Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce TheRecapture" Case (Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. U. S., 263 U. S. 456), interpreting section 422 of the transportation act of 1920 (section 15a, interstate commerce act), held: That the provisions for "recapture" and use of excess income are essential to the plan of the act, which aims for an efficient national transportation system, and therein seeks to maintain uniform rates for all shippers as a means of distributing traffic and avoiding congestion on the stronger railroads, while keeping the net returns of the railroads, whether strong or weak, to the varying percentages that are fair to them, respectively; rates which as a body enable all the railroads necessary to do the business of a rate section, to enjoy not more than a fair net operating income on the aggregate value of their properties therein economically and efficiently operated, are, in their general level, reasonable from the standpoint of the individual shipper in that section; the statute leaves the reasonableness of each particular rate open to inquiry independently of the net return to the carrier from all; a railroad, however strong financially, is not entitled as a constitutional right to more than a fair net operating income upon the value of its properties devoted to transportation. Under the statute excess income is taken in trust, and the carrier never has such a title to it as to render its recapture by the Government a taking without due process, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The recapture clause does not, by reducing net income from intrastate rates, invade the reserved power of the States in violation of the Tenth Amendment, but, in view of its relation to the plan and national purpose of the act, is within the power of Congress over interstate commerce. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U. S. (175 U. S. 211), holding: Under this grant of power to Congress, that body, in our judgment, may enact such legislation as shall declare void and prohibit the performance of any contract between individuals or corporations where the natural and direct effect of such a contract will be, when carried out, to directly, and not as a mere incident to other and innocent purposes, regulate to any substantial extent interstate commerce. We do not assent to the correctness of the proposition that the constitutional guaranty of liberty to the individual to enter into private contracts limits the power of Congress and prevents it from legislating upon the subject of contracts of the class mentioned. Champion v. Ames (188 U. S. 321), in which it was held that "lottery tickets are subjects of traffic, and therefore are subjects of commerce, and the regulation of the carriage of such tickets from State to State, at least by independent carriers, is a regulation of commerce among the several States"; such interstate carriage prohibited as injurious to the public generally. Prohibition as a means of regulation has been approved by the Supreme Court in several other cases: U. S. v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470. U. S. v. Delaware & H. Co., 213 U. S. 366. I. C. C. v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (220 U. S. 235), holding that a carrier can not make mere ownership of goods tendered for transportation the test of the duty to carry, nor may a carrier discriminate in fixing charges for carriage upon such ownership, and that in the absence of statutory authority to exclude forwarding agents from availing of published rates the courts can Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce not overrule a conclusion of the Interstate Commerce Commission that such exclusion would create a preference. The term "commerce" not only includes navigation but the transportation, by whatever agencies, of commodities or of passengers, even on foot, or the transmission of ideas, and it is immaterial whether such transportation is connected with a sale. Included in the term transportation are all the services in connection with the receipt and delivery of the property transported. A contract may or may not be a transaction of interstate commerce. If it is in the form of a bill of lading, it is; but if in the form of a bill of exchange, or of a contract to perform labor outside the State, or of a contract for future delivery to be executed in another State, or of the contract of a private banker with his depositors, it is not. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Brdg. Co., 13 How. 518. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713. Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580. U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Frt. Assn., 166 U. S. 290. Covington Brdg. Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204. Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123. Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73. Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270. Ware & Leland v. Mobile County, 209 U. S. 405. Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U. S. 128. See also Henderson v. New York City, 92 U. S. 259. Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U. S. 541. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557. Willson v. Blackbird Creek etc. Co., 2 Pet. 245. Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275. Railroad Co. v. Fuller, 17 Wall. 560. Lake Shore etc. R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285. Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38. Inman S. S. Co. v. Tinker, 94 U. S. 238. Interstate commerce is not confined to transportation from one State to another, but comprehends all commercial intercourse between different States and all the component parts of that intercourse, including the purchase and sale of the commodities transported. Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282. The Grant of Power To Congress It is Congress, and not the judicial department, to which the Constitution has given the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States. The courts can never take the initiative on this subject. Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 701. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress To Regulate Cl. 3.-Commerce To regulate, in the sense intended, is to foster, protect, control, and restrain, with appropriate regard for the welfare of those who are immediately concerned and of the public at large. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 47. The power to regulate includes the power to prohibit in cases where such prohibition is in aid of the lawful protection of the public. Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137. Addyston Pipe, etc., Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 211. U. S. v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U. S. 505. