Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States Cl. 1.-Contracts-Of Railroads Atlantic Coast Line v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, as to conforming to grade and shifting of cars. Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 537, as to use of steam in propelling cars. Worcester v. Worcester, etc., R. Co., 196 U. S. 548; Oklahoma R. Co. v. Severns Pav. Co., 251 U. S. 104; Pacific Gas Co. v. Police Ct., 251 U. S. 22, and Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Denver, 250 U. S. 241, as to general regulations affecting railroad track laid in public street. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Frazier, 139 U. S. 288, as to power to create a mortgage. Batlimore, etc., R. Co. v. Nesbit, 10 How. 395, and Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Emmons, 149 U. S. 364, as to right to hold and method of acquiring land. Offield v. New York, etc., R. Co., 203 U. S. 372, as to condemnation of stock owned by a person who refuses to agree on the terms of purchase. Southern Wisconsin R. Co. v. Madison, 240 U. S. 457, and New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Louisiana, 157 U. S. 219, as to paving and repairing streets. Power to require abolition of railroad grade crossings regarded as authority impliedly reserved when State granted right to occupy land. Erie R. Co. v. New Jersey, 254 U. S. 394. Regulation of rates.1-In general.-A State may regulate the rates to be charged by a railroad for the transportation of freight and passengers, unless restrained by some positive provision in the charter; and its power in this regard is not affected by the fact that the corporation's income has been pledged to meet obligations incurred on the faith of the charter. It is competent for the State to empower a corporation absolutely to fix its own rates, and where this is done expressly any attempt to change the rates by the State impairs a contract obligation. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155. Ex parte Koehler, 23 Fed. 529. See also Peik v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 94 U. S. 164. San Antonio Traction Co. v. Altgelt, 200 U. S. 304. A carrier can not assert, as against the operation of a ratemaking order of the State railroad commission, the constitutional protection of a contract right under its charter to charge certain rates where its charter became, by the carrier's own voluntary act, subject to legislative alteration, since the commission's order fixing rates is a legislative act under delegated power. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298. An ordinance granting a right to charge 5 cents fare for one continuous ride on a street railway, passed after the adoption 1 See Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3, p. 83, as to regulation by Congress. Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States Cl. 1.-Contracts-Of Railroads of a constitutional provision declaring that "no irrevocable or uncontrollable grant of special privileges" shall be made, does not constitute a contract with respect to which no further legislation upon that subject can be enacted without impairing its obligation, and a statute requiring the company to sell tickets to school children for half the regular fare is valid. San Antonio Traction Co. v. Altgelt, 200 U. S. 304. As to acceptance by corporation of subsequent constitutional provision sec Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298. Order of Public Service Commission of Washington requiring street railway passengers to be carried beyond limits of particular franchise held not to impair obligation of contract contained in municipal ordinance granting street railway franchise. Puget Sound Traction, etc., Co. v. Reynolds, 244 U. S. 574. Railroad can not repudiate rates contracted for.—A railroad corporation may contract with a municipality or with a State to operate a railway at agreed rates of fare. And where the provisions of an accepted statute respecting rates to be charged for transportation are plain and unambiguous, and do not contravene public policy or positive rules of law, a railroad company can not avail itself of privileges which have been procured upon stipulated conditions and repudiate performance of the latter at will. Grand Rapids, etc., Co. v. Osborn, 193 U. S. 29. A decision of a State supreme court denying an interstate carrier an immunity based upon a stipulation on an interstate passenger ticket held reviewable by certiorari and not by writ of error. A ticket for interstate passage over several railroads bore a printed stipulation limiting the selling carrier's liability to its own lines. Held, that by accepting and using the ticket, though without reading it, a passenger must be presumed to have agreed to the stipulation, thereby establishing a contract, prima facie valid, and binding in a State court. Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Prude, 265 U. S. 99. Construction of language granting right.-In providing for a rate of fare to be charged by a street railway company, it may very well be that language used by a legislature in merely conferring authority upon a company to fix certain charges for fare might not be regarded as amounting to a contract, when the same language used by parties in fixing rates under a legislative authority and direction to agree upon them would be regarded as forming a contract, because the statute provided specially for that mode of determining them. Detroit v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 184 U. S. 388. Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States Cl. 1.-Contracts Of Railroads Where a street railway has by ordinance a contract right to charge 5 cents for one continuous fare, the acceptance of a subsequent ordinance giving the city the right to control the "construction, maintenance, and operation" of its lines, does not abrogate the contract right as to the fare. Minneapolis v. Minneapolis St. R. Co., 215 U. S. 417. The right given a railroad by the law under which it is incorporated to have its passenger rates, within certain limits, unaffected by future legislation, does not inure to the benefit of the purchaser of its property, in the absence of express direction to that effect in the law. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649. When subject to legislative or municipal control.