Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate Regulation of tolls.-A State has not the power to regulate tolls upon a bridge connecting it with another State. Covington, etc., Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204. See also Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 13 How. 565; 18 How. 421. Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566. Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Interstate Transp. Co., 155 U. S. 585. Monongahela Bridge Co. v. U. S., 216 U S. 177. Union Bridge Co. v. U. S., 204 U. S. 364. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1. Atlee v. Packet Co., 21 Wall. 395. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 365. New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Mississippi, 112 U. S. 12. International bridge.-International character does not of itself divest State of power over its part of structure in silence of Congress. International Bridge Co. v. New York, 254 U. S. 126. Pilots and pilotage. The regulation of pilots and pilotage is not a subject which is national in its nature, admitting only of one uniform system or plan of regulation, and the States may act in the absence of congressional legislation. Cooley v. Philadelphia, 12 How. 319. Anderson v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., 225 U. S. 187. Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U. S. 572. Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 242. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. Olsen v. Smith, 195 U. S. 341. Steamship Company v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 459. Steamship Company v. Portwardens, 6 Wall. 34. Thompson v. Darden, 198 U. S. 315. Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U. S. 93. Dams and booms.-Statute authorizing the erection of dams and booms held valid. Pound v. Turck, 95 U. S. 460. Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 250. Lindsay, etc., Co. v. Mullen, 176 U. S. 145. As to controlling authority of acts of Congress prohibiting obstructions to navigable streams, see North Shore Boom Co. v. Nicomen Boom Co., 212 U. S. ‘66. Canals.-A license taken out under an act of Congress to prosecute the coasting trade conveys no privilege to use, free of tolls or of any conditions whatsoever, the canals constructed by a State and made practicable for navigation by the funds of the State. Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 567. Riparian water rights.-Statute declaring that "it shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to transport or carry, through pipes, conduits, ditches, or canals, the waters of any Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate fresh-water lake, pond, brook, creek, river, or stream of this State into any other State for use therein " does not impair any right of such owner to use such waters in interstate commerce as to one who has entered into a contract to carry such water into another State, as a person can not acquire a right to property by his desire to use it in interstate commerce. Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349. Warehouses and elevators.-A general State statute regulating the business and charges of public warehousemen engaged in elevating and storing grain for profit does not amount to a regulation of commerce. Brass v. Stoeser, 153 U. S. 405. See also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 135. Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517. Merchants' Exch, v. Missouri, 248 U. S. 365. Stockyards. State laws attempting to regulate the interstate and local business of stockyards companies, sustained in Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (82 Fed. 844, 79 Fed. 679), held invalid on the ground that the statutes denied to the company the equal protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U. S. 110 Banks and banking.-Statute which forbids individuals or partnerships engaged in the banking business without a license from the comptroller, is not, as to one whose business chiefly consists in receiving deposits in small sums from time to time until they reach an amount sufficient to be sent to other States and mainly to foreign countries, invalid as a regulation of interstate and foreign commerce. Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U. S. 128. As to State law escheating unclaimed deposits as applied to a national bank, see First Natl. Bank v. California, 262 U. S. 366. Automobiles.-Statute prescribing a comprehensive scheme for licensing and regulating motor vehicles is not, as to vehicles coming into the State, invalid as a regulation of interstate com merce. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610. Ka v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160. Manufacture, sale, and delivery of goods.-The legislature of a State has the power in many cases to determine as a matter of State policy whether to permit the manufacture and sale of articles within the State or entirely to forbid such manufacture and sale, so long as the legislation is confined to the manufacture and sale within the State. Those are questions of public policy which belong to the legislative department to determine, but the legislative policy does not extend so far as to embrace the right 12703°-S. Doc. 157, 68-1-15 Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate to prohibit absolutely the introduction within the State of an article not injurious, properly and honestly manufactured. Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 15. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 674. Williams v. Walsh, 222 U. S. 415. Statute making it a criminal offense to keep any office, store, or other place wherein is permitted the buying and selling of commodities for future delivery, on margin or otherwise, is not invalid as a regulation of interstate commerce. Brodnax v. Missouri, 219 U. S. 285. Congress did not, by the passage of the food and drugs act, prohibit the enactment of State laws relating to sales of foodstuffs in original packages. Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501. Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U. S. 540. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115. Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461. A State can not discriminate against a foreign citizen by reason of his being engaged in selling the products of other States. Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434. Pittsburg, etc., Coal Co. v. Louisiana, 156 U. S. 590. May & Co. v. New Orleans, 178 U. S. 496. Where foreign corporation manufacturing signaling devices contracted to equip railroad in another State, and for that purpose engaged labor and proceeded to install signal apparatus along the line, such corporation was doing intrastate business. General Railway Signal Co. v. Virginia, 246 U. S. 500. Intoxicating liquors.-This subject, of course, is now governed by the eighteenth amendment and legislation thereunder, but the following cases are cited to show what the laws and regulations were prior to the incorporation of the amendment into the Constitution.1 Vance v. Vandercook, 170 U. S. 438. Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 201. Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446. Bowman v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 125 U. S. 465. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100. Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 563. Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58. American Exp. Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 133. Adams Exp. Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 147. Foppiano v. Speed, 199 U. S. 501. Delamater v. South Dakota, 205 U. S. 93. Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 206 U. S. 129. See same subject, pp. 605, 685, 734, and 747. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate Purity Extract Co. r. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192. Heyman v. Hays, 236 U. S. 178. Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U. S. 190. Cigarettes. Statute making it a misdemeanor for any person, firm, or corporation to bring cigarettes into the State, for the purpose of selling same, is not an infringement upon the exclusive power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, when it operates only on sales not by the owner in the original packages. Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343. See also Sawrie v. Tennessee (82 Fed. 615), in which the Tennessee law was declared invalid; and Iowa v. McGregor (76 Fed. 956), in which the Iowa law was declared invalid. Food and drugs.—Regulating net weight of retail packages.— Statute providing that lard compound or lard substitute, unless sold in bulk, shall be put up in pails or other containers holding 1, 3, or 5 pounds net weight, or some multiple of these numbers, does not violate the commerce clause as to sales by retail. Nor is the statute repugnant to the pure food and drugs act of Congress. Armour v. North Dakota, 240 U. S. 510. Requiring State brand only.-Statute relating to the sale of certain commodities which provides that they shall bear the label required by the State law and none other is in conflict with the act of Congress of June 30, 1906, under which such articles which have moved in interstate commerce shall be and remain branded under the Federal regulations until they reach the consumers. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115. Misbranding of food products.-Statute making unlawful shipment of food products misbranded by reason of misleading label, or sale under name of another article, held a legitimate exercise of the power to regulate commerce. Weeks v. U. S., 245 U. S. 618. Oleomargarine.-State law condemned: Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 15. Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 245. Coffee. Statute prohibiting the manufacture or sale of any adulterated food or drug, or the coloring or coating of food whereby it is made to appear better than it really is, is not repugnant to the commerce clause, but is an exertion by the State of its reserved police power to legislate for the protection of the health and safety of the community and to provide against deception and fraud. Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U. S. 196. Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 113 Fed. 616; 191 U. S. 405. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate Citrus fruits.-Statute which makes it unlawful for any one to sell, offer for sale, ship, or deliver for shipment any citrus fruits which are immature or otherwise unfit for consumption is valid. Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52. Meat.-Virginia law regulating the sale of meat held unconstitutional as a regulation in restraint of interstate commerce. Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78. See also Seven Cases v. U. S. (239 U. S. 510), where it was held that Congress had power to amend the food and drugs act so as to declare misbranded drugs which bear labels containing false statements as to curative powers. Game laws.-A State has power to make it an offense to have in possession, for the purpose of transportation beyond the State, birds which have been lawfully killed within the State during the open season. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519. Statute making it unlawful to have possession of imported game during the closed season, except upon giving bond against its sale, is a proper exercise of the police power. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U. S. 31. By right of ownership and in the exercise of police power, a State may regulate the taking of wild animals within its borders, their subsequent use, and the property rights that may be acquired in them. Lacoste v. Dept. of Conservation, 263 U. S. 545. Fish laws.-Statute for the protection of fisheries in water within the territorial jurisdiction of the State is valid. Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240. Statute to promote the growth of oysters in the waters of the State held valid. Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71. Excluding certain classes of persons from State.-Statute inhibiting a certain class of persons from entering the State would be invalid under the commerce clause. See Arkansas v. Kansas, etc., Coal Co. (96 Fed. 353), holding that no statute of the State inhibited persons described as "armed men of the low and lawless type of humanity" coming into the State. "It will be time enough to decide whether the State has the power to prohibit them coming when a proper case, based on such a statute, is brought to the attention of the court. It is enough now to say that under the fourteenth amendment and under the commerce clause of the Constitution they now have that right." Reversed and remanded to the State court in 183 U. S. 185. The police power of a State justifies the adoption of the precautionary measures against social evils. Under it a State |