Will, which sustains both knowledge and existence, is constantly appealed to as the foundation of everything. Schopenhauer fails to distinguish between the individuals and the principle. As it grows they fade continually. It takes the place of the presented facts, and after this identification, one can easily show that the principle is in the facts. Sophism has been substituted for sober philosophical analysis, with the result that everything is constructed out of nothing, and so nothing is explained. Will is the absolute process, and the absolute process is the factual world. Very true. But to ring the changes on two specious phrases is not to account for this universe.

The realistic tendency, implicit in the critical philosophy and explicit in the Kantian school, was thus pushed to extremes by Schopenhauer, in whose view the world must be theorised by reference to a single principle which, while itself remaining one, subsumes all differences. A redaction of experience is undertaken in the interests of the principle. The world is declared to be "my representation"; to say that an object exists on its own account apart from any thought is an absurdity. Reality is completely conditioned by, if not identified with, this relation. Objects, in other words, have been deprived of their self-containedness and substantiality, and have been transformed into products of a certain relation. Or, to put it otherwise, an abstract principle has been saddled with responsibility for the existence of realities. But to become possessed of the secret involved in the ultimate nature of this principle is, at the same time, to be placed in a position to dictate terms to the cosmos. "The world is my representation," yet not

mine only; for," one who believes that he alone exists is not to be found out of bedlam." Accordingly, while the law of causality is merely a mental necessity indispensable to our representation of a concatenated world to ourselves, it at once leads beyond the representation to real forces, or to some single force, which controls the universe. Leagued with this power, the philosopher, if he be so minded, can easily "remove mountains and set them in the midst of the sea." Schopenhauer's system, and all its kind, however, have a certain positive value. They serve to illustrate the grave defect of a method that exalts synthesis at the expense of analysis. In view of the vast extension of the field of knowledge in recent times, it is more than ever necessary to insist upon the analytic side of philosophic discipline. New materials are continually being found in the sphere of concrete fact by the special sciences and by the distinctively analytic departments of philosophy. To appreciate, much more to appraise, these, a nominalistic attitude must be adopted. On the other hand, all such details imply specific first principles. These are brought into prominence when the thinker applies synthetic processes to the facts in an attempt to spell out rational order. This, in turn, is the realistic element. Neither avails without the other. In English thought the former has predominated, in Kant and modern speculation the latter, while in Berkeley, as we have tried to show, both are present in a species of implicit unity. His interest at the present juncture is that he tries to rationalise the facts on their own terms.

V. Conclusion.

Proceeding to gather up the strands of this limited discussion, it may be said that not a little can be learned, for present use, from the historical development, after Berkeley, through Kant to Schopenhauer. A few points may be instanced at a venture. As opposed to later tendencies, Berkeley's first philosophical efforts brace the individual to regard himself as possessed of an imperishable personality all his own. He is not to be reduced to a mechanism for the fixing of sensations, nor to a series of relations emanating from an absolute process, nor to a simple incident in the insatiable striving of a blind will. Egoity is neither a phenomenon nor an idea. Individuality is not an accident nor an illusion, but the condition of every act of knowledge. It is more than a mere accompaniment of objective consciousness, and therefore is capable of being known definitely, not, as Kant sometimes leads. us to suppose, only with a certain vagueness. Berkeley will not have personality exploited either by association or by an interpenetrative principle void of individuality. His doctrine of causality, accordingly, to take an example, is exactly the reverse of Schopenhauer's. Causality is not of phenomena only, but is a real result of noumenal action. No object of sense is capable of rising to the dignity of a cause; it must, by its own nature, ever be an effect. "The material world contains substances and causes only in a figurative way." If Berkeley does not work out his theory fully,-if he assumes too much, and attaches undue importance to the revelation contained in this assumption, he is, at

the same time, proceeding in the right direction. Causality is not a bare category immanent in the mind, nor is it a simple form. It is closely connected with ultimate reality as such. The fundamental mistake respecting Berkeley, which so many later thinkers have made-not excepting his learned German editor1consists in a misapprehension of his conception of cause, and of its bearing upon his theory of matter.

He is not a representationist, like Schopenhauer, as some few would have us suppose. He does not declare that we can possess a knowledge only of states of our own. consciousness. But he points out, that in virtue of the operation of noumena quá cause or causes, our ideas of a cosmos, with their causal references, become possible. Ueberweg's question about the Herculanean MSS. is not germane to the discussion. For "things" are not dependent upon our imperfect conceptions, but are, and are themselves interdependent parts of our world, because they ever bear a meaning for our perception, which is itself derived from some noumenal personality. This last is the realistic element in Berkeley. Certainly, in his pronounced early nominalism, of which he never shook himself entirely free, he renders the noumenal conclusion difficult of demonstration.2 His frequent polemic against "abstract" as distinct from "perceived" ideas, limits him in a certain manner. But this only renders more impressive the lesson to be learned from him. What he hinted at an organic relation between the nominalistic and the realistic elements-is now a chief, if not the chief, desideratum of philosophy. His very deficiencies on the realistic 1 Ueberweg.

2 Cf., e.g., Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, sects. 122, 123.

side show us this. The ethical defect of Berkeleyanism, which does not furnish adequate ground for the supremacy of God in moral judgment; its inability to say plainly how "things exist in the eternal mind"; and above all, perhaps, its imperfect presentation of the rational order of knowledge-these leave halfformulated, and almost wholly unanswered, just those problems to which speculation has been addressing itself since Kant. But while he only points the way here, Berkeley has elsewhere given guidance which has not been laid to heart. His nominalistic tendencies, combined with what may be called his realistic aspirations, contain not merely a problem, but also hints of a method. The task of philosophy pre-eminently is, while remaining faithful to the facts (sensations), to account for, explain, in short, to rationalise, the laws in obedience to which these sensations become the ordered universe of thoughts and things. It is hardly sufficient to declare either that mind arrives at a "full chaos" provided with certain forms, and by their aid cuts off a part from chaos for behoof of cosmos, or that a blind principle fashions by its blundering the universe of our knowledge. It cannot be admitted

that facts are flung out by a machinery of principles. The world must be allowed to speak for itself, as, according to Berkeley's method, it always is. At the same time, and on the other side, his acceptance of the Leibnitian formula has to be remembered. He lays stress on the nisi intellectus ipse—“ in which the universals of reasons are recognised as constituents of knowledge, and of which modern German philosophy is a development. The tabula rasa1 of Aristotle is

1 Selections, p. 377.