Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States Cl. 1.-Contracts-Police Powers tained, it was held that a second ordinance changing the boundary so as to put the contemplated works outside of the territory where they could be erected was void. Robbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223. Minneapolis v. Rand, 285 Fed. 818. (e) Slaughterhouses.-A State legislature can not, by contract with an individual or corporation, restrain, diminish, or surrender its powers to enact laws for the preservation of the public health or the public morals. A State constitution and municipal ordinances passed thereunder, opening to general competition the right to build slaughterhouses, establish stock landings, and engage in the business of butchering in that city, under regulations established by these ordinances, are not void as impairing the obligation of a contract granting exclusive privileges for stock landings and slaughterhouses at that city. Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746. (f) Railroad companies.-The charter of a railroad is not such a contract binding the State to allow the company at all times and in all ways to manage its own affairs, as is impaired by legislation establishing a railroad commission and empowering it to fix rates and make regulations for the operation of the road. Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 331. (g) Liability of railroad for negligence.—A statute under which a railroad company was incorporated, which contained a provision exempting the company from liability for the death of any person in its service, even if caused by its negligence, does not confer such a contract right as to exempt it from the operation of a later statute subjecting it to liability for negligence. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, 221 U. S. 408. As to the State increasing the liability of a railroad company, see Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Miller, 132 U. S. 75. (h) Abolition of grade crossings.-A State statute which is directed to the elimination of railroad grade crossings and which authorizes municipal corporations to require alterations in such crossings, allowing the imposition of the entire expense of changes of grade, both costs and damages, irrespective of benefits, on the railway companies, does not impair the obligation of the charter contracts of the companies. New York, etc., R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 566. (i) Liability for communicated fires.-State statute by which a railroad is made responsible in damages for property injured 1 See same subject under commerce clause, p. 83. Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States Cl. 1.-Contracts-Police Powers or destroyed by fire communicated by its locomotives does not impair the obligation of the charter contracts. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 5. See also Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67, as to requiring railroad to cut drain through railroad embankment. (j) Advertising in stage coaches.-Contract obligations are not unconstitutionally impaired by a municipal ordinance under which a domestic corporation operating stage routes in the city streets is forbidden to display exterior advertisements on its stages, where at the time the advertising contracts were entered into there existed an ordinance almost identical in terms, and the company's charter did not confer any right to use its stages for advertising purposes. Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U. S. 467. (k) Use of city streets.-An ordinance prohibiting the hauling of freight cars on railroads in a city street is not a valid exercise of regulation reserved in ordinance designating streets on which railroad tracks could be located, as impairing the obligation of the contract under which tracks were located and terminals built. Southern Pac. Co. v. Portland, 227 U. S. 559. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548. No contract rights to occupy city sidewalks with a spur track can be implied from resolution of aldermen, after construction of road, granting permission to occupy the sidewalk without any contract as to time. Seaboard Air Line v. Raleigh, 242 U. S. 15. See also Northern Ohio Traction, etc., Co. v. Ohio, 245 U. S. 574. (1) Free transportation.-Requirements of Laws of New Jersey, 1912, page 235, that street railways grant transportation to city detectives held not an arbitrary exercise of police power, where charter of street railway company in question was subject to alteration by legislature. Sutton v. New Jersey, 244 U. S. 258. (m) Location of station.-The consent of railroad commissioners that a railroad company might discontinue and abandon a depot at a certain place, upon providing suitable accommodations at another point, is not such a contract as is impaired by a statute requiring the company to maintain a depot at the abandoned place. Railroad Co. v. Hamersley, 104 U. S. 1. Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Texas, 170 U. S. 239. Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States See also Cl. 1.-Contracts--Police Powers Fair Haven, etc., R. Co. v. New Haven, 203 U. S. 379, as to the State requiring a railroad company to pave and repair part of street occupied by track. Grand Trunk, etc., R. Co. v. Indiana, 221 U. S. 400, as to contract between railroads to guard crossings and State requirement to install interlocking plant. Railroad corporations are always amenable to the State's police power, notwithstanding any charter provisions to the contrary. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 73. Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427. Intoxicating liquors.-The legislature may regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors, and the regulation or prohibition may operate to revoke licenses already granted and not yet expired. The fact that the Federal Government may have granted a license to sell liquor does not authorize any violation of State laws nor preclude prohibition on the part of the State. Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 479. See also Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall, 730. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 132. Eilenbecker v. Plymouth Co., 134 U. S. 40. Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 662. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 91. Lottery franchises.