Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Delegation of Power to the President C. 15.-Militia Act of Congress of February 28, 1795, delegating to the President power to call forth the militia, held constitutional. Under this act the power to determine when the exigency requiring the calling forth of the militia has arisen is exclusively in the President, and his determination upon this point is conclusive. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 43. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 32. The President may make his request directly to the executive of the State, or by order directed to any subordinate officer of the militia; such a request is, in legal intendment, an order, disobedience of which renders a citizen liable to court-martial. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 15. Status of Militia in Service So long as the militia is acting under the military jurisdiction to which it belongs the State and Federal Governments have concurrent power over it; but the militia is not subject to the rules and Articles of War unless in the actual employment of the United States. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 16. Congress has always recognized a substantial difference between the regular forces and the militia, and it is only when called out and actually mustered into the service of the United States that State forces become national militia. McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U. S. 56. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19. Jones v. Perkins, 245 U. S. 390. Relator's claim that he was entitled to discharge from military service under selective draft act of May 18, 1917, on ground that call to service for which draft was made under act, was for duty in foreign country, need not be considered as original proposition; power of Congress to compel military service in foreign country is not restricted to militia clause. Cox v. Wood, 247 U. S. 3. Clause 16.-TO PROVIDE FOR ORGANIZING MILITIA. The Congress shall have power. . . To To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. In Houston v. Moore (5 Wheat. 16) the court said: Congress has power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining them, and this power being unlimited, except in the two particulars of 12703°-S. Doc. 157, 68-1-19 Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 16.-Militia officering and training them, according to the discipline to be prescribed by Congress, it may be exercised to any extent that may be deemed necessary by Congress. * The power of the State governments to legislate on the same subjects having existed prior to the formation of the Constitution, and not having been prohibited by that instrument, it remains with the States, subordinate nevertheless to the paramount law of the General Government, operating upon the same subject. But after a detachment of the militia has been called forth, and has entered the Federal service, the authority of Congress over such detachment is exclusive. Clause 17.-SEAT OF GOVERNMENT. The Congress shall have power. . . To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings. District of Columbia In General This clause confers upon Congress absolute authority and control over the District of Columbia. It probably grew out of an unpleasant episode in the history of the Continental Congress while it was sitting in Philadelphia. Toward the close of the War of the Revolution Congress was surrounded and greatly mistreated by a body of mutineers of the Continental Army. This led to the removal of the seat of government from Philadelphia to Princeton, N. J., and later, for the sake of greater convenience, to Annapolis. (Watson on the Constitution, p. 698.) By this clause Congress is given exclusive jurisdiction over the District of Columbia for every purpose of government, national or local, in all cases whatsoever, including taxation. The terms of the clause are not limited by the principle that representation is necessary to taxation; taxes may be levied on the basis of the census directed to be taken by the Constitution. Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 321. Kendall v. U. S., 12 Pet. 619. Shoemaker v. U. S., 147 U. S. 300. Parsons v. District of Columbia, 170 U. S. 52. Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U. S. 404. Congress legislates for the District with the same power as the legislative assemblies of the States, and in doing so it acts as the legislature of the Union. The failure of Congress to exercise its Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 17.-Seat of Government power in no way impairs the grant, but it must be exercised subject to the prohibitions contained in the Constitution. Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U. S. 690. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264. U. S. v. More, 3 Cranch 160. In Geofroy v. Riggs (133 U. S. 258) it was held that the District of Columbia is a "State" within the terms of a treaty with France regulating the rights of Frenchmen to inherit property within the "States of the Union." The District of Columbia is a separate political community in a certain sense, and in that sense may be called a State whose sovereign power is lodged in the Government of the United States; but it is not strictly a State within the meaning of that term as used in the Constitution. The inhabitants of the Dis trict are not citizens of a State. Metropolitan R. R. v. District of Columbia, 132 U. S. 9. Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch 453. Hooe v. Jamieson, 166 U. S. 397. The District of Columbia is a municipal corporation, and as such it may be invested with legislative authority; but it can exercise only those powers which are expressly conferred by statute, which must be of a strictly municipal nature. Thompson v. Carroll, 22 How. 435. U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 388. Welch v. Cook, 97 U. S. 542. District of Columbia v. Bailey, 171 U. S. 176. Congress may delegate the power to improve or repair streets and to assess adjacent property therefor, and to regulate public markets; but the power of Congress to regulate commerce can not be delegated to the District. Willard v. Presbury, 14 Wall. 680. Wight v. Davidson, 181 U. S. 379. Washington Market Co. v. District of Columbia, 172 U. S. 367. The act of July 16, 1790, providing for the establishment of the seat of government, accepted a certain district, but by its provisions State laws were not to be affected until Congress provided for the government of the District. As such provision was not made until February 27, 1801, the State right to legislate continued until that time, and where the acts of Congress made no changes in the existing laws the laws of Virginia and Maryland remained in force in the parts of the District ceded by them respectively, but the effect of statutes within the District can Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 17.-Seat of Government not be controlled by decision of the State courts rendered since the cession. Young v. Bank of Alexandria, 4 Cranch 384. U. S. v. Simms, 1 Cranch 256. As to the operation of the cession upon individuals its only effect was to terminate the State citizenship of residents; contract obligations were not affected, and liens on property for debt were continued. Reily v. Lamar, 2 Cranch 356. Korn v. Mutual Assur. Soc., 6 Cranch 199. Cession of Territory and Assumption of Sovereignty Land ceded by Virginia and Maryland.-In pursuance of this clause Virginia by act of December 3, 1789, ceded to the United States that part of her territory subsequently known as Alexandria County, and Maryland ceded the county of Washington, which cessions were accepted by Congress. Phillips v. Payne, 92 U. S. 131. Date jurisdiction of United States vested.--In U. S. v. Hammond (1 Cranch [C. C.] 15) it was held that the jurisdiction of the United States over the District of Columbia vested on the first Monday in December, 1800. But see U. S. v. Williams (4 Cranch [C. C.] 372), wherein it was held that the laws of Maryland and Virginia, which were adopted by act of Congress of February 27, 1801 (2 Stat. 103), do not operate here proprio vigore, but solely by virtue of the act which adopted them en masse instead of enacting them totidem verbis. Such of those laws only can be considered as adopted as were applicable to the circumstances of the District; such as were local in their nature and operation, and such as were applicable only to State officers or State courts could not operate here, because the subjects upon which they were to operate did not exist here. See also Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 36. The compact of 1785 between Virginia and Maryland in respect to the free navigation of the Potomac was a compact between the two States as such, the citizens of each being entitled individually to the benefit of it, but individually in no just sense parties to it. The compact could be modified or annulled at the will of the two States, and when they ceded the District of Columbia to the United States whatever the Legislatures of Virginia and Maryland could have before done could be done by Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 17.-Seat of Government Congress after the cession in respect to that portion of the river within the District subject only to the limitations imposed by the act of cession. Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Pet. 91. In Marine R. Co. v. U. S. (257 U. S. 47), it was said that this compact did not settle the question of boundary between the States. Suits pending at time of cession. It was intended on the cession to the United States that the suits then pending in the Maryland tribunals should be proceeded in until final decision, and that the judgments and decrees there made should be as valid and conclusive as if the sovereignty had not been transferred to the United States. Van Ness v. U. S. Bank, 13 Pet. 17. Title of United States to streets.-Under the agreement between the original proprietors of the lands on which the city of Washington was laid out and the commissioners, and upon the enactment of the Maryland act of December 19, 1791, ratifying the cession, the United States became the owner in fee of the streets of the city, although no conveyance thereof by the trustees was ever in fact made as provided in such agreement. Morris v. U. S., 174 U. S. 196. Status and Governmental Powers of District Organization of district.-The District of Columbia is a municipal corporation, although its organization is peculiar, there being no general organic law covering all of the ordinary powers usually conferred in the creation of a municipal corporation; no formal charter. District of Columbia v. Tyrrell, 41 App. D. C. 463. Sovereignty. Certain corporate powers are exercised by the District Government, yet the District of Columbia as the seat of the government is controlled by Congress exclusively. The United States Government is the sovereign and the District government one of the agencies of the sovereign power. Mackey v. U. S., 47 Ct. Cl. 121. See also James v. U. S., 38 Ct. Cl. 615; reversed in 202 U. S. 401. National and municipal powers blended in Congress.-In Pollard v. Hagan (3 How. 223), it was held: Within the District of Columbia and the other places purchased and used for the purposes above mentioned, the national and municipal powers of government of every description are united in the Government of the Union; and these are the only cases within the United States in which all the powers of government are united in a single government, except in the cases ** of the temporary Territorial governments, and there a local government exists. Employers' liability act.-The act of Congress of June 11, 1906, known as the employers' liability act, was held valid as applied |