may abrogate common-law defenses, and impose liability without fault, and substitute new rules of legal procedure in place of the old, so long as its action is not arbitrary, unjust and unreasonable.-State v. Hagan, N. D., 175 N. W. 372.

59. Mechanics' Lien-Public Policy.-No public policy prevents express Covenant in the principal contract against right of anyone to mechanic's lien. Baldwin Locomotive Works v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., Ind., 125 N. E. 400.

60. Mines and Minerals-Unilateral Lease.Provision in an oil and gas lease, allowing the lessee on payment of $1 to surrender the lease for cancellation, does not render the lease unilateral, so as to give the lessor a right of cancellation.-Washburn v. Gillespie, U. S. C. C. A., 261 Pac. 41.

61. Monopolies Resales. Manufacturer's announcement in advance that customers were expected to charge the price fixed by it, and that penalty for refusal to maintain price would be refusal to sell to the offending customer, observance of the request to maintain price by customers generally, and the actual enforcement of the penalty by refusing to sell to a customer failing to maintain the price, does not constitute a violation of the statutes against monopolies.-Cudahy Packing Co. v. Frey & Son, U. S. C. C. A., 261 Fed. 65.

63. Municipal Corporations Competitive Bidding.-Ordinance providing for a patented pavement is void under Local Improvement Act, § 74, because it prevents competitive bidding.City of Rockford v. Armour, Ill., 125 N. E. 356. 64.- -Option to Rescind. Where a city waived its option to rescind or annul a contract for construction of a reservoir, because it was not completed within time limited, it did not thereby deprive itself of future right to annul or suspend contract for unsatisfactory work, and where contractor refused to do certain required parts of work it was not estopped from declaring a forfeiture, annulment, or suspension for sufficient cause, other than the time of completion. McKallip v. City of Altoona, Pa., 108 Atl. 408.

65. Public Service Commission.-The municipal authorities in the state of Illinois have never been clothed with power to fix by binding contract street car fares for any definite term of years. State Public Utilities Commission v. City of Quincy, Ill., 125 N. E. 374.

66. Negligence Contributory Negligence. Negligence of plaintiff, if one of the producing or efficient causes which helped to bring about the injury, will preclude recovery, regardless of when this negligent act was committed.Francis v. City of West Plains, Mo., 216 S. W. 808.

67. Independent Contractor.-A passenger in an automobile driven on a railroad crossing by an independent contractor, engaged to transport him and others, was not concluded by the driver's negligence, under the law of principal and agent.-Griffin v. Hustis, Mass., 125 N. E. 387.

68. Invitee. The proprietor of a bath establishment owes to a customer a duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain the premises in safe condition, which duty is satisfied when he uses reasonable care to maintain the premises in a safe condition for their proper use by patrons, and he does not insure the safety of patrons against accident.-Rom v. Huber, N. J., 108 Atl. 361.

69. Nuisance-Blasting.-A stone quarry in the heart of a city was a nuisance where the blasting disturbed persons who dwelt in the vicinity, and caused rocks and debris to fall on a boulevard.-Baker v. Gates, Mo., 216 S. W. 775.

70. Patents-Lack of Identity.-A combination patent for an oil-burning system cannot be expanded beyond the fair meaning of the terms, and a device not operating in the same manner as the combination patent is not an infringement, where there is a substantial lack of identity between the combinations in respect to their functioning.-Barley v. G. E. Witt & Co., U. S. C. C. A., 261 Fed. 77.

71. Partnership-Holding Out.-Where plaintiff relies on a holding out as partner or firm by estoppel, he must prove knowledge of or reliance on such fact by himself in extending credit. -Interstate Coal Co. v. Gordon, Mo., 216 S. W.

783.

72. Offer of Judgment.-There is no presumption that one member of a firm has authority to make an offer of judgment, so as to bind the_copartner.-Friedman v. Blauner, N. J., 125 N. E. 443, 227 N. Y. 327.

73. Principal and Agent-Ratification.-Before a principal can be held to have ratified the act of his agent, it must be shown that he had full knowledge of the acts of such agent by which he is to be bound.-Kline v. Indiana Trust Co., Ind., 125 N. E. 434.

