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Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States

Cl. 1.-Ex Post Facto Law

Changing place of trial.-A law changing the place of trial from one county to another county in the same district, or even to a different district from that in which the offense was committed or the indictment found, is not an ex post facto law, though passed subsequent to the commission of the offense or the finding of the indictment.

Gut v. State, 9 Wall. 37.

Grand and petit jurors. A change in the law regulating the selection of grand and petit jurors is not ex post facto as to a crime theretofore committed.

Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 588.

Regulating appeals.-A law granting the right of appeal to the State is not an ex post facto law within the meaning of the Constitution.

Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 593.

No State Shall Pass Any Law Impairing the Obligation of

Contracts

Leading Cases

Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 518), in connection with

which see Evans's Leading Cases on American Constitutional Law, p. 170, note.

Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420.

Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122.

Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659.

Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U. S. 307.

Skaneateles Water Works v. Skaneateles, 184 U. S. 354.

Joplin v. Light Co., 191 U. S. 150.

Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307.

Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213.

Railroad Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. 177.

Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361.

Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175.

Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87.

Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527.

New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164.

Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Pet. 380.

Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514.
Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190.
McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662.

Salt Company v. East Saginaw, 13 Wall. 373.
Fisk v. Jefferson, 116 U. S. 131.

Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wall. 190.

Beer Company v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25.

Georgia R., etc., Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174.

East Hartford v. Hartford Brdg. Co., 10 How. 511.

Morley v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 146 U. S. 162.

McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608.

As to particular contracts protected by the Federal Constitution against impairment by the States, see

Church v. Kelsey, 121 U. S. 282 (a State constitution).

Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (a conveyance).

Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States

New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164.

Cl. 1.-Contracts-Leading Cases

Providence Bank v. Billings, Pet. 514.

State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How. 369 (exemption from taxation).

Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (contract between States for the benefit of individuals).

The Binghampton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51.

New Orleans Water Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674.

Vicksburg v. Waterworks Co., 202 U. S. 453 (exclusive franchises). Los Angeles v. City Water Co., 177 U. S. 558 (contracts as to rates of public service companies).

Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285 (judgment for damages collectible in an action of contract).

Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387 (how far governmental powers can be made the subject of irrepealable contracts).

By the obligation of a contract is meant the means which at the time of its creation the law affords for its enforcement.

Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716.

Any form of State law which impairs the obligation of a contract is invalid.

Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432.

New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, etc., Co., 125 U. S. 18.
Grand Trunk, etc., R. Co. v. Indiana, 221 U. S. 400.

Ross v. Oregon, 227 U. S. 150.

The restraint operates only upon a State's legislative power, not upon the decisions of its courts.

Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386.

Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87.

Commercial Bank v. Buckingham, 5 How. 317.

Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103.

Moore-Mansfield, etc., Co. v. Electrical, etc., Co., 234 U. S. 619.

Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175.

Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666.

Douglas v. Pike, 101 U. S. 677.

Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278.

When a State gives effect to later legislation on the ground that the earlier legislation did not create a contract, it is for the Federal Supreme Court to determine whether or not a contract existed.

Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U. S. 195.

Louisiana R., etc., Co. v. New Orleans, 235 U. S. 164.

As to what constitutes an impairment of the obligation of a contract, see

Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469.

Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314.

Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69.

New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. New Orleans, 157 U. S. 219.

Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610.

Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595.

Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311.

Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States

Cl. 1.-Contracts-Definition

Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118 (statutes altering mortgagor's

right of redemption).

Penniman's Case, 103 U. S. 714 (abolition of imprisonment for debt). Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U. S. 245 (alteration in statute of limitations).

Definition of Contracts

In general. For the purposes of this clause the term "contracts" embraces agreements between States, between States and individuals, between States and corporations, between a State and the United States. Corporations are within the protection of the clause to the same extent as individuals. Mere social compacts between a State and its citizens are not comprehended by the prohibition; it protects contracts relating to rights which are not governmental.

Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1.

Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 560.

Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 627.
McGee v. Mathis, 4 Wall. 155.

Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. 1.

Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 820.

See also

Achison v. Huddleson, 12 How. 298.

State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How. 389.

West River Brdg. Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 531.

New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164.

Pennsylvania v. Wheeling, etc., Bridge Co., 13 How. 560.
Searight v. Stokes, 3 How. 151.

Neil v. Ohio, 3 How. 720.

Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 550.

Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 8.

Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 146.

Miller v. State, 15 Wall. 488.

