Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce tions, to say that no contract or combination shall be legal which shall restrain trade and commerce by shutting out the operation of the general law of competition. U. S. v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U. S. 569. Contracts, combinations, or conspiracies to control domestic enterprise in manufacture, agriculture, mining, production in all its forms, or to raise or lower the prices or wages, might unquestionably tend to restrain external as well as domestic trade, but the restraint would be an indirect result, however inevitable and whatever its extent, and such result would not necessarily determine the object of the contract, combination, or conspiracy. U. S. v. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 16. Over Rules by Which Commerce Shall Be Governed Congress has the power to establish rules by which interstate and international commerce shall be governed, and, by the antitrust act, has prescribed the rule of free competition among those engaged in such commerce. Northern Securities Co. v. U. S. (193 U. S. 337), in which the court said: Whether the free operation of the normal laws of competition is a wise and wholesome rule for trade and commerce is an economic question which this court need not consider or determine. Undoubtedly there are those who think that the general business interests and prosperity of the country will be best promoted if the rule of competition is not applied. But there are others who believe that such a rule is more necessary in these days of enormous wealth than it ever was. * Congress has in effect recognized the rule of free competition by declaring illegal every combination or conspiracy in restraint of interstate and international commerce. As in the judgment of Congress the public convenience and the general welfare will be best subserved when the natural laws of competition are left undisturbed by those engaged in interstate commerce, and as Congress has embodied that rule in a statute, that must be for all the end of the matter, if this is to remain a government of laws and not of men. It was held in U. S. v. Coffee Exchange, 263 U. S. 611, that— Sales of a commodity upon an exchange, under contracts calling for actual delivery in the future but which in practice are cleared by the processes called "matching” and “ringing," serve useful and legitimate purposes. and are legal when not abused for illegal ends, and that Congress has the power to provide rules and regulations for the conduct of such exchanges to prevent abuse of their lawful functions. Over Safety Appliances Congress having determined to regulate the use of cars running on interstate railroads so as to provide for the use of certain safety appliances on such cars, has by such acts taken jurisdiction thereof. Southern R. Co. v. U. S., 222 U. S. 20. Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Castle, 224 U. S. 541. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Over Hours of Service Cl. 3.-Commerce Congress has so acted upon the subject as to preclude a State from making or enforcing as to interstate employees a local regulation limiting hours of labor. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370. Erie R. Co. v. New York, 233 U. S. 671. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. I. C. C., 221 U. S. 612. Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332. Ellis v. U. S., 206 U. S. 246. U. S. v. Garbish, 222 U. S. 257. Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. U. S., 231 U. S. 112. Over Liability for Injuries to Employees The laws of the several States, in so far as they cover the same field, were superseded by the employers' liability act, but the original act of June 11, 1906, was held invalid as being a regulation of intrastate as well as of interstate commerce in Employers' Liability cases (207 U. S. 463). It had been held valid in Lancer v. Anchor Line (155 Fed. 433); Kelley v. Great Northern R. Co. (152 Fed. 211); Plummer v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (152 Fed. 206); and Spain v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (151 Fed. 522). In the exertion of its power over interstate commerce Congress may regulate the relations of common carriers and their employees while both are engaged in such commerce, subject to the limitations prescribed in the Constitution and to the qualification that the particulars in which those relations are regulated must have a real or substantial connection with the interstate commerce in which the carriers and their employees are engaged. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1. The act of 1906 was held valid and enforceable as to carriers and their employees within the District of Columbia and the Territories, in El Paso, etc., R. Co. v. Gutierrez (215 U. S. 87). The liability acts were held to be limited to common carriers "by railroad" and not applicable to independent steamship lines, in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen (244 U. S. 205). The section of the act of 1908, declaring any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any carrier to exempt itself from liability created by the act, to be void, is valid. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co. v. Schubert, 224 U. S. 603. In connection with the Second Employers' Liability Cases see also St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Hesterly, 228 U. S. 702. Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U. S. 439. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Wabash R. Co. v. Hayes, 234 U. S. 86. Cl. 3.-Commerce New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147. North Carolina R. Co. v. Lee, 260 U. S. 16. Over Telegraphs and Telephones A telegraph company occupies the same relation to commerce as a carrier of messages that a railroad company does as a carrier of goods. Both companies are instruments of commerce, and their business is commerce itself. They do their transportation in different ways, and their liabilities are in some respects different, but they are both indispensable to those engaged to any considerable extent in commercial pursuits. A State can not grant the exclusive right to maintain telegraph lines so as to exclude from its limits a corporation organized under an act of Congress. The subject of the hours of labor of employees of interstate railways using the telegraph or telephone in connection with trains is so far removed from State legislation by the hours of service act as to invalidate a State law on the same subject. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 464. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1. Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 646. Essex v. New England Tel. Co., 239 U. S. 313. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 195 U. S. 540. Erie R. Co. v. New York, 233 U. S. 671. Delegation of Power To District of Columbia Congress can not delegate to the District of Columbia power to regulate commerce between the District and the States. Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141. To Interstate Commerce Commission Congress has authority under its sovereign and exclusive power to regulate commerce, to create a commission for the purpose of supervising, investigating, and reporting upon matters or complaints connected with or growing out of interstate and foregn commerce. The powers and duties of the commission are prescribed by Congress, and it performs for the Federal Government, in respect to that commerce committed by the Constitution to the exclusive care and jurisdiction of Congress, the same functions which State commissioners exercise in respect to local or intrastate commerce, over which the States appointing them have exclusive control. Their validity in their respective spheres of operation stands upon the same footing. Kentucky, etc., Brdg. Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 37 Fed. 567. U. S. v. Great Northern R. Co., 157 Fed. 288. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce As to the effect of the delegation of power to the Interstate Commerce Commission, see Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Larabee (211 U. S. 612), in which it was said that Congress has already acted, has created the Interstate Commerce Commision, and given to it a large measure of control over interstate commerce. But the fact that Congress has entrusted power to that commission does not, in the absence of action by it, change the rule which existed prior to the creation of the commission. Congress could always regulate interstate commerce, and could make specific provisions in reference thereto, and yet this has not been held to interfere with the power of the State in these incidental matters. A mere delegation by Congress to the commission of a like power has no greater effect, and does not of itself disturb the authority of the State. It is not contended that the commission has taken any action in respect to the particular matters involved. It may never do so, and no one can in advance anticipate what it will do when it acts. Until then the authority of the State in merely incidental matters remains undisturbed. See also Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412. The powers and duties of the commission have been greatly enlarged, since the above decisions, by amendments to the act to regulate commerce, and by the transportation act, q. v. See also "Interstate Commerce" (4 Fed. Stat. Ann. [2d ed.] p. 331). The part of the act of Congress of August 24, 1912, known as the Panama Canal act, especially section 11, which amends section 5 of the interstate commerce act of 1887, and which, in effect, provides that even if the Interstate Commerce Commission shall find that competition, or the possibility of competition, exists between a particular carrier by water under common control, the service by water may still be continued if the commission shall be of opinion that the convenience and commerce of the people will be promoted thereby, is not invalid as delegating a legislative function to the commission. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. U. S., 234 Fed. 682. To States In general. It is within the power of Congress to permit the exercise of the power to regulate interstate commerce by the States. In sections 4278 and 4279 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, relating to nitroglycerine and other explosives, Congress gives directly to any State, Territory, District, city, or town the right to prohibit the introduction of such substances into its limits for sale, use, or consumption therein. Ex parte Jervey, 66 Fed. 960. Imported liquors.-In pursuance of the decision in Leisy v. Hardin (135 U. S. 100), and in recognition of the conditions in certain localities, Congress provided, in the act of August 8, 1890 (26 Stat. 313): That all fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors or liquids transported into any State or Territory or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale, or storage therein shall, upon arrival in such State or 'See also "Intoxicating Liquors," pp. 174, 605, 685, 734, and Amendment 18, p. 747. Sec. 8.--Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce Territory, be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers to the same extent and in the same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such State or Territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or otherwise. The act cited above was held to be a valid and constitutional exercise of the legislative power conferred upon Congress in In re Rahrer (140 U. S. 561), in which the court said: Congress has not attempted to delegate the power to regulate commerce, or to exercise any power reserved to the States, or to grant a power not possessed by the States, or to adopt State laws. It has taken its own course and made its own regulation, applying to these subjects of interstate commerce one common rule, whose uniformity is not affected by variations in State laws in dealing with such property. No reason is perceived why, if Congress chooses to provide that certain designated subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed by a rule which divests them of that character at an earlier period of time than would otherwise be the case, it is not within its competency to do so. See also Laughter v. M'Lain, 229 Fed. 280. Evansville Brewing Assn. v. Excise Commrs., 225 Fed. 204. A State may prohibit the shipment into the State to agents of the shipper of intoxicating liquors for the purpose of being stored and sold therein in original packages. Vance v. Vandercook Co. (170 U. S. 451), in which the court said: But the weight of the contention is overcome when it is considered that the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution guarantees the right to ship merchandise from one State into another and protects it until the termination of the shipment by delivery at the place of consignment; and this right is wholly unaffected by the act of Congress which allows State authority to attach to the original package before sale but only after delivery. See also Pabst Brewg. Co. v. Crenshaw, 198 U. S. 17. Phillips v. Mobile, 208 U. S. 472. Scott v. Donald, 165 U, S. 58. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Cook Brewg. Co., 223 U. S. 70. Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U. S. 218; 238 U. S. 190; 206 U. S. 129. Delamater v. South Dakota, 205 U. S. 93. Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 568. Foppiano v. Speed, 199 U. S. 501. The Webb-Kenyon Act of March 1, 1913, which in substance prohibits the shipment or transportation from one State to another of intoxicating liquors in violation of any law of such State, is a valid exercise of the power of Congress. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. R. Co., 242 U. S. 326. Commerce with Foreign Nations In General The power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, being an enumerated power, is complete in itself, acknowledging no |