74. Principal and Surety Voluntary Payment.-Generally the liability of the principal is the measure of the liability of the surety, and if a surety pay where no liability exists against the principal, such payment will be treated as a voluntary payment, not recoverable from the principal.-Peay v. Southern Surety Co., Ark., 216 S. W. 722.

75. Rewards Public Policy.-There are limits to the right of contracting parties to prove facts which might disgrace third persons, and the legislature might declare invalid an agreement to pay a reward for the arrest and conviction of a person.-Kozler v. New York Telephone Co., N. J., 108 Atl. 375.

ma

76. Sales-Conditional Sales. Where chinery was conditionally sold, to "remain the personal property of the company, whatever may be the mode of its attachment to realty, or otherwise, until fully paid for in cash," the conditional sale contract did not vest the buyer expressly or impliedly with any power to sell or transfer the seller company's title to a city for which the buyer had contracted to install the machinery as equipment of an electric power plant.-Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. City of Ellensburg, Wash., 185 Pac. 811.

77.-Executory Contract.-Where a contract for the sale of staves was an executory one, the purchasers had the right to inspect them in order to ascertain whether they conformed to the agreement.-General Cooperage & Timber Co. v. Hedges, Ark., 216 S. W. 712.

sonable care and diligence to avoid loss or minimize the damages. -Sentney Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Thompson, Mo., 216 S. W. 780.

80.

Set-Off and Counterclaim-Separate Action. Although a defendant may in an action against him set up a counterclaim, his failure to do so does not prevent him from resorting to a separate action.-Bank of Commerce & Trusts v. McArthur, U. S. D. C., 261 Fed. 97.

81. Specific Performance - Judicial Discretion, is a sound judicial discretion, and not an arbitrary one.-Carter v. Schrader, Ia., 175 N. W. 329.

82. Reliance on Statements.-Where purchaser had full opportunity to and did perconally examine land, and record discloses no concealment and no positive misrepresentations of fact, as alleged, the rule of caveat emptor applies, and purchaser is not entitled to rescind the contract.-Asher v. Jensen, N. D., 175 N. W. 265.

83. Trustee-Passive Trustee.-Where a trustee has only the duty to convey property and no discretion as to a sale, and the trust is passive, the remedy of the cestui que trustent and parties interested is by proceedings in partition. In re Behringer's Estate, Pa., 108 Atl. 414. 84. Usury-Bonus.-Where a husband negotiating a mortgage investment for his wife paid out $1,231.29, and took notes aggregating $1,359.42, the mortgage and notes also providing for 7 per cent interest, the highest legal rate, the 10 per cent bonus exacted was usurious, and the wife's assignee, not a holder in due course, can recover from the mortgagor, under Comp. Laws 1915, § 5998, only the principal sum of the mortgage debt unpaid.-Umphrey v. Auyer, Mich., 175 N. W. 226.

85. -Statutory Maximum.-Unless the rate of interest exceeds the applicable statutory maximum, there is no usury.-Whitworth v. Davey, Mo., 216 S. W. 736.

86. Vendor and Purchaser-Profits.-Where a purchaser goes into possession under a contract to purchase, he is entitled to the profits of the land.-Hall v. Ely, N. J., 108 Atl. 370.

87. Waters and Water Courses-Dominant Tenement. The owner of a dominant heritage or higher tract of land has the right to have the surface water falling or coming naturally upon his premises pass off the same upon or over lower or servient lands, and may, by ditches or tile drains, drain his own land into the natural and usual channel, even if the quality of water thrown upon the servient heritage is thus increased.-Adams v. Abel, Ill., 125 N. E. 320.

88. Wills-Contingent Estate.-When there are two or more periods fixed in the instrument for the happening of a contingency upon which an unlimited estate in land will devolve, that one will be selected which will vest the feesimple title and give the devisee an absolute estate.-Knox v. Knox, Ky., 216 S. W. 844.

89. Contract for Devise.-If one party renders services under a proposed contract to devise property to him, and the other accepts the services, the contract is binding without a formal, verbal or written acceptance thereof.Snyder v. McGill, Pa., 108 Atl. 410.

extrinsic

90. Extrinsic Evidence.-While evidence may be admitted to aid or explain a will, it must always relate to that which is embodied in the will.-In re Reinheimer's Estate, Pa., 108 Atl. 412.

