Amend. 4.-Searches and Seizures. "Search and seizure" laws enacted to aid in the suppression of the unlawful traffic in liquors have been sustained in many States as not being violative of the fourth amendment. State v. Nejin, 74 So. 103; but see Amos v. U. S. 255 U. S. 313, where it was held that a search and seizure was unlawful without proper warrant. Necessity for Warrant A seizure of books and papers found in a person's office immediately after his arrest, without authority of law and without warrant, is an unreasonable search and seizure. U. S. v. Mounday, 208 Fed. 186. An information signed by the district attorney, but without any affidavit as required by the Constitution, is insufficient to authorize an arrest. U. S. v. Wells, 225 Fed. 320. Opening Letters and Papers in Mail The use in evidence in a criminal case of letters voluntarily written by the accused after the crime, while he was in prison, and which came into the possession of the prison officials under established practice reasonably demanded to promote discipline. did not infringe the constitutional safeguards against selfincrimination or unreasonable searches and seizures. Stroud v. U. S., 251 U. S. 15. Compulsory Production of Books and Papers Suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of offenses against the law are of a quasi criminal nature, and a compulsory production of the private books and papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit is compelling him to be a witness against himself and is the equivalent of an unreasonable search and seizure. Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 634. The admission in evidence of papers taken from the person of a defendant in a criminal case is not a violation of the fourth amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Sharpless, 111 S. W. 69. There is no unreasonable search and seizure when a writ, suitably specific and properly limited in its scope, calls for the production of documents which, as against their lawful owner to whom the writ is directed, the party procuring its issuance is entitled to have produced. It was so held in Wilson v. U. S. (221 U. S. 361) as to an officer of a corporation who was compelled to produce books and papers of the corporation whose guilt of an offense was under investigation. See also Wheeler v. U. S., 226 U. S. 478. Heike v. U. S., 227 U. S. 131. Amend. 4.-Searches and Seizures. If a litigant has no right in or to the papers in the hands of a third person, nor any legal interest in them, it might possibly violate the fourth amendment to force the latter to produce them by an unwarrantable seizure, actual or constructive. See In re Comingore (96 Fed. 552, affirmed in 177 U. S. 470), as to the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, under the regulations as to the custody, use and preservation of the records, papers, and property appertaining to the business of his department, to take from a subordinate, such as a collector, all discretion as to permitting the records in his custody to be used for any other purpose than the collection of the revenue, and reserve for his own determination all matters of that character. This clause was not intended to interfere with the power of courts to compel, through a subpœna duces tecum, the production, upon a trial in court, of documentary evidence, and an officer or agent of a corporation may be required, under such process, to produce the books and papers of the corporation. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43. American Lith. Co. v. Werckmeister, 221 U. S. 603. Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616. Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541. Potter v. Beal, 49 Fed. 793, distinguishing Boyd v. U. S., supra. Essgee Co. v. U. S., 262 U. S. 151. Dier v. Banton, 262 U. S. 147. Requiring Corporations to Make Tax Returns The provisions of the tariff act of August 5, 1909, known as the corporation tax law, requiring certain returns to be filed by corporations in the office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, do not offend against this amendment. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107. Compelling Interstate Corporations to Produce Contracts Compelling interstate corporations to produce contracts with coal companies, to be used as evidence before the Interstate Commerce Commission, which would tend to show a discrimination against coal companies not having such contracts and paying the full rate, does not constitute a violation of the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. I. C. C. v. Baird, 194 U. S. 44. Requiring Witness to Testify Before Senate as to Business Transaction A party is not subjected to an unreasonable search by reason of being required, in an investigation conducted by the Senate, to appear as a witness and answer the question whether the firm of which the witness was a member had bought or sold certain stocks for or in the interest of any United States Senator. In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 669. Chapman v. U. S., 5 App. Cas. (D. C.) 122; 8 App. Cas. 302. 12703°-S. Doc. 157, 68-1-40 Amend. 4.-Searches and Seizures. Use of Papers or Property Illegally Obtained as Evidence The admission of testimony illegally obtained does not constitute a violation of the constitutional guaranty of privilege under this amendment. Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 597. The refusal of an application to return private papers, books, and other property, seized by the marshal upon the arrest of a person without warrant or search warrant, and their use in evidence on the trial, is a denial of rights secured by this amendment. Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383. The knowledge gained by the Federal Government's own wrong in seizing papers in violation of the owners' constitutional protection against unlawful searches and seizures can not be used by the Government in a criminal prosecution by serving subpoenas upon such owners to produce the original papers, which it had returned after copies had been made, and by obtaining a court order commanding compliance with such subpoenas. Silverthorne Lbr. Co. v. U. S., 251 U. S. 385. The United States may retain for use as evidence in the criminal prosecution of their owner incriminating documents which are turned over to it by private individuals who procured them without the participation or knowledge of any Government official, through a wrongful search of the owner's private desk and papers in an office. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465; Justices Brandeis and Holmes dissenting. But a governmental fishing expedition into the papers of a private corporation on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of crime is so contrary to first principles of justice, if not defiant of this amendment, that an intention to grant the power to a subordinate agency will not be attributed to Congress unless expressed in most explicit language. Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298. In a prosecution for concealing spirits, admission of testimony of revenue officers as to finding moonshine whiskey in a broken jug and other vessels near the house where the defendant resided and as to suspicious occurrences in that vicinity at the time of their visit, held not violative of the fourth or fifth amendments, even though the witnesses held no warrant and were trespassers on the land, the matters attested being merely acts and disclosures of defendant and his associates outside the house. The protection accorded by the fourth amendment to persons, houses, papers, and effects" does not extend to open fields. 66 Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57. Necessity of Showing "Probable Cause" A warrant of commitment by justices of the peace must state a good cause certain, supported by oath. Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch 448. Amend. 4.-Searches and Seizures. An act of Congress, legislating for the District of Columbia, providing that all vagrants, all idle and disorderly and suspicious persons, etc., shall upon conviction thereof be fined, etc., held nugatory and without effect as to the provisions declaring that "all suspicious persons" could be arrested and prosecuted as criminals. A suspicious character does not constitute crime, nor does it justify the Government in treating the party having such reputation as a criminal, without connecting him with some criminal act or conduct. Stoutenburgh v. Frazier, 16 App. Cas. (D. C.) 229. Amendment 5.-RIGHTS OF PERSONS. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. Leading Cases Indictment In Talton v. Mayes (163 U. S. 376) it was said: As the powers of local self-government enjoyed by the Cherokee Nation existed prior to the Constitution, they are not operated upon by the fifth amendment, which had for its sole object to control the powers conferred by the Constitution on the National Government (p. 382). It was held in Hawaii v. Mankichi (190 U. S. 213) that this amendment did not apply to Hawaii during the period of its transition from the Republic of Hawaii to a Territory of the United States. Double Jeopardy In Ex parte Lange (18 Wall. 169) it was held: To every indictment or information charging a party with a known and defined crime or misdemeanor, whether at the common law or by statute, a plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict is a good defense. In Simmons v. U. S. (142 U. S. 148) the court held that an acquittal before a court having no jurisdiction is like all the proceedings in the case, absolutely void, and, therefore, no bar to a subsequent indictment and trial in a court which has jurisdiction of the offense. Where a jury is discharged in a criminal case during the trial for reasons satisfactory to the judge, and the defendant is subsequently tried by another jury, he is not twice in jeopardy. 1 See p. 25 for ratification. For prohibition on States relating to due process of law, see Amend. 14, p. 660. Amend. 5. Rights of Persons-Leading Cases. In Thompson v. U. S. (155 U. S. 271) the court, without the consent of the defendant, discharged the jury and directed another jury to be called. The defendant pleaded he had been once put in jeopardy for the same offense for which he now stood charged. It was held that courts of justice are invested with the authority to discharge a jury from giving a verdict, whenever in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of justice would otherwise be defeated, and to order a trial by another jury; and that defendant is not thereby twice put in jeopardy. In Grafton v. U. S. (206 U. S. 333) it was held that one having been tried for committing an offense in the Philippine Islands and acquitted can not subsequently be tried for the same offense in the United States; for an acquittal anywhere within the jurisdiction of the United States is a good defense against a second trial, although this is not true where one commits an offense which is indictable both in a State and the United States. In such case an acquittal in one court does not preclude a trial in the other. Self-Incrimination In Counselman v. Hitchcock (142 U. S. 562) the court said: It is impossible that the meaning of the constitutional provision can only be that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution against himself. It would doubtless cover such cases, but it is not limited to them. The object was to insure that a person should not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony which might tend to show that he himself had committed a crime. The privilege is limited to criminal matters, but it is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard. * It is entirely consistent with the language of article 5 that the privilege of not being a witness against himself is to be exercised in a proceeding before a grand jury. In Brown v. Walker (161 U. S. 600) it was said: The danger of extending the principle announced in Counselman v. Hitchcock is that the privilege may be put forward for a sentimental reason, or for a purely fanciful protection of the witness against an imaginary danger, and for the real purpose of securing immunity to some third person, who is interested in concealing the facts to which he would testify. Every good citizen is bound to aid in the enforcement of the law and has no right to permit himself, under the pretext of shielding his own good name, to be made the tool of others, who are desirous of seeking shelter behind his privilege. The court held that the act of Congress of 1893 afforded immunity against prosecution and deprived the witnesses of their constitutional right to refuse to answer. In the Matter of Moran (203 U. S. 96) the petitioner was compelled to stand up and walk before the jury and during recess of the court the jury was stationed so as to observe his size and walk. Whether this was compelling one to be a witness against himself was a question which the Supreme Court declined to decide. |