Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Application of Principles of Common Law Cl. 3.-Commerce The principles of the common law are operative upon all interstate commercial transactions except so far as they are modified by congressional enactment. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call, 181 U. S. 101. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 490. National Power of Eminent Domain' Whenever it becomes necessary, for the accomplishment of any object within the authority of Congress, to exercise the right of eminent domain and take private lands, making just compensation to the owners, Congress may do this, with or without a concurrent act of the State in which the lands lie. Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 529. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 657. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713. Exclusive Powers of Congress Over Commerce In General In the exercise of its exclusive power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce Congress has enacted several statutes which not only restrain the States but act directly upon individuals and corporations engaged in such commerce and impose restrictions or create affirmative duties. Among the most important of these are: The interstate commerce act, first enacted in 1887 and many times amended. The predominant purpose of its enactment was to prevent unreasonable and discriminatory rates, but the Interstate Commerce Commission was not empowered to fix rates. By the Hepburn Act of 1906 this power was conferred upon the commission, transportation companies were forbidden to transport their own commodities, the giving of free passes was regulated, pipe lines, express companies, and sleeping-car companies were brought within the provisions of the act, and the supervisory powers of the commission were much enlarged. In 1910 the jurisdiction of the commission was extended to cover telegraph and telephone companies, and it was empowered to suspend advances in rates. By the Panama act of 1912 the power of the commission was extended to transportation by both water and rail, but not over commerce that moved wholly by water. In 1913 the commission was directed to undertake a physical valuation of all the property owned by every carrier subject to its jurisdiction. The antitrust act of 1890 provided that "every contract, combination in the form of trust, or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations is hereby declared to be illegal." This act has been applied to combinations among transportation companies, to holding companies which interfere with the freedom of interstate commerce, to combinations of manufacturers for the pur See also "Eminent Domain," under Amendment 5, p. 607. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce pose of controlling the course of trade, and to labor unions conducting a boycott which interfered with interstate commerce. The employers' liability act of 1906 considerably modified the fellow-servant rule of the common law as applied to the employees of carriers. As the act applied to persons in both intrastate and interstate commerce, it was declared unconstitutional in respect to the former, but was held valid as to carriers in the District of Columbia and the Territories. In order to meet the objections raised by the Supreme Court, Congress in 1908 passed a second act, which is confined to persons actually engaged in interstate commerce, and this was sustained by the Supreme Court. The Federal safety appliance acts, enacted in 1893 and the years following, required interstate trains to be equipped with certain safety devices. The hours of service act of 1907 restricted the hours of labor of railway employees operating trains moving in interstate commerce. The so-called "Adamson law" of 1916 established an eighthour day and minimum wages for employees of carriers engaged in interstate and foreign commerce. The Federal Trade Commission act of 1914 creates the Federal Trade Commission. The gist of the act is contained in the provision "that unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful." The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 undertakes to prevent all persons engaged in interstate commerce from discriminating in prices between different purchasers of commodities or to accord preferential treatment to one person over another. Corporations engaged in interstate commerce are forbidden to purchase the stock of another corporation when such purchase would substantially diminish competition, and the right of individuals to act as director in more than one corporation is restricted. The relation between carriers and the corporations from which they obtain service or supplies is also regulated. The Federal control act of March 21, 1918, under which, pursuant to the act of August 29, 1916, and the President's proclamation of December 26, 1917, the railroads were taken over and administered under the war power, gave the Government full possession and control of the transportation systems of the country, and gave the President and the Interstate Commerce Commission power to fix all rates, interstate and intrastate, and superseded State power over the subject during the period of such control. The transportation act of February 28, 1920, Title III, creates the Railroad Labor Board, and clothes it with authority to entertain and decide disputes between carriers and their employees in respect of wages, grievances, rules, or working conditions. directs that all parties to such disputes be accorded a hearing 12703°-S. Doc. 157, 68-1-10 Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce either in person or by counsel, and requires that the decisions be entered in an appropriate record and that they and all violations of them be given such publicity as the board may indicate. Title IV invests the Interstate Commerce Commission with a substantial measure of control or supervision over interstate rates and fares; over the removal of any undue or unreasonable advantage, preference, or prejudice, as between persons or localities in intrastate commerce on the one hand and in interstate commerce on the other, arising from intrastate rates and fares; over the removal of any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate commerce caused by intrastate rates and fares; over the division of the carriers of the country into territorial groups for valuation and rate-making purposes; over what shall be regarded as a fair return on the aggregate value of the property of the carriers in each group; over the maintenance and use of certain reserve and contingent funds to be set apart from any revenue in excess of such fair returns; over the construction and acquisition of new lines and the extension and abandonment of old ones; over the pooling of traffic or earnings; over the consolidation of carriers; over the issue of stocks, bonds, and other securities by carriers; and over making the same person a director or officer of more than one carrier. These provisions contemplate and require in respect of most of the matters recited that the State wherein the carrier's line lies shall be notified and accorded a hearing before a finding or order is made by the commission. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. I. C. C., 162 U. S. 211. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. U. S. 243, U. S. 412. Montague v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38. Loewe v. Lawler, 208 U. S. 274. Eastern States Lbr. Assn. v. U. S., 234 U. S. 600. Swift & Co. v. U. S., 196 U. S. 375. U. S. v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417. Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443. Geddes v. Anaconda Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590. Frey & Son v. Cudahy, 256 U. S. 208. Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332. Federal Trade Comm. v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U. S. 441. Federal Trade Comm. v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 429 (dissenting opinion by Justice Brandeis). Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce Northern Pac. R. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Ault, 256 U. S. 554. Texas v. I. C. C., 258 U. S. 158. Texas v. Eastern Texas R. Co., 258 U. S. 204. Section 16 of the interstate commerce act, providing, "All actions at law by carriers subject to this act for recovery of their charges. . . shall be begun within three years from the time the cause of action accrues, and not after," does not apply to an action by the Director General of Railroads to recover demurrage charges accrued to the United States during the period of Federal control of railroads. Dupont & Co. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 456. This clause vests power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, etc., exclusively in Congress. Whether the power in any given case is vested exclusively in the General Government depends upon the nature of the subject to be regulated. It is only direct interferences with the freedom of interstate commerce that bring a case within the exclusive domain of Federal legislation. Hanley v. Kansas, etc., R. Co., 187 U. S. 617. Ohio v. Worthington, 225 U. S. 101. Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 358. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 727. Field v. Barber Asphalt Co., 194 U. S. 623. The National Government may remove all obstructions to interstate commerce and the transportation of the mails, either by force operating through the Executive or by process emanating from the courts. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564. Any act of a State interfering in any way with the free traffic between citizens of different States in any article of commerce is an attempted regulation of such commerce, and an invasion of the power exclusively conferred upon Congress, whose nonaction with respect to any particular commodity is a declaration of its purpose that the commerce therein shall be free. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313. Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce by any means which may be proper, so long as such means are not contrary to some provision of the Constitution. I. C. C. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447. Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U. S. 218. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Kaw Valley, 233 U. S. 75. A valid regulation of commerce need not apply to all commodities alike, but the regulations may make a discrimination between articles and carriers. U. S. v. Delaware & H. Co., 213 U. S. 366. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce Commerce among the States in any commodity can only be free when the commodity is exempted from all discriminating regulations and burdens imposed by local authority by reason of its foreign growth or manufacture. Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 351. This power is exclusive when the subjects of regulation are national in character or admit only of one uniform system of regulation. Ex Parte McNeil, 13 Wall. 236. State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232. Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691. Cardwell v. American River Brdg. Co., 113 U. S. 205. Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160. No part of the power of regulating commerce that is vested in Congress can be executed by a State; that power, so far as it is thus vested, belongs exclusively to Congress. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. Inhibitive congressional legislation is not essential to exclude State legislation upon incidental matters relating to interstate commerce with respect to which the States and Congress have a concurrent power. It is sufficient if the congressional legislation occupies the field of regulation. Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424. Same v. Reid & Beam, 222 U. S. 444. National Subjects Requiring Uniform Regulations The power to regulate commerce among the States, etc., is an absolute and exclusive grant of power to Congress; so far exclusive that no State has power to make any law or regulation which will affect the free and unrestrained intercourse and trade among the States. Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. The power embraces all the instruments by which such commerce may be conducted. Commerce, as embraced by this clause, strictly considered, consists in intercourse and traffic, including in these terms navigation and the transportation and transit of persons and property, as well as the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities. Whatever may be the nature and extent of the police power, no definition of it and no urgency for its use can authorize a State to exercise it in regard to a subject matter which has been confided to Congress exclusively. Whenever the statute of a State invades the domain of legislation which belongs exclusively to Congress, it is |