Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate A compact between States to keep open the navigation of a river, when sanctioned by Congress, becomes a law of the Union. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, etc., Bridge Company, 13 How. 518. The act of Congress admitting California as a State of the Union, which declares "that all the navigable waters within the said State shall be common highways and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of the said State as to the citizens of the United States, without any tax, impost, or duty therefor," did not deprive the State of any powers over navigable waters within her limits which the original States possessed over such waters. Cardwell v. Bridge Company, 113 U. S. 210. Scott v. Lattig, 227 U. S. 229. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 435. Lands under or bordering navigable waters.-Subject to the paramount right of navigation, the regulation of which, in respect to foreign and domestic commerce, has been granted to the United States, each State owns the beds of all tidewaters. within its jurisdiction, unless they have been granted away; and in like manner, the tide waters themselves and the fish in them, so far as they are capable of ownership while running, and for this purpose represents the people, and the ownership is that of the people in their united sovereignty. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391. The common-law doctrine as to the dominion, sovereignty, and ownership of lands under tidewaters on the borders of the sea applies equally to the lands beneath the navigable waters of the Great Lakes; and in this country such dominion, sovereignty, and ownership belong to the States, respectively, within whose borders such lands are situated, subject always to the right of Congress to control the navigation so far as may be necessary for the regulation of interstate and foreign commerce. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387. The title and rights of riparian or littoral proprietors in the soil below high-water mark are governed by the laws of the several States, subject to the rights granted to the United States by the Constitution, and new States have the same rights as the original ones. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1. See also Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84. Morris v. U. S., 174 U. S. 196. U. S. v. Rio Grande, etc., Co. 174 U. S. 690. Scott v. Lattig, 227 U. S. 229. Donnelly v. U. S., 228 U. S. 243. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate Power to make improvements and to exact tolls.-Acts which do not necessarily interfere with the operation of legislation by Congress for the improvement of a navigable stream will not be interfered with by the courts. The improvement of harbors, bays, and navigable rivers within the States falls within the class of cases of a local nature or operation in which the States may adopt regulations in the absence of congressional action. Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 699. Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co., 123 U. S. 295. A State has the right, in the absence of congressional regulation, to establish, manage, and carry on works and improvements of a local character, though necessarily more or less affecting interstate and foreign commerce. Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 447. See also Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 571. The Fox and Wisconsin River Case, Green Bay, etc., Canal Co. v. Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 548. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 214. Lindsay, etc., Co. v. Mullen, 176 U. S. 148. Nothing in congressional legislation creating the Mississippi River Commission justifies the conclusion that Congress assumed the control of the entire work of protection from overflow by levees, to the displacement of local authorities. Jackson v. U. S., 230 U. S. 1. Grant of exclusive navigation.-Statutes granting to certain persons the exclusive navigation of all the waters within the jurisdiction of the State with boats moved by fire or steam for a term of years are repugnant to the commerce clause so far as those statutes prohibit vessels licensed according to acts of Congress for carrying on the coasting trade from navigating the said waters by means of fire or steam. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. A statute of Maine granting the exclusive navigation of the upper part of the river Penobscot (said river being wholly within the State and not navigable for the last 8 miles of its course) for a certain time, on condition that the grantees would improve the navigation of the said upper part, is not unconstitutional. Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568. Power to obstruct navigable waters.-Waters navigable in themselves in a State and connecting with other navigable waters so as to form a waterway to other States or foreign nations can not be obstructed or impeded so as to impair, defeat, or place any burden upon a right to their navigation granted by Congress. Harman v. Chicago, 147 U. S. 411. owers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate Congress has not legislated on the subject of obstructions avigation, the States may act. Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 459. Egan v. Hart, 165 U. S. 188. wer to prohibit obstructions.-Congress has power to pass s for the regulation of the navigation of public rivers and revent any and all obstructions therein, but until it does some such law there is no common law of the United States ch prohibits obstructions and nuisances in navigable rivers ss it be by the maritime law, administered by the courts of iralty and maritime jurisdiction; and in the absence of the cise of such power by Congress the States may adopt regula S. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 8. iability for marine torts.-Until Congress makes some reguon touching the liability of parties for marine torts resultin the death of the persons injured, a State statute providing at when the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or ssion of another, the personal representatives of the former maintain an action therefor against the latter, if the former ht have maintained an action, had he lived, against the latter an injury for the same act or omission," applies, and, as thus lied, it constitutes no encroachment upon the commercial er of Congress. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 104. The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398. ules of navigation as to displaying lights.-In Steamboat ew York "v. Rea (18 How. 225), the court said that a statute airing a light to be suspended in the rigging at least 20 feet ve deck as a rule of navigation Dubtless binding upon the State courts, but can not regulate the decis of the Federal courts administering the general admiralty law. y can be governed only by the principles peculiar to that system, as erally recognized in maritime countries, modified by acts of Congress pendently of local legislation. arbor regulations.-Statute enacting that the master and den of a port within the State should be entitled to demand receive, in addition to other fees, the sum of $5 whether ed on to perform any service or not, for every vessel arrivin that port is void as a prohibition on commerce. Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 6 Wall. 31. Gloucester Ferry Co., v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 214. - State may, by its legislature, or through a board of harbor missioners, establish, for the protection and benefit of comce and navigation, harbor lines in navigable waters not Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate inconsistent with any legislation of Congress limiting the building of wharves and other structures. Prosser v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 152 U. S. 64. Gring v. Ives, 222 U. S. 365. Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605. Surveys and repairs of vessels.-Statute making it the duty of the masters and wardens of a port within a State to offer their services to make a survey of the hatches of all seagoing vessels which should arrive at that port is void as a regulation of com merce. Foster v. New Orleans, 94 U. S. 246. Fisheries. The commerce clause does not prohibit a State from regulating fisheries in the navigable waters within its territory where such regulation makes no discrimination in favor of its own citizens and against those of other States, and where there is no Federal statute or treaty on the subject. Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240. Ferries. The power of the State to regulate matters of internal police includes the establishment of ferries as well as the construction of roads and bridges. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 215. The right to establish and regulate ferries is part of that mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a State not surrendered to the General Government. Conway v. Taylor, 1 Black 634. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365. Sault Ste. Marie v. International Transit Co., 234 U. S. 333. Conceding, arguendo, that the police power of a State extends to the establishment, regulation, and licensing of ferries on a navigable stream being the boundary between two States, none of the cases justifies the proposition that such power embraces transportation by water across such a river which does not constitute a ferry in a strict technical sense. St. Clair County v. Interstate Transfer Co., 192 U. S. 466. In the case of a ferry between two States, not operated in connection with railroads and not part of continuous transportation, each State has the power to regulate the ferriage charges from its own shore. Port Richmond Ferry v. Hudson County, 234 U. S. 317. When Congress legislates with respect to interstate ferries, State legislation is superseded and the inclusion of interstate railroad ferries in the act to regulate commerce prevents the operation of an ordinance regulating fares on such ferries even as applicable to persons other than railroad passengers. New York Cent. R. Co. v. Hudson County, 227 U. S. 248. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate Wharves, piers, and docks.-A State has authority to construct piers, etc., on navigable rivers within the State in the absence of controlling legislation by Congress. Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 464. Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691. Cushing v. The John Fraser, 21 How. 184. Ordinance regulating the use of wharves in a town and forbidding the landing of vessels, except by permission of a wharfmaster at any point within the town other than between certain designated streets, if it be a regulation of commerce is one which belongs to that class of rules which like pilotage can be most wisely exercised by local authority and is valid until Congress assumes to establish regulations. Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S. 559. In the absence of congressional legislation, wharfage is governed by the local State law. By the State law it is generally required to be reasonable, and by that law its reasonableness must be judged. The appropriation of the wharfage receipts to the objects of keeping wharves in repair, of gradually expending them as additions may be needed, and of maintaining a police for their protection and lights for their better enjoyment, is entirely germane to the purposes of wharfage facilities. Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 448. Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 427. A municipal corporation having by the law of its organization an exclusive right to construct wharves, collect wharfage, and regulate wharfage rates, can not consistently with the Constitution charge and collect wharfage proportionate to the tonnage of the vessel from the owners of enrolled and licensed steamboats mooring and landing at the wharves constructed on the banks of a navigable river. Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80. Bridges. Authority to erect.-Bridges over navigable streams which are entirely within the limits of a State are of the class of subjects on which the power of the State may be exercised as local in their nature and operation. The local authority can better appreciate their necessity, and can better direct the manner in which they shall be used and regulated than a government at a distance. Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 687. Cardwell v. Bridge Company, 113 U. S. 205. Power to order removal.-Ordering the raising of railroad bridges to specified heights and the removal of other bridges over navigable waters and across which interstate commerce passes is a direct interference with such commerce. Kansas City Sou. R. Co. v. Kaw Valley, 233 U. S. 75. |