Amend. 14.-Rights of Citizens Sec. 1.-Citizenship have been rendered, does not amount to an arbitrary deprivation of the rights of the citizen. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Woodson, 134 U. S. 623. Statutes regulating the manufacture and sale of goods do not abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 657. Gray v. Connecticut, 159 U. S. 77. Lemieux v. Young, 211 U. S. 489. Kidd, etc., Co. v. Musselman Gro. Co., 217 U. S. 461. Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260. Relation of Employer and Employee 1 Regulating hours of labor.-A State statute providing that the period of employment of mine workers shall be eight hours per day, except in case of emergency where life or property is in imminent danger, does not abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens. These employments, when too long pursued, the legislature has judged to be detrimental to the health of the employees, and so long as there are reasonable grounds for believing that this is so, its decision upon this subject can not be reviewed by the Federal courts. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 380. Employment of labor on public works. A statute which provides that "In the construction of public works by the State or a municipality, or by persons contracting with the State or such municipality, only citizens of the United States shall be employed; and in all cases where laborers are employed on any such public works, preference shall be given citizens of the State of New York," does not abridge the privileges and immunities of contractors and those of their alien employees. Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175. Crane v. New York, 239 U. S. 195. Employers' liability.—A statute making a railroad company liable to its employees for injuries resulting from the negligence of fellow servants and depriving the company of the defense of contributory negligence does not abridge its privileges and immunities under this clause. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Castle, 224 U. S. 541. See same subject, p. 103, as to Federal regulation. * See also same subject, p. 103. Amend. 14.-Rights of Citizens Practice of Law Sec. 1.-Citizenship The right to admission to practice in the courts of a State is not one of the privileges or immunities belonging to citizens of the United States, and the refusal of a State court to grant a license to a woman to practice law is not within the prohibition of this clause. Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. 139. In re Lockwood, 154 U. S. 116. Right of Suffrage The Constitution does not define the privileges and immunities of citizens, and the right of suffrage is not one of them. This amendment, the court said in Minor v. Happersett (21 Wall. 171) did not add to the privileges and immunities of a citizen. It simply furnished an additional guaranty for the protection of such as he already had. No new voters were necessarily made by it. Indirectly it may have had that effect, because it may have increased the number of citizens entitled to suffrage under the Constitution and laws of the States, but it operates for this purpose, if at all, through the States and the State laws, and not directly upon the citizen. See also Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 632. Negligence Prohibiting stipulation against negligence in delivery of telegraph message. A statute prohibiting a stipulation against liability for negligence in the delivery of an interstate message is not invalid as abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens. Western Union v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U. S. 406. Liability of mine owner for negligence of licensed manager or engineer. It is an appropriate exercise of the police power of the State to regulate the use and enjoyment of mining properties, and mine owners are not deprived of their property, privileges, or immunities without due process of law by the Illinois mining statute of 1899, which requires the employment of only licensed mine managers and mine examiners, and imposes upon the mine owners liability for the willful failure of the manager and examiner to furnish a reasonably safe place for the workmen. Wilmington Star Min. Co. v. Fulton, 205 U. S. 60. Public Speaking A municipal ordinance providing that "no person shall, in or upon any of the public grounds, make any public address * except in accordance with a permit from the mayor," is not void under this amendment, as the power conferred upon the chief executive officer of the city may be fairly claimed to be a mere administrative function vested in the mayor. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U. S. 44. Amend. 14.-Rights of Citizens State Taxation 1 Sec. 1.-Citizenship Tax on emigrant agents.-A State law taxing the business of hiring persons to labor outside the State does not restrict the right of a citizen to move from one State to another, and so abridge his privileges and immunities. If it can be said to affect the freedom of egress from the State, or the freedom of contract, it is only incidentally and remotely. The individual laborer is left free to come and go at pleasure, and to make such contracts as he chooses, while those whose business it is to induce persons to enter into labor contracts and to change their location, though left free to contract, are subjected to taxation in respect of their business as other citizens are. Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 274. Tax on passengers.-A State statute imposing a capitation tax upon passengers for the privilege of leaving the State, or passing through it by the ordinary mode of passenger travel, deprives citizens of other States of the right to pass and repass through every part of the United States, as the tax would ultimately fall upon the passengers. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 49. Succession tax.-State law imposing a tax upon transfer before the funds come within the State is not contrary to this amendment. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189. Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 287. Taxing debt held against nonresident.