nature ‘all men are liars'; and a master judge of the human character has said that 'to be honest as the world goes, is to be one man picked out of ten thousand. To punish a crime then, what the multitude of offenders make a custom is an attempt to what we can never hope to execute. It is the remark of a profound philosopher that 'the operation of the wisest laws is imperfect and precarious; they seldom' inspire virtue; they cannot always restrain vice; their power is insufficient to prohibit all that they condemn, nor can they always punish the actions which they prohibit'. Though the laws will not justify, yet they must recognize the frailties and imperfections of human nature, and they do deal with men as being subject to propensities and passions which they may aid to restrain, but which it is impossible to extirpate. How incomsistent would it be, when the law will not receive a man's oath, if he has a six-pence to stake upon it, that it should send him to the State's prison for an untrue answer to an inquiry into his pecuniary affairs, which he may have the strongest motive for concealing. And how disturbed and uncomfortable would be the condition of a community like ours where traffic and credit are infinitely ramified and unceasingly active, if every person dissatisfied with a bargain or dissapointed by a misplaced confidence, in the responsibility or puctuality of another, shall be quickened, by the prospect of redress or revenge, to recollect some untrue representation made in the course of the transaction. Stimulated by the hope of rescinding a bad bargain or of securing a doubtful debt, or irritated by the unexpected loss of what he had supposed a good one-how natural it is that he should persuade himself that 'falsehood had a material effect to induce him to part with his property; and prompted by an opinion which interest or irritation had created, first to threaten a criminal prosecution, and afterwards, if the terror of it proved availing, to sustain it by testimony always colored, and sometimes wholly composed by his passion. It is dangerous to give one man such power over the reputation and personal liberty of another. If possessed it would be often abused; and it

is inevitable that perjuries would be multiplied, and injustice and rank oppression promoted.

"I cannot concede or conceive that a construction is sound, or fitted to advance the general welfare, which proposes to protect property from loss by impositions which the owners can easily guard against and exposes reputation and liberty to invasions which no prudence or integrity may always repel. Besides it is an Utopian idea that the sanctions of criminal justice can be made coextensive with moral delinquencies. However agreeable to our sentiments of natural justice, it might be to punish every immoral act, it would be Quixotic to attempt it. No community every assumed the obligation of protecting by penal laws every member of it from the consequences of his own credulity, imprudence or folly; and if any one should, it would be following 'false images of good,' that could make no promise perfect. It is impossible for the public to sustain the burden of redressing every injury or loss which individual credulity or cupidity may bring upon itself. The most it can do, and what by the statute under consideration it proposes to do is to protect individuals from those ingeniously contrived frauds and unusual artifices against which common sagacity and an ordinary experience of mankind will not afford a sufficient guard. Beyond this men must trust to their own prudence and caution, with such aids and redress as may be obtained from the civil tribunals."

In this case, we are of the opinion that the evidence is wholly insufficient to establish a fraudulent intent, and the testimony, as shown by the record, is not sufficient within the meaning of the statute, to support a conviction for the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses. Our conclusion is fortified by the fact that defendant has resided in this city for twenty years, in good repute, as shown by the record.

For the reasons heretofore stated, the judgment is reversed, and remanded with directions to the court below to dismiss the case.

Furman, Presiding Judge, and Baker, Judge, concur.

CURRENT Decisions of THE SUPREME
COURT OF OKLAHOMA.

MICK ARIS, Plaintiff in Error,

VS.

No. 11.

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Defendant in Error. Opinion of the Court by WILLIAMS, Justice.

1. The prohibition article, which was separately submitted with the constitution for ratification or rejection, the party assailing the same failing to point out in what particular it was not properly submitted in accordance with the Enabling Act (ch. 3333, 34 U. S. Stat. at Large 1905-6, part 1, p. 267), it having been declared adopted and accepted and recognized by the political departments of both the Federal and state governments, will not be declared by the courts invalid on the ground that it was not properly submitted or adopted.

