Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate that cars should be provided by individual users of the road. Under such a scheme, the engines-while individually in and of themselves chattels-would, while in use, savor of realty, like trade fixtures, and would be, pro tanto, within principles applicable to the real estate plant. The scheme proved to be impracticable, as a general scheme, and gave way, in general, to the plan of ownership by the railroad corporation, of cars, as well as engines, and other rolling stock. Lake Superior, etc., R. Co. v. U. S., 93 U. S. 442. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Denver, etc., R. Co., 110 U. S. 667. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453. For instances of arbitrary and unreasonable (and therefore void) State requirement of furnishing freight cars, see: Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 136. Distribution of coal cars.-A rule fixing the number of cars distributable to coal mines in proportion to the daily capacity of each to produce, held not arbitrary, unreasonable, or violative of due process as applied to mines served by more than one carrier. United States v. New River Co., 265 U. S. 533. Coal cars owned by an interstate carrier in which it receives from the tipple of the coal mines along its line purchased by it and used solely for its own fuel purposes, come within the instrumentalities by which commerce is carried on. I. C. C. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 215 U. S. 452. State railroad engaging in interstate commerce.-When a State railroad corporation voluntarily engages as a common carrier in interstate commerce by making an arrangement for a continuous carriage of shipment of goods it is subjected, so far as such traffic is concerned, to the regulating power of Congress; likewise, a railroad company which has become a link in a through line of road over which, as part of its business, freight and passengers are carried into and out of the State is engaged in interstate commerce. I. C. C. v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 167 U. S. 642. Regulation of rates-(a) In general.-Congress may legislate in respect to interstate commerce to the same extent both as to rates and all other matters of regulation as the States may do in respect to purely local or internal commerce, and therefore State requirements as to rates for interstate commerce are not operative. In the absence of congressional action, however, minor State regulation is permissible. Kentucky, etc., Brdg. Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 37 Fed. 634. Hanley v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 187 U. S. 617. Railroad Company v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 500. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate (b) Long and short haul.-The long and short haul provision of the act to regulate commerce held valid. Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U. S. 476. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Eubank, 184 U. S. 43. The long and short haul provision of the interstate commerce act (sec. 4) is violated, and the carrier incurs, prima facie at least, the penalties prescribed by section 10 by publishing, without authority from the commission, a rate for a longer haul lower than that scheduled for a shorter haul of the same kind of property over the same line or route in the same direction. Davis v. Portland Seed Co., 264 U. S. 403. (c) Abrogating passes granted for life.-That provision of the act to regulate commerce providing that no carrier should issue or give any interstate free ticket is not invalid as applied to the case of an agreement made many years previously to issue free passes for life in compromise of a claim for damages for injuries. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467. (d) Obtaining transportation at less than published rates.The Elkins Act is not invalid in authorizing the prosecution of a shipper for securing transportation of goods in interstate commerce at less than the carrier's published rates within any district through which the transportation may have been conducted. Armour Packing Co. v. U. S., 209 U. S. 56. No contract of a carrier can reduce the amount of charges legally payable to it under its tariff for an interstate shipment, or release from liability a shipper who has assumed their payment; nor can any act or omission of the carrier (except the running of the statute of limitations) estop or preclude it from enforcing payment of the full amount by the person liable. L. & N. R. R. v. Central Iron Co., 265 U. S. 59. For the purpose of securing the reduced rates for transportation of its property over land-grant railroads, the Government purchased goods for prices f. o. b. at place of shipment, paid the freight, and had shipment made by the sellers with Government bills of lading. Held, that title passed at place of shipment, although the contracts of sale reserved to the Government the right of inspection and rejection at the place of destination and imposed certain duties there upon the sellers, and that goods so transported, and accepted by the Government, were entitled to the reduced rates of transportation. Illinois Central R. R. v. U. S., 265 U. S. 209. (e) Connecting carriers.—Provisions of interstate commerce act, regulating liability of connecting carrier, is a valid regulation of interstate commerce. Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481. Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186. I. C. C. v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 167 U. S. 633. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Behlmer, 175 U. S. 648. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403. U. S. v. Delaware & H. Co., 213 U. S. 366. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Iowa, 233 U. S. 334. U. S. v. Colorado, etc., R. Co., 157 Fed. 321 (writ of certiorari denied, Barrett v. City of New York, 183 Fed. 793. Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114. (f) Incidental control of intrastate rates.