91.- -Testamentary Capacity.-That testator was enfeebled by the usual infirmities of old age and that he was childish does not establish a want of testamentary capacity.-Chandler v. Fisher, Ill., 125 N. E. 324.

92. Testamentary Capacity.-One is competent to execute a will if he has sufficient mind and a memory to understand the particular business in hand, remembers who are the natural objects of his bounty, and can recall to mind his property and make disposition of it understandingly according to some purposes or plan formed in his mind.-Hart v. Hart, Ill., 125 N. E. 366.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., MARCH 5, 1920.

MAKING THE JURY JUDGE OF THE LAW AND THE FACT IN RESPECT TO THE DEFENSE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

The Oklahoma Constitution provides that "the defense of contributory negligence or of assumption of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact, and shall at all times be left to the jury." This provision has been attacked as being in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. The

Supreme Court, in a recent case, sustained the provision and holds generally that there is no constitutional right to have a particular matter decided by the Court or by the jury, as the legislature can deprive either of its time-honored jurisdiction in regard to any matter of controversy and confer it upon an altogether different tribunal, as on

ever, in the Constitution of the United States or its Amendments that requires a state to maintain the line with which we are familiar between the functions of the jury and those of the Court. It may do away with the jury altogether. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. ed. 678; modify its constitution, Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 20 Sup. Ct. 448, 494, 44 L. ed. 597; the requirements of a verdict, Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211, 36 Sup. Ct. 595, 60 L. ed. 961, L. R. A. 1917A, 86 Ann. Cas. 1916E, 505; or the procedure before it, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 111, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53 L. ed. 97; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 340, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 59 L. ed. 969. As it may confer legislative and judicial powers upon a commission not known to the common law, Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 29 Sup. Ct. 67, 53 L. ed. 150; it may confer larger powers upon a jury than those that generally prevail."

The remark of Justice Holmes, that the state could have removed the defense of contributory negligence altogether and practically make a defendant liable for an

v. Cole, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 68. The Court's decision is an interesting review of some recent decisions of the Supreme Court, which have narrowly restricted the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment in favor

of modern reforms in the creation of new remedies. The Court said:

"The State Constitution was in force when the death occurred and therefore the defendant had only such right to the defense of contributory negligence as that Constitution allowed. The argument that the railroad company had a vested right to that defense is disposed of by the decisions that it may be taken away altogether. Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 39 Sup. Ct. 553, 63 L. ed. —; Bowersock v. Smith, 243 U. S. 29, 34, 37 Sup. Ct. 371, 61 L. ed. 572. It is said that legislation. cannot change the standard of conduct, which is matter of law in its nature into matter of fact, and this may be conceded; but the material element in the constitutional enactment is not that it called con

tributory negligence fact, but that it left it wholly to the jury. There is nothing, how

how far the Supreme Court is ready to go to uphold the new conceptions of social justice as again individual rights. This was brought out more clearly in the Arizona. Employers' Lliability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 39 Sup. Ct. 553, when the Supreme Court divided five to four on the question whether a state could make a master liable to an action for unlimited damages for an injury not due to any fault on his part. The Supreme Court, held that they had such power, on the ground that a state could impose on any business responsibility for accidents. occurring in such business. In other words, a state can make any employer an insurer of the safety of his employers or of the public. The employer transfers the risk to the insurance company and the insurance company spreads or prorates the risk over the whole field of industry, and this final charge is added to the cost of production and thus charged back to the people who buy the goods.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

ANNULLING A MARRIAGE FOR FAILURE OF ONE OF THE PARTIES TO KEEP. HIS PROMISE TO HAVE A RELIGIOUS CEREMONY.-The Supreme Court of New York (Special Term) seems to be unable to agree on whether it is fraud sufficient to avoid a marriage for a man to marry a Jewish girl by civil ceremony under a promise that later there should be a Jewish ceremony, which promise he refuses to keep.

