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from manifest clerical error? To give any other construction to this statute would lead us into interminable confusion.

In the same section 489 it is provided that

If the appraised value of any merchandise exceeds the value declared in the entry by more than 100 per centum, such entry shall be presumptively fraudulent, and the collector shall seize the whole case or package containing such merchandise and proceed as in case of forfeiture for violation of the customs law.

In the act of 1913, it is provided that if the appraised value “exceeded the entry value by more than 75 per centum" the entry should be held to be presumptively fraudulent. If this section of the act of 1922 is held to be retroactive as to additional duties, it would follow that it would be retroactive as to the percentage of undervaluation required for presumption of fraud. We think Congress here intended that a new standard or percentage of undervaluation should be made for new entries, and that they did not intend that those charged with the administration of the law should be required to readminister on fraudulent entries which arose under the act of 1913. To give a retroactive effect to section 489 would also justify the giving of the same effect to many different provisions in the act of 1922 which were not contained in the act of 1913. Section 516 on appeal or protest by American producers, and section 517 on frivolous protest or appeal, would also have a retroactive effect, and we do not think Congress so intended.

It will not be denied that the Government was entitled to regular duties on the correct market value when the goods were entered, notwithstanding the fact that the amount thereof was not finally determined until long after, and it seems clear that the same rule applies to additional duties, and that the fact that they were only declared upon final appraisement does not change the time of their accrual any more than it changes the time the importer becomes liable for regular duties.

It is urged by the importer that the liability for additional duties does not arise until after liquidation. Liquidation does not create any liability to pay duty. It merely registers the fact that duties had theretofore accrued to the Government. In United States v. Boyd (24 Fed. 692) the court held:

The right to duties accrues by the importation of merchandise with the intent to unlade, and immediately upon the importation the duties become a personal charge and debt upon the importer. (Citing Prince v. United States, supra.)

The case of the United States v. Brown & Roese (6 Ct. Cust. Appls. 382; T. D. 35922) is directly in point in the decision of the case at bar. In that case liquidation was had September 22, 1913, under the act of 1909. The protest was filed October 4, 1913, one day after the act of 1913 took effect. The act of 1909 did not require a pro

test fee; the act of 1913 required payment of $1 within 30 days after the protest was filed. The court at page 383 said:

The sole question standing for decision is whether the Congress saved the right to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the act of 1909 by paragraph S of section 4 of the act of 1913, which contained these provisions:

* But the repeal of existing laws or modifications thereof embraced in this act shall not affect any act done, or any right accruing or accrued, or any suit or proceeding had or commenced in any civil case before the said repeal or modification; but all rights and liabilities under said laws shall continue and may be enforced in the same manner as if said repeal or modifications had not been made. Any offenses committed and all penalties or forfeitures or liabilities incurred prior to the passage of this act under any statute embraced in or changed, modified, or repealed by this act may be prosecuted or punished in the same manner and with the same effect as if this act had not been passed. acts of limitation now in force, whether applicable to civil causes and proceedings or to the prosecution of offenses or for the recovery of penalties or forfeitures embraced in or modified, changed, or repealed by this act shall be affected thereby so far as they affect any suits, proceedings, or prosecutions, whether civil or criminal, for causes arising or acts done or committed prior to the passage of this act, which may be commenced and prosecuted within the same time and with the same effect as if this act had not been passed.

*

*

*

No

That the right to protest against the assessment of duties by the collector had accrued before the repeal of the act of 1909 took effect is clear. The saving clause of paragraph S declares that "the repeal of existing laws or modifications thereof embraced in this act shall not affect any act done or any right accruing or accrued * before the said repeal or modification," and that “all rights * under said laws shall continue and may be enforced in the same manner as if said repeal or modifications had not been made." The least that can be said is that paragraph N of section 3 of the act of 1913 modifies the manner of enforcing the right. It extends the time for filing protests, and at the same time imposes an additional requirement, i. e., payment of a fee. It can not be said that the importer is given the privilege of enforcing his rights in the same manner as under the act of 1909 if he is subjected to an additional burden.

