Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate passengers of another racei s a question of interstate commerce and to be determined by Congress alone. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 590. In Chiles v. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. (218 U. S. 71), in which a colored passenger riding on a through ticket from Washington, D. C., to Lexington, Ky., was required by the railway company, when he changed trains at Ashland, Ky., to go into a car set apart exclusively for colored people, the State requiring all railroads to provide separate accommodations for white and colored passengers, the railroad company contended that it had not acted under the State statute but had adopted the regulation under its common-law right to make reasonable regulations for the conduct of its business, and the court declined to pass upon the validity of the statute and held that the common-law rule allowing railroads to make reasonable regulations were not a burdensome regulation of interstate commerce. The court further held that the regulation in question was a reasonable one for the company to make. In Hall v. De Cuir (95 U. S. 485), the court held that a statute of Louisiana requiring interstate carriers to permit negroes and whites to intermingle freely among each other in all parts of their trains or boats was invalid. As was said by Chaplin, in his Principles of the Federal Law (sec. 182): Mere classification of persons, by race or color, not being in and of itself violative of equal protection of the laws, Congress has, in the field of suprastate commerce, power of such classification. A State has no power to this effect in suprastate commerce but the matter is of exclusive congressional competency. Congress, if not having taken affirmative action in this field, leaves the matter to be governed by the common-law principles governing common carriers-that is to say, leaves carriers free, in suprastate transit, to make such classification or not, at their pleasure. In South Covington, etc., R. Co. v. Kentucky (252 U. S. 399), it was held that a State law requiring interurban railroad companies to supply separate accommodations for white and colored passengers, and punishing failure to do so, was not an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce as applied to such railroads. Use of local rates or bills of lading as between connecting carriers. When goods shipped under a through bill of lading from a point in one State to a point in another are received in transit by a State common carrier, under a conventional division of the charges such carrier must be deemed to have subjected its road to an arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment within the meaning of the act to regulate commerce. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. I. C. C., 162 U. S. 193. Baer Bros. v. Denver, etc., R. Co., 233 U. S. 479. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Communication by Telegraph and Telephone Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate Communication by telegraph is commerce, as well as in the nature of postal service, and if carried on between different States it is interstate commerce and directly within the power of regulation conferred upon Congress and free from the control of State regulations, except such as are strictly of a police character. Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 645. Western Union v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U. S. 406. Western Union v. Alabama, 132 U. S. 473. Western Union v. Pendleton, 122 U. S. 356. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union, 96 U. S. 9. A telegraph company occupies the same relation to commerce as a carrier of messages that a railroad company does as a carrier of goods. Both companies are instruments of commerce and their business is commerce itself. A State can not prevent an interstate telegraph company from doing business in it. A statute of Texas provided that every chartered telegraph company doing business in that State should pay a tax for every message sent. The validity of this law was sustained by the Supreme Court of Texas, but the Supreme Court of the United States reversed that judgment and held the act unconstitutional so far as it included the tax on messages sent out of the State for the Government on public business." But that portion of the statute which levied a tax on messages sent by private parties and not by the agents of the Government from one place to another within the State was held to be constitutional. 66 Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 461 (reversing 55 Tex. 314). The rules applicable to telegraph companies apply alike to telephone companies. When their lines run from one State into another they are carriers of interstate commerce. Delaware, etc., Co. v. Delaware, 50 Fed. 677. But see Richmond v. Telephone Co. (174 U. S. 777), in which the court said: If Congress desires to extend the provisions of the act of 1866 to companies engaged in the business of electrically transmitting articulate speech-that is, to companies popularly known as telephone companies, and never otherwise designated in common speech-let it do so in plain words. It will be time enough when such legislation is enacted to consider any questions of constitutional law that may be suggested by it. New York stock quotations furnished by telegraph to subscribers in Massachusetts held interstate commerce. Western Union v. Foster, 247 U. S. 105. In 1910, by amendment to the act to regulate commerce, the jurisdiction of the commission was extended to telegraph and. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate telephone companies, and it was empowered to suspend advances in rates. Handling and Slaughtering Animals When cattle are sent for sale from a place in one State, with the expectation that they will end their transit, after purchase, in another, and when in effect they do so with only the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the stock yards, and when this is a typical, constantly recurring course the current thus existing is a current of commerce among the States, and the purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of such commerce. Swift v. U. S., 196 U. S. 398. The Kansas City Live Stock Exchange is conducted by a board of directors at the Kansas City Stock Yards, which are situated partly in Missouri and partly in Kansas; substantially all of the business tranacted in the matter of receiving, buying, selling, and hadling their live stock at Kansas City is carried on by the members of the exchange as commission merchants, and large amounts of live stock are shipped from other States; when this stock is received at the stock yards it is sold by the members of the exchange to the various packing houses in Kansas City, Mo., and Kansas City, Kans., and it is also sold for shipment to various other markets in other States. It was held