This prohibition includes and protects contracts which respect property or some object of value and which confer rights that may be asserted in a court of justice. It is not necessary that a contract be executory; the clause includes executed contracts as well. Nor is it necessary that the contract be express; implied contracts as well are protected; whether the contract relates to real or personal estate, is executed or executory, by parol or under seal, the Constitution preserves it inviolate as to its obligations.

Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 136.

Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 683.
Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402.

Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U. S. 131.

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The term contract presupposes a valid contract, one imposing obligations under general principles of law and not void under the constitution and laws of a State or entered into without authority of the party sought to be charged. A contract to be protected from impairment must be founded upon good con

Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States

Cl. 1.-Contracts-Definition

sideration. Before the Supreme Court can determine whether a State law is repugnant to the obligation clause it must appear that a legal contract is involved, and for this purpose the bare averment of a contract is insufficient. The ultra vires contract of a corporation is not within the protection of this clause. A State constitution is not a contract within the meaning of that term as here used.

New Orleans v. Water Works Co., 142 U. S. 88.
Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co., 161 U. S. 667.
Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U. S. 500.

City R. Co. v. Citizens' R. Co., 166 U. S. 564.

Church v. Kelsey, 121 U. S. 283.

Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563.

If a contract, when made, was valid by the constitution and laws of the State, as then expounded by the highest authority whose duty it was to administer them, no subsequent action by the legislature or judiciary can impair its obligation.

Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 3 Wall. 303.

Zane v. Hamilton County, 189 U. S. 381.

Pacific, etc., R. Co. v. Los Angeles, 194 U. S. 118.

Necessity for mutual assent.-The term "contract" is used in the Constitution in its ordinary sense as signifying the agreement of two or more minds for considerations proceeding from one to the other to do or not to do certain acts. Mutual assent to its terms is of its very essence.

Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 288.

Durkee v. Board of Liquidation, 103 U. S. 646.

Where a corporation is by its charter authorized to engage in a business affecting the public interest, and given exclusive privileges which tend to establish a monopoly, such grant of exclusive privileges does not become a contract or vested right, so as to be protected from impairment by the State or Federal Constitution, until the grantee has, to say the least, begun preparations or made some expenditures to perform the service to the public which constitutes the consideration for the grant of the privileges.

Capital City Light, etc., Co. v. Tallahassee, 28 So. 810; affirmed in 186 U. S. 401.

Necessity for consideration. To make a contract which can not be impaired by subsequent legislation there is the same necessity for a consideration that there would be if it were a contract between private parties. If the law be a mere offer of a bounty, it may be withdrawn at any time notwithstanding the recipients of such bounty may have incurred expenses upon the faith of such offer.

Grand Lodge, etc., v. New Orleans, 166 U. S. 146.
Durkee v. Board of Liquidation, 103 U. S. 646.

Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States

Cl. 1.-Contracts-Definition

If it be a mere nude pact, a bare promise to allow a certain thing to be done, it will be construed as a revocable license.

Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co., 161 U. S. 667.

A grant of exemption is never to be considered as a mere gratuity-a simple gift from the legislature. No such intent to throw away the revenues of the State or to create arbitrary discriminations between the holders of property can be imputed. A consideration is presumed to exist.

Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Decatur, 147 U. S. 201.

There is no necessity of looking for the consideration for a legislative contract outside of the objects for which the corporation was created. These objects were deemed by the legislature to be beneficial to the community, and this benefit constitutes the consideration for the contract, and no other is required to support it.

Home of Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 437.

While an issue of new mortgage bonds by a street railway can not properly be termed a legal consideration for an ordinance extending the term of an exclusive franchise, since the negotiation of the new loan was neither a benefit to the city nor a detriment to the railroad company, yet the subsequent negotiation of such a loan operates against the city by way of estoppel. The continued operation of the road may itself be regarded a sufficient consideration for the extension of the franchise.

City R. Co. v. Citizens' R. Co., 166 U. S. 566.

Interest. Interest on a principal sum may be stipulated for in the contract itself, either to run from the date of the contract until it matures or until payment is made; and its payment in such a case is as much a part of the obligation of contract as the principal, and equally within the protection of the Constitution. Morley v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 146 U. S. 168. Missouri & Ark. Co. v. Sebastian County, 249 U. S. 170. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cushman, 108 U. S. 51. Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563.

See also

Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 679, as to implied contract for
interest.

Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 207, and Ewell v. Daggs, 108
U. S. 148, as to usury laws.

Implied contracts.-The protection of the constitutional provision may be invoked against impairing the obligation of implied contracts as well as express contracts.

Stewart v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U. S. 135.

See also

Bryan v. Board of Education, 151 U. S. 639, for a case where the court would not imply a contract in the absence of express provisions.

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