land. The question of the abuse of power by a petitioner in condemning property for park uses is a preliminary one and must be heard by the court before the jury trial. There being no averment in the petition of necessity for the use of this property, and no proof having been offered by appellee showing such necessity, the court erred in overruling appellant's motion to dismiss the petition. City of Chicago v. Lehmann, 262 Ill. 468, and cited cases. Counsel for the petitioner, however, argue that this motion to dismiss was heard before Judge John E. Hillskotter while the bill of exceptions was signed by Judge Frank G. Plain, and that as no bill of exceptions as to this question was signed by Judge Hillskotter the law will presume he acted on sufficient evidence to sustain his ruling on this motion. The abstract does not show anything as to two different judges having taken part in the trial nor as to what judge signed the bill of exceptions. Under the rules and practice of this court the abstract must be sufficient to present every error and exception relied upon. If it is not sufficient for a full understanding of the questions presented for decision the opposite party should file a further abstract, making the necessary corrections. The abstract on file must be assumed by this court to be accurate. (Gibler v. City of Mattoon, 167 Ill. 18; Rehfuss v. Hill, 243 id. 140.) Furthermore, assuming that this motion was heard and passed upon by Judge Hillskotter, the bill of exceptions containing this motion and affidavits in support is signed by Frank G. Plain as trial judge and O. K.'d as correct by counsel for appellee and states it contains all the evidence heard on the trial. Besides, counsel also signed a stipulation that the original bill of exceptions signed by Judge Plain should be incorporated into the record instead of a copy. This being so, the conclusion is inevitable that counsel agreed that Judge Plain should sign this bill of exceptions and that it is correct, and they cannot now raise this question. (Lederbrand v. Pickrell, 167 Ill. 624; Brethold v. Village of Wilmette, 168 id. 162; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Jennings, 229 id. 608.) It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether counsel for appellant could raise this question for the first time in their briefs rather than on a motion to dismiss, or whether counsel for appellant is right in arguing that this question, of necessity, on account of the faulty petition herein, can be raised by a motion in arrest of judgment, regardless of any evidence submitted on the motion to dismiss. Counsel for the appellant further argue that the court erred in refusing to admit testimony as to the valuations placed upon long-term leases for property in the vicinity of that sought to be condemned. The property here in question was vacant and unoccupied. Most of the evidence offered by appellant as to leasehold interests was as to property some distance away, covered with buildings. While there should be liberality in admitting evidence to enable the jury to determine value, (City of Chicago v. Lehmann, supra,) no general rules can be laid down that will govern in all cases. The degree of similarity that must exist between the property concerning which proof is offered and the property taken, and the nearness in respect of time and distance, are matters which must be left very largely to the sound discretion of the trial judge. (Aledo Terminal Railway Co. v. Butler, 246 Ill. 406; Illinois Central Railroad · Co. v. Roskemmer, 264 id. 103; 2 Lewis on Eminent Domain,-2d ed.-sec. 443.) Evidence as to long-term leases of property in a great city, or as to the rental value of other property similarly situated, may or may not be competent, depending upon the particular facts of the case. Some of the leases offered here were only for fifteen years. That is hardly a "long-term lease," as the phrase is usually understood. Under the decisions of this court, on the facts in this record we are not disposed to hold that the court erred in its rulings on the admission of evidence. See Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. Schneider, 127 Ill. 144; Pullman Co. v. City of Chicago, 224 id. 248; Geohegan v. Union Elevated Railroad Co. 266 id. 482. The judgment of the county court will be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in harmony with the views herein expressed. Reversed and remanded. CECILIA M. THERENS, Admx., Appellee, vs. Clement THERENS et al. Appellants. Opinion filed April 22, 1915. 1. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-extent to which practice in chancery applies to administrator's sale. The meaning of the provision of section 101 of the Administration act that the practice with reference to petitions by administrators to sell land to pay debts shall be the same as in cases in chancery is, that after the petition is filed and service is had as provided in the Administration act, then the court proceedings in matters relating to the appearance of the parties, the pleadings, hearing and continuances shall be in accordance with general chancery practice except where otherwise provided by the Administration act. 2. SAME-Section 19 of Chancery act, relating to opening decree within three years, does not apply to sale to pay debts. Section 19 of the Chancery act, which permits a person who has not received the copy of the notice sent by mail to come in within one year after notice in writing given him of the decree, or within three years after such decree, and petition the court to be heard and answer the bill, etc., does not apply to a proceeding by an administrator to sell land to pay debts. APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Probate Court of Cook county; the Hon. CHARLES S. CUTTING, Judge, presiding. BRADLEY, HARPER & EHEIM, for appellants. MANIERRE & PRATT, for appellee. Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the court: On August 26, 1907, Peter Therens died intestate at his home in the city of Chicago, leaving Cecilia M. Therens, his widow, and Clement Therens and Joseph Therens, his brothers, and Mary Therens, his sister, as his only heirs-at-law him surviving. Letters of administration were granted on the estate of the deceased on December 23, 1907, by the probate court of Cook county, to Cecilia M. Therens, his widow. In the course of administration, on December 14, 1909, the administratrix filed a petition to sell real estate of the deceased to pay debts, making the brothers and sisters of the deceased, who are the appellants in this court, parties defendant as heirs-at-law of the deceased. An affidavit of non-residence was filed, stating that appellants were non-residents and that their places of residence were known, and correctly giving the residence of Clement and Mary Therens as Ettelbrueck, in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, and the residence of Joseph Therens as Liege, Belgium. None of the appellants appeared or answered, and thereafter, on April 11, 1910, they were defaulted and a decree of sale of the real estate described in the petition was entered, finding, among other things, that appellants were duly notified of the proceedings by publication and mailing of notices, as required by law. The sale was advertised and made, and a report of such sale was made to the probate court at the June term, 1910, and approved. Thereafter, on July 18, 1910, the appearance of Bradley, Harper & Eheim was entered in the probate court as the attorneys for appellants, and an order entered that in the future notice should be given to them, as solicitors for the appellants, in all further proceedings in the matter. On January 17, 1911, the administratrix filed her final report in the estate, and on September 18, 1911, appellants filed objections thereto. A hearing was had on the objections on October 20, 1911, when all objections were over 267 - 38 ruled, the final account and report were approved, and the estate was declared finally settled and closed and the administratrix discharged. On April 18, 1913, within three years of the time of the entering of the order of sale, appellants filed their petition for leave to answer the original petition filed by the administratrix to sell real estate to pay debts, alleging that appellants were not, nor was either of them, summoned in said proceeding or served with process therein; that they were not, nor was either of them, served with a copy of the petition in said proceedings to sell real estate, and that no notice, in writing, of the final order or decree had been received by them or either of them; that they believed that they have a good defense to the claims of Cecilia M. Therens set forth in said petition; that she was not the lawful widow of said Peter Therens, deceased, and that she was not entitled to an estate of homestead or right of dower in said real estate. The prayer was that they may be permitted to answer the petition of the administratrix to sell real estate to pay debts, and to be heard in said proceedings the same as if they had appeared in due season and no decree had been entered, and that said decree may be set aside. The probate court held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition and struck the same from the files. From that order of the probate court appellants appealed to the Appellate Court for the First District, assigning as error the action of the probate court in holding it was without jurisdiction to entertain the petition and striking the same from the files. The Appellate Court affirmed the order of the probate court and granted a certificate of importance, and the appellants have prosecuted a further appeal to this court, assigning as error the action of the Appellate Court in affirming the order of the probate court of Cook county. Appellants base their right to file the petition in question on that part of section 101 of the Administration act (Hurd's Stat. 1913, p. 27,) which provides that in petitions |