Justice Chopsey of Kings County in the case of Schachter v. Schachter, 178 N. Y. Supp. 212, 89 Cent. L. J. 451, held that this was not a misrepresentation of an existing essential fact and that therefore the marriage could not be set aside..

In an exactly similar case Justice Cohalen of New York City recently held that this was a false representation without which the plaintiff would not have been married and without which she would not regard herself as married. Rubinson v. Rubinson (Jan. 25, 1920), 62 N. Y. L. J. 1430. The Court said:

"The false and fraudulent representations made by the defendant to the plaintiff were such as to authorize this court to annul the marriage. These misrepresentations were material and elemental, because without them the plaintiff would not have consummated the marriage by cohabitation. Both parties were of the Hebrew faith, and neither the plaintiff nor her mother considered the marriage binding unless performed as required by their religion. They both have testified that they would not have consented to the marriage of it had not been for the defendant's consent to such a ceremonial marriage. The tendency of the courts of this state to relieve an innocent party from a marriage contract induced by fraud and misrepresentation is evidenced by the following decisions: Moore v. Moore, 157 N. Y. Supp. 819; Robert v. Robert, 150 N. Y. Supp. 366; Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174 N. Y. 467; Svenson v. Svenson, 178 N. Y. 158. It is my view that an injustice has been done the plaintiff. She was induced to enter into a marriage with the defendant solely by reason of his false and fraudulent misrepresentations. She has never cohabited with the defendant, nor has she ever lived with him. He has never contributed in any way to her support, and he has now apparently deserted her. Upon the evidence and upon the above authorities the plaintiff is entitled to a decree adjudging her marriage to the defendant null and void. Decision and judgment signed."

However unjust and reprehensible was defen'dant's attitude in this case, we believe the Court in the Rubinson case failed to take into account the rule that fraud to annul a marriage must be much stronger than in other cases and must be a misrepresentation of an existing fact essential to constitute a proper marriage. A misrepresentation as to whether

one has a venereal disease is fraud while a misrepresentation as to one's wealth or social standing is not. So also an unkept promise to do a certain thing in the future cannot be regarded as a misrepresentation. A man might promise to give the wife a million dollars after marriage and she might make such payment a condition of her marriage, but the husband's failure to pay the million dollars would not avoid the marriage.

A girl who wishes to insist on certain conditions to her marriage should see that such conditions are met prior to or at the time of her marriage. When a civil ceremony is performed she should not be heard to say in a court of law that she did not believe or consider herself married until some other ceremony was performed as that would be to plead ignorance of the law and its effect which is a plea which is never allowed.

In such cases there may be a way of escape by showing that neither party regarded the civil ceremony as a marriage ceremony. in analogy with the rule pertaining to mock marriages, but such cases are difficult of proof.

VALIDITY OF PROVISION FOR SURRENDER BY LESSEE IN OIL LEASES ON PAYMENT OF ONE DOLLAR.-There has been much doubt expressed as to whether the usual provision in oil leases for surrender of lease by lessee on payment of one dollar did not make the lease so unilateral as to give the lessors the right to abandon the agreement before the lessee enters upon the performance of the contract. One thing, however, has been settled by the federal courts, and that is, that there will not be one rule on this subject in the federal courts and another in the state court. Washburn v. Gillespie, 261 Fed. 41. In this case the usual five-year lease was made providing for drilling a well within one year, and providing that lessee could surrender lease at any time on payment of one dollar. Oil having been discovered on adjoining land be fore lessee had made any bona fide attempt to drill, the owners sought to cancel the lease. The Court in holding that the provision for surrender did not make the lease unilateral and that the lessors had no right to cancel the lease, said:

"The third contention is that the surrender clause of the lease, which gives the lessee the right to surrender and terminate the lease at any time, on the payment of $1, makes the lease so unilateral as to give the lessors a right of cancellation which they exercised. The va lidity and interpretation of this character of surrender clause has been before the courts on 101, 113, 35 Sup. Ct. 526, 59 L. Ed. 856, settles several occasions. Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S.

