JEWISH PESSIMISM. I. Introductory. LIKE so many general terms, which imply mainly an abstraction and ideal unification of qualities, Pessimism is not interpreted precisely in the same way by every one. Dissatisfaction with life, arising from the supposed emptiness of existence, hopelessness in the present and despair of the future, these and similar sentiments, often with widest variations, usually serve to constitute its chief implications. Taken somewhat more definitely, viewed rather as a reasonable conclusion from ascertained facts than as a vague opinion, the word signifies that philosophical scheme which explains the universe by "proving" its badness; or, more strictly still, the systematised view of human nature which ends in the elimination of moral value,-goods there may be, good on the whole there emphatically is not. But, no matter what its explicit doctrine or implicit dogma, pessimism can only be connected with Jewish morals and religion under some very distinct restrictions. Of the pessimism of evil, with its speculative Α questions respecting origin and end, the Jews knew nothing. Happily for them, and for mankind, spiritual leanings effectually prevented the emergence of such problems. Of vice, with its inversion of the human ideal, they, like other men, necessarily learned much in the course of experience. And, as a closely welded community inheriting patriarchal conceptions, they were in the habit of treating it to some extent as crime, or violation of the regulations requisite to the preservation of society. Specific law happened to be with them one indispensable condition of order in personal character. But this presupposed that aspect of the badness of life by close acquaintance with which they were chiefly distinguished. Jewish pessimism was always intimately associated with conviction of sin, an aspect of moral consciousness evinced more continuously and deeply by the Hebrews than by any other people. Now, sin bears a practical rather than a speculative interpretation. It presupposes a personal creator and a personal creature, -presuppositions amplified in Judaism by the direct relation of the Holy One to the special race. The difficulty of life, accordingly, could hardly prove absolute or productive of utter despair. For, though events may run counter to ideals, it can hardly be said that with God the opposition can become irremediable. The bad, for instance, whatever its nature, cannot be entirely assigned to external things. The Greek reference of evil to defects "in the matter" could not but be either no reason or unreason to the Jew. Man having taken his place as a co-operator with God, the question of goodness and badness could not be extended to an outer sphere beyond these personal terms in the great equa tion of life. Thus the Jewish view was so far essen tially hopeful that it left no room for a surd at the outset. Even the Satan of Job has slight independent being: he proposes to work with divine permission, and, having started the machinery of trial, he disappears. Unlike Mephistopheles, he comes to try the fibre of Job's character, not to stimulate his intellect. Despite his advent, the Deity and the man face the issue together, and attain an understanding of a kind without vital help from him. God's reality, God's wisdom, condition all the circumstances. In other words, the limits within which the question is set imply that it can be answered. Whether the reply is sufficient or final we need not immediately inquire. The central point is that, as faith accompanies the moral schism, hope cannot fail to attend also. By its very constitution Judaism was eudæmonistic, not in a "low utilitarian," but in the highest, sense. According to its survey man is here, difficulties abound, and the simple practical matter is, how can he, taking them at their worst, make the best of them. The riddle was kept out of the intellectual and speculative field, and rendered almost entirely a disciplinary experience, by religious considerations. All the elements pertaining to the problem were involved. Both universal and individual were present. On the other hand, each was conceived as of a specifically predetermined nature, and so the sweep of the conclusion came to be limited. Critics of Judaism, especially when bound by the presuppositions incident to the speculative construction of Christianity, have not invariably been careful to keep these two issues separate. Indeed, they are often prone to take account of nothing but the limitation,a convenient course, maybe, yet none the less unfair, |