whole of the divine proceedings, so far as they come within human observation.

It is a matter of remark, and perfectly undeniable that some individuals, whose moral advantages are comparatively small, become the subjects of deep and permanent religious impressions, abandon their former course of life with serious detestation, and subsequently maintain a course of conspicuous piety. It is equally notorious, that some individuals, of no unusual perverseness of natural temper, enjoy through life the highest advantages for religious improvement, who give not the smallest evidence of possessing the Christian character; nor manifest any serious regard to a future life.

Is it irrational to suppose that there is some cause for so great a difference? Is it reasonable to imagine that events so contrary, proceed from the same causes? And as it was shown by copious evidence, in a former lecture, that piety or real virtue does not exist in the human heart without divine culture, is not the conclusion almost forced upon us, that, in one of the cases supposed, a degree of divine power was exerted, which was not exerted in the other? That this supposition accounts for the fact, will not be denied; that it is suported by the analogy of divine distribution, has been shown; and that any other very satisfactory account can be given will scarcely be asserted.

It has been observed, that whatever may in time be done consistently with the divine character, might have been predetermined from eternity. If in the favours which he bestows, it is just in the divine Being to make discriminations, it was not unjust in him to determine on this before the foundation of the world.

We cannot consistently with any rational ideas of God suppose, that in regard to him, there can be any thing new or unforeseen. He has neither more knowledge nor wisdom at present, than he had before eternal ages. Therefore, no reasons can be now discerned, inclining him to a particular course of proceeding, which were not previously discerned. The plan of his governinent is eternal, like himself.

I now request you to notice an obvious and indisputable fact,

viz. that some men are, and some are not brought to salvation. Therefore, in regard to some men, it is not true, that they are placed in that situation, and are subjects of such degrees of divine influence, as actually bring them to salvation. Did God ever determine to place them in those circumstances, and operate on them with such divine power as would ensure an event which does not in fact, and never will take place? Again, in regard to those, who are actually saved, it is true, that they are placed in that situation, and are subjects of those degrees of divine influence, which actually brings them to piety and eternal life. Therefore, the situation, these degrees of inhappy result, were predetermined.

fluence, and the

It is important here, that we notice a distinction between what men will in fact do under those religious means, and with those divine communications, which they enjoy, and what they might do, were they not hindered by voluntary perverseness. We by no means say, that God is determined to produce, in any person, that impenitence, which precedes hopeless misery. But he determines to place some in such or such a condition, although he clearly foresees, that they will remain impenitent, and incur perdition.

To prevent, if possible, all misapprehension, I would resort to the following illustration: Some men, it is well known, who are habitually intemperate, do actually reform. Other persons of similar character, do not. Of these latter persons, is it not perfectly absurd to say, that Deity ever determined to place them in that condition, to give them such faithful advisers, or to impose on them such restraints, as would in fact produce a reform? Whereas, of the other class this is perfectly true. But though God does see fit to put them in those circumstances without which he knows they will not repent, it is perfectly consistent that he should desire their repentance, in those circumstances in which he actually places them.

It may perhaps be inquired, whether, on the part of God, all is done which is proper, for the salvation of each person? I answer that all, which is proper on the part of God, is doubtless

performed; and I apprehend, that so much is done for each person, as to render him perfectly inexcusable for rejecting what are to him the conditions of salvation. Yet it must be acknowledged, that the same is not done for all. Deity has done far less for the salvation of pagans, than for that of nominal believers. No person, capable of reflection, would assert, that he, who has received the best, and he, who has received the worst education, are in a condition, equally favourable to present virtue and future glory.

Though the wicked will perish for obstinately resisting and rejecting the light which they have; yet it must be conceded, with regard to some, that had they possessed that degree of light and influence, which has been granted to some others, they would by repentance, have secured salvation: Woe unto thee, Chorazin! woe unto thee, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works, which were done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago, in sackcloth and ashes.

But, at the same time, another doctrine seems here to be established; viz. that equal degrees of light and influence are not at a given time necessary to effect the conversion of all sinners. That grace which was rejected at Bethsaida, would have been effectual, had it been enjoyed at Tyre and Sidon. Or, in other words, that grace, which would have been effectual at Tyre and Sidon, was rejected at Bethsaida.

It is by no means to be imagined, that in distributing variously the blessings of his providence and grace, God acts capriciously. When we say that he is a sovereign, we are far from meaning, that he is not perpetually under the influence of his wisdom. In every instance, he has the best reason for diversifying his dispensations. That these reasons are not discerned by us, can be matter of a moment's surprise to no person, who reflects on the extent of God's empire, and considers the unlimited number of interests, which must under such a government, be consulted.

The difficulties, which are often felt in view of the subject we are considering, arise, it is believed, in no inconsiderable deVOL. II.

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gree, from viewing human degeneracy, rather as a misfortune than as a crime. The account which revelation gives of the matter is this: We have voluntarily departed from God, and are so perversely inclined, that independently of divine operation, we shall never choose the path of virtue and glory. There is no impediment to the salvation of a wicked man but the want of a right inclination towards his duty. The dishonest or profane man may as well complain of his Maker, for not inducing him to relinquish his immoral habits, as the sinner can complain of God for not inducing him to repent. Nor could the latter complain of the unequal distributions of divine grace, with more justice or decency, than could the wretch, who had been injuring you through his whole life complain, that although you had very frequently endeavored to reconcile him to you, there was some other person of similar character, with whom you had been more urgent.

To cite but one additional instance by way of illustration,however detestable in the view of God were the crimes of Cain and of Judas, it is most evident, that He did not, and therefore never determined to prevent the first from slaughtering his brother; nor the second from betraying his master. We say not that they were necessitated to commit these crimes; we make no decision at present, whether their abstinence under circumstances existing would not have been more agreeable to the divine will. The extent of what we assert is this; that he never determined on his part to do that which would in fact prevent them. In like manner, He never determined to bring to salvation them who are actually lost. This is perfectly undeniable, whatever may become of those points which are at issue between the abettors of free will, and those of necessity.

Some further remarks on the subject will compose the next lecture.

LECTURE XLV.

ELECTION.

AGREEABLY to what was intimated in the last lecture, the present will consist of some further remarks, designed to elucidate the subject of election.

1. In pursuance of this design, I request you to notice the two following propositions. That there is demerit in vice; or to vary the expression, that all wicked men are criminal for being such; and that the appointment of a Saviour was matter of benignity and not of obligation.

As to the first proposition, that there is demerit in vice, and that all wicked men are criminal for being such, it is so clear that every person, it is probable, will, at first sight, yield full assent. For, if there be not demerit in vice, there is either demerit in virtue, or else there is no such thing as demerit in the universe.

But, however readily the understanding may assent to the proposition, either its bearings and relations are not duly considered, or else the sentiments of the heart disagree with those of the intellect. Human degeneracy is often considered rather as a misfortune than as a crime. And sinners are viewed, as more entitled to pity, than as meriting punishment.

The other proposition, viz. That the appointment of a Saviour was matter of benignity and not of obligation, usually meets a reception, much like that which has just been mentioned. In words it is allowed, but its import is not felt. The Scriptures use a language on the subject, which cannot be mistaken. They assert the justice of that condemnation, which had passed on all men ; and attribute the intervention of Christ to the compassion, the generosity, if I may be allowed the