Prolegomena to Ethics

Thomas Hill Green

Clarendon Press, 1884 - 427 páginas

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INTRODUCTION	1

The speculative part of Moral Philosophy being thus reduced to natural	7

BOOK I	13

This something is that which holds plurality in unity and so constitutes	28

For a even if we admit with Kant that there are unknown thingsin	30

The existence of action from such motives is far more certain than	37

If so there will be no universe but two unrelated worlds each determining	39

Alike in the world of facts and in the consciousness implied in it feeling	50

X203	222

And though it is true that a man might think of his good or happiness	228

In the first place cf 218 this development consists in the extension	230

But in reality the good which a man seeks for himself is not a succession	234

If he nevertheless supposed that he sought pleasures for others this	237

In the second place moral progress is not only the widening of the range	240

By such reflection the reason which had been active in social develop	250

In the early stages of this progress the social good may appear to be con	259

This is concealed by the ordinary representation of knowledge as a series	56

For this if true must mean not a number of sensations revived as sen	62

And though the relations through which the perceiving consciousness	63

The common notions of the growth of knowledge also involve this two	69

Nor does the epithet free take away all meaning from the word	77

nor can either be conceived as having a nature of its own apart from	83

BOOK II	90

This knowledge being a knowledge of action from the inner side can only	93

Indeed but for our imperfect knowledge we should see that in	95

Thus the statement that the motive is the outcome of circumstances	106

6	112

Feeling of self constitutes individuality in a sense in which individuality	119

CHAPTER II	120

Desire and Will	124

And apart from selfconsciousnessanimal desire would have no moral	125

And 3 the same action of selfconsciousness is farther implied in	131

Will seems to be distinct from desire and capable of opposing it as well	137

Desire to the consciousness desiring strives to remove the opposition	138

The will then is not some distinct part of a man separable from intel	157

Mills meaning however is not this but that for example the sense	165

Good then being defined as that which satisfies desire true good	171

And this implies the union of developed will with developed reason	177

If moral goodness then is devotion to the moral end or ideal and if	180

Whatever be the difficulties attending it the idea of human progress	186

In this definition a certain precedence is given to reason because	194

And although this realisation would seem to imply a difference	201

This duty is felt by the highest minds to be morally as binding as	207

CHAPTER III	210

The recognition of this idea by Utilitarianism in the formula Every	213

Thus progress with regard to the standard and practice of virtue means	267

Further 2 the range of the actions which issue from temperance	268

To us also the higher object is the state or some other association	281

At a certain stage of reflection arises an effort to discover a unity in	284

For the realisation described in the Greek ideal and apparently	295

But since for practical purposes enquiry into motive is restricted	296

And apart from this such a spirit has an intrinsic value which unlike	302

As the presence of the moral ideal in the character cannot always avert	310

It is an illusion to suppose that the desires of different men for pleasure	323

In such cases it is certainly not for philosophy simply to destroy	325

Any one who puts such a question must face a preliminary difficulty	340

According to our theory the act cannot be in the full sense good	346

Though we cannot form a positive or detailed conception of what human	353

But the Chief Good according to the theory is the greatest possible	359

329	361

But desirable when it is distinguished from desired seems to	366

And thus it is the creator of existing moral practice and in its various	368

We return to the comparison of the theories as possible sources	372

this being conceived as a common good and the mode in which	381

Mr Sidgwicks view of Ultimate Good

The healthful influence of Utilitarianism has arisen from its giving

402

368

409

If for example a man thinks of acting against inclination or social

415

For it is harder to say whether a particular course of action will

Derechos de autor

Otras ediciones - Ver todas

Prolegomena to Ethics
Thomas Hill Green
Vista completa - 1884

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Términos y frases comunes

absolute value abstract according action actual admit agent animal arise Aristotle attainment become Benthamite capable capacity categorical imperative character Christendom claims common conceived conception conscience consciousness consisting constitutes contemplated depends desire for pleasure determined directed distinction dition divine principle duties effect enjoyment equally eternal existence experience expression fact feeling fulfilment Greek habit happiness Hedonism Hedonistic human idea imagined pleasure implies impulse individual intelligence interest Kant knowledge living man's manifold matter means ment merely mind motive nature notion object ourselves pain particular perfection persons phenomena philosophers Plato possible practical present principle pursuit question racter realisation reason recognised reflection relation result satis satisfaction seeks self-consciousness self-satisfaction sensation sense social society soul spirit succession of pleasures sum of pleasures suppose suum cuique theory thing thought tion true unconditional Utilitarian vidual virtuous well-being yield

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Página 172 - Now, it is an unquestionable fact, that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties.‎

Aparece en 159 libros desde 1861-2007

Página 179 - Moral good and evil then is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the law-maker...‎

Aparece en 230 libros desde 1722-2007

Página 340 - Burn all the statutes and their shelves : They stir us up against our kind ; And worse, against ourselves. We have a passion — make a law, Too false to guide us or control ! And for the law itself we fight In bitterness of soul. And, puzzled, blinded thus, we lose Distinctions that are plain and few : These find I graven on my heart : That tells me what to do.‎

Aparece en 132 libros desde 1807-2007

Página 172 - ... a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or another, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them.‎

Aparece en 77 libros desde 1861-2008

Página 169 - ... pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.‎

Aparece en 239 libros desde 1861-2008

Página 193 - To speak of any progress or improvement or development of a nation or society or mankind, except as relative to some greater worth of persons, is to use words without meaning.‎

Aparece en 61 libros desde 1876-2006

Página 226 - So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end and never as merely a means only...‎

Aparece en 117 libros desde 1883-2008

Página 317 - The morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention that is, upon what the agent wills to do. But the motive, that is, the feeling which makes him will so to do, if it makes no difference in the act, makes none in the morality...‎

Aparece en 59 libros desde 1864-2008

Referencias a este libro

Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics
David Owen Brink
Vista previa limitada - 1989

Doctrines of Development
Michael Cowen,Robert W. Shenton
Sin vista previa disponible - 1996

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Acerca del autor (1884)

Born in Birkin, Yorkshire, the son of an Anglican clergyman, Thomas Hill Green entered Balliol College, Oxford, in 1855 and was elected a fellow in 1860. His early efforts at an academic career were unsuccessful, and in 1865--66 he worked on a royal commission investigating the British educational system. He returned to Balliol as a tutor, and when Benjamin Jowett became master in 1870, Green took over many of the college's administrative duties. He was finally elected a professor of moral philosophy in 1878. Throughout his career Green was active in politics as a Liberal, supporting the temperance movement and the local Oxford school system. Green's chief works are his critique of empiricism in his long introduction to his and T. H. Grose's edition of Hume's works (1874) and his Prolegomena to Ethics (published posthumously, 1883). The remainder of his writings, including his lectures on political philosophy, were published in three volumes between 1885 and 1888. Green's interests centered on ethics and political philosophy. He was one of the leading "British idealists," critical of empiricism and naturalism and sympathetic to the metaphysical position of Kant and Hegel (see also Vol. 3).

Información bibliográfica

Título	Prolegomena to Ethics
Autor	Thomas Hill Green
Editor	Andrew Cecil Bradley
Edición	2
Editor	Clarendon Press, 1884
Procedencia del original	Universidad de California
Digitalizado	29 Nov. 2007
ISBN	0722220766, 9780722220764
Largo	427 páginas

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