A case cited by importer's counsel is Bechtel v. United States (101 U. S. 597). The Government brought suit to recover against certain manufacturers of matches for the value of revenue stamps delivered to the defendants, and at the trial offered in evidence a transcript of the defendant's account upon the books of the Treasury Department, which was admitted over objection. By section 2 of the act of March 3, 1797, certified transcripts of the accounts of the Treasury and all departments were competent evidence in all such cases. This act was

in force at the time suit was brought. Before the case came to trial, however, section 886 of the Revised Statutes was passed, which made such transcripts competent evidence only in suits against revenue officers. The question was whether the right to introduce these transcripts, notwithstanding the change in the law which would, as to future cases, render them inadmissible, was saved by the provision of section 5597 of the Revised Statutes, which provided:

The repeal of the several acts embraced in said revision shall not affect any act done, or any right accruing cr accrued, or any suit or proceeding had or commenced in any civil cause before the said repeal, but all rights and liabilities under said acts shall continue, and may be enforced in the same manner as if said repeal had not been made. *. (p. 384.)

It will be noted that the saving clause of the act of 1913 construed in the Brown & Roese case, supra, is in substantially the same language as is used in the act of 1922. True, the word "right" is omitted.

where it is used in connection with liabilities, but this is not regarded as material in the decision of the case at bar in so far as we hold that the obligation of paying additional duties was a liability of the importer at the time of undervaluation, and that this liability should continue and be enforced by the act of 1913. All the entries in the case having been made prior to the passage of the act of September 21, 1922, and the additional duties having been assessed by virtue of the undervaluation made at the time of entry, it follows that there is no remedy given for the remission of such duties except as provided for under the act of 1913, and that the Board of General Appraisers had no jurisdiction to hear petitions for remission of additional duties when filed under and in pursuance to the provisions of the act of 1922.

The judgment of the Board of General Appraisers is affirmed.

KEVE & YOUNG v. UNITED STATES (No. 2231).1

COURT OF CUSTOMS APPEALS, Jurisdiction-SECTION 489, Tariff Act of 1922. Following Brown & Co. et al. v. United States (12 Ct. Cust. Appls. 93; T. D. 40026), decided concurrently herewith, this court has jurisdiction to decide whether or not section 489, tariff act of 1922, granting the right to petition the Board of United States General Appraisers for remission of additional duties applies to entries made during the life of the act of 1913, and decides that it does not.

United States Court of Customs Appeals, February 9, 1924.

APPEAL from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8599 (T. D. 39399). [Affirmed.]

Barnes, Chilvers & Halstead (Frank M. Halstead of counsel) for appellants. William W. Hoppin, Assistant Attorney General (Oscar Igstaedter, special attorney, of counsel), for the United States.

Thomas J. Doherty, amicus curiæ.

[Oral argument October 23, 1923, by Mr. Halstead and Mr. Hoppin.]

Before MARTIN, Presiding Judge, and SMITH, BARBER, and BLAND, Associate Judges; HATFIELD, Associate Judge, participating in the decision by agreement of counsel.

BLAND, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court:

Certain auto plate junior matrixes were imported from Germany and entered on September 16, 1921. Final appraisement was on October 18, 1922, after the passage of the tariff act of September 21, 1922. The appraisal of the merchandise was in excess of the entered value, and the importer filed with the Board of General Appraisers his petition for remission of additional duties as provided for in section 489 of the law of 1922. The Government moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the law of 1922 did not apply and

1T. D. 40027.

that the board had no jurisdiction to hear the petition. The petition was dismissed. Upon the authority of Wm. A. Brown & Co. et al. v. United States (12 Ct. Cust. Appls. 93; T. D. 40026), decided concurrently herewith, the motion of the Government to dismiss is overruled and the judgment of the Board of General Appraisers is hereby affirmed.

