Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 18.-Incidental always recognized as a good legal tender in payment of money debts, unless specifically objected to at the time of the tender. Legal Tender Case, 110 U. S. 445. U. S. Bank v. Bank of Georgia, 10 Wheat. 333. Ward v. Smith, 7 Wall. 447. Farmers' Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 33. The act of Congress incorporating the Bank of the United States was held to be a law made in pursuance of the Constitution and part of the supreme law of the land. In McCulloch v. Maryland (4 Wheat. 407) the court said: Although among the enumerated powers of Government we do not find the word "bank" or "incorporation," we find the great powers to lay and collect taxes, to borrow money, to regulate commerce, to declare and conduct a war, and to raise and support armies and navies. The sword and the purse, all the external relations, and no inconsiderable portion of the industry of the Nation, are intrusted to its Government. It can never be pretended that these vast powers draw after them others of inferior importance merely because they are inferior. Such an idea can never be advanced. But it may with great reason be contended that a government intrusted with such ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the Nation so vitally depend, must also be intrusted with ample means for their execution. See also Osborn v. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738. Act of June 3, 1864, subjects shares of bank associations authorized by it and in the hands of shareholders to taxation by the State under certain limitations, without regard to the fact that a part or the whole of the capital is invested in national securities declared by statute to be exempt, and the act thus construed is constitutional. Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 581. Congress, having power to create a system of national banks, is the judge as to the extent of the powers which should be conferred upon such banks, and has the sole power to regulate and control the exercise of their operations. Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S. 220. Congress may prohibit any taxation of national banks by States, cities, counties, or towns, and its mere silence on the subject, if it were silent, would be a prohibition. First Nat. Bank v. Richmond, 39 Fed. 309; appeal dismissed, 149 The provision of the act of Congress establishing the Federal Reserve Board giving to that board authority "to grant by special permit to national banks applying therefor, when not in contravention of State or local law, the right to act as trustee, executor, administrator, or registrar of stocks and bonds," held valid. First National Bank v. Union Trust Co., 244 U. S. 416. People v. Brady, 110 N. E. 864. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 18.-Incidental Statute securing title to persons occupying lands for seven years in good faith does not apply to receiver of national bank acquiring title to its assets by a secret trust. Baker v. Schofield, 243 U. S. 114. Legal Tender Treasury Notes The acts of Congress making Treasury notes legal tender were held to be valid when applied to contracts made before their passage as well as to debts contracted since their enactment. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 544, overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603. See also Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 15 Wall. 195. Dooley v. Smith, 13 Wall. 604. Legal Tender Cases, 110 U. S. 449. Distribution of Judicial Power Under this clause Congress passed the judiciary act of 1789, under which the judicial system of the United States was organized, the powers of the courts defined, and the manner of their exercise regulated. In Rhode Island v. Massachusetts (12 Pet. 721) the court said: * * * It was necessarily left to the legislative power to organize the Supreme Court, to define its powers consistently with the Constitution as to its original jurisdiction, and to distribute the residue of the judicial power between this and the inferior courts, which it was bound to ordain and establish, defining their respective powers, whether original or appellate, by which and how it should be exercised. In obedience to the injunction of the Constitution Congress exercised their power, so far as they thought it necessary and proper, for carrying into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the judicial as well as all other departments and officers. * * No department could organize itself; the Constitution provided for the organization of the legislative power and the mode of its exercise, but it delineated only the great outlines of the judicial power, leaving the details to Congress, in whom was vested, by express delegation, the power to pass all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution all powers except their own. U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 389. Congress may provide for the review of the action of commissions and boards created by it exercising quasi judicial powers for the transfer of their proceedings and decisions to judicial tribunals for determination de novo, and may do so in respect of the action of tribal authorities. Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 445. This clause was considered in support of the legislation in Revised Statutes, sec. 643, relating to the removal of causes against Federal officers in Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 263. The power to prescribe what effect shall be given to the judicial proceedings of the Federal courts is conferred by this clause and other provisions of the Constitution. Embry v. Palmer, 107 U. S. 3. 12703°-S. Doc. 157. 68-1-20 Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 18.-Incidental Congress possesses the constitutional power and is charged with the constitutional duty to protect all the agencies of the Federal Government including the courts, their officers, and all persons whose attendance is necessary in the proceedings of those courts, such as parties, witnesses, and jurors. U. S. v. Sanges, 48 Fed. 78; writ of error dismissed in 144 U. S. 310, holding that a writ of error does not lie in behalf of the United States in a criminal case. Judgments The authority to carry into complete effect the judgments of the courts necessarily results by implication from the power to ordain and establish such courts. But it does not rest altogether upon such implication, for express authority is given to Congress to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States. U. S. Bank v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 53. States have no authority to control these proceedings, except as far as the State process acts are adopted by Congress or by the courts of the United States under the authority of Congress. Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 22. Punishment of Crimes In General Although the Constitution contains no grant, general or specific, to Congress of the power to provide for the punishment of crimes except piracies and felonies on the high seas, offenses against the law of nations, treason, and counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States, no one doubts the power of Congress to provide for the punishment of all crimes within one of the States of the Union or within the territory over which Congress has plenary and exclusive jurisdiction. Logan v. U. S., 144 U. S. 283. U. S. v. Hall, 98 U. S. 346. Impersonating a Federal Officer Act of Congress of March 4, 1909, making it an offense falsely to assume or pretend to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department with intent to defraud held to be within the general power of Congress. U. S. v. Barnow, 239 U. S. 74. The power of Congress to prescribe a penalty for the infraction of a rule or regulation which the Constitution expressly empowers it to enact is clearly and necessarily implied, and if it was not so implied authority for it is found in this section. Howard v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 148 Fed. 997, affirmed in 207 Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Punishment for Conspiracy Cl. 18.-Incidental Act providing punishment for any two or more persons conspiring to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, etc., was lawfully enacted under the authority of this clause. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651. U. S. v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76. Whether it is competent for Congress to exempt the employees of the United States from arrest on criminal process from the State courts for crimes charged against them mala in se doubted. U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 486. Encouragement of Patriotism Any act of Congress which plainly and directly tends to enhance the respect and love of the citizen for the institutions of his country, and to quicken and strengthen his motives to defend them, and which is germane to and intimately connected with and appropriate to the exercise of some one or all of the powers granted by Congress must be valid. U. S. v. Gettysburg Elec. R. Co., 160 U. S. 681. Protection of Guaranteed Civil Rights The right of a citizen of the United States in the custody of a United States marshal under a lawful commitment to answer for an offense against the United States to be protected against lawful violence is a right secured to him by the Constitution. Logan v. U. S., 144 U. S. 263. U. S. v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383. Rakes v. U. S., 212 U. S. 55. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651. U. S. v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76. In re Quarles, 158 U. S. 537. Raising Funds for Political Purposes * Act of Congress of Aug. 15, 1876, ch. 287, sec. 6, providing “that all executive officers or employees of the United States not appointed by the President are prohibited from requesting, giving to, or receiving from any other officer or employee of the Government any money or property or other thing of value for political purposes," held constitutional. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371. Section 9.-POWERS DENIED TO CONGRESS. Clause 1.-IMPORTATION OF SLAVES.1 The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, 1 Except as a matter of history, this clause now has but little interest. Sec. 9.-Powers Denied to Congress Cl. 1.-Slaves shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person. In General The several clauses of this section impose limitations upon the powers of Congress and were not intended to apply to the State governments. The first clause is a restriction upon the general power to regulate commerce (see Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3); but while it is to be deemed a limitation upon a power already granted, rather than a grant of power, members of the constitutional convention recognized that it was designed to confer upon Congress power to abolish the slave trade from the period limited, and an act of Congress having that object was later upheld. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 135. Morgan v. Louisiana, 118 U. S. 467. Johnson v. Chicago, etc., Ele. Co., 119 U. S. 400. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 401. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 216. Madison papers, pp. 1388-1673. U. S. v. Preston, 3 Pet. 65. In People v. Compagnie Gen. Trans. (107 U. S. 62) the Supreme Court declared that there has never been any doubt that the first clause of this section refers only to persons of the African race, and that the words "migration" and "importation" refer to the different conditions of this race as regards freedom and slavery. "Importation" had always been applied to property and things as contradistinguished from persons, and as the framers of the Constitution were unwilling to use the word "slaves," and described them as "persons," it was necessary to use the word "migration" as applied to them. Notwithstanding the early dictum that "migration" applies to voluntary as well as involuntary arrivals, the clause has finally been restricted in its application to the African race. Persons Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393. This clause includes within it the migration of other persons as well as the importation of slaves, and in terms recognizes that other persons as well as slaves may be the subject of importation and commerce. This clause, taken in connection with Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 18, "seems necessarily to include the whole power over the subject; and the Constitution and laws of the United States being the supreme law of the land, State power can not be extended over the same subject." It therefore follows that passengers entering ports on vessels can never be subject to State laws until they become a portion of the population of the State. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 454 |