—Congress is entitled to keep the highways of interstate communication open to interstate traffic upon fair and equal terms. That an unjust discrimination in the rates of a common carrier, by which one person or locality is unduly favored as against another under substantially similar conditions of traffic, constitutes an evil is undeniable; and where this evil consists in the action of an interstate carrier in unreasonably discriminating against interstate traffic over its line, the authority of Congress to prevent it is equally clear. It is immaterial, so far as the protecting power of Congress is concerned, that the discrimination arises from intrastate rates as compared with interstate rates. The use of the instrument of interstate commerce in a discriminatory manner so as to inflict injury upon that commerce, or some part thereof, furnishes abundant ground for Federal intervention. Nor can the attempted exercise of State authority alter the matter, where Congress has acted, for a State may not authorize the carrier to do that which Congress is entitled to forbid and has forbidden. Houston, etc., R. Co. v. U. S., 234 U. S. 342. Texas v. Eastern Texas R. Co., 258 U. S. 204. (g) Prohibiting combinations between competing roads.-Congress, in the exercise of its right to regulate interstate commerce, has the power to prohibit, as in restraint of interstate commerce, a contract or combination between competing railroads entered into for the purpose of establishing and maintaining interstate rates and fares for transportation on any of the roads parties to the contract or combination, even though the rates and fares thus established are reasonable. U. S. v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U. S. 505. (h) Express rates.-The so-called uniform zone or block system of express rates in interstate transportation, established by the Interstate Commerce Commission, which prohibits charging higher interstate rates than intrastate rates, and which may be complied with by reducing the interstate rates to the local scale, or by raising the local rates to the interstate scale, or by reducing one and raising the other until equality is reached in an intermediate scale, must be observed. American Exp. Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U. S. 617. Section 15, paragraph 4, of the amended interstate commerce act provided that, in establishing any through route, the commission shall not "require any carrier by railroad, without its Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate consent, to embrace in such route substantially less than the entire length of its railroad and of any intermediate railroad operated in conjunction and under a common management or control therewith, which lies between the termini of such proposed through route, unless such inclusion of lines would make the through route unreasonably long as compared with another practicable through route which could otherwise be established." Held, that an express company is not a "carrier by railroad" within the meaning of the paragraph. U. S. v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 265 U. S. 427. Prohibiting transportation of commodities produced by carrier.-So-called commodities clause of the act to regulate commerce (act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584) held to be within the power of Congress under this clause. U. S. v. Delaware & H. Co., 213 U. S. 366. Safety appliance acts.-The acts of Congress known as the safety appliance acts were within the power of Congress to enact as applied to vehicles used on any railroad that is a highway of interstate traffic and are not confined to vehicles engaged in such traffic. Southern R. Co. v. U. S., 222 U. S. 20. U. S. v. Atlantic Coast Line, 153 Fed. 918. Congress had the power to adopt the provisions of the safety appliance acts making a railroad whose right of way is used for the transportation of interstate traffic liable to an employee not engaged in interstate commerce for defects in appliances. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33. Liability for loss or injury to property.—The power of Congress comprehends power to regulate contracts between the shipper and the carrier by defining the liability of the carrier for loss, delay, injury, or damage to such property. Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491. Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Owen & Co., 256 U. S. 427. See also Peirce v. Van Dusen, 78 Fed. 693 (as to power of States). "Carmack amendment" making initial carrier liable for loss or injury. The provisions of the so-called Carmack amendment to the act to regulate commerce (June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584, 595), the effect of which is to hold the initial carrier as having contracted for through carriage to destination and liable 12703°-S. Doc. 157, 68-1-12 Sec. 8.--Powers of Congress Cl. 3-Commerce-Interstate to the shipper for loss or injury to property on a connecting line, held valid. Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186. Boston, etc., R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Robinson, 233 U. S. 173. Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Dixie Tobacco Co., 228 U. S. 593. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319. The first "Cummins Amendment" (March 4, 1915, c. 176, 38 Stat. 1196) made the carrier liable for the full actual loss of property shipped, when caused by the carrier, regardless of any agreement or representation of the shipper. Adams Express Co. v. Darden, 265 U. S. 265. Liability for injury or death of employees.—A freight conductor on a round-trip run between State points held not engaged in interstate commerce within employers' liability act, while on a train on his return trip, devoted solely to domestic commerce, because his train on the trip out carried interstate freight. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Peery, 242 U. S. 292. A night watchman, injured while guarding tools and material for the erection of a depot, held not engaged in interstate commerce, though such depot was intended to be used in interstate commerce. New York Cent. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 Member of crew switching loaded cars from storage track to coal shed was not engaged in interstate commerce, although coal was to be used by locomotives in interstate haul. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U. S. 177. Fireman on switching engine, killed while his engine was transferring an empty car, was employed in interstate commerce if the movement was for purpose of reaching an interstate car. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Parker, 242 U. S. 13. In Reed v. Director General (258 U. S. 92), the court held that in actions under the employers' liability act the doctrine of assumption of risk has no application when the negligence of a fellow servant which the injured party could not have foreseen is the sole, direct, and immediate cause of the injury. See also Erie R. Co. v. Welsh, 242 U. S. 303. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Barlow, 244 U. S. 183. Southern R. Co. v. Puckett, 244 U. S. 571. In North Carolina R. Co. v. Lee (260 U. S. 16) it was held that a lessor railroad was not liable for death of employee during Federal control. |