-A State has power to limit the amount of charges which railroad companies receive for the transportation of persons and property within its own jurisdiction, unless restrained by some contract in the charter. The court said: This power of regulation is a power of government, continuing in its nature, and if it be bargained away at all it can only be by words of positive grant, or something which is in law equivalent. If there is reasonable doubt, it must be resolved in favor of the existence of the power. Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 325. See also Southern Pac. Co. v. Campbell, 230 U. S. 537. St. Paul, etc., Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 296 Fed. 749. When not subject to legislative or municipal control.—An ordinance constituting a binding contract in respect to the rates of fare to be thereafter exacted upon the consolidated and extended lines of street railway companies can not be impaired by subsequent ordinances reducing those rates. Cleveland v. Cleveland City R. Co., 194 U. S. 536. When a rate of fare that may be charged by a street railway company is fixed by positive agreement under expressed legislative authority, the subject is not open to alteration thereafter by the common council alone, under the right to prescribe from time to time the rules and regulations for the running and operation of the road. Detroit v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 184 U. S. 389. Municipal aid to construction of railroad.'-An agreement between a county and a railroad company by which the company voted in favor of a proposition to donate a certain sum to the See "Contracts of States-legislative grants," p. 330, and "Police Powers," p. 309. Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States Cl. 1.-Contracts-Of Railroads company, provided the railroad should be located on a certain line as specifically prescribed, and provided the bonds issued in payment of such donation should not be payable until the railroad had been completed, is such a contract as can not be impaired by a constitutional provision declaring that no municipal corporation shall ever make a donation to any railroad or private corporation adopted after the contract had been partly performed by the railroad. County of Clay v. Savings Soc., 104 U. S. 590. See also Railroad Co. v. Falconer, 103 U. S. 824. Aspinwall v. Daviess County, 22 How. 364. Pearsall v. Great Northern R. Co., 161 U. S. 666. Norton v. Brownsville, 129 U. S. 490. Wadsworth v. Supervisors, 102 U. S. 536. Concord v. Portsmouth Sav. Bank, 92 U. S. 625. Contracts of Waterworks Companies Grant of franchise.-The grant of a right to supply gas or water to a municipality and its inhabitants, through pipes and mains laid in the streets, upon condition of the performance of its service by the grantee, is the grant of a franchise vested in the State, in consideration of the performance of a public service, and after performance by the grantee is a contract protected by the Constitution against State legislation to impair it, and it is equally clear that such franchises may be bestowed upon corporations by the municipal authorities, provided the right to do so is given by their charters. Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 9. Skaneateles Waterworks Co. v. Skaneateles, 184 U. S. 363. Grant of exclusive privilege.-The grant of a franchise to a waterworks company is for a public purpose, and the grant could be accompanied by such exclusive privileges to the grantee as in the judgment of the State were proper. Such a grant is a contract the obligation of which can not be impaired by subsequent legislation or by a change in the organic law of the State. New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 680. See also St. Tammany Waterworks v. New Orleans Waterworks, 120 U. S. 64. Ramapo Water Co. v. New York, 236 U. S. 579. Helena Waterworks Co. v. Helena, 195 U. S. 388. Boise Water Co. v. Boise City, 230 U. S. 84. St. Anthony Falls, etc., Co. v. St. Paul, 168 U. S. 349. Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U. S. 123. Mercantile Trust, etc., Co. v. Columbus, 203 U. S. 311. Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U. S. 65. Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 202 U. S. 453; 206 U. S. 496. Madera Waterworks v. Madera, 228 U. S. 454. Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 200 U. S. 22. Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U. S. 577. Sec. 10.-Powers Denied to States Cl. 1.-Contracts-Of Waterworks Regulation of water rates.-It is within the power of the Government to regulate the prices at which water shall be sold by one who enjoys a virtual monopoly of the sale. Spring Valley Waterworks v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 354. See also Owensboro v. Owensboro Waterworks Co., 191 U. S. 358. Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, 189 U. S. 434. Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin, etc., Co., 192 U. S. 208. Riparian rights.-Riparian lands or rights acquired by power company held to be property acquired under its charter and not contract rights expressed or implied in the grant of the charter. Sears v. Akron, 246 U. S. 242. See also Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, as to diversion of water by riparian owner. Contracts Between Corporations and Individuals In general.-Contracts between a corporation and individuals do not affect the right of the State to modify the corporate charter pursuant to a reserve power. Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wall. 190. A statute authorizing the transfer of corporate franchises to a new corporation held not to impair the obligation of the contract of the old corporation with its creditors. Smith v. Chesapeake Canal Co., 14 Pet. 45. When corporations created for a public purpose, such as railroad companies, enter into contracts affecting the safety and welfare of the public, the presumption is that they do so with the knowledge that their agreements can not withdraw such subjects from the police power of the State; and hence such contracts are not necessarily protected by the Federal Constitution from subsequent State legislation modifying or annulling their provision. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57. The common-enemy doctrine as to surface water was not so imported into railroad's írrepealable charter or its contracts with landowners from whom its right of way was acquired as to be protected by the contracts clause. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67. A contract between two intersecting railway companies, imposing upon the junior road the duty of constructing and properly maintaining the physical crossings of the two roads, and |