Amend. 14.-Rights of Citizens Sec. 1.-Due Process-Criminal Prosecutions Mob domination.-Trial for murder in a State court in which accused are hurried to conviction under mob domination without regard for their rights is without due process, and void. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86. Witnesses and evidence.—In general.-Exemption from disclosure as a witness of evidence against oneself is not guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78. Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Minnesota, 193 U. S. 52. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U. S. 212. Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35. Lindsley v. Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61. Reitler v. Harris, 223 U. S. 437. Esterling Lbr. Co. v. Pierce, 235 U. S. 380. Testimony taken at former hearing.-Due process of law does not forbid a hearing upon a transcript of evidence formerly heard in court when the parties assented to the course. De La Rama v. De La Rama, 241 U. S. 154. Refusal of court to refer to presumption of innocence.-Refusal to refer to the presumption of innocence in a charge to the jury, when the court charged that the guilt of the accused must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt, and also explained what is meant by the term "reasonable doubt," which charge was sustained by the Supreme Court, is not a denial of due process of law. Howard v. Fleming, 191 U. S. 137. Judgment. When by a State law, at the time of the trial and sentence of an accused person, the court in which he was tried and sentenced was a court de jure, and the judge who tried and sentenced him was at least judge de facto, and the sentence itself was valid, such sentence is not a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In re Manning, 139 U. S. 504. The striking out of an answer and rendering judgment by default for failure to produce books and papers called for is not a deprivation of property without due process of law. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322. Sentence and punishment.-Statute providing for the infliction of the death penalty by electricity does not violate the due process clause by imposing a cruel punishment. In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436. Coffey v. Harlan County, 204 U. S. 659. Amend. 14.-Rights of Citizens Sec. 1.-Due Process-Criminal Prosecutions See also Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U. S. 483, as to power of governor to fix date McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U. S. 155, as to mode of directing execution. A statute which provides for a hearing on whether a person convicted of crime and sentenced to the penitentiary has been previously convicted and punished for crime, and if so found to be an habitual criminal to be sentenced to an additional or increased term of imprisonment, does not deprive such a person of liberty without due process of law. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616. Due process of law does not require that the accused shall, upon the affirmance of a judgment, be sentenced anew by the trial court or be present when the day is fixed by the appellate court for carrying the original sentence into execution. The judgment prescribing the punishment is not vacated by the writ of error; only its execution is stayed pending proceedings in the appellate court. Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U. S. 451. Legislation and judicial action of the State enforcing it can only be interfered with, if the fines imposed are so grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Waters-Pierce-Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 86. A sentence of 14 years for the crime of perjury can not be held to be so grossly excessive as to be prohibited by this amendment when it does not exceed the limit prescribed by statute. Collins v. Johnston, 237 U. S. 502. The Federal Constitution neither grants nor forbids to the governor of a State the right to stay the execution of a sentence. Storti v. Massachusetts, 183 U. S. 142. Enormous fines and imprisonment.-A statute prescribing rates and attempting to enforce them by imposing enormous fines and possible imprisonment as a result of an unsuccessful effort to test the validity of the laws themselves, is unconstitutional on its face without regard to the question of the insufficiency of those rates. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123. That a statute can not, by severe penal provisions, penalize resort to the courts in doubtful cases, see also the following cases. Missouri v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 241 U. S. 533. Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Michigan, 231 U. S. 457. Amend. 14.—Rights of Citizens Sec. 1.-Due Process-Criminal Prosecution Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Conley, 230 U. S. 513. Southwestern Tel., etc., Co. v. Danaher, 238 U. S. 482. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26. Penalties and forfeitures.-Penalties imposed by the jury and confirmed by the State courts at the rate of $1,500 and $50 per day for violating State antitrust laws are not so excessive as to deprive defendant of its property without due process of law, where such property amounts to more than $40,000,000 and its dividends have been as high as 700 per cent per annum. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 86. See also Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 234 U. S. 123. Absence of defendant-In general.-Where a verdict was rendered in the absence of the defendant, who shortly thereafter was made fully aware of the facts, and he then made a motion for a new trial upon many grounds, without including this as one, and had the motion heard by both the trial court and the State supreme court, a ruling of the State courts that he could not, after this motion had been finally adjudicated against him, move to set aside the verdict as a nullity because of his absence when the verdict was rendered, does not violate this amendment. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309. Waiver of right to be present.