PARFUMS D'ORSAY (INC.) v. UNITED STATES (No. 2236).1 ́

COURT OF CUSTOMS APPEALS, Jurisdiction-SECTION 489, TARIFF ACT OF 1922. Following Brown & Co. et al. v. United States (12 Ct. Cust. Appls. 93; T. D. 40026), decided concurrently herewith, this court has jurisdiction to decide whether or not section 489, tariff act of 1922, granting the right to petition the Board of United States General Appraisers for remission of additional duties applies to entries made during the life of the act of 1913, and decides that it does not.

United States Court of Customs Appeals, February 9, 1924.

APPEAL from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8591 (T. D. 39381). [Affirmed.]

Walter F. Welch for appellant.

William W. Hoppin, Assistant Attorney General (Abraham Goodman, special attorney, of counsel), for the United States.

Thomas J. Doherty, amicus curiæ.

[Oral argument October 23, 1923, by Mr. Hoppin.]

Before MARTIN, Presiding Judge, and SMITH, BARBER, and BLAND, Associate Judges; HATFIELD, Associate Judge, participating in the decision by agreement of counsel.

BLAND, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court:

The importer, petitioner herein, entered on December 1, 1920, at the New York customhouse, certain perfumes made in Paris. The final appraised value, which was ascertained on June 22, 1922, exceeded the entered values sufficiently to require a levying of additional duties. The importer, on October 2, 1922, filed with the Board of General Appraisers its petition for remission of additional duties under section 489 of the tariff act of 1922. The entry had not been liquidated. The board denied the application of the petitioner and dismissed the petition. Upon the authority of Wm. A. Brown & Co. et al. v. United States (12 Ct. Cust. Appls. 93; T. D. 40026), decided concurrently herewith, the motion of the Government to dismiss is overruled and the judgment of the Board of General Appraisers is hereby affirmed.

1 T. D. 40028.

FENSTERER & Voss (INC.) v. UNITED STATES (No. 2317).1

1. CONSTRUCTION, PARAGRAPH 218, TARIFF ACT OF 1922-"PARTLY BLOWN" GLASS.

By the provision of paragraph 218, tariff act of 1922, for "all articles of every description not specially provided for, composed wholly or in chief value of glass or paste, or combinations of glass and paste, blown or partly blown in the mold or otherwise," it was the intention of Congress to classify all articles not specifically provided for elsewhere, the chief value of which was glass, if any part of the glass was blown, the phrase "partly blown" referring to the article itself, and not to the method of its manufacture. 2. GLASS BLOWN AND MOLDED.

Plain glass stemware with blown bowls and molded feet, chief value molded, substantially identical with that in United States v. Fondeville & Von Iderstine (7 Ct. Cust. Appls. 135; T. D. 36457), is classifiable as glass "partly blown" under paragraph 218, tariff act of 1922, rather than as miscellaneous glass manufactures under paragraph 230.

United States Court of Customs Appeals, February 9, 1924.

APPEAL from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 8669 (T. D. 39734).

[Affirmed.]

Comstock & Washburn (George J. Puckhafer and Henry J. Rode of counsel) for appellant.

William W. Hoppin, Assistant Attorney General (Charles D. Lawrence, special attorney, of counsel), for the United States.

[Oral argument December 13, 1923, by Mr. Puckhafer and Mr. Lawrence.]

Before MARTIN, Presiding Judge, and SMITH, BARBER, and BLAND, Associate Judges; HATFIELD, Associate Judge, participating in the decision by agreement of counsel.

BLAND, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court:

It is stipulated in this case that the merchandise consists of "goblets and other plain glass stemware, composed of blown bowls with molded stems and feet, molded glass the component material of chief value."

A further stipulation provides that the merchandise is in all material respects similar to that which was passed upon by this court in United States v. Fondeville (7 Ct. Cust. Appls. 135; T. D. 36457).

The goods were assessed with duty at the rate of 55 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 218 of the tariff act of 1922. The parts of said paragraph pertinent to this case are as follows:

* and all articles of every description not specially provided for, composed wholly or in chief value of glass or paste, or combinations of glass and paste, blown or partly blown in the mold or otherwise,

55 per centum

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