2. It was the intention of the framers of the constitution that the prohibition provision requires to be incorporated therein by virtue of paragraph 2 of section 3 of the Enabling act (34 U. S. Stat. at Large, ch, 3335, part 1. p. 267, 1905-6) should be enforcable in the courts of the state immediately upon the admission of the state into the Union.

2a. Such provision was incorporated in section 7, article 1, by the framers whereof with a like intent.

2b. The prohibition article (Bunn's Ed. sec. 499; Snyder's Ed. p. 394; Gen. Stat. Okla., Ann., p. 162) was submitted as a separate proposition with the intention that it should become effective over the entire state in like manner if approved by the people, and the constitution was also ratified.

2c. A license issued under a statute to a dealer in liquors is in no sense a contract between the state and the licensee, and is not protected by the contract clause of

the Federal constitution, being a mere permit, which may be modified, annuled or revoked at the pleasure of the legislative power.

2d. A schedule to a constitution generally contains temporary provisions for the preparatory machinery necessary to put the principles of the government under the constitution in motion without disorder of collision, not as a rule to control the principles of the organic law or limit the same, but to carry the whole into effect without break or interval.

2e The laws licensing the liquor traffic (art. 1, ch. 49, Wilson's Rev. & Ann..Stat., 1903) at the time of the admission of the state into the Union were repugant to the provisions of the prohibition article thereof, and were not extended to and did not remain in force in said state

2f A license to carry on the traffic is revoked or annulled by the repeal of the law authorizing the granting of such license.

2g. A liquor license, the period for which it was issued not having expired when the state of Oklahoma was admitted into the Union, was revoked and discontinued on the admission of said state, the prohibition article thereof becoming then and there effective.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Steck, Stevens & Meyers, for plaintiff in Error.

W. C. Reeves, Assis't Att'y Gen. for defendant in error.

GEORGE ANDERSON, Plaintiff,

VS.

No. 407.

FRED W. RITTERBUSCH, Treasurer of Logan County, State of Oklahoma, Defendant.

Original Proceeding for Writ of Prohibition.

Opinion by Chief Justice KANE.

Denied.

1. Revenue laws are those laws only whose principal object is the raising of revenue, and not those under which revenue may incidentally arise.

2. Senate Bill Number 245, entitled, "An Act for the discovery of property not listed for taxation, providing for its assignment and the collection of taxes thereon,'

is not a "bill for raising revenue," such as must orginate in the House of Representatives, under section 33, article 5, of the Constitution.

3. Revenue bills are those that levy taxes in the strict sense of the word, and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.

4. Taxes due the territory of Oklahoma prior to statehood on account of omitted property, constituted a debt accruing to the territory under section 3 of the schedule to the Constitution, and the legislature of the state may make provisions for the recovery of such taxes by the State.

5. Whenever a law of a general nature is passed by the legislature for the whole state and is not applied by the legislature to any particular locality therein and has no words prohibiting its application to any particular locality, it is a law having uniform operation throughout the state, within the meaning of section 59, article 5, of our Constitution, although it may not practically have operation in every part of the state.

6. Senate Bill Nu nber 245 is purely remedial in its nature. It does not attempt to levy a tax, but only goes to confirm pre-existing rights by providing a means for the collection of taxes upon omitted or escaped property. Such legislation is not repugnant to section 19, article 10, of the Constitution, which provides that every act levying a tax shall specify the purpose for which it is levied and that the tax so levied shall not be devoted to any other purpose.

7. The fact that the public expenses have been paid for the years in which the taxes were omitted or that the particular purposes for which they were originally required have been met with other funds, or that the collection of the ommited taxes may temporarily create a surplus of public revenues, presents no constitutional grounds why omitted property should continue to escape its due share of taxation, when collected, those taxes will still belong to the public, and like any other surplus be subject to future appropriation, and thereby lessen future taxation upon those who have already paid more than their share.