that the business thus conducted is not interstate commerce. Hopkins v. U. S., 171 U. S. 578, wherein the court said that there is a distinction between a regulation which directly affects and embarrasses interstate trade or commerce and one which is nothing more than a charge for a local facility provided for the transaction of such commerce. See Anderson v. U. S., 171 U. S. 604. Manufacture and Sale of Goods In general. Where the contract is for the sale of the article and for its delivery in another State the transaction is one of interstate commerce, although the vendor may have also agreed to manufacture it in order to fulfil his contract of sale. Addyston Pipe, etc., Co. v. U. S. (175 U. S. 246), in which case the court said: It is almost needless to add that we do not hold that every private enterprise which may be carried on chiefly or in part by means of interstate shipments is therefore to be regarded as so related to interstate commerce as to come within the regulating power of Congress. Such enterprises may be of the same nature as the manufacturing of refined sugar in the Knight case (156 U. S. 1)—that is, the parties may be engaged as manufacturers of a commodity which they thereafter intend at some time to sell, and possibly to sell in another State; but such sale we have already held is an incident to and not the direct result of the manufacture, and so is not a regulation of, or an illegal interference with, interstate commerce. See also Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. U. S. Rubber Co., 156 Fed. 1. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate The sale of coal f. o. b. cars at the mine, the cars when loaded to be promptly forwarded to purchasers in other States, is interstate commerce. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Sonman, etc., Co., 242 U. S. 120. A shipment of merchandise C. O. D. from one State into another constitutes interstate commerce, as the right of parties to make a contract in another State than that of the residence of the purchaser, for the sale and purchase of merchandise, and in doing so to fix by agreement the time when, and the condition on which, the completed title should pass, is beyond question. American Exp. Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 143. Adams Exp. Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 147. Delivery by agent after breaking bulk.-The soliciting of orders by an agent of a nonresident principal, to be filled by putting up the objects of the several orders in distinct packages and forwarding them to the agent for delivery, each package being labeled for the customer, except that in the case of one class of goods, brooms, they were tagged and marked like the other articles, according to the number ordered, but then tied together into bundles of about a dozen, and wrapped up conveniently for shipment, is interstate commerce, and a municipal ordinance imposing a license fee for engaging in such business is void. Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507. Transactions between manufacturing companies in one State, through agents, with citizens of another, constitute a large part of interstate commerce. Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 632. Leases. When an act of Congress refers specifically to leases of chattels as well as to their sale in interstate commerce, whatever doubt there may be as to the validity of the statute will be resolved in favor of sustaining the exercise of the power of Congress over such subjects. When a corporation with millions of capital, doing an annual business amounting to millions of dollars, sees proper to conduct its business by only leasing its chattels, instead of selling them, it is as much engaged in commerce as if it sold them outright. U. S. v. United Shoe Mach. Co. 234 Fed. 127. Subjects of Regulation by Congress In general. The commerce power embraces all instruments by which commerce may be carried on, and all the immediate vehicles and agents for all purposes, as well as the articles carried, and negotiations leading up to interstate and foreign commerce. The powers of Congress are not confined to instrumentalities known when the Constitution was adopted, but they keep pace Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate with and adapt themselves to new developments, and what is an article of commerce is to be determined by usages of the commercial world. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 280. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 204. Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 24. Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 646. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union, 96 U. S. 9. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 581. Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125 U. S. 501. Persons.-Persons are subject to the commerce power when they conduct commerce or are employed by others who conduct it or when they are carried as passengers. So Congress may prescribe rules for the government of pilots and fix their qualifications. Cooley v. Philadelphia, 12 How. 316. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 282 (overruling New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 136, on this point). Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 40. Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 269. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 516. People v. Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique, 107 U. S. 60. Railroads and express companies.'-In general.-Carriers engaged in interstate and intrastate commerce are subject to the regulation of Congress in so far as they are engaged in interstate commerce, and to the regulation of the States so far as they are engaged in intrastate commerce. A contract by a railroad to furnish cars on a certain day for interstate transportation as common carrier, is void if not provided for in the published tariffs. Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 155. Davis v. Cornwell, 264 U. S. 560. Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Larabee, 211 U. S. 612. Construction of railroads.-Under the power given by this clause, Congress has the right to authorize the construction of railroads and terminal facilities. California v. Central Pac. R. Co., 127 U. S. 39. Railroad Comm. v. Southern Pac. Co., 264 U. S. 331. Right of way. In exercising the power of eminent domain. Congress has a right to grant railroad right of way through lands owned by an Indian nation where the road will have relation to interstate commerce. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641. Stocks and bonds.-Federal act requiring carrier to obtain permission before issuing stocks and bonds held not to deny due process. Pittsburgh & W. V. Ry. v. I. C. C., 293 Fed. 1001. Rolling stock. An early conception of right-of-way railroads was that the corporation should provide only motive power and |