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412. Nature, Extent, and Grounds of Power The power of Congress extends to such acts done on land which interfere with the due exercise of its powers to regulate commerce, including navigation. U. S. v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72. Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 459. So far as it may be necessary to protect the products of other states and countries from discrimination by reason of their foreign origin, the power of the National Government over commerce reaches the interior of every State in the Union. Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434. St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 149 U. S. 465. The power to regulate commerce has no limitations other than those prescribed in the Constitution, but does not carry with it the right to destroy or impair those limitations and guaranties which are also placed in the Constitution and amendments. U. S. v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U. S. 505. Relation of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction1 The Act of February 26, 1845 (5 Stat. 726), extending the jurisdiction of the district courts to certain cases upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting the same is not referable to the commerce clause, but was enacted under the clause granting maritime and admiralty jurisdiction to the Federal courts. The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443. Fretz v. Bull, 12 How. 466. The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624. The power of Congress to legislate on the subject of the right of recovery for death on the high seas caused by negligence has been derived both from the power to regulate commerce and from the clause extending the judicial power to cases of maritime and admiralty jurisdiction. Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. Gilmore, 207 U. S. 404. 'See also same subject, Article III, section 2, p. 446. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce Congress has undoubted authority under the commercial power, if no other, to introduce such changes as are likely to be needed. The scope of the maritime law and that of commercial regulation are not conterminous, but the latter embraces much of the largest portion of ground covered by the former. Under it Congress has regulated the registry, enrolment, license, and nationality of ships and vessels; the method of recording bills of sale and mortgages thereon; the rights and duties of seamen; the limitations of the responsibility of shipowners for the negligence and misconduct of their captains and crews; and many other things of a character truly maritime. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 577. Providence, etc., S. S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U. S. 589. Right to Raise Constitutional Question An interstate carrier who has refused to furnish cars for interstate transportation, as required by State statute, can not test the constitutionality of the act as affecting interstate commerce in a suit to enjoin actions to recover penalties for violation of its provisions where provisions affecting interstate commerce are separable from the remaining provisions. Hampton v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 227 U. S. 456. Missouri, etc., R. Co. v. Cade, 233 U. S. 642. The constitutionality of an act is not involved in a case where the plaintiff is not affected by the provisions of the act. Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1. Effect of the Fifth Amendment 1. The power of Congress to regulate commerce is subject to the limitation of the fifth amendment, and in exercising the power to take private property it must proceed subject to that amendment. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S. 312. Riparian owners who have erected on a water front wharves conforming to harbor line adopted by the Federal Government have no right to compensation under the fifth amendment where Congress establishes a new harbor line requiring destruction of a portion of such structures. Greenleaf-Johnson Lbr. Co. v. Garrison, 237 U. S. 251. U. S. v. Delaware & H. Co., 213 U. S. 366. Effect of the Eleventh Amendment' This amendment, prohibiting the bringing of a suit against a State by a citizen of another State, can not be construed to nullify the power of Congress to regulate commerce nor prevent an action to restrain a State railroad commission from enforcing an order injuriously affecting interstate commerce. Mississippi v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.. 203 U. S. 335. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Commencement and Termination of Power Cl. 3.-Commerce Goods do not cease to be part of the general mass of property in the State, subject as such to its jurisdiction and to taxation in the usual way, until they have been shipped, or entered with a common carrier for transportation to another State, or have been started upon such transportation in a continuous route or journey. Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 527. Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U. S. 111. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 565. Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 U. S. 96. U. S. v. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 13. Addyston Pipe, etc., Co. v. U. S. 175 U. S. 211. The commercial power continues until the commodity has ceased to be the subject of discriminating legislation by reason of its foreign character. That power protects it, even after it has entered the State, from any burdens imposed by reason of its foreign origin. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 282. Tierman v. Rinker, 102 U. S. 127. General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211. Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U. S. 7. Pittsburg, etc., Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 577. Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Louisiana, 236 U. S. 157. Susquehanna Coal Co. v. South Amboy, 228 U. S. 665. Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 196 U. S. 22. The point of time when the prohibition ceases and the power of the State to tax commences is not the instant when the article enters the country, but when the importer has so acted upon it that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, which happens when the original package is no longer such in his hands. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 110. Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296. McNeill v. Southern R. Co., 202 U. S. 543. When goods are sent from one State to another for sale, or in consequence of a sale, they become part of its general property, and amenable to its laws; provided that no discrimination be made against them as goods from another State, and that they be not taxed by reason of being brought from another State, but only taxed in the usual way as other goods are. Robbins v. Shelby County, 120 U. S. 497. |