DUNCAN & O'CONOR, and MCDOUGALL & CHAPMAN, for appellees.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the court:

Henry Johnson Brewick, who was also known as Henry Johnson, died on April 12, 1897, leaving a last will and testament, made on March 17, 1896. When the will was made he had nine living children, and a daughter, Josephine, had died, leaving her husband, Andrew Anderson, and her daughter, Clara Anderson, her heirs-at-law. The testator's wife and the nine children who were living when the will was made survived him. The grand-daughter, Clara Anderson, died intestate and unmarried during the lifetime of the widow, leaving her father, Andrew Anderson, and twelve brothers and sisters of the half-blood, her heirs-atlaw. The testator disposed of his estate as follows:

"First-It is my will and desire to give to my beloved wife, Johanna Johnson, the full use and controle of all of my property, both real and personal and real estate, as long as she may live, subject only to my just debts, which I desire her to pay out of my personal estate on hand at the time of my death, and further out of the profits from my real estate as they may accrue. Said real estate being my farm of about one hundred and fifty acres of land, situated in sections twenty-three (23) and twenty-six (26), township thirty-five (35), R. 5, in the town of Mission, LaSalle county, Illinois, provisions of above section to be taken in lieu of her dower and widow's award.

"Second-At the death of my beloved wife, Johanna Johnson, it is my will and desire to then have all of my real estate that I die possessed of, tagether with all personal property then belonging to my said estate, after all just debts of my said wife have been paid, to be devided equaly among my children, share and share alike, and in case of the death of any of my children before the distribution of my said estate, then in case they have left at said time of distribution any living issue, then said child or children to take the part of my deceased child or children."

The widow died on January 19, 1913, and all of the children who were living when the will was made survived her. Four of them filed their bill in this case in the cir

cuit court of LaSalle county for the partition of the lands, making the other living children and the heirs-at-law of Clara Anderson defendants, and alleging that the devise included only the nine children who were living at the time the will was made and who survived the testator. The heirs of Clara Anderson by their answer claimed that she became seized in fee simple of an undivided part of the real estate upon the death of the testator, subject only to the life estate of the widow. The controversy was submitted to the chancellor on a stipulation of the facts, and a decree was entered finding that the heirs of Clara Anderson took nothing by the will and ordering partition of the lands among the children of the testator who survived the life tenant. This appeal is from that decree.

We are to ascertain the intention of the testator from the provisions of the will and to give that intention effect unless prevented by some rule of law. He first gave his entire estate, both real and personal, to his widow for life, subject to the payment of his just debts, and at her death the whole estate, both real and personal, remaining after the payment of her just debts, was to go to his children, share and share alike. He provided that in case of the death of any of the children before the distribution of the estate, if there was any living issue of a deceased child or children, such issue was to take the portion of the deceased child or children. The widow was not only given all the estate, both real and personal, for life, but it was charged, after her death, with the payment of all her just debts, and the manifest intention of the testator was that the remaining estate should then go to his children or their descendants who might be living at the termination of the life estate. Where there is a devise to a class, as to the children of the testator, and the gift is postponed, pending the termination of a particular estate which intervenes between the death of the testator and the period of distribution of the estate devised to the class, those members of the class, and

those only, take who are in existence at the arrival of the time for distribution, as at the death of a life tenant, unless there is particular language in the will showing a different intention. (Handberry v. Doolittle, 38 Ill. 202; 40 Cyc. 1477.) The testator made no distinction between children living when the will was made or who were deceased at that time, but his intention was to confine the devise to his children and their descendants. If Clara Anderson had lived to the termination of the life estate she would have been included in the devise, but she died before that time, unmarried and without issue, and her heirs-at-law did not answer the description of persons entitled to share in the

estate.

Section II of the Statute of Descent, which was enacted to prevent the lapse of a devise to a child or grandchild of the testator, does not apply to a case like this, where the devise was limited to the children or their issue surviving the life tenant.

The decree is affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

THE PEOPLE ex rel. Samuel T. Kincaid, Appellee, vs. THE SCHOOL DIRECTORS OF DISTRICT No. 8, Appellants.

Opinion filed February 17, 1915.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Section 13 of article 4 was not intended to apply to every act affecting prior laws. Section 13 of article 4 of the constitution, providing that no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title, only, etc., was not intended to apply to every enactment that may affect prior laws.

2. SAME when act is not within the meaning of section 13 of article 4. If an act can properly be held to be a complete act of the legislature on the subject with which it deals it is not within the meaning of section 13 of article 4 of the constitution, providing that no act shall be amended by reference to its title, only.

3. SAME-High School law of 1913 does not contravene section 13 of article 4. The High School law of 1913, providing for the transfer of pupils to a high school when there is no high

school in the district where they reside, is complete in itself and does not contravene section 13 of article 4 of the constitution.

4. SCHOOLS-High School law of 1913 need not be read in connection with section 121 of School law. The High School act of 1913, concerning the transfer of pupils to a high school, need not be read in connection with section 121 of the School law, as the requirement in the act of 1913 that the tuition shall be paid by the district from which the pupils are transferred does not require the aid of any other portion of the School law, but the tuition may be collected in any mode provided by law for enforcing similar obligations.

5. SAME neither the parents nor the school directors can arbitrarily select high school. The provision of the High School act of 1913 that the parent or guardian shall select the high school to be attended, subject to the approval of the school directors of the home district, does not give either the parent or guardian or the school directors arbitrary power to select the high school to be attended, and if the parent or guardian and the school directors disagree, the matter must be determined by the court according to the circumstances.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Crawford county; the Hon. ENOCH E. NEWLIN, Judge, presiding.

Parker & EAGLETON, for appellants.

JOSEPH B. CROWLEY, State's Attorney, and STEWART W. KINCAID, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the court:

Samuel T. Kincaid, relator, filed in the circuit court of Crawford county on December 15, 1913, his petition for a writ of mandamus against the directors of school district 8, town 6, north, range 11, west, to compel the said directors to approve the transfer of his children, Tura Kincaid and Theresa Kincaid, from said school district to the Robinson township high school, in said county, and to pay the tuition therefor that might thereafter become due to the said high school selected by him for the attendance of said children, according to the provisions of an act of the legislature ap

proved June 26, 1913, (Laws of 1913, p. 584,) providing for the transfer of pupils to a public high school when there is no high school in the district in which they reside. The respondents answered the petition, setting up in their answer that the act in question is unconstitutional, and further setting up that the selection of the high school to be attended must be by the concurrent act of the relator and the respondents; that under the law the relator had no right to select the high school to be attended without the consent and approval of respondents; that respondents did not refuse to make any transfer, but when the relator made application for the transfer of said children to the Robinson township high school, they, as directors, refused to permit such transfer but granted a transfer and permit for said children to attend the Palestine high school, which meets the requirements of the High School law and is on the accredited list of the high schools of the State. They further answered that on June 14, 1914, the Palestine township high school was formed, embracing all the territory of said district 8, and that the relator and his children resided at the time of filing said petition, and now reside, in said Palestine township high school district. The relator demurred to the answer, which demurrer was sustained by the court, and respondents elected to abide by their answer and refused to answer further. Thereupon it was ordered by the court that a writ of mandamus issue commanding the respondents to draw an order on the treasurer of said school district 8, directing the payment to the treasurer of the Robinson township high school of the amount of $72, the amount of one year's tuition, on account of the admission and attendance of the two children of relator for and during the school year which commenced September 1, 1913, and for costs. The final order was entered in October, 1914, at which time the school year which commenced September 1, 1913, having ended, it would have been unavailing to order the approval by respondents of the transfer of