Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3-Commerce-Interstate Qualifications and duties of employees.-Congress may legislate as to the qualifications, duties, and liabilities of employees and others on railway trains engaged in interstate commerce, and such legislation will supersede any State action on the subject. Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 99. Hours of service of employees.-The so-called hours-of-service act is not invalid as applied to those who are engaged in both interstate and intrastate service; that is, as to all employees connected with the movement of trains in interstate transportation, but intrastate railroads and employees engaged in purely and wholly local business are not affected by its provisions. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. I. C. C., 221 U. S. 612. Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370. Railroad Labor Board.-Transportation act 1920, authorizing the Labor Board to ascertain just and reasonable wages and working conditions does not violate right of private contract, or take property without due process. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Labor Board, 282 Fed. 693. Uniform system of accounting.-Act of Congress of June 29, 1906, authorizing the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate the entire system of bookkeeping of interstate carriers, including its intrastate accounts, held valid. I. C. C. v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194. Valuation of property.—Under section 19a of the act to regulate commerce, directing the commission to investigate, ascertain, and report the value of the properties of common carriers, and to hear the protests of any carrier against a valuation tentatively made; declaring a final valuation prima facie evidence of the value of the carrier's property in all proceedings under the act and in various judicial proceedings, and providing that, unless otherwise ordered by the commission, its records and data shall be open to the inspection and examination of the public, held, that an order of the commission denying inspection of records by others than its employees, unless and until offered in evidence, was valid against an interested carrier in so far as the claim to examine them might be based upon the naked ground of their being public documents. Congress may make one fact prima facie evidence of another if the inference is not so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. St. Louis Ry. v. Int. Com. Com., 264 U. S. 64. Effect of membership in labor organization.-Act of Congress of June 1, 1898 (30 Stat. 424), making it a criminal offense against the United States for an agent or officer of an interstate carrier, having full authority in the premises from the carrier, to discharge an employee from service simply because of his membership in a labor organization, can not be sustained Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate under the power of Congress to regulate commerce, and is unconstitutional. Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S. 161. Telegraph and telephone companies.-A telegraph company occupies the same relation to commerce as a carrier of messages that a railroad company does as a carrier of goods. Both companies are instruments of commerce and their business is commerce itself. Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460. Ships and shipping.—In general.-The power to regulate commerce includes navigation as well as traffic in its ordinary signification, and embraces ships and vessels as the instruments of intercourse and trade as well as officers and seamen employed in their navigation. State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 216. Street v. Shipowners' Assn., 263 U. S. 334. The whole commercial marine of the country is placed by the Constitution under the regulation of Congress, and all laws passed by that body in the regulation of navigation and trade, whether foreign or coastwise, is therefore but the exercise of an undisputed power. When, therefore, an act of the legislature of a State prescribes a regulation of the subject repugnant to and inconsistent with the regulation of Congress, the State law must give way; and this without regard to the source of power whence the State legislature derived its enactment. Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 243 (reversing Pilotage Comrs. v. See also The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 564. The duty of an interstate carrier by water under section 1, subdivision (4), of the amended interstate commerce act, to furnish transportation upon reasonable request, does not oblige it to continue operation of boats on a particular route; and section 1, subdivision (18), of the commerce act, concerning abandonment, relates only to railroads. Lucking v. Detroit Nav. Co., 265 U. S. 347. When a vessel is engaged in interstate commerce.-It is entirely possible for a vessel to be engaged in interstate commerce although all the ports touched by her are in the same State; and in the absence of evidence to the contrary it may be inferred from the route pursued by the boat and the connection between the boat and railroads at each end of her route, that the boat is so engaged. The extent to which she is engaged in interstate commerce is immaterial. Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U. S. 541. The Hazel Kirke, 25 Fed. 601. The Gretna Green, 20 Fed. 901. Enrolling and licensing of vessels.-The power of Congress to require vessels to be enrolled and licensed is derived from the Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate commerce clause, but such enrollment does not of itself exclude the right of a State to exact a license from her own citizens on account of their ownership and use of such property having its situs within the State. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 377. I. C. C. v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194. Limitation of vessel owners' liability.-Act of June 19, 1886, which extends the limited liability acts to all sea-going vessels, and also to all vessels used on lakes or rivers or in inland navigation, including canal boats, barges, and lighters, was passed in amendment of the maritime law, and the power to make such amendments is coextensive with such law. The power of Congress is not confined to the boundaries or class of subjects which limit and characterize the power to regulate commerce; but in maritime matters it extends to all matters and places to which the maritime law extends. In re Garnett, 141 U. S. 12. The Katie, 40 Fed. 480. In re Vessels Owners' Towing Co., 26 Fed. 169. In re Long Island, etc., Transp. Co., 5 Fed. 599. King v. American Transp. Co., 1 Flipp. (U. S.) 1. Recording conveyances of vessels.