-The Constitution does not prohibit a State from taxing in the hands of one of its resident citizens a debt held by him upon a resident of another State, and evidenced by the bond of the debtor, secured by deed of trust or mortgage upon real estate situated in the State in which the debtor resides. So long as the State, by its laws prescribing the mode and subjects of taxation, does not intrench upon the legitimate authority of the Union, or violate any right recognized or secured by the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court, as between the State and its citizens, can afford him no relief against State taxation, however unjust, oppressive, or onerous. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 498. Due Process Leading Cases In Munn v. Illinois (94 U. S. 123, 125) the court said: The Constitution contains no definition of the word deprive" as used in the fourteenth amendment. To determine its signification it is necessary to ascertain the effect which usage has given it, when employed in 1 See also same subject, pp. 74, 180, 315, 362, 366, 600, 636, 707, and 728. Amend. 14.-Rights of Citizens Sec. 1.-Due Process-Leading Cases the same or a like connection In Twining v. New Jersey (211 U. S. 101) the court considered the meaning of the words in the light of their historical origin and drew the following conclusions: First. What is due process of law may be ascertained by an examination of those settled usages and modes of proceedings existing in the common and statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors, and shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country. Second. It does not follow, however, that a procedure settled in English law at the time of the emigration and brought to this country and practised by our ancestors is an essential element of due process of law. If that were so, the procedure of the first half of the seventeenth century would be fastened upon the American jurisprudence like a strait-jacket, only to be unloosed by constitutional amendments. Third. But, consistently with the requirements of due process, no change in ancient procedure can be made which disregards those fundamental principles, to be ascertained from time to time by judicial action, which have relation to process of law and protect the citizen in his private right, and guard him against the arbitrary action of government. In Allgeyer v. Louisiana (165 U. S. 589) it was said that the liberty mentioned in this amendment means: Not only the right of a citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to use them in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned. In Raymond v. Chicago Packing Co. (207 U. S. 20) the court said that the fourteenth amendment is not confined to the action of the State through its legislative, its executive, or judicial departments, but covers all the instrumentalities by which the State acts, and whoever by virtue of public position in a State government deprives one of any right protected by the amendment violates it, and if he acts in the name of the State and for the State and is clothed with the State's authority, his act is that of the State. In Muller v. Oregon (208 U. S. 421) it was held: It is undoubtedly true, as more than once declared by this court, that the general right to contract in relation to one's business is part of the liberty of the individual, protected by the fourteenth amendment to the Amend. 14.-Rights of Citizens Sec. 1.-Due Process-Leading Cases Federal Constitution, yet it is equally well settled that this liberty is not absolute and extending to all contracts, and that a State may, without conflicting with the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, restrict in many respects the individual's power of contract. Murray v. Hoboken Land, etc., Co., 18 How. 272. Williams v. Feers, 179 U. S. 274. Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U. S. 179. Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Bank, 207 U. S. 256. Heath v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366. Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45. Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U. S. 481. Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316. Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U. S. 401. Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516. Wadley Southern R. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651. Ex parte Wall. 107 U. S. 265. In Davidson v. New Orleans (96 U. S. 97) the court said: Whenever by the laws of a State or by State authority a tax, assessment, servitude, or other burden is imposed upon property for the public use, whether it be for the whole State or of some more limited portion of the community, and those laws provide for a mode of confirming or contesting the charge thus imposed in the ordinary courts of justice with such notice to the person or such proceeding in regard to the property as is appropriate to the nature of the case, the judgment in such proceedings can not be said to deprive the owner of his property without due process of law. In Hager v. Reclamation District (111 U. S. 708) it was said that this clause means "that there can be no proceeding against life, liberty, or property which may result in the deprivation of either, without the observance of those general rules established in our system of jurisprudence for the security of private rights." In Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Humes (115 U. S. 520) the court said: If the laws enacted by a State be within the legitimate sphere of legislative power, and their enforcement be attended with the observance of those general rules which our system of jurisprudence prescribes for the security of private rights, the harshness, injustice, and oppressive character of such laws will not invalidate them as affecting life, liberty, or property without due process of law. In Truax v. Corrigan (257 U. S. 312) the court considered the relations of this and the equal protection clauses. (Opinion by Chief Justice Taft, p. 331.) Definition In general. The phrase "due process of law " is, in terms, extended to the States by this amendment. As applied to the States the guaranty adds nothing to the right of one citizen against another, but simply prevents any encroachment by the State upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen. "Due process of law," as here used refers to the law of the land |