Here follows a discussion of the law of nature which is stated to be the will of God, such as that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his dues. This law of nature is superior in obligation to any other. In consequence of the defects of human reason by which we endeavor to know the will of God, there is made necessary the revealed or divine law, found only in the holy scriptures. Upon the law of nature and the law of revelation depend all human laws.

The law of nations arises to regulate the intercourse of states, and rests upon the rules of natural law or mutual compacts, treaties and agree

ments.

Municipal Law.

Municipal law is properly defined to be "a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong."

Better perhaps is the definition given by Cicero: "Municipal law is a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is to be done and forbidding the contrary."

Let us endeavor to explain its several properties, as they arise out of this definition. And, first, it is a rule; not a transient. sudden order from a superior to or concerning a particular person; but something permanent, uniform and universal.

It is also called a rule to distinguish it from advice or counsel, which we are at liberty to follow or not, as we see proper. It is also called a rule to distinguish it from a compact or agreement; for a compact is a promise proceeding from us, law is a command. directed to us.

Municipal law is also a "rule of civil conduct." This distinguishes municipal law from natural, or revealed.

It is likewise "a rule prescribed." Because a bare resolution, confined in the breast of the legislator, without manifesting itself. by some external sign, can never be properly a law. It is requisite that this resolution be notified to the people who are to obey it. But the manner in which this notification is to be made, is matter of very great indifference. It may be notified by universal tradition and long practice, which supposes a previous publication, and is the case of the common law of England. It may be notified viva voce, by officers appointed for that purpose, as is done with regard to proclamations, and such acts of parliament as are appointed to be publicly read in churches and other assemblies. It may lastly be notified by writing, printing, or the like; which is the general course taken with all our acts of parliament. Yet, whatever way is made use of, it is incumbent on the promulgators to do it in the most public and perspicuous manner.

Ex Post Facto Laws.

There is still a more unreasonable method than this, which is called making of laws ex post facto; when after an action (indif

ferent in itself) is committed, the legislator then for the first time declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon the person who has committed it.

All laws should be therefore made to commence in futuro, and be notified before their commencement; which is implied in the term "prescribed." But when this rule is in the usual manner notified, or prescribed, it is then the subject's business to be thoroughly acquainted therewith; for if ignorance of what he might know were admitted as a legitimate excuse, the laws would be of no effect, but might always be eluded with impunity.

But further: municipal law is "a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state." For legislature, as was before observed, is the greatest act of superiority that can be exercised by one being over another. Wherefore it is requisite to the very essence of a law, that it be made by the supreme power. Sovereignty and legislature are indeed convertible terms; one cannot subsist without the other.

Here follows a short inquiry concerning the nature of society and civil government. The wants and fears of individuals are the only true and natural foundations of society. Society originates in a contract; not perhaps formally expressed at the first institution of the state, yet always to be implied, that the whole should protect all its parts and that every part should pay obedience to the will of the whole. There are three forms of government recognized: Democracy, where the sovereign power is lodged in an aggregate assembly consisting of all the free members of a com-. munity. Aristocracy, where it is lodged in a council, composed of select members. Monarchy, where it is entrusted to the hands of a single person. All other species of government, say political writers of antiquity, are either corruptions of or reducible to these three."

From what has been advanced, the truth of the former branch of our definition is (I trust) sufficiently evident; that "municipal law is a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state." I proceed now to the latter branch of it; that it is a rule so prescribed, "commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong."

The Parts of a Law.

Now, in order to do this completely, it is first of all necessary that the boundaries of right and wrong be established and ascertained by law. And when this is once done, it will follow, of course, that it is likewise the business of the law, considered as a rule of civil conduct, to enforce these rights, and to restrain or redress these wrongs. It remains therefore only to consider in what manner the law is said to ascertain the boundaries of right and wrong: and the method which it takes to command the one and prohibit the other.

For this purpose every law may be said to consist of several

parts; one, declaratory: whereby the rights to be observed, and the wrongs to be eschewed, are clearly defined and laid down; another, directory: whereby the subject is instructed and enjoined to observe those rights; and to abstain from the commission of those wrongs; a third, remedial : whereby a method is pointed out to recover a man's private rights, or redress his private wrongs; to which may be added a fourth, usually termed the sanction, or vindicatory branch of the law: whereby it is signified what evil or penalty shall be incurred by such as commit any public wrongs, and transgress or neglect their duty.

The Declaratory Part.