-When a person charged with a felony has, through his counsel, waived his right to be present, the examination of a juror as to his competency to serve, by the presiding judge in the absence of the prisoner, does not deprive him of his liberty without due process. This was decided upon the ground that under the law of the State, occasional absence of the accused from the trial, from which no injury results to his substantial rights, is not reversible error. Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U. S. 164. In appellate court.-Due process of law does not require the personal presence of one convicted of a crime in an appellate court at the time of entering the order affirming the judgment by which he was sentenced; and this is so notwithstanding that the appellate court, under express authority conferred by statute, fixes the time when the punishment prescribed by the judgment which is affirmed shall be inflicted. Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U. S. 451. See also Fielden v. Illinois, 143 U. S. 456. As to statutes imposing penalties and forfeitures in connection with taxation, see p. 708. Amend. 14.-Rights of Citizens Sec. 1.-Due Process-Criminal Prosecutions Appellate jurisdiction and procedure.—The right of appeal is not essential to due process of law. Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 508. While the fourteenth amendment does not require that a State shall provide for an appellate review in criminal cases, it is perfectly obvious that where such an appeal is provided for, and the prisoner has had the benefit of it, the proceedings in the appellate tribunal are to be regarded as a part of the processs of law under which he is held in custody by the State, and to be considered in determining any question of alleged deprivation of his life or liberty contrary to the fourteenth amendment. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 327. Allen v. Georgia, 166 U. S. 138. Statute which requires the court on appeal to consider evidence received without objection, though not admissible under the pleadings, and to render judgment regardless of the variance between the pleadings and the evidence, does not deny due process of law. Loeber v. Schroeder, 149 U. S. 580. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Higdon, 234 U. S. 592. Liability for costs.-The question of what costs are allowed by law is for the court to determine, and an erroneous judgment of what the law allows does not deprive a party of due process of law. Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 258. A statute providing that when a prosecution has been instituted without probable cause and maliciously, the name of the prosecutor shall be stated in the finding and he shall be adjudged to pay the costs, and committed to the county jail until they are paid, is not invalid as depriving the prosecutor of his property without due process of law. Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U. S. 81. Allowance of attorney's fees.-A statute providing for the recovery of reasonable attorney's fees in actions on small claims against all classes of defendants, individual and corporate, does not deprive a defendant in such cases of property without due process of law. Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Cade, 233 U. S. 642. Capital Trust Co. v. Calhoun, 250 U. S. 208. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Nye-Schneider-Fowler Co., 260 U. S. 35. State Control Over Court Procedure In general.-The State has full control over the procedure in its courts, both in civil and criminal cases, subject only to the qualification that such procedure must not work a denial of fundamental rights or conflict with specific and applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution. Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 175. Roller v. Murray, 234 U. S. 738. McDonald v. Oregon R., etc., Co., 233 U. S. 665. Amend. 14.-Rights of Citizens Sec. 1.-Due Process-Court Procedure York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 20. Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U. S. 167. Allen v. Georgia, 166 U. S. 138. West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 263. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Cole, 251 U. S. 54. Proceedings under statute antedating amendment.-Proceedings taken subsequent to the enactment of this amendment under a statute passed prior to its enactment, fall within its inhibition. Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay, etc., Co., 142 U. S. 254. State court must have jurisdiction.-Proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 733. Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 46. Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193. Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U. S. 464. Mandamus to maintain or restore status quo.-The granting of an order or writ to maintain or restore the status quo pending the outcome of existing litigation does not deny due process of law, especially when the relief is granted upon condition that ample security be given to make good any loss that may be sustained thereby. Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. Michigan, 240 U. S. 564. Continuance.-Refusing a continuance after permitting a pleading to be amended does not present a case of denial of due process of law, especially when there is nothing to show an abuse of discretion. Seaboard Air Line v. Koennecke, 239 U. S. 352. To establish equitable interest in land.-This amendment does not prevent a State from giving jurisdiction to a court of equity of a suit brought by the owner of an equitable interest in land to establish his rights against the holder of the legal title, as depriving the holder of the legal title of the right to a trial by jury which he would have had in a suit at law. Church v. Kelsey, 121 U. S. 283. Issue of insanity.-When, after a regular conviction and sentence, a suggestion of a then existing insanity is made, it is not necessary, in order to constitute due process of law, that the question so presented should be tried by a jury in a judicial proceeding surrounded by all the safeguards and the requirements of a common-law jury trial, when, by the State law, full and adequate administrative and quasi-judicial process is created for the purpose of investigating the suggestion. Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U. S. 405. See also Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427, as to arrest and confinement of insane persons. 12703°-S. Doc. 157, 68-1- 48 |