claims that the Unconscious, as a Neutrum1 from which both will and intellect proceed, includes and transcends Hegel's first principle. Of course it is a question whether this plan of abolishing Idealism does not rather intensify Hegel's alleged intellectualism, and this while losing such advantages as his system undoubtedly had. But, whatever one may think of Hartmann's inferiority to Hegel, there can be no question of his superiority, as a system-maker, to Schopenhauer. Doubtless he agrees with his predecessor on certain points. Both, for example, attach much weight to the relative proportion of pain to pleasure in life; both declare that the world is phenomenal, not real; both refer reality to an unintelligent first principle, and, as a consequence, deny freewill. Again, except on the first question, both are disciples of Kant, and they further agree to differ from him regarding the possibility of a science of the intelligible. But, even on the points just indicated, their methods of investigation are so diverse, that apparent similarities are largely obliterated. In practice Hartmann differs from Schopenhauer on several all-important questions. First, by declaring, with Aristotle, that there is no volition without mental object," 2 he at once abolishes the unintelligence of Schopenhauer's Will. "This simple consideration," he says, "exposes the singular defectiveness of the system of Schopenhauer, in which the Idea is by no means recognised as the sole and exclusive content of Will, but a false and subordinate position is assigned it, whilst the maimed and blind 1 Here Hartmann might be shown to be indebted to Schelling. 2 Philosophy of the Unconscious, vol. i. pp. 119, 120. Will nevertheless altogether comports itself as if it had a notional or ideal content." Secondly-a point which critics have been too ready to burk-Schopenhauer was a subjective idealist, Hartmann is not. To the former the world is simply my representation, your representation; always, that is to say, the individual's for himself. With Hartmann, although reality is only phenomenal, it still has a rateable value. The revelation of the Unconscious, unlike the manifestation of Will, has a worth of its own, albeit ultimate essence still resides in the first principle independently of its phenomena. The truth is, modern science has led Hartmann away from subjective idealism to one of the most curious forms of ideal-realism ever constructed. Thirdly, this new doctrine respecting the world's reality resulted in a theory of "man and his dwelling-place" altogether different from Schopenhauer's. So far from considering this sphere the worst possible, Hartmann declares that, for all its misery, it is the best that could be. Wretchedness truly is inevitable; but, as if to compensate, the plan for its removal can be put into execution only here and now. The extinction of pain is the sole reason for the being of this cursed globe and its thrice-cursed inhabitants. As a consequence, Schopenhauer's quietism becomes an absurdity. Redemption is to be universal, not individual; therefore it must be wrought out by ceaseless co-operation in the common cause. Passive contemplation can but retard Hartmann's final theocrasy. For the gradual recognition by individuals of their essential unity with one another will reveal the long-veiled truth, that all participate in a pact to free God-and themselvesfrom pain by annihilation of consciousness. "Real existence is the incarnation of deity; the world process is the passion-history of God made flesh, and at the same time the way to the redemption of him who was crucified in the flesh. To be moral is to lend a helping hand in shortening this way of suffering and of redemption." 1 IV. Hartmann's relation to the Realism of his In order to disengage Hartmann's universalism from the mass of heterogeneous material with which it is overlaid, we may first look at his account of his relation to his great predecessors, always accepting, as far as we can, his own opinions. Although he did not attempt this in his earlier works, he has latterly tried to father his pessimism upon Kant.2 His main aim is to prove that the philosophy of Kant, in so far as it is realistic, is as much responsible for his own pessimism as for the optimism of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. There are, no doubt, not a few points in Kant's criticism of utilitarianism and of eudæmonism in general which lend themselves to Hartmann's very acute treatment. For Kant was not wholly unaffected by the tenets of Rousseau's school. The argument in its entirety, however, is not convincing. This appears especially in the fact that it is almost exclusively directed against the unquestioned optimism of Kant in the Critique of Practical Reason,' where he looks for 1 Phän. des sitt. Bewusstseins, p. 685. 2 Cf. Zur Geschichte u. Begründung des Pess. (especially the chap. "Kant als Vater des Pess.") ness. the final unification of completed morality with happiOn the other hand, Hartmann certainly scores an important advantage when he shows, from the metaphysical rather than the ethical side, that Transcendental Realism has a critical basis. On Kant's own theory, the categories possess only an immanent value. As forms operative in the mind, and throughout all knowledge of this or that individual, they are good. But then they apply solely to phenomena. Knowledge of the actual cannot take place by their means. This circumstance Hartmann uses as a stepping-stone to his proof, that he, equally with Hegel, is a child of the realistic or universalising movement inaugurated by Kant. For he says, if the categories have a partial value as regards reality, they also have, in their own right, a transcendent value. As matter of common experience, we are not denizens of two worlds. The phenomena known by means of the categories are, so far as we are concerned, identical with the objects in the real world. In other words, there is some secret relationship between our thoughts and things. To this the intelligibility of the universe, in terms of our thought, is due. At the same time, we do not create things, nor do they create our ideas. Therefore, the transcendental scheme, propounded by Kant, depends on a reference alike of our thoughts and of things to another rational principle or power. This power, Hartmann argues, made things while as yet unconscious. In our thoughts it arrives at a consciousness of its creation. Consequently, to render Kant selfconsistent, the realism which is hidden in his philosophy must be brought to light and emphasised. Our thoughts are integral parts of the process of self evolution through which the pristine Unconscious inevitably passes, and things are simply projections of the Unconscious, which, in us, informs itself of their being. But, if this ingenious view of his genealogical relation to Kant be an afterthought, the same cannot be said of Hartmann's conception of his connection either with Hegel or Schelling. The Philosophy of the Unconscious' and 'Schelling's Positive Philosophie'—which, although published sooner, was written later than the chef-d'œuvre-conclusively show that he had it in mind. to unify panlogism and alogism, empirical pessimism and a priori optimism. He proposed to do this by criticising Hegel from the standpoint of Schopenhauer; by criticising Schopenhauer from the Hegelian position; and, finally, by abolishing the half-monism of both, to render each a subordinate part in a more thorough-going system of realism. With respect to Schopenhauer, Hartmann's task was in a manner easy. He saw, as every unprejudiced thinker must observe, that blind Will furnishes no explanation of the phenomena of consciousness which everywhere demand attention. The philosopher is necessarily most familiar with the combination of will-power and rational intuition which are alike present in man's life; and these are not reducible to incomplex manifestations of the unilluminated will. Hence, as Hartmann points out, the attempt of Schopenhauer to receive materialism into philosophy is meritorious but indefensible. "His compromise was unsatisfactory; it allowed Materialism the intellect, and reserved speculation to the will. This violent dismembering is his weak point; for if once conscious ideation and thought be handed over to |