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That this clause of section 7 is prospective finds strong support in the words of the last part of the section, which read, "the wife or husband of such adopting parent shall be capable of inheriting from such child the same as if she or he had become the adopted mother or father of such child, pursuant to this act.” No child could be adopted "pursuant to this act” until after the act had been in force. It is manifest that the legislature by this act intended to fix the rules of inheritance from children who were merely designated in wills or deeds as adopted, as well as from children regularly adopted under the provisions of the act. Reasonably and naturally construed, the words, "where such adoption has been declared or assumed in any deed or last will and testament,” should be read in connection with the words, “the preceding section shall apply,” etc., in the first part of said section 7. That is, to find the true intent of the clause under discussion the section should read as follows: "The preceding section shall apply to any case * * * where such adoption has been declared or 'assumed in any deed or last will and testament, giving, bequeathing,” etc., the words “where a child has heretofore been declared by any court to have been adopted or” being omitted to give the proper meaning and construction to the disputed clause. The word “or” clearly connects the two clauses, each beginning with “where.” This construction, reading section 7 by itself or with the entire act, is in accord with the meaning and intent of the act and harmonizes fully with every rule of construction that should be invoked in reaching the true legislative intent. The decree of the court is in conformity with this construction. Counsel concedes that if this is the proper construction of the statute the decree is correct. The decree of the city court must be affirmed.
THE PEOPLE ex rel. Alfred H. Gleghorn, County Col
lector, Appellee, vs. The Chicago, Rock ISLAND AND Pacific RailwAY COMPANY, Appellant.
Opinion filed February 17, 1915.
1. TAXES—copy of ordinance cannot be amended to show matters of substance not in original. While the court may permit a certified copy of a tax levy ordinance to be amended so as to conform to the original, it cannot lawfully permit matters of substance to be inserted in the copy which do not appear in the original.
2. SAME-townships do not levy taxes by a tax levy ordinance. Townships do not levy taxes by a tax levy ordinance but by motion or resolution at the annual town meeting, after which it is the duty of the clerk of the township to make a certificate of the amount of tax voted by the electors and file the same with the county clerk.
APPEAL from the County Court of Grundy county; the Hon. GEORGE BEDFORD, Judge, presiding.
M. L. BELL, C. F. Hanson, and A. B. Enoch, for appellant.
FRANK H. HAYES, State's Attorney, for appellee.
Mr. JUSTICE VICKERS delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from the decision of the county court of Grundy county overruling objections to taxes levied against the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company and entering judgment and an order of sale against the property of said company. The objections filed and overruled question the legality of a portion of the taxes levied in the village of Minooka and all of the taxes levied in the township of Saratoga. These objections will be considered in the order in which they are above stated.
The county clerk of Grundy county extended a rate of $2.44 per $100 valuation for the year 1913 against all the property in the village of Minooka. The appellant paid $1.53 per $100 valuation on its property and objected to the excess on the ground that the village authorities had levied an amount in excess of $1.20 per $100 for general corporate purposes. A certified copy of the tax levy ordinance was introduced in evidence, which included, among other items, $1500 for water-works. By reference to the original ordinance it appeared that the word "bonds” appeared after the word "water-works," and on application the court permitted an amendment of the certified copy by inserting after the word "water-works” the word “bonds," which amendment was properly allowed. The court also permitted the insertion in the certified copy of the ordinance of the words, "and sidewalk bonds and interest." These words were not in the original ordinance, and the court erroneously permitted their insertion in the copy. While the court had power to permit any amendment in the certified copy to make it correspond with the original, the court did not have power to permit the insertion in the copy of matters of substance which did not appear in the original. To permit such an amendment would, in effect, be the making of a new ordinance. It appears from the copy of the levy ordinance as the same was properly amended, that $1500 was levied to pay water-works bonds. The evidence shows that the village of Minooka had $4000 of water-works bonds outstanding, one of which matured each year, and that one of these $1000 bonds was due and payable out of the levy for the year 1913. The evidence further showed that $200 was required to pay interest on water-works bonds which became due for the year 1913. There was also $500 due for interest on sewer bonds, making a total of $1700 that was legally levied over and above the $1.20 for general corporate purposes. To raise the $1700 required a rate of $1.05 on the $100. This added to the rate of $1.20 made a total rate of $2.25, which was the highest rate that the village could legally levy. The excess above this rate was illegal, and to that extent appellant's objections should have been sustained.
Appellant objects to the whole of the tax levied in Saratoga township on the ground that a certified copy of a tax levy ordinance was not filed, and that the certificate filed was indefinite, in that the date thereon was uncertain. The omission in the date was that the figures "13" did not appear after the figures "19." This was corrected on the hearing by amendment, which was properly allowed. The objection that a certified copy of the levy ordinance was not filed is not well taken. Townships levy taxes at the annual town meeting, which is done by motion or resolution. After the town meeting makes the levy, it is then the duty of the township clerk to make a certificate of the amount of tax voted by the electors and file the same with the county clerk, and that was done by the town clerk of Saratoga township. The record of the town meeting held in Saratoga township was introduced, which showed that an appropriation of $500 for expenses of the township was duly voted upon and carried by those present. The town clerk testified that he made a certificate, and the same was offered in evidence after being amended by inserting the figures "13" after “19," as above stated. There is no merit in the objections filed to the taxes of Saratoga township.
The judgment of the county court of Grundy county will be affirmed as to the township tax of Saratoga township and reversed as to the tax of the village of Minooka, and the cause will be remanded, with directions to the county court to enter judgment for the correct amount of village tax.
Reversed in part and remanded, with directions.
THE STATE Public UTILITIES COMMISSION ex rel. Ed
Beck, Appellee, vs. THE TOLEDO, Sr. LOUIS AND WEST-
Opinion filed February 17, 1915.
1. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION—State Public Utilities Commission has power to enforce paragraph 50 of the Railroads act. Under section 79 of the Public Utilities act, making it the duty of the State Public Utilities Commission to enforce the provisions of the constitution and the statutes affecting public utilities, where the enforcement of such provisions is not vested in some other tribunal or officer, such commission has power to enforce paragraph 50 of the general Railroads act, relating to maintaining depots in towns and villages having a population of two hundred or more.
2. RAILROADS-paragraph 50 of Railroads act applies though village is unincorporated. Paragraph 50 of the general Railroads act, requiring railroad companies to maintain depots in towns or villages having a population of two hundred or more, applies to a village having the required population even though it is not incorporated.
3. SAME-count of population not limited to persons living on platted lots. In determining the population of an unincorporated village the count is not limited to persons living on the platted lots, where all the residences in the village are in one group and there is no line of demarcation, other than that some of the residences are on platted lots while others are not.
4. Same-provisions of paragraphe 50 of Railroads act must be enforced unless the result will be confiscatory. The provisions of paragraph 50 of the general Railroads act relating to maintaining depots in towns and villages must be enforced by the State Public Utilities Commission unless the result of such enforcement will be confiscatory, and the burden is upon the objecting railroad company to show such result.
5. Same-the orders of State Public Utilities Commission must be reasonable. The Public Utilities act does not give to the commission such arbitrary powers as will result in confiscation of the property of utility companies, but expressly requires that the orders of the commission shall be lawful and reasonable and provides for a review of its orders by the courts.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. JAMES A. CREIGHTON, Judge, presiding.