With regard to the first of these, the declaratory part of the municipal law, this depends not so much upon the law of revelation or of nature, as upon the wisdom and will of the legislator. This doctrine, which before was slightly touched, deserves a more particular explication. Those rights then which God and nature have established, and are therefore called natural rights, such as are life and liberty, need not the aid of human laws to be more effectually invested in every man than they are; neither do they receive any additional strength when declared by the municipal laws to be inviolable. On the contrary, no human legislature has power to abridge or destroy them, unless the owner shall himself commit some act that amounts to a forfeiture. Neither do divine or natural duties (such as, for instance, the worship of God, maintenance of children, and the like) receive any stronger sanction from being also declared to be duties by the law of the land. The case is the same as to crimes and misdemeanors, that are forbidden by the superior laws, and therefore styled mala in se, such as murder, theft, and perjury; which contract no additional turpitude from being declared unlawful by the inferior legislature. For that legislature in all these cases acts only, as was before observed, in subordination of the great Law Giver, transcribing and publishing His precepts. So that, upon the whole, the declaratory part of the municipal law has no force or operation at all, with regard to actions that are naturally and intrinsically right or wrong.

But, with regard to things in themselves indifferent, the case is entirely altered. These become either right or wrong, just or unjust, duties or misdemeanors, according as the municipal legislator sees proper, for promoting the welfare of the society, and more effectually carrying on the purposes of civil life. Thus our own common law has declared, that the goods of the wife do instantly upon marriage become the property and right of the husband; and our statute law has declared all monopolies a public offense; yet that right, and this offense have no foundation in na

ture, but are merely created by the law, for the purposes of civil society, and sometimes, where the thing itself has its rise from the law of nature, the particular circumstances and mode of doing it become right or wrong, as the law of the land shall direct. Thus, for instance, in civil duties; obedience to superiors is the doctrine of revealed as well as natural religion; but who those superiors shall be, and in what circumstances or to what degrees they shall be obeyed, it is the province of human laws to determine. And so, as to injuries or crimes, it must be left to our own legislature to decide, in what cases the seizing another's cattle shall amount to a trespass or a theft; and where it shall be a justifiable action, as when a landlord takes them by way of distress for rent.

The Directory Part.

And the directory stands much upon the same footing; for this virtually includes the former, the declaration being usually collected from the direction. The law that says "thou shalt not steal," implies a declaration that stealing is a crime. And we have seen that, in things naturally indifferent, the very essence of right and wrong depends upon the direction of the laws to do or to omit them.

The Remedial Part.

The remedial part of a law is so necessary a consequence of the former two, that laws must be very vague and imperfect without it. For in vain would rights be declared, in vain directed to be observed, if there were no method of recovering and asserting these rights, when wrongfully withheld or invaded. This is what we mean properly, when we speak of the protection of the law.

The Vindicatory Part.

With regard to the sanction of laws, or the evils that may attend the breach of public duties, it is observed, that human legislators have for the most part chosen to make the sanction of their laws rather vindicatory, than remuneratory, or to consist rather in punishments, than in actual particular rewards.

Of all the parts of a law the most effectual is the vindicatory. For it is but lost labor to say, "do this, or avoid that," unless we also. declare, "this shall be the consequence of your non-compliance." We must therefore observe, that the main strength and force of a law consists in the penalty annexed to it. Herein is to be found the principal obligation of human laws.

Interpretation of Laws.

The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs the most natural and probable. And these

signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law.

I. Words are generally to be understood in their usual and most known signification; not so much regarding the propriety of grammar, as their general and popular use. Again, terms of art, or technical terms, must be taken according to the acceptation of the learned in each art, trade, and science.

2. If words happen to be still dubious, we may establish their meaning from the context, with which it may be of singular use to compare a word, or a sentence, whenever they are ambiguous, equivocal, or intricate. Thus the proeme or preamble is often called in to help the construction of an act of parliament. Of the same nature and use is the comparison of a law with other laws, that are made by the same legislator, that have some affinity with the subject, or that expressly relate to the same point. Thus, when the law of England declares murder to be felony without benefit of clergy, we must resort to the same law of England to learn what the benefit of clergy is.

3. As to the subject matter, words are always to be understood as having a regard thereto, for that is always supposed to be in the eye of the legislator, and all his expressions directed to that end.

4. As to the effects and consequence, the rule is, that where words bear either none, or a very absurd signification, if literally understood, we must a little deviate from the received sense of them.

5. But, lastly, the most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it; or the cause which moved the legislator to enact it, for when this reason ceases, the law itself ought likewise to cease with it.

Equity.

From this method of interpreting laws by the reason of them, arises what we call equity, which is thus defined by Grotius: "the correction of that wherein the law (by reason of its universality) is deficient." For, since in laws all cases cannot be foreseen or expressed, it is necessary that, when the general decrees of the law come to be applied to particular cases, there should be somewhere a power vested of defining those circumstances, which (had they been foreseen) the legislator himself would have expressed.