Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate Including property not used in the business of the company.— The principle of organic unity may not be made the means of unlawfully taxing the privilege of property outside the State, under the name of enhanced value or good will, and a tax purporting to be based on an assessment under the unit rule, which includes property outside the State not necessarily used in the actual business of the company, is invalid. Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490. License and privilege taxes-(a) In general.-No State can compel a party, individual, or corporation to pay for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160. No State can interfere with interstate commerce through the imposition of a tax, by whatever name called, which is in effect a tax for the privilege of transacting such commerce; but this restriction does not in the least abridge the right of a State to tax at their full value all the instrumentalities used for such commerce. Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio, 166 U. S. 185. The fact that grain stored in an elevator is to be shipped out of the State does not make a State statute requiring a license for conducting the business of such elevator in the State amount to a regulation of interstate commerce. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 452. Statute providing that no person shall engage in certain occupations without obtaining license from the United States is not unconstitutional. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462. Where the business or occupation consists in the sale of goods, the license tax required for its pursuit is in effect a tax upon the goods themselves. If such a tax be within the power of the State to levy, it matters not whether it be raised directly from the goods, or indirectly from them, through the license to the dealer; but if such tax conflict with any power vested in Congress by the Constitution of the United States, it will not be any the less invalid because enforced through the form of a personal license. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 278. A city can not make a charge as the price of the privilege of navigating a river in accordance with the terms of the party's license from the United States, as it violates the commerce clause. Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69. (b) Express companies.-Statute imposing license tax on express companies doing business within the State held valid. Osborne v. Florida, 164 U. S. 654. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate Municipal ordinance requiring a license tax to be paid by an express company as a condition to its right to do business in the city is invalid as applied to a company doing an interstate business. Adams Exp. Co. v. New York, 232 U. S. 14. State tax purporting on its face to be for carrying on the express business within the State, the length of the line used being the measure of the tax and thereby casting the burden of the tax upon interstate business, is void. U. S. Exp. Co. v. Allen, 39 Fed. 712, reversed in Shelton v. Platt, 139 (c) Osborne v. Mobile (16 Wall. 479) overruled.-In Leloup v. Mobile (127 U. S. 647) the court said: The State court relies upon the case of Osborne v. Mobile (16 Wall. 479), which brought up for consideration an ordinance of the city requiring every express company or railroad company doing business in that city, and having a business extending beyond the limits of the State, to pay an annual license of $500; if the business was confined within the limits of the State the license fee was only $100; if confined within the city it was $50; subject in each case to a penalty for neglect or refusal to pay the charge. This court held that the ordinance was not unconstitutional. This was in December term, 1872. In view of the course of decisions which have been made since that time, it is very certain that such an ordinance would now be regarded as repugnant to the power conferred upon Congress to regulate commerce among the several States. Statute requiring the agent of a foreign express company doing business in the State to pay a license fee, and to deposit with the auditor a statement of the company's assets and liabilities, is unconstitutional as applied to interstate commerce. Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47. Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 171. Ewing v. Leavenworth, 226 U. S. 464. (d) Railroad companies.-State tax on cab service maintained by railroad company held valid. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Knight, 192 U. S. 21. Stipulation in a railroad company's charter that it shall pay a bonus to the State from time to time is not invalid as a tax on the transportation of passengers or as infringing the powers of Congress. Railroad Company v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 469. Statute prescribing a different rule of taxation for railroad. companies from that for individuals does not violate the Constitution. State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575. State board of equalization included in their assessment all the franchises of a railroad company, among which were franchises Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate conferred by the United States, of constructing a railroad across the State and other States, and of taking toll thereon. Held unconstitutional. California v. Central Pac. R. Co., 127 U. S. 1. See also McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104. Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114. State law applicable to interstate and intrastate commerce, which imposes fees in excess of cost of inspection, imposes tax and is void, if not so far separable that excess may be assigned to intrastate commerce alone. Phipps v. Cleveland Refg. Co., 261 U. S. 449. (e) Sleeping-car companies.-State statute imposing a privilege on the running of sleeping cars over railroads which in terms applies strictly to business done in the transportation of passengers taken up at one point in the State and transported wholly within the State to another point therein is not an interference with interstate commerce. Allen v. Pullman Co., 191 U. S. 181. See also Pullman Co. v. Adams, 189 U. S. 420. Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U. S. 330. (f) Telegraph and telephone companies.-A State or municipal corporation may impose a license tax on a telegraph company on account of business done wholly within the State. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 694. See also Williams v. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404. Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 645. Western Union v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1. Ludwig v. Western Union, 216 U. S. 146. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 696. Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 466. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Fremont, 255 U. S. 124. An ordinance compelling a telegraph company to pay a tax for every pole within the city for the privilege of using the streets, alleys, etc., is a charge in the nature of a rental, and is not a privilege or license tax, which would be invalid as applied to a corporation doing interstate business. St. Louis v. Western Union, 148 U. S. 92. (g) Steamship companies.-Municipal ordinance exacting a license fee for the privilege of navigating a stream within the 12703°-S. Doc. 157, 68-1-16 Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate State by tugs enrolled and licensed in the coasting trade is invalid when the license fee is a tax for the use of navigable waters and not a charge by way of compensation for any specific improvement. Harman v. Chicago, 147 U. S. 404. Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 70. Tax imposed upon transportation companies for the privilege of carrying on the business in a corporate capacity within the State, on transportation purely intrastate, is valid as applied to a steamboat company plying navigable waters between points in the same State. Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Sohmer, 235 U. S. 549, distinguishing the case of Harman v. Chicago, supra. (h) Ferries.-License fee imposed upon the keepers of ferries living within the State is not a regulation of commerce. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 373. The fact that a company engaged in carrying passengers and freight between two States could not lease its wharf in one State, except by the implied consent of the legislature of that State, does not give to that State a right to tax the receiving and landing of passengers and freight at its wharf in that State. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 205. (i) Agents.-Municipal license tax on railroad and steamboat agents. McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 109. A State license tax can not be laid upon the business of a corporation employed as agent by owners of vessels engaged exclusively in interstate and foreign commerce where its business is confined to, and is a necessary adjunct of, their commerce. McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104, followed. Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District, 145 U. S. 1, distinguished. Texas Transport Co. v. New Orleans, 264 U. S. 150. Privilege tax for keeping an office.-Invalid when imposed by State on interstate carrier. Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 118. (j) Tax on passengers and immigrants.-Statute providing that "there shall be levied and collected a duty of one dollar for each and every alien passenger who shall come by vessel from a foreign port to the port of New York for whom a tax has not heretofore been paid," is a regulation of commerce with foreign nations, confided by the Constitution to the exclusive control of Congress, notwithstanding that the caption of the act calls it an inspection law. People v. Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique, 107 U. S. 60. State capitation tax upon every person leaving the State, or passing through it, by any railroad, stage coach, or other vehicle Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce-Intrastate engaged or employed in the business of transporting passengers for hire, is not void as a regulation of commerce, inasmuch as the tax does not itself institute any regulation of commerce of a national character or which has a uniform operation over the whole country, but, as the operation of such a statute would embarrass the operations of the National Government, it is void. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 40. State statutes imposing taxes on alien passengers are void. See also Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580. Lees v. U. S., 150 U. S. 476. (k) Taxation of bridges and bridge companies.-The taxation by a State of a bridge over a navigable stream is in no proper sense inconsistent with the power of Congress to regulate the use of the river as one of the navigable waters of the United States. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 141 U. S. 679; 173 U. S. 622. Keokuk, etc., Bridge Co. v. Illinois, 175 U. S. 632. (1) Tax on owners of grain elevators.-Statute requiring a license fee from the owners of grain elevators and warehouses situated on the right of way of a railroad is not inconsistent with the commerce clause. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 470. (m) Tax on oil and gas in pipe lines held void as to part passing out of the State of production. Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U. S. 265. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U. S. 277. Taxation of corporate franchises-(a) In general.-There is nothing in the nature of things or in the limitations of the Constitution which restrains a State from taxing at its real value intangible property. Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio, 166 U. S. 185. The Federal circuit courts have no jurisdiction of an original action in mandamus to compel the return of a franchise tax collected under the authority of a State statute, although the basis of the relief sought is the alleged repugnancy of the tax to the commerce clause. Covington, etc., Bridge Co. v. Hager, 203 U. S. 109. Statute imposing franchise tax on foreign corporations, measured by capital stock, held invalid as applied to nonresident corporation engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce. Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U. S. 178. International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135. |