Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 4.-Naturalization Naturalization under the laws can only be completed before a court and the usual proof of naturalization is a copy of the record of the court. But where no record of naturalization can be produced evidence that a person having the requisite qualifications to become a citizen did in fact and for a long time vote and hold office and exercise rights belonging to citizens is sufficient to warrant a jury in inferring that he had been duly naturalized as a citizen. Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135. The oath prescribed by the naturalization act when taken confers citizenship and an order of court admitting the applicant is necessary. Campbell v. Gordon, 6 Cranch 182. Stark v. Chesapeake Ins. Co., 7 Cranch 420. Spratt v. Spratt, 4 Pet. 393. Right of Expatriation The Constitution is silent on this subject, and that department which can nationalize must be held to have authority to expatriate. Comitis v. Parkerson, 56 Fed. 558. See also Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242. Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99. The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283. The Venus, 8 Cranch, 253. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64. Talbot v. Janson, 3 Dall. 133. The act of March 2, 1907, in providing that when any naturalized citizen shall have resided for two years in the foreign State from which he came it shall be presumed that he has ceased to be an American citizen, does not apply to a retired officer of the Navy who resided abroad with the permission of the Navy Department. U. S. v. Gay, 264 U. S. 353. Congress has authority to vest in the courts of the States having common-law jurisdiction the judicial power to admit qualified aliens to citizenship, and in the absence of legislative authority or permission from the States which created them, such courts may lawfully exercise this power. Levin v. U. S., 128 Fed. 826. A State can only confer citizenship upon a person within its own limits and not for the entire Nation. Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 4.-Bankruptcies Notwithstanding the rights of citizenship under the State and Federal Governments differ, a citizen of the United States is a citizen of the State where he resides. U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 549. Gassies v. Ballon, 6 Pet. 761. Bankruptcies Leading Cases Sturges v. Crowninshield (4 Wheat. 122), holding that since the adoption of the Constitution of the United States a State has authority to pass a bankrupt law, provided such law do not impair the obligation of contracts within the meaning of Article I, section 10, of the Constitution; and provided there be no act of Congress in force to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy, conflicting with such law. The New York statute of April 3, 1811, which not only liberates the person of the debtor, but discharges him from all liability for any debt contracted previous to his discharge, on his surrendering his property in the manner it prescribes, is, so far as it attempts to discharge the contract, a law impairing the obligation of contracts, within the meaning of the Constitution, and is not a good plea in bar of an action brought upon such contract; and that the obligation of a contract is not satisfied by a cessio bonorum; it extends to future acquisitions; but the imprisonment of the debtor is no part of the contract, and he may be released without impairing the obligation. It was held in Ogden v. Saunders (12 Wheat. 213) that a State insolvent law, which discharges both the person of the debtor and his future acquisitions, is not unconstitutional so far as respects debts contracted with citizens of the same State. To the same effect is the holding in Baldwin v. Hale (1 Wall. 223). But a discharge under such law does not bar the rights of citizens of other States, unless they come in and make themselves parties by receiving a dividend. Clay v. Smith, 3 Pet. 411. See also Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 635. Cook v. Moffatt, 5 How. 295. Baldwin v. Bank of Newbury, 1 Wall. 234. A State bankrupt or insolvent law, so far as it attempts to discharge the contract, is repugnant to the Constitution, and it makes no difference in the application of this principle whether the law was passed before or after the debt was contracted. A discharge under á foreign bankrupt law is no bar to an action, in the courts of this country, on a contract made here. McMillan v. McNeill, 4 Wheat. 209. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 4.-Bankruptcies Prior to 1841 there was no act of Congress permitting voluntary bankruptcy in the United States, but in that year Congress passed an act under which debtors could voluntarily take the benefit of the bankrupt law, and such has been the law since. The purpose of the passage of such laws was to secure equality of distribution of the property of the bankrupt. Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U. S. 438. See also Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 196. Toof v. Martin, 13 Wall, 40. Wager v. Hall, 16 Wall. 599. Dutcher v. Wright, 94 U. S. 557. U. S. v. Hooe, 3 Cranch 91. Wilson v. City Bank, 17 Wall. 487. National Bank v. Colby, 21 Wall. 613. Grant of Power The power conferred on Congress does not carry with it the restrictions of the English bankruptcy system, but it is general and unlimited. It gives to Congress the unrestrained authority over the entire subject. It embraces voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy, and Congress may be authorized to distribute generally all the property of the debtor among his creditors, and to annul the debt. Matter of Klein, 1 How. 277. Act of Congress establishing a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States is constitutional, although providing that others than traders be adjudged bankrupts. Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 187. U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358. Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U. S. 438. Congress may embrace within its legislation whatever may be deemed important to a complete and effective bankrupt system. The object of such a system is to secure a ratable distribution of the bankrupt's estate among his creditors, when he is unable to discharge his obligations in full, and at the same time to relieve the honest debtor from legal proceedings for his debts upon a surrender of his property. The distribution of the property is the principal object to be attained. The discharge of the debtor is merely incidental, and is granted only where his conduct has been free from fraud in the creation of his indebtedness or the disposition of his property. U. S. v. Fox, 95 U. S. 672, in which it was held that the act of Congress (Rev. Stat. sec. 5132) making criminal the obtaining of goods under false pretenses by a person against whom within three months thereafter bankruptcy proceedings should be commenced related to a matter which concerned only the State in which the act was committed. See also Forsyth v. Vehmeyer, 177 U. S. 182. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 4.-Bankruptcies See Page v. Edmunds (187 U. S. 596) for definition of "property.' The recognition of the local law, in a bankruptcy act, in the matter of exceptions, dower, priority of payments, and the like is not an attempt by Congress to unlawfully delegate its legislative power. Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 190. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 605. Uniform Laws The emphasis is on the words "uniform" and "throughout," and their correlation leaves no doubt that the uniformity required is geographical and not personal, in the sense of being alike applicable to all members of the community. Leidigh Carriage Co. v. Stengel, 95 Fed. 637. When a bankrupt law is made by its terms applicable alike to all the States of the Union without distinction or discrimination, it can not be successfully questioned on the ground that. it is not uniform, in the sense of the Constitution, merely because its operation or working may be wholly different in one State from another. Darling v. Berry, 13 Fed. 656. The provision in the bankruptcy act that the statute shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of their exemptions which are prescribed by the State laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition is not in derogation of the limitation of uniformity. The system is, in the constitutional sense, uniform throughout the United States when the trustee takes in each State whatever would have been available to the creditors if the bankrupt law had not been passed. The general operation of the law is uniform, although it may result in certain particulars differently in different States. Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 190. Notwithstanding the constitutional provision, recognition and enforcement by bankruptcy act of State laws affecting dower, exemptions, etc., held not to affect its constitutionality. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 605. Exclusive Powers of Congress Congress having established "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies," the jurisdiction becomes exclusive throughout the United States, and State laws in conflict therewith are suspended. Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass, etc., Co., 91 U. S. 661. Matter of Klein, 1 How. 277. Boese v. King, 108 U. S. 379. Mayer v. Hellman, 91 U. S. 496. Globe Bank, etc., Co. v. Martin, 236 U. S. 288. Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 4.-Bankruptcies An arrangement between a railway company in Canada, unable to meet its obligations, and the majority of its creditors, confirmed by an act of the Dominion Parliament, was held to be binding upon nonconsenting mortgage bondholders, citizens of the United States. Canada Sou. R. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 539. Books and papers in possession of receiver in bankruptcy appointed by Federal court can not be taken by subpoena issuing from State court unless Federal court, exercising its discretion with due regard for comity, consents. Dier v. Banton, 262 U. S. 147. Section 67f of the bankruptcy act does not invalidate a lien obtained by levy of an execution within the four months preceding the filing of the petition in bankruptcy on which the judgment debtor is adjudged a bankrupt, if the debtor was in fact solvent when the levy was made. Congress has power to confer upon the bankruptcy court jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights of trustees in bankruptcy to property adversely claimed, when not in the possession of the bankruptcy court, and may determine to what extent jurisdiction shall be exercised by summary proceedings and to what extent by plenary suit. Taubel Co. v. Fox, 264 U. S. 426. Section 8 of the bankruptcy act, providing that the death of a bankrupt shall not abate the proceedings, held inapplicable to so much of the petition as sought the bankruptcy of the firm and the other partners, they not consenting to such adjudications. Meek v. Centre County Co., 264 U. S. 499. Where a person obtained money by fraudulent representations from many others upon his time notes for the amounts borrowed and 50 per cent, but, to stimulate public confidence, gave it out that he would return the amount borrowed on any note at any time before its maturity and pursued that practice, held, that lenders who took advantage of this offer and secured repayment shortly before his bankruptcy, when they had reason to believe him insolvent, were not thereby rescinding their contracts for the fraud and reclaiming their own funds, but were creditors equally with the others who filed their claims for reimbursement in the bankruptcy proceedings; and that the repayments thus made were illegal preferences recoverable by the bankrupt's trustees. Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U. S. 1. |