the law that this is a kind of question which should be settled by the local law in so far as it affects the validity of the lease. The latest expressions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court favor the validity of such provisions. Northwestern Oil & Gas Co. v. Branine, Okla., 175 Pac. 533; Rich v. Doneghey, Okl., 177 Pac. 86. It is true that these two cases were decided after this case was tried below, and that up to that time the Oklahoma Supreme Court had taken the contrary view. The evidence here shows that a large percentage of the oil and gas leases in Oklahoma, covering millions of acres of land, contain this or similar' clauses. There should not be opposed rules of property affecting so many persons and so much property within the same state. These leases should all be valid, or all be invalid, no matter whether they be tested in state or federal courts. Harmony and absence of confusion are desirable. Guided by this pressing need of harmony in decision, by the consideration that this is the character of question where the state courts would be unhesitatingly followed were there no difference in such decisions, by our own view that this clause should be held valid, and by the view, expressed by the Supreme Court concerning such a surrender clause, that 'it is difficult to perceive how it could be declared inequitable', Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101, 117, 35 Sup. Ct. 526, 59 L. Ed. 856, we shall follow these last decisions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court declaring the surrender clause valid and as applicable to the lessee alone."

DISREGARD

OF CORPORATE FORM WHERE CORPORATION IS A MERE CONVENIENCE FOR HANDLING THE INTERESTS OF TENANTS IN COMMON.-It seems that the corporate form does not always carry with it all the usual results of such form of organization. In the recent case of Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co. v. Arctic Iron Co., 261 Fed. 15, the Court held that where two tenants in common owning iron ore land form a corporation to lease and sell the ore, the two stockholders, although directors, are not bound by the rule making directors trustees for the corporations and one of them is not accountable in equity for securing an additional advantage over the other director. The Court in describing this corporation, said:

"Whatever standing plaintiff has to demand the relief sought depends upon a rule of corporate law, and upon the fact that the interests of the parties were represented by stock in a corporation. This corporation, with its equal division of stock between the two beneficial interests and with its four directors, two allotted to each interest, was the convenient form by which the two tenants in common real estate made the estate indivisible by the act of either, and provided that nothing should be done with it without the consent of both. The beneficiaries have continually dealt with the property as tenants in common would do. Any such corporation forms as they observed were of no effect as to their substantial mutual relations. When any step was to be taken, it was

not considered at a stockholders' or directors' meeting, but was taken up and decided independently by the two interests. If they agreed, the corporate signature was attached; if they disagreed, nothing was done. When the Cliffs, the owner of one-half, desired a lease, it went directly to the owners of the other half and negotiated. When the Olivers sought a lease, it bargained separately and independently with the owner of each half."

It is interesting to note that the United States Supreme Court has taken a similar position in the case of Chicago Co. v. Minneapolis, 247 U. S. 490, 38 Sup. Ct. 553. That Court said:

"Where stock ownership has been resorted to, not for the purpose of participating in the affairs of a corporation in the normal and usual manner, but for the purpose, as in this case, of controlling a subsidiary company so that it may be used as a mere agency or instrumentality of the owning company or companies, ***the courts will not permit themselves to be blinded or deceived by mere forms of law, but, regardless of fictions, will deal with the substance of the transaction involved as if the corporate agency did not exist and as the justice of the case may require."

In the Minneapolis case two corporations, for convenience, put their common interests into a third subsidiary corporation which became merely their instrument for doing their business. As the Court said in the principal case, "it is not easy to see why the principle may not apply as well to stockholding individuals as to stockholding corporations, nor why the existence of the corporate shell and corporate forms, without more, should transform what is right into what is wrong."

VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE REQUIRING CONDUCTOR AND MOTORMAN TO OPERATE CARS.-The "one man" car which has been boomed so extensively the last few years seems to be doomed under legislation which has just been held to be constitutional. In the recent case of Sullivan v. City of Shreveport, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 102, the Supreme Court held valid an ordinance requiring every street car to be operated by a conductor and a motorman.

The superintendent of a street railway company, the defendant in the cause, who had been arrested for violation of the ordinance, contended that the ordinance deprived the railway of its property without due process of law. But the Supreme Court held that the running of street cars is a matter that vitally concerns the safety of the people and therefore is well within the police power.

The defendant further contended, however, that even if the "one man car" was dangerous when it first appeared, that it has since been perfected by mechanical devices so as to be