-Act of Congress of July 29, 1850, held constitutional. As Congress under its power to regulate commerce has made regulations pertaining to vessels of the United States, its power may be extended to the security and protection of the rights and title of all persons dealing in such property. White's Bank v. Smith, 7 Wall. 650. Regulating payment of seamen's wages.-Act of Congress making it unlawful to pay any seaman wages in advance held valid as applied to contracts of sailors for interstate and foreign service. Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U. S. 173. Kenney v. Blake, 125 Fed. 672. As to prohibiting foreign vessels from entering United States ports, see "Commerce with Foreign Nations," p. 106. Navigation and navigable waters.-The power of Congress to regulate navigable waters is not expressly granted in the Constitution, but is a power incidental to the express power to regulate commerce. All the powers which existed in the States before the adoption of the Constitution are the powers possessed by Congress over navigable waters under its authority to regulate commerce. This power involves the control of the waters Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate of the United States which are navigable in fact. On this subject the court said, in Nelson v. Leland (22 How. 55): Under the English system the ebb and flow of the tide, with few if any exceptions, established the fact of navigability; and this was the course of decision in this country until recently. Our contracted views of the English Admiralty, which was limited by the ebb and flow of the tide, were discarded and the more liberal principles of the civil law, equally embraced by the Constitution, were adopted. This law is commercial in its character and applies to all navigable waters, except to a commerce exclusively within a State. Many of our leading rivers are sometimes unnavigable; but this can not affect their navigability at other times. A commerce carried on between two or more States is subject to the laws and regulations of Congress and to the admiralty jurisdiction. See also Leovy v. U. S., 177 U. S. 632. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 725. Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 682. Miller v. New York, 109 U. S. 395. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, etc., Brdg. Co., 18 How. 421. Gibson v. U. S., 166 U. S. 269. The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166. Hill v. U. S., 149 U. S. 593. Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473. All navigable waters are under the control of the United States for the purpose of regulating and improving navigation, and although the title to the shore and submerged soil is in the various States, and individual users under them, it is always subject to the servitude in respect of navigation created in favor of the Federal Government by the Constitution. Gibson v. U. S., 166 U. S. 269. U. S. v. Chandler-Dunbar, etc., Co., 229 U. S. 53. U. S. v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387. The title and rights of riparian or littoral proprietors in the soil below high-water mark are governed by the laws of the several States, subject to the rights granted to the United States by the Constitution. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1. The power to regulate commerce includes the regulation of navigation and comprehends navigation within the limits of every State in the Union so far as that navigation may be in any manner connected with the commerce over which Congress has jurisdiction. Cooley v. Philadelphia, 12 How. 299. The City of Salem, 37 Fed. 846. The Hazel Kirke, 25 Fed. 607. Foster v. Davenport, 22 How. 244. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, etc., Brdg. Co., 18 How. 421. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 725. Union Bridge Co. v. U. S., 204 U. S. 364. Cl. 3.-Commerce-Interstate Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Kaw Valley, 233 U. S. 75. Railroad Company v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584. An obstruction placed by authority of Congress at the head of one channel in a navigable river between two States, for the purpose of improving another channel, is not an invalid exercise by Congress of control of a navigable river. South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U. S. 13. Woodruff v. North Bloomfield, etc., Co., 18 Fed. 778. Under the power to regulate commerce Congress may establish lighthouses, build wharves, improve harbors, etc. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 537. Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605. The liability of the United States under the fifth amendment to make just compensation for land taken by the Government for public use is not defeated because such land was taken in the exercise of the power of Congress to improve navigation. U. S. v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445. Chappell v. Waterworth, 155 U. S. 102. Canals.-Congress had power to construct the Panama Canal acquired by treaty with the Republic of Panama. Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24. Canals and waterways may be opened to connect navigable bays, harbors, and rivers with each other or with the interior of the country. Stockton v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 32 Fed. 9. Bridges. The paramount power of regulating bridges that affect navigation is in Congress. It comes from the power to regulate commerce. Bridge Co. v. U. S., 105 U. S. 475. Stone v. Bridge Co., 206 U. S. 267. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 12. Monongahela Bridge Co. v. U. S., 216 U. S. 177. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713. Congress may use its sovereign powers directly or through a corporation created for that object, to construct bridges for the accommodation of interstate commerce. Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 530. Miller v. New York, 109 U. S. 385. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 37 Fed. 129. An act of Congress declaring certain bridges across a river between two States "to be lawful structures in their present positions and elevations, and shall be so held and taken to be, anything in the law or laws of the United States to the contrary |