Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce—Intrastate Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 292. New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 138, on certificate of division of opinion in 2 Paine (U. S.), 429. This case has been discredited in opinions in subsequent cases, notably in Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 265. In the absence of legislation by Congress.-While the laws of the State must yield to acts of Congress passed in execution of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, the mere grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce did not of itself and without legislation by Congress impair the authority of the States to establish such reasonable regulations as were appropriate for the protection of the health, the lives, and the safety of their people. New York, etc., R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 631. See also Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52. Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352. Burden upon interstate commerce.-The State can do nothing which will directly burden or impede interstate commerce, and the police power does not justify a direct interference with such commerce. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Kaw Valley, 233 U. S. 75. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115. Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501. Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 299. Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 12. A State may make valid enactments in the exercise of its legislative power to promote the welfare and convenience of its citizens, although in their operation they may have an effect upon interstate commerce. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 488. See also South Covington, etc., R. Co. v. Covington, 235 U. S. 537. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 103. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 518. License Cases, 5 How. 599, and adopted by the court in In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, as to the distinction between the incidental regulation of commerce admissible under the reserved police power of the States and the power of commercial regulation delegated to Congress. Effect of action by Congress.-Generally it may be said in rcspect to laws of this character that, though resting upon the police power of the State, they must yield whenever Congress, in the exercise of the powers granted to it, legislates upon the precise subject matter, for that power, like all other reserved Sec. 8.--Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate powers of the States, is subordinate to those in terms conferred by the Constitution upon the Nation. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 104. Even when an act of Congress does not go into effect until a certain time following its passage, State legislation is immediately superseded upon the enactment of the Federal statute. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 370. An unconstitutional act of Congress does not so manifest a purpose to take control of the subject matter of the statute as to supersede State legislation on the same subject; a void statute is not law for any purpose. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559. See also U. S. v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41, in which the act of Congress of March 2, 1867, making it a misdemeanor to sell oil for illuminating purposes inflammable at a temperature of less than 110° F., was held unconstitutional as being merely a police regulation of trade within the State. Effect of delegation of power to Interstate Commerce Commission.— The fact that Congress has intrusted power to that commission does not, in the absence of action by it, change the rule which existed prior to the creation of the commission. Congress could always regulate interstate commerce, and could make specific provisions in reference thereto, and yet this has not been held to interfere with the power of the State in these incidental matters. A mere delegation by Congress to the commission of a like power has no greater effect, and does not of itself disturb the authority of the State. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Larabce, 211 U. S. 612. Effect of nonaction by Congress.-Where the power of Congress to regulate is exclusive, the failure of Congress to make express regulations indicates its will that the subject shall be left free from any restrictions or impositions; and any regulation of the subject by the States, except in matters of local concern only, is repugnant to such freedom. Robbins v. Shelby County, 120 U. S. 493. See also Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424. Western Union v. James, 162 U. S. 655. U. S. v. Knight, 156 U. S. 11. Pittsburgh, etc., Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 588. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 555. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 110. Philadelphia, etc., S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 336. Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 455. Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 687. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 282. Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 302. Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125 U. S. 482. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 473. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 385. Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 699. Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate Ouachita, etc., Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 444. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610. A regulation of interstate commerce which would be valid if rested upon the common law of the State is no less valid because made by a State statute. Western Union v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U. S. 406. Any act of a State interfering in any way with the free traffic between citizens of different States in any article of commerce is an attempted regulation of such commerce and an invasion of the power exclusively conferred upon Congress, whose nonaction with respect to any particular commodity is a declaration of its purpose that the commerce therein shall be free. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313. Internal commerce.-A State has power to regulate its internal commerce unless what is done amounts to a regulation of interstate and foreign commerce. Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U S. 307. Peik v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 94 U. S. 164. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283. Covington, etc., Brdg. Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 209. Western Union v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Knight, 192 U. S. 27. The exemption of interstate and foreign commerce from State regulation does not prevent a State from taxing the property of those engaged in such commerce located within the State as the property of other citizens is taxed, nor from regulating matters of local concern which may incidentally affect commerce, such as wharfage, pilotage, and the like. Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 649. The effect on interstate commerce of requiring under State authority that an interstate carrier move local freight between private spurs in the same city is so indirect that it can not be deemed to deprive the carrier of rights secured by the commerce clause. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Higdon, 234 U. S. 592. Any State statute which, in its direct result, regulates the interstate transportation of a single individual carrier violates the commerce clause. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Eubank, 184 U. S. 27. U. S. v. Delaware & H. Co., 213 U. S. 366. Hampton v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 227 U. S. 456. Quarantine and health laws.-In giving the commercial power to Congress the States did not part with that power of selfpreservation which must be inherent in every organized community. They may guard against the introduction of anything Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate which may corrupt the morals or endanger the health or lives of their citizens. Quarantine or health laws have been passed by the States, and regulations of police made, for their protection and welfare. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 400. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U. S. 21. Compagnie Francaise, etc., v. Louisiana, 186 U. S. 385. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 151. Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 471. Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 220. Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. 198. Smith v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 181 U. S. 248. Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. 581. The States may provide by law suitable measures to prevent the introduction into the States of articles of trade which, on account of their existing condition, will bring in and spread disease, for such articles are not merchantable, and are not legitimate subjects of trade and commerce. Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125 U. S. 465. In Cook v. Marshall County (196 U. S. 272) it was said that the commerce clause was adopted that all the States might have the benefit of the duties collected at the maritime ports, and to relieve them from the embarrassing restrictions imposed on the internal commerce of the country, but the same policy which authorizes the use of this power as a shield to protect commerce from the vexatious interference of the States forbids its employment as a sword to assail measures designed to promote the public health, morals, and comfort. State and Municipal Legislation Affecting Commerce. Adoption of construction given by State courts.-A construction or meaning attributed to the terms of a State statute by the courts of such State will, of course, be adopted by this court when called upon to decide questions arising under such legislation. New York, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 158 U. S. 431. Gatewood v. North Carolina, 203 U. S. 531. Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 U. S. 226. Machinery Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485. Peik v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 94 U. S. 178. Olsen v. Smith, 195 U. S. 341. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 42. Constraints of commerce.-No State can endow any of its corporations or any combination of its citizens with authority to Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate restrain interstate or international commerce or to disobey the national will as manifested in legal enactments of Congress. Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 350. Evansville Brew. Assn. v. Excise Commission, 225 Fed. 204. Discrimination against foreign products.-Any local regulation which, in terms or by its necessary operation, denies to owners of articles of commerce in other States the right to compete in the markets of the State upon terms of equality with the owners of like articles within the State, "is, when applied to the people and products or industries of other States, a direct burden upon commerce among the States and therefore void." Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 82. Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 351. The specification of a particular asphalt for a municipal improvement, the asphalt being the product of a foreign country and there being other deposits in other States within the United States from which suitable asphalt could be had, is not an interference with, and a regulation of, interstate commerce, in violation of the exclusive right of Congress. Field v. Barber, etc., Co., 194 U. S. 622. Inspection laws.-This provision does not prohibit a State from establishing inspection, quarantine, health, and other regulations to govern the ports of the State. Foster v. New Orleans, 94 U. S. 246. Red "C" Oil Co. v. North Carolina, 222 U. S. 380. Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 191 U. S. 414. Pittsburg, etc., Co. v. Louisiana, 156 U. S. 597. Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501. Vance v. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 455. Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 55. Standard, etc., Co. v. Wright, 225 U. S. 540. Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148. Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, 198 U. S. 17. Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio, 236 U. S. 230. It is competent for a State to enact a statute providing for the inspection of fertilizing materials in order to prevent the practice of imposition on the people of the State, and to provide for the charge of a certain price per ton merely to defray the cost of such inspection. Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U. S. 345. Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U. S. 158. Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U. S. 389. See also Art. I, sec. 10, cl. 2, p. 364. |