Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 18.-Incidental The Constitution does not profess to enumerate the means by which the powers it confers shall be enumerated, and where an end is required and a duty is enjoined the ability to perform it is contemplated to exist on the part of the functionaries to whom it is intrusted. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 407. The courts will determine whether the means employed by Congress to accomplish the ends sought have any relation to the powers granted by the Constitution, and if the measures adopted as the most eligible and appropriate are adapted to the end to be accomplished, and are not inconsistent in letter or spirit with the limitations of the Constitution, the courts can not declare them inexpedient or unwise. Cherokee Nation v. Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 657. Logan v. U. S., 144 U. S. 283. Wilkes v. Dinsman, 7 How, 127. Every act of Congress, to be valid, must find in the Constitution some warrant for its passage; but while construction, for the purpose of conferring a power, should be resorted to with great caution, yet resort must be had to every reasonable construction to save a statute from unconstitutionality, and a choice of means by Congress is not to be adjudged invalid unless the conflict between the Constitution and the statute is clear and strong. U. S. v. Harris, 106 U. S. 635. In the execution of a power Congress is not restricted to the employment of those means alone without which the power would be nugatory, and if the end may be reached indirectly by one mode, it may be reached directly by another. The limitation of necessity and propriety expressed in this clause extends only to incidental legislation, and in no way affects the powers expressly granted. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 468. Every right created by, arising under, or dependent upon the Constitution may be protected or enforced by such means as Congress may deem best; if the Constitution guarantees a right, the National Government is clothed with authority to enforce it-the powers given to the National Government are not ineffective because the means of enforcing them are not expressly given. Congress has a large discretion as to the means to be employed, and may employ those means which, in its judgment, Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 18.-Incidental are most advantageous, taking care only that they are not inconsistent with the limitations placed upon the general power by the Constitution. In re Quarles, 158 U. S. 535. Prigg v. Commonwealth, 16 Pet. 619. Congress has undoubted power to construct interstate highways, and as a means to the exercise of that power may organize a corporation. Under its power to regulate commerce Congress may empower a commission to investigate the conduct of interstate commerce, and may provide a penalty for obstructing it. Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 529. I. C. C. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 473. U. S. v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 78. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 578.1 Congress may use all known and appropriate means for collecting and disbursing the revenue, and may provide for the protection of revenue collectors and officers, and in case of the death of a collector may provide that the Government shall be the first paid out of his estate. Murray v. Hoboken, etc., Co., 18 How. 272. Dugan v. U. S., 3 Wheat. 179. U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 388. As an incident to its power to carry on war Congress had power to suspend the operation of the statute of limitations during the Rebellion and to pass the nonintercourse acts. Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 507. Hamilton v. Dillin, 21 Wall. 93. Under this clause Congress may incorporate a bank. National banks being designed to aid the Government, Congress is the sole judge of the necessity for creating them. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 411. Farmers', etc., Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 33. Osborn v. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738. See also U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 386. Talbot v. Silver Bow County, 139 U. S. 440. People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 543. The power to make Treasury notes legal tender is not expressly given to Congress, but the power exists and is attributable to the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States and to regulate the currency. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 553; 110 U. S. 438. Congress may create, define, and punish crimes or offenses when necessary for effectuating the objects of government. The 1 For other citations under the power of Congress to regulate commerce, see commerce clause, p. 83. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 18.-Incidental power to punish offenses is incidental to constitutional powers of sovereignty. The alteration of registered United States bonds may be made a crime against the United States and be punished as such; also the passing of counterfeit national bank bills; the conspiring to injure prisoners in the custody of a United States marshal; and bringing into the country counterfeit foreign coins. There is a peace of the United States for the breach of which Congress may provide a penalty. U. S. v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384. U. S. v. Marigold, 9 How. 567. U. S. v. Hall, 98 U. S. 357. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 420. Ex parte Carll, 106 U. S. 523. Logan v. U. S., 144 U. S. 283. In re Neagle, 135 U. S. 69. In re Quarles, 158 U. S. 535. Congress may also make all laws necessary for carrying into execution the judgments of Federal courts, and having the power to make such laws may proceed under them to satisfy a judgment in favor of the Government. This power of regulating proceedings may be delegated by Congress to the courts themselves. So also when a Territory is admitted as a State Congress may designate the court to which records shall be transferred and prescribe the mode for enforcement and review of judgments. U. S. Bank v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 53. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1. Express Company v. Kountze, 8 Wall. 350. Other instances in which this incidental power has been held to have been validly exercised are: Acts prohibiting the mailing of letters or circulars containing lotteries; acts providing for the lease of public lands; acts providing for the condemnation of lands for various purposes of government; acts providing for the distraint of property to satisfy a Federal tax; acts providing for extensions of patent rights; an act levying a tax on State bank notes in circulation; an act protecting homesteads on public lands. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 732. U. S. v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 537. Kohl v. U. S., 91 U. S. 373. U. S. v. Fox, 94 U. S. 320. Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 154. Cherokee Nation v. Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 656. Springer v. U. S., 102 U. S. 593. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533. U. S. v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Grant of Power "Necessary and Proper" Cl. 18.-Incidental This phrase was construed in Legal Tender Cases (110 U. S. 440) in this language: By the settled construction and the only reasonable interpretation of this clause, the words "necessary and proper" are not limited to such measures as are absolutely and indispensably necessary, without which the powers granted must fail of execution; but they include all appropriate means which are conducive or adapted to the end to be accomplished, and which in the judgment of Congress will most advantageously affect it. See also Legal Tender Cases (12 Wall. 550), where it was said: It is impossible to know what those nonenumerated powers are, and what is their nature and extent, without considering the purposes they were intended to subserve. Those purposes, it must be noted, reach beyond the mere execution of all powers definitely intrusted to Congress and mentioned in detail. They embrace the execution of all other powers vested by the Constitution, in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. We are accustomed to speak for mere convenience of the express and implied powers conferred upon Congress. But in fact the auxiliary powers, those necessary and appropriate to the execution of other powers singly described, are as expressly given as is the power to declare war, or to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy. They are not catalogued, no list of them is made, but they are grouped in the last clause of section 8 of the first article, and granted in the same words in which all other powers are granted to Congress. See also Logan v. U. S., 144 U. S. 282. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 225. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 419. First National Bank v. Union Trust Co., 244 U. S. 416. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 730. Congress has a large discretion as to the means to be employed in the exercise of any power granted it. Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 343. Fairbank v. U. S., 181 U. S. 287. U. S. v. Sugar, 243 Fed. 423. Story v. Perkins, 243 Fed. 997, affirmed in Jones v. Perkins, 245 Maritime Jurisdiction State legislation affecting general maritime law held invalid. under Article III, section 2, this clause giving Congress power to make all necessary laws, and Judicial Code, section 24 and section 256, giving Federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction of civil causes of admiralty jurisdiction. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205. Clyde S. S. Co. v. Walker, 244 U. S. 255. In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart (253 U. S. 149) the act of Congress of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 395), amending the Judicial Code relating to admiralty jurisdiction by saving "to claimants the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any State," was held unconstitutional as an attempt to delegate the legislative power of Congress under this clause and section 2 of Article III. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 18.-Incidental See also Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219, in which the act of Congress of June 10, 1922 (42 Stat. 634), was held unconstitutional in undertaking to permit application of the workmen's compensation laws of the several States to injuries within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, for the reasons explained in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, and other cases reviewed. Within the legitimate scope of this grant, Congress is permitted to determine for itself what is necessary and what is proper. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371. U. S. v. Hoke, 187 Fed. 992, affirmed in 227 U. S. 308. In Legal Tender Cases (12 Wall., 543) the Court said: Congress is not authorized to enact laws in furtherance even of a legitimate end, merely because they are useful, or because they make the Government stronger. There must be some relation between the means and the end; some adaptedness or appropriateness of the laws to carry into execution the powers created by the Constitution. But in I. C. C. v. Brimson (154 U. S., 473) Mr. Justice Harlan said: Congress is not limited in its employment of means to those that are absolutely essential to the accomplishment of objects within the scope of the powers granted to it. The test of the power of Congress is not the judgment of the courts that particular means are not the best that could have been employed to effect the end contemplated by the legislative department. The judiciary can only inquire whether the means devised in the execution of a power granted are forbidden by the Constitution. It can not go beyond that inqury without intrenching upon the domain of another department of the Government. See also Logan v. U. S. (144 U. S. 282), in which it is held that in the exercise of the general power given by this provision Congress may use any means appearing to it most eligible and appropriate, which are adapted to the end to be accomplished, and are consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Legislation Giving Effect to Treaty Stipulations The power of Congress to make all laws " necessary and proper" for carrying into execution the powers vested in the Government of the United States includes the power to enact such legislation as is appropriate to give effect to any stipulations which it is competent for the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to insert in a treaty with a foreign power. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U. S. 121. Incorporation of National Banks Congress has the power to incorporate national banks with the capacity, for their own profit as well as for the use of the Government in its money transactions, of issuing bills which under ordinary circumstances pass from hand to hand as money at their nominal value, and which, when so current, the law has |