-May be repealed even after rights have been acquired thereunder. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 820. Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645. Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How. 167. Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U. S. 495. New Orleans v. Houston, 119 U. S. 265. State can not divest itself of police power.-A State legislature can not, by any contract, divest itself of the power to provide for the protection of the lives, health, and property of its citizens and the preservation of good order and the public morals. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 33. Atlantic Coast Line v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548. Grand Trunk, etc., R. Co. v. South Bend, 227 U. S. 544. Wabash R. Co. v. Defiance, 167 U. S. 100. Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U. S. 557. The doctrine that a corporate charter is a contract which the Constitution protects against impairment by subsequent State legislation is ever limited in the area of its operation by the equally well-settled principle that a legislature can neither bargain away the police power nor in any wise withdraw from its successors the power to take appropriate measures to guard Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States Cl. 1.-Contracts-Police Powers the safety, health, and morals of all who may be within their jurisdiction. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, 221 U. S. 408. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Duluth, 208 U. S. 583. State Taxation.1 In general. The provisions of this clause are a limitation upon the taxing power of a State as well as upon any other legislation; the manner of impairment is immaterial. A statute requiring the tax upon State bonds to be deducted from the coupons originally attached to them when tendered in payment of debts due the State is void as to coupons already separated from bonds held by a different person. The taxation of city bonds not liable to taxation impairs them, but there is no prohibition against the taxation by a State of bonds issued by itself for borrowed money. A statute authorizing the imposition of a tax according to a previous assessment is not unconstitutional. Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 443. Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U. S. 672. Locke v. New Orleans, 4 Wall. 173. North Missouri R. Co. v. Maguire, 20 Wall, 46. It is within the power of the legislature also to validate erroneous assessments; to authorize a tax auditor to go back for a certain period and correct false returns; to provide for the taxation of lands which have improperly escaped taxation; to change the method of taxing corporations; to provide that taxes. already delinquent shall bear interest from the date delinquency commenced. But legislative ratification can not cure undisclosed fraud nor can it validate a tax sale void for want of notice. Mattingly v. D. C., 97 U. S. 691. Sturges v. Carter, 114 U. S. 516. Winona, etc., Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 529. State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How. 408. League v. Texas, 184 U. S. 161. Santa Ana Water Co. v. San Buena Ventura, 65 Fed. 328. Forster v. Forster, 129 Mass. 566. Williams v. Supervisors, 122 U. S. 164. Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 316. New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 654. Blount v. Windley, 95 U. S. 180. A State can not pass a law taxing a corporation if it would thereby impair the obligation of any contract. So, where the charter of a corporation provides for the payment of a certain amount per annum upon each share of its stock in lieu of all other taxes, an additional tax upon shares in the hands of stockholders is void, and a law requiring corporations to retain, for 1 See art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 1, as to power of Congress to lay and collect taxes, p. 74. See also same subject, pp. 180, 600, 636, 707, 728, and 745. Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States Cl. 1.-Contracts-Taxation the payment of taxes, a certain portion of the interest due on bonds held by nonresidents impairs the obligation of the contract expressed in the bond. Washington University v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 439. Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 688. State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, but in connection with this case, see Ammidown v. Freeland, 101 Mass. 303, 3 Am. Rep. 359. Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430. Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. 136. Delaware R. R. Tax, 18 Wall. 232. Curtis v. Whitney,.13 Wall. 68. A lawful tax on a new subject, or an increased tax on an old one, does not interfere with a contract or impair its obligation within the meaning of this clause even though such taxation may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the security of another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of another. North Missouri R. Co. v. Maguire, 20 Wall. 61. See also Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta, 93 U. S. 120. Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60. Memphis Gas Light Co. v. Shelby County, 109 U. S. 399. This inhibition does not enable a contract between individuals to prevent a municipal corporation from exerting, as between it and one of the individuals, any power of taxation it legally pos sesses. Henderson Brdg. Co. v. Henderson, 173 U. S. 592. Limitation of municipal power of taxation by State.-Where a municipality contracts a debt when it has authority to levy a tax, a subsequent act limiting the power impairs the contract. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 549. Ralls County Court v. U. S., 105 U. S. 733. Louisiana v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716. Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289. Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278. The limit of a city's power of taxation at the time a judgment for a tort was rendered against it was fixed at a certain rate which was subsequently reduced, making it impossible for plaintiffs to collect their judgment. Held, that the municipal liability for damages being purely statutory and for a tort, the provision reducing the rate of